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HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Cloister Library 

Tor Andrae 

Augustine/ Przywara 

Roland H. Bainton 

Karl Barth 

Karl Barth 

Nicolas Berdyaev 

Nicolas Berdyaev 

James Henry Breasted 

Martin Buber 

Martin Buber 

Jacob Burckhardt 

Edward Conze 
F. M. Cornford 

G. G. Coulton 
G. G. Coulton 

H. G. Creel 

Adolf Deissmann 

C. H. Dodd 

Johannes Eckhart 

Mircea Eliade 

Morton S. Enslin 

Morton S. Enslin 

Austin Farrer, ed. 

G. P. Fedotov 

Ludwig Feuerbach 

Harry Emerson Fosdick 

Sigmund Freud 

Maurice Friedman 

ictavius Brooks Frothingham 

Edward Gibbon 

Edward Gibbon 

Charles C. Gillispie 
Maurice Goguel 

Maurice Goguel 

Edgar J. Goodspeed 
Herbert J. C. Grierson 

William Haller 

Adolf Harnack 

Edwin Hatch 

Karl Heim 

F. H. Heinemann 

Stanley R. Hopper, ed. 

Johan Huizinga 

Aldous Huxley 

Immanuel Kant 

S0ren Kierkegaard 

S0ren Kierkegaard 

S0ren Kierkegaard 

Alexandre Koyre 

Emile Male 

T. J. Meek 

H. Richard iSTiebuhr 

H. Richard Niebuhr 

H. J. Rose 

Josiah Royce 

MOHAMMED : The Man and His Faith tb/Sz 










MOSES : The Revelation and the Covenant TB/27 

trated Edition] : Vol. I, TB/40 ; Vol. II, TB/41 
BUDDHISM : Its Essence and Development tb/s8 
of Western Speculation TB/20 





PAUL: A Study in Social and Religious History tb/is 


MEISTER ECKHART : A Modcm Translation tb/8 
COSMOS AND HISTORY : The Myth of the Eternal Return 




THE RUSSIAN RELIGIOUS MIND : Kievon Christianity, the 
loth to the 13th Centuries ts/yo 



Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, Religion TB/45 
MARTIN BUBER : The Life of Dialogue TB/64 



Edition ; Illustrated] TB/37 


[J. B. Bury Edition ; Illustrated] TB/46 


ena to the Life of Jesus tb/6s 

of Jesus tb/66 

A life OF JESUS Tb/i 


The World, the Flesh, the Spirit TB/47 














THE GOTHIC IMAGE : ReUgious Art in France of the 13th 
Century TB/44 






(Continued on next page) 

Auguste Sabatier 

George Santayana 
George Santayana 

Friedrich Schleiermacher 
Henry Osborn Taylor 

Paul Tillich 

Edward Burnett Tylor 

Edward Burnett Tylor 

Evelyn Underbill 

Evelyn Underbill 
Johannes Weiss 

Wilhelm Windelband 

Wilhelm Windelband 



PLATONISM and the spiritual LIFE TB/24 

ON RELIGION : Spccclies to Its Cultured Despisers TB/36 


The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages TB/48 




THE GOLDEN SEQUENCE : A Fourfold Study of the Spir- 
itual Life tb/68 

WORSHIP tb/io 

EARLIEST CHRISTIANITY : A History of the Period a.d. 
30-150 : Vol. I, tb/s3 ; Vol. II, TB/54 

a HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1 : Greek, Roman, Medieval 

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY II : Renaissance, Enlighten- 
ment, Modern TB/39 

HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Academy Library 

H. J. Blackham 
Walter Bromberg 

Editors of Fortune 

G. P. Gooch 

Francis J. Grund 
W. K. C. Guthrie 
Henry James 
Henry James 
Henry James 
Arnold Kettle 

Arthur O. Lovejoy 

J. P. Mayer 

Samuel Pepys 

Georges Poulet 
Ferdinand Schevill 
W. Lloyd Warner 


THE MIND OF MAN : A History of Psychotherapy and 
Psychoanalysis TB/1003 

AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES : The Economy and the Society 

english democratic ideas in the seventeenth cen- 
tury tb/1oo6 







to George Eliot, tb/ i i i ; Vol. II, Henry James 

to the Present, tb/io 12 
THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING : A Study of the History of an 

Idea TB/1009 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEViLLE : A Biographical Study in Political 

Science TB/1014 
THE DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS : Selections, ed. by O. F. 

Morshead ; illus. by Ernest H. Shepard rs/1007 




HARPER TORCHBOOKS / The Science Library 

R. B. Braithwaite 

Louis de Broglie 

J. Bronowski 

T. G. Cowling 

W. C. Dampier, ed. 

Arthur Eddington 

H. T. Pledge 

George Sarton 
Paul A. Schilpp, ed. 

O. G. Sutton 

Stephen Toulmin 

Andrew G. Van Meisen 

Friedrich Waismann 

W. H. Watson 

G. J. Whitrow 

A. Wolf 






SPACE, TIME AND GRAVITATION : An Outline of the Gen- 
eral Relativity Theory tb/sio 

SCIENCE SINCE 1 500 : A Short History of Mathematics, 
Physics, Chemistry, and Biology tb/so6 


ALBERT EINSTEIN: Philosopher-Scicntist : Vol. I, 
tb/so2; Vol. II, TB/503 





ON UNDERSTANDING PHYSICS t An Analysis of the Philos- 
ophy of Physics TB/507 


Introduction to Cosmology TB/504 


THE i6th AND 17TH CENTURIES: Vol. I, tb/so8 ; 
Vol. II, TB/509 





Renaissance, Enlightenment y and Modern 




'New York 

A HISTOEY OF PHILOSOPHY: II — Eenaissonee, Enlightenment, and Modem 
Printed in the United States of America 

Reprinted by arrangement with The MacmUlan Company, New York, from 
the revised edition of 1901, translated by James H. Tufts. 

First Harpee Tobchbook edition published 1958 

tV 76 3 

V. p. 

Library of Congress catalog card number: LC-58-7114 — Vol. II 






Introduction 348 

Chapter I. The Humanistic Period 352 

§ 28. The Struggle between the Traditions 357 

§ 29. Macrocosm and Microcosm 366 

Chapter II. The Natural Science Period 378 

§ 30. The Problem of Method 383 

§ 31. Substance and Causality 399 

§ 32. Natural Right 425 



Introduction 437 

Chapter I. Theoretical Questions 447 

§ 33. Innate Ideas 449 

§ 34. Knowledge of the External World 466 

§ 35. Natural Religion 486 

Chapter II. Practical Questions 500 

§ 36. The Principles of Morals 502 

§ 37. The Problem of Civilisation 518 



Introduction 529 

Chapter I. ICant's Critique of the Reason 532 

§ 38. The Object of Knowledge 537 

§ 39. The Categorical Imperative 551 

§ 40. Natural Purposiveness 559 


vi Contents. 


Chapter II. The Development of Idealism 568 

§ 41. The Thing-m-itself 573 

§ 42. The System of Reason 590 

§ 43. The Metaphysics of the Irrational 615 



Introduction 623 

§ 44. The Controvery over the Soul 634 

§ 45. Nature and History 648 

§ 46. The Problem of Values 660 

Appendix 683 









J. E. Erdmann, Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der GeschichU 

der neueren Philosophie. 3 pts., in 6 vols. Eiga and Leips. 1834-53. 
H. Ulrici, Geschichte und Kritik der Principien der neueren Philosophie. 2 

vols. Leips. 1845. 
Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. 4th ed. Heidelb. 1897 ff. 

[Eng. tr. of Vol. I., Descartes and His School, by J. P. Gordy, N.Y. 1877.] 
Ed. Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz. 2d ed., Berlin, 

W. Windelband, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. 2 vols. Leips. 2d ed. 1899. 

E. Falckenberg, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Leips. 1886. [Eng. tr. by 
A. C. Armstrong, N.Y. 1893.] 

J. Schaller, Geschichte der Naturphilosophie seit Bacon. 2 vols. Leips. 1841-44. 
J. Baumann, Die Lehren von Baum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neueren Phi- 
losophie. 2 vols. Berlin, 1868 f. 

F. Vorländer, Geschichte der philosophischen Moral-, Hechts-, und Staatslehre 
der Engländer und Franzosen. Marburg, 1855. 

F. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie. 2 vols. Stuttgart, 

B. Pünjer, Geschichte der christlichen Beligionsphilosophie seit der Beforma- 

tion. 2 vols. Braunschweig, 1880-83. [Eng. tr. of Vol. L, History of the 

Christian Philosophy of Beligion from the Beformation to Kant, by W. 

Hastie, Edin. and N.Y. 1887.] 
[B. F. Burt, History of Modern Philosophy. 2 vols. Chicago, 1892.] 

The antitlieses which make their appearance in mediaeval philoso- 
phy at the time of its close have a more general significance ; they 
show in theoretical form the self-conscious strengthening of secular 
civilisation by the side of that of the Church. The undercurrent, 
which for a thousand years had accompanied the religious main 
movement of the intellectual life among the Western peoples, 
swelling here and there to a stronger potency, now actually forced 
its way to the surface, and in the centuries of transition its slowly 
wrested victory makes the essential characteristic for the beginning 
of modern times. 

Thus gradually developing and constantly progressing, modern 


Philosophy of the Renaissance. 849 

science freed itself from mediaeval views, and the intricate process 
in which it came into being went hand in hand with the multifold 
activity with which modern life in its entirety began. For modern 
life begins everywhere with the vigorous development of details ; 
the tense (lapidare) unity into which mediaeval life was concen- 
trated, breaks asunder in the progress of time, and primitive vigour 
bursts the band of common tradition with Avhich history had 
encircled the mind of the nations. Thus the new epoch announces 
itself by the awakening of national life ; the time of the world- 
empire is past in the intellectual realm also, and the wealth and 
variety of decentralisation takes the place of the unitary concen- 
tration in which the Middle Ages had worked. Rome and Paris 
cease to be the controlling centres of Western civilisation, Latin 
ceases to be the sole language of the educated world. 

In the religious domain this process showed itself first in the fact 
that Rome lost its sole mastery over the Church life of Christianity. 
Wittenberg, Geneva, London, and other cities became new centres 
of religion. The inwardness of faith, which in Mysticism had 
already risen in revolt against the secularisation of the life of the 
Church, rose to victorious deliverance, to degenerate again at once 
into the organisation which was indispensable for it in the outer 
world. But the process of splitting into various sects, which set 
in in connection with this external organisation, wakened all the 
depths of religious feeling, and stirred for the following centuries 
the passion and fanaticism of confessional oppositions. Just by this 
means, however, the dominance at the summit of scientific life of a 
complete and definitive religious belief was broken. What had 
been begun in the age of the Crusades by the contact of religions 
was now completed by the controversy between Christian creeds. 

It is -not a matter of accident that the number of centres of 
scientific life in addition to Paris was also growing rapidly. While 
Oxford had already won an importance of its own as a seat of 
the Franciscan opposition, now we find first Vienna, Heidelberg, 
Prague, then the numerous academies of Italy, and finally the 
wealth of new universities of Protestant Germany, developing their 
independent vital forces. But at the same time, hy the invention of 
the art of printing, literary life gained such an extension and such a 
widely ramifying movement that, following its inner impulse, it 
was able to free itself from its rigid connection with the schools, 
strip olf the fetters of learned tradition, and expand unconstrained 
in the forms shaped out for it by individual personalities. So 
philosophy in the Renaissance loses its corporate character, and 
becomes in its best achievements the free deed of individuals ; it 

350 FhilosopJiy of the Renaissance. [Part IV 

seeks its sources in the broad extent of the real world of its owi 
time, and presents itself externally more and more in the garb of 
modern national languages. 

In this way science became involved in a powerful fermentation 
The two-thousand-year-old forms of the intellectual life seemed tc 
have been outlived and to have become unusable. A passionate, and 
at the first, still unclear search for novelty filled all minds, ancj 
excited imagination gained the mastery of the movement. But, in 
connection with this, the whole multiplicity of interests of secular 
life asserted themselves in philosophy, — the powerful development 
of political life, the rich increase in outward civilisation, the exten- 
sion of European civilisation over foreign parts of the world, and 
not least the world-joy of newly awakened art. And this fresh and 
living wealth of new content brought with it the result that philoS' 
ophy became pre-eminently subject to no one of these interests, but 
rather took them all up into itself, and with the passing of time 
raised itself above them again to the free work of knowing, to the 
ideal of knowledge for its own sake. 

The new birth of the purely theoretical spirit is the true meaning of 
the scientific " Renaissance," and in this consists also its kinship oj 
spirit with Greek thought, which was of decisive importance for its 
development. The subordination to ends of practical, ethical, and 
religious life which had prevailed in the whole philosophy of the 
Hellenistic-Roman period and of the Middle Ages, decreased more 
and more at the beginning of the modern period, and knowledge of 
reality appeared again as the absolute end of scientific research. 
Just as at the beginnings of Greek thought, so now, this theoretical 
impulse turned its attention essentially to natural science. The 
modern mind, which had taken up into itself the achievements of 
later antiquity and of the Middle Ages, appears from the beginning 
as having attained a stronger self-consciousness, as internalised, and 
as having penetrated deeper into its own nature, in comparison 
with the ancient mind. But true as this is, its first independent 
intellectual activity was the return to a disinterested concep 
tion of Nature. The whole philosophy of the Renaissance pressed 
toward this end, and in this direction it achieved its greatest 

Feeling such a relationship in its fundamental impulse, the 
modern spirit in its passionate search for the new seized at first 
upon the oldest. The knowledge of ancient philosophy brought out 
by the humanistic movement was eagerly taken up, and the systems of 
Greek philosophy were revived in violent opposition to the mediaeval 
tradition. But from the point of view of the whole movement of 

Philosophy of the Renaissance. 351 

history this return to antiquity presents itself as but the instinctive 
preparation for the true work of the modern spirit/ which in this 
Castalian bath attained its youthful vigour. By living itself into the 
world of Greek ideas it gained the ability to master in thought its 
own rich outer life, and thus equipped, science turned from the sub- 
tility of the inner world with full vigour back to the investigation 
of Nature, to open there new and wider paths for itself. 

The history of the philosophy of the Renaissance is therefore in 
the main the history of the process in which the natural science 
mode of regarding the world is gradually worked out from the 
humanistic renewal of Greek philosophy. It falls, therefore, appro- 
priately into two periods, the humanistic period and the natural 
science period. As a boundary line between the two we may per- 
iiaps regard the year 1600. The first of these periods contains the 
supplanting of mediaeval tradition by that of genuine Grecian 
thought, and while extremely rich in interest for the history of 
civilisation and in literary activity, these two centuries show from 
a philosophical point of view merely that shifting of earlier thoughts 
by which preparation is made for the new. The second period in- 
cludes the beginnings of modern natural research which gradually 
conquered their independence, and following these the great meta- 
physical systems of the seventeenth century. 

The two periods form a most intimately connected whole. For 
the inner impelling motive in the philosophical movement of Hu- 
manism was the same urgent demand for a radically new knowledge 
of the world, which ultimately found its fulfilment in the process in 
which natural science became established and worked out according 
to principles. But the manner in which this work took place, and 
the forms of thought in which it became complete, prove to be in 
all important points dependent upon the stimulus proceeding from 
the adoption of Greek philosophy. Modern natural science is the 
daughter of Humanism. 

1 In this respect the course of development of science in the Renaissance ran 
exactly parallel to that of art. The line which leads from Giotto to Leonardo, 
Raphael, Michael Angelo, Titian, Dürer, and Rembrandt, passes gradually from 
the reanimation of classical forms to independent and immediate apprehension 
of Nature. And Goethe is likewise proof that for us moderns the way to 
Nature leads through Greece, 



Jac. Burckhardt, Die Cultur der Benaissance in Italien. 4th ed. , Leips. 1886. 
{The Civilisation of the Benaissance. Tr. by S. G. C. Middlemore, Lond. 

1878 and 1890. 
Mor. Carriere, Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Beformationszeit. 2d ed., 

Leips. 1887. 
A. Stöckl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. 3d vol., Mainz, 1866. 
[J. A. Symonds, The Benaissance in Italy. 5 pts. in 7 vols., 1875-86.] 

The continuity in the intellectual and spiritual development of 
European humanity manifests itself nowhere so remarkably as in 
the Kenaissance. At no time perhaps has the want for something 
completely new, for a total and radical transformation, not only in 
the intellectual life, but also in the whole state of society, been felt 
so vigorously and expressed so variously and passionately as then, 
and no time has experienced so many, so adventurous, and so ambi- 
tious attempts at innovation as did this. And yet, if we look closely, 
and do not allow ourselves to be deceived, either by the grotesque 
self-consciousness or by the naive grandiloquence which are the 
order of the day in this literature, it becomes evident that the whole 
multiform process goes on within the bounds of ancient and mediae- 
val traditions, and strives in obscure longing toward a goal which 
is an object rather of premonition than of clear conception. It was 
not until the seventeenth century that the process of fermentation 
became complete, and this turbulent mixture clarified. 

The essential ferment in this movement was the opposition 
between the inherited philosophy of the Middle Ages, which was 
already falling into dissolution, and the original works of Greek 
thinkers which began to be known in the fifteenth century, A new 
stream of culture flowed from Byzantium by the way of Florence 
and Eome, which once more strongly diverted the course of Western 
thought from its previous direction. In so far the humanistic 
Renaissance, the so-called re-birth of classical antiquity, appears as 
a continuation and completion of that powerful process of appropri- 


Chap. 1.] Humanistic Period. 353 

ation presented by the Middle Ages (cf. pp. 264 ff., 310 f.) ; and if this 
process consisted in retracing in reverse order the ancient move- 
ment of thought, it now reached its end, inasmuch as essentially all 
of the original ancient Greek literature which is accessible to-day, 
now became known. 

The becoming known of the Greek originals, and the spread of 
humanistic culture, called out a movement of opposition to Scholas- 
ticism, at first in Italy, then also in Germany, France, and England. 
As regards subject-matter, this opposition was directed against the 
mediaeval interpretations of Greek metaphysics ; as regards method, 
against authoritative deduction from conceptions taken as assump- 
tions; as regards form, against the tasteless stiffness of monastic 
Latin : and with the wonderful restoration of ancient thought, with 
the fresh imaginative nature of a life-loving race, with the refine- 
ment and wit of an artistically cultivated time for its aids this oppo- 
sition won a swift victory. 

But this opposition was divided within itself. There were Plato- 
nists, who for the most part would better be called Neo-Platonists ; 
there were Aristotelians, who, in turn, were again divided into differ- 
ent groups, vigorously combating one another, according to their 
attachment to one or another of the ancient interpreters. There, 
too, were the reawakened older doctrines of Greek cosmology, of 
the lonians and Pythagoreans; the conception of Nature held by 
Democritus and Epicurus rose to new vigour. Scepticism and the 
mixed popular and philosophical Eclecticism lived again. 

While this humanistic movement was either religiously indiffer- 
ent or even engaged together with open " heathenism " in warfare 
against Christian dogma, an equally violent controversy between 
transmitted doctrines was in progress in the life of the Church. 
The Catholic Church intrenched itself against the assault of thought 
more and more firmly behind the bulwark of Thomism, under the 
leadership of the Jesuits. Among the Protestants, Augustine was the 
leading mind — a continuation of the antagonism observed in the 
Middle Ages. But when dogmas were thrown into philosophical 
form in the Protestant Church, the Reformed branch remained 
nearer to Augustine, while in the Lutheran Church, in consequence 
of the influence of Humanism, a tendency toward the original form 
of the Aristotelian system prevailed. In addition to these ten- 
dencies, however, German Mysticism, with all the widely ramified 
traditions which united in it (cf. § 26, 5), maintained itself in the 
religious need of the people, to become fruitful and efficient for the 
philosophy of the future, more vigorous in its life than the Church 
erudition that sought in vain to stifle it. 

854 :^hilosopliy of the Renaissance. [Part IV, 

The new whicli was being prepared in these various conflicts was 
the consummation of that movement which had begun with Duns 
Scotus at the culmination of mediseval philosophy, viz. the separa- 
tion of philosophy from theology. The more philosophy established 
itself by the side of theology as an independent secular science, the 
more its peculiar task was held to be the knowledge of Nature. In this 
result all lines of the philosophy of the Renaissance meet. Philoso- 
phy shall be natural science, — this is the watchword of the time. 

The carrying out of this purpose, nevertheless, necessarily moved 
at first within the traditional modes of thought ; these, however, 
had their common element in the anthropocentric character of their 
Weltanschauung, which had been the consequence of the develop- 
ment of philosophy as a theory and art of life. For this reason the 
natural philosophy of the Renaissance in all its lines takes for its 
starting-point, in constructing its problems, man's p>osition in the 
cosmos; and the revolution in ideas which took place in this aspect, 
under the influence of the changed conditions of civilisation, became 
of decisive importance for shaping anew the whole theory of the 
world. At this point metaphysical imagination and fancy was most 
deeply stirred, and from this point of view it produced its cosmical 
poetry, prototypal for the future, in the doctrines of Oiordano 
Bruno and Jacob Boehme. 

The following treat in general the revival of ancient philosophy : L. Heeren, 
Geschichte der Studien der classischen Litteratur (Göttingen, 1797-1802) ; 
G. Vogt, Die Wiederbelehung des classischen Alterthums (Berlin, 1880 f.). 

The main seat of Platonism was the Academy of Florence, which was 
founded by Cosmo de' Medici, and brilliantly maintained by his successors. 
The impulse for this had been given by Georgius Gemistus Pletho (1355-1450), 
the author of numerous commentaries and compendiums, and of a treatise in 
Greek on the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian doctrine. 
Cf. Fr. Schultze, G. G. P. (Jena, 1874).— Bessarion (born 1403 in Trebizond, 
died as Cardinal of the Roman church in Ravenna, 1472) was his influential 
pupil. Bessarion's main treatise, Adversus Caluniniatorem, Platonis, appeared 
at Rome, 1469. Complete Works in Migne's coll. (Paris, 1866). — The most 
important members of the Platonic circle were Marsilio Fioino of Florence 
(1433-1499), the translator of the works of Plato and Plotinus, and authoi 
of a Theologia Platonica (Florence, 1482), and at a later time, Francesco 
Patrizzi (1529-1597), who brought the natural philosophy of this movement to 
its completest expression in his Nova de Universis Philosophia (Ferrara, 1591). 

A similar instance of Neo-Platonism alloyed with Neo-Pythagorean and 
ancient Pythagorean motives is afforded by John Pico of Mirandola (1463-94). 

The study of Aristotle in the original sources was promoted in Italy by 
Georgius of Trebizond (1396-1484 ; Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis, 
Venice, 1523) and Theodorus Gaza (died 1478), in Holland and Germans 
by Rudolf Agricola (1442-1485), and in France by Jacques Lef&vre (Fabei 
Stapulensis, 1455-1537). 

The Aristotelians of the Renaissance (aside from the churchly-scholastif 
line) divided into the two parties of the Averroists and the Alezandrlsts 
The University of Padua, as the chief seat of Averroism, was also the pla« 
of the liveliest controversies between the two. 

Chap. 1.] Sumanistie Period. 355 

As representatives of Averroism we mention Nicoletto Vernias (died 
1499), especially Alexander Achillini of Bologna (died 1518; works, Venice, 
1545) ; further, Augostiuo Nifo (1473-1546 ; main treatise. De Intellectu et 
DcBinonibus ; Opuscula, Paris, 1654), and the Neapolitan Zimara (died 1532). 

To the Ale:^andrists belong Ermolao Barbaro of Venice (1454-1493 ; 
Compendium Scientiae Naturalis ex Aristotele, Venice, 1547), and the most 
important Aristotelian of the Eenaissance, Pietro Pomponazzi (born 1462 in 
Mantua, died 1524 in Bologna. His most important writings are De Immortali- 
täte Animce with the Defensorium against JS'iphus, De fata liber o arhitno prce- 
desiinatione Providentia dei libri quinque ,' cf. L. Ferri, La Psicologia di P. P., 
Eome, 1877), and his pupils, Gasparo Contarini (died 1542), Simon Porta 
(died 1555), and Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558). 

Among the later Aristotelians, Jacopo Zabarella (1532-1589), Andreas 
Caesalpinus (1519-1603), Cesare Cremonini (1552-1631) and others seem 
rather to have adjusted the above oppositions. 

Of the renewals of other Greek philosophers, the following are especially to 
be mentioned : — 

Jcest Lips (1547-1606), Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam (Antwerp, 
1604), and other writings ; and Caspar Schoppe, Elementa Stoicce Philosophice 
Moralis (Mainz, 1606). 

Dav. Scnnert (1572-1637), Physica (Wittenberg, 1618) ; Sebastian Basso 
(Philosiiphia Naturalis adversus Aristotelem, Geneva, 1621) ; and Johannes 
Magnenus, Democritus Beviviscens (Pavia, 1646) . 

Claude de Berigard as renewer of the Ionic natural philosophy in his 
Cermli Plsani (Udine, 1643 ff.). 

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), De Vita Moribus et Doctrina Epicuri (Ley- 
den, 1647) [works, Lyons, 1658], and lastly 

Emanuel Maignanus (1601-1671), whose Cursus Philosophicus (Toulouse, 
1652) defends Empedoclean doctrines. 

The following wrote in the spirit of the ancient Scepticism : Michel de 
Montaigne (1533-1592 ; JEssais, Bordeaux, 1580, new editions, Paris, 1866, 
and Bordeaux, 1870) [Eng. tr. by Cotton, ed. by Hazlitt, Lond. 1872 ; also by 
Florio, ed. by Morley, Lond. 1887J, Frangois Sanchez (1562-1632, a Portu- 
guese who taught in Toulouse, author of the Tractatvs de multum nobili et 
prima universali scientia quod nihil scitur, Lyons, 1581 ; cf. L. Gerkrath, F. Ä, 
Vienna, 1860), Pierre Charron (1541-1603 ; De la Sagesse, Bordeaux, 1601) : 
later Francois de la Motte le Vayer (1586-1672, Cinq Dialogues, Mons, 1673), 
Samuel Sorbiöre (1615-1670, translator of Sextus Empiricus), and Simon 
Foucher (1644-96, author of a history of the Academic Sceptics, Paris, 1690). 

The sharpest polemic against Scholasticism proceeded from those Humanists 
who set against it the Koman eclectic popular philosophy of sound common 
sense in an attractive form, and as far as possible in rhetorical garb. Agricola 
is to be mentioned here also, with his treatise De Inventione Dialectica (1480). 
Before him was Laurentius Valla (1408-1457 ; Dialecticce Disputationes contra 
Aristoteleos, Ven. 1499), Ludovico Vives (born in Valencia, 1492, died 
in Brügge, 1546; De Disciplinis, Brügge, 1531, works, Basel, 1555; cf. A. 
Lange in Schmidt's Encyclopädie der Pädagogik, Vol. IX.), Marius Nizolius 
(1498-1576; De veris principiiis et vera ratione philosophandi, Parma, 1553), 
finally Pierre de la Ramöe (Petrus Ramus, 1515-1572, Institutiones Dialec- 
ticce, Paris, 1543; cf. Ch. Waddington, Paris, 1849 and 1855). 

The tradition of Thomistic Scholasticism maintained itself most strongly 
at the Spanish univei'sities. Among its supporters the most prominent was 
Francis Suarez of Granada (1548-1617 ; Disputationes Metaphysical, 1605, 
works, 26 vols., Paris, 1856-66 ; cf. K. Werner, S. und die Scholastik der 
letzten Jahrhunderte, Regensburg, 1861) ; the collective work of the Jesuits of 
Coimbra, the so-called Collegium Conembricense, is also to be mentioned. 

Protestantism stood from the beginning in closer relation to the humanistic 
movement. In Germany especially the two went frequently hand in hand ; cf . 
K. Hagen, Deutschlands litterarische und religiose Verhältnisse im Beforma- 
tionszeitalter, 3 vols., Frankfort, 1868. 

At the Protestant universities Aristotelianism was introduced principally 

356 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV. 

by Philip Melancthon. In the edition of his works by Bretschneider and 
Bindseil the philosophical works form Vols. 13. and 16. Of chief importance 
among them are the text-books on logic (dialectic) and ethics. Cf. A. Richter, 
M.''s Verdienste um den philosophischen Unterricht (Leips. 1870); K. Hart- 
felder, M. als PrcBceptor Germanice (Berlin, 1889). 

Luther himself stood much nearer the position of Augustinianism (cf. Ch. 
Weisse, Die Christologie Luther'' s, Leips. 1852). This was still more the case 
«vith Calvin, while Zwingli was friendlier inclined toward contemporaneous 
philosophy, especially the Italian Neo-Platonism. The scientific importance of 
all three great reformers lies, however, so exclusively in the theological field 
that they are to be mentioned here only as essential factors of the general intel- 
lectual movement in the sixteenth century. 

Protestant Aristotelianism found its opponents in Nicolaus Taurellus 
(1547-1606, Professor in Basel and Altorf ; Philosophice Triumphus, Basel, 
1573 ; Alpes Ccesce, Frankfort, 1597 ; cf. F. X. Schmidt-Schwarzenberg, N. T., 
Der erste deutsche Philosoph, Erlangen, 1864), further in Socinianism founded 
by Lelio Sozzini of Sienna (1525-1562) and his nephew Fausto (1539-1604 ; 
cf. A. Fock, Der Socinianismus, Kiel, 1847, and the article S. by Herzog in his 
Theol. Enc, 2d ed., XIV. 377 ff), and especially in the popular movement of 
Mysticism. Among the representatives of this movement are prominent 
Andreas Oslander (1498-1552), Caspar Schwenckfeld (1490-1561), Sebas- 
tian Franck (1500-1545; cf. K. Hagen, op. cit., III. chap. 5) and especially 
Valentine Weigel (1553-1588 ; Lihellus de Vita Beata, 1606, Z)'T giildne Griff, 
1613, Vom Ort der Welt, 1613, Dialogus de Christianismo, 1614, TvQdi cravrdv. 
1615 ; cf. J. 0. Opel, V. W., Leips. 1864). 

The tendency toward natural philosophy in attachment to Nie. Cusanus 
appears more strongly in Charles Bouillö (Bovillus, 1470-1553 ; De Intellectu 
and De Sensibus ; De Sapientia. Cf. J. Dippel, Versuch einer system. Darstel- 
lung der Philos. des C. B., Würzburg, 1862), and Girolamo Cardano (1501- 
1576 ; De Vita Propria, De Varietate Herum, De Subtilitate ; works, Lyons, 
1663). Cf. on this and the following, Rixner und Siber, Lehen und Lehrmeinun- 
gen berühmter Physiker im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 7 Hefte, Sulzbach, 1819 ff.). 

The most brilliant among the Italian natural philosophers is Giordano Bruno 
of Nola, in Campania. Born in 1548, and reared in Naples, he met so much sus- 
picion in the Dominican Order, into which he had entered, that he fled, and from 
that time on, led an unsettled life. He went by way of Rome and upper Italy 
to Genoa, Lyons, Toulouse, held lectures in Paris and Oxford, then in Witten- 
berg and Helmstädt, visited also Marburg, Prague, Frankfort, and Zurich, and 
finally, in Venice, met the fate of coming into the hands of the Inquisition by 
treachery. He was delivered to Rome, and there, after imprisonment for sev- 
eral years, was burned, 1600, on account of his steadfast refusal to retract. 
His Latin works (3 vols., Naples, 1880-91) concern partly the Lullian art (esp. 
De Imaginum Signorum et Idearam Compositione), and in part are didactic 
poems or metaphysical treatises (De Monade Numero et Figura ; De Triplici 
Minimo) : the Italian writings (ed. by A. Wagner, Leips. 1829, new ed. by P. de 
Lagarde, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1888) are partly satirical compositions (II Candelajo, 
La Cena delle Cineri, Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante, German by Kuhlenbeck, 
Leips. 1890, Cabala del Cavallo Pegaseo), and on the other hand, the most 
complete expositions of his doctrines : Dialoghi della Causa Principio ed Uno, 
German by Lasson (Berlin, 1872) ; Degli Eroici Furori ; DelV Infinito, Universo 
e Dei Mondi. Cf. Bartholm&ss, G. B. (Paris, 1816 f.) ; Dom. Berti, Vita di G. B. 
(Turin, 1867), and Documenti Intorno a G. B. (Turin, 1880) ; Chr. Sigwart in 
Kleine Schriften, I. (Freiburg, 1889) ; H. Brunnhofer, G. B.''s Weltanschauung 
und Verhängniss (Leips. 1882). [G. Bruno, by I. Frith, Lond., Trübner; T. 
Whitaker in 3Iind, Vol. IX.]. 

Another tendency is represented by Bernardino Telesio (1508-1588 ; De 
rerum natura juxta propria principia, Rome, 1565 and Naples, 1586. On him 
see F. Fiorentino, Florence, 1872 and 1874 ; L. Ferri, Turin, 1873), and his more 
important successor, Tommaso CampaneUa. Born 1568, in Stilo of Calabria, 
he early became a Dominican, was rescued and brought to France after many 
persecutions and an imprisonment of several years. There he became intimate 
with the Cartesian circle, and died in Paris. 1639. before the completion of the 

Chap. 1, § 28.] The Warring Traditions. 357 

full edition of his writings, which was to be called Instauratio Scientiarum. A 
new edition, with biographical introduction by d'Ancona has appeared (Turin, 
1854) . Of liis very numerous writings may be mentioned : Prodromus Philos- 
ophice Instaurandce, 1617 ; Bealis Philosophice Partes Quatuor (with the ap- 
pendix, Civitas Solis), 1623 ; De Monarchia Hispanica, 1625 ; Philosophice 
Rationalis Partes Quinque, 1638 ; Universalis Philosophice seu metaphysicarum 
rerum juxta propria principia partes tres, 1638. Cf . Baldachini, Vita e Filosofia 
di T. C. (Naples, 1840 and 1843) ; Dom. Berti, Nuovi Documenti di T. C. 
(Kome, 1881). 

Theosophical-magical doctrines are found with John Reuchlin (1455-1522 ; 
DeVerbo Mirifico, De Arte Cabbalistica) , A-giippa. of Nettesheim (1487-1635; 
De Occulta Philosophia ; De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum), TrancGBCO 
Zorzi (1460-1540, De Harmonia 3Iundi, Paris, 1549). 

A more important and independent thinker is Theophrastus Bombastus Par- 
acelsus of Höhenheim (born 1493 at Einsiedeln, he passed an adventurous life, 
was Professor of Chemistry in Basel, and died in Salzburg, 1541). Among his 
works (ed. by Huser, Strassburg, 1616-18), the most important are the Opus 
Paramirum, Die grosse Wundarznei, and De Natura Berum. Cf. E. Eucken, 
Beiträge zur Gesch. der neueren Philos., Heidelberg, 1886. Of his numerous 
pupils the most important are Johann Baptist van Helmont (1577-1644 ; Ger- 
man ed. of his works, 1683), and his son, Franz Mercurius, also Robert Fludd 
(1574-1637, Philosophia Mosaica, Guda, 1638), and others. 

The most noteworthy deposit of these movements is formed by the doctrine 
of Jacob Boehme. He was bom, 1575, near Görlitz, absorbed all kinds of 
thoughts in his wanderings, and quietly elaborated them. Settled as a shoe- 
maker at Görlitz, he came forward, 1610, with his main treatise Aurora, which 
at a later time after he had been temporarily forced to keep silence, was followed 
by many others, among them especially Vierzig Fragen von der Seele (1620), 
Mysterium Magnum (1623), Von der Gnadenwahl (1623). He died 1624. Coll. 
works ed. by Schiebler, Leips. 1862. Cf. H. A. Fechner, J. B., sein Leben und 
seine Schriften, Görlitz, 1853 ; A. Peip, J. B. der deutsche Philosoph, Leips. 1860. 

§ 28. The Struggle between the Traditions. 

The immediate attachment to the Greek philosophy which became 
prevalent in the Benaissance, was not entirely without its precedent 
in the Middle Ages, and men like Bernard of Chartres and William 
of Conches (cf. p. 302) were prototypes of the union of an increas- 
ing interest for knowledge of Nature with the humanistic move- 
ment. It is noteworthy, and characteristic of the changing fortune 
of transmitted doctrines, that now, as then, the union between 
Humanism and natural philosophy attaches itself to Plato, and 
stands in opposition to Aristotle. 

1. In fact, the revival of ancient literature showed itself at first 
in the form of a strengthening of Platonism. The humanistic move- 
ment had been flowing on since the days of Dante, Petrarch, and 
Boccaccio, and arose from the interest in Koman secular literature 
which was closely connected with the awakening of the Italian 
national consciousness ; but this current could not become a vic- 
torious stream until it received the help of the impulse from with- 
out which proceeded from the removal of the Byzantine scholars to 
Italy. Among these the Aristotelians were of like number and im- 
portance with the Platonists, but the latter brought that which was 

358 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part n 

relatively less known, and therefore more impressive. In addition 
to this, Aristotle was regarded in the West as the philosopher who 
was in agreement with the Church doctrine, and thus the opposition, 
which longed for something new, hoped much more from Plato ; and 
still further there was the aesthetic charm that comes from the writ- 
ings of the great Athenian, and for which no time was more keenly 
susceptible than this. Thus Italy first became intoxicated with an 
enthusiasm for Plato that matched that of departing antiquity. As 
if to connect itself immediately with this latter period, the Academy 
was again to live in Florence, and under the protection of the 
Medicis a rich scientific activity actually developed here, in which 
a reverence was paid to the leaders like Gemistus Pletho and Bes- 
sarion which was not less than that once given to the Scholarchs of 

But the relationship with this latter system of thought went 
deeper ; the Byzantine tradition, in which the Platonic doctrine was 
received, was the Neo-Platonic tradition. What at that time was 
taught in Florence as Platonism was in truth Neo-Platonism. Mar- 
silio Ficino translated Plotinus as well as Plato, and his " Platonic 
Theology" was not much different from that of Proclus. So, too, 
the fantastic natural philosophy of Patrizzi is in its conceptional 
basis nothing but the Neo-Platonic system of emanation ; but it is 
significant that in this case the dualistic elements of Neo-Plato- 
nism are entirely stripped off, and the monistic tendency brought out 
more purely and fully. On this account the Neo-Platonist of the 
Renaissance places in the foreground the beauty of the universe; on 
this account even the deity, the Unomnia (One-all) is for him a 
sublime world-unity which includes plurality harmoniously within 
itself ; on this account he is able to glorify even the infinity of the 
universe in a way to fascinate the fancy. 

2. The pantheistic tendency, which is so unmistakable in this, 
was enough to make this Platonism an object of suspicion to the 
Church, and thus to give its Peripatetic opponents a welcome in- 
strument with which to combat it ; and an instrument that was 
used not only by the scholastic Aristotelians, but also by the others. 
On the other hand, to be sure, the Platonists could reproach the 
new humanistic Aristotelianism for its naturalistic tendencies, and 
praise their own tendency toward the super-sensuous, as allied to 
Christianity. Thus the two great traditions of Greek philosophy 
fought their battle over again, while each charged the other with 
its unchristian character.^ In this spirit Pletho, in his vo/xwv o-uy- 

1 Quite the same relation is repeated in the case of the different groups of 
Aristotelians, each of which wished to be regarded orthodox, — even at the price 

CuAr. 1, § 28.] Warring Traditions : Platonists, Aristotelians. 85^ 

ypa^rj, conducted his polemic against the Aristotelians, and incurred 
thereby condemnation from the Patriarch Gennadios in Constanti- 
nople; in this spirit George of Trebizond attacked the Academy, 
and in the same spirit, though milder, Bessarion answered him. 
Thus the animosity between the two schools, and the literary stir 
it produced in antiquity, were transferred to the Renaissance, and 
it was in vain that men like Leonicus Thomaeus of Padua (died 
1533) admonished the combatants to understand the deeper unity 
that subsists between the two heroes of philosophy. 

3. Meanwhile there was absolutely no unity among the Aristote- 
lians themselves. The Grecian interpreters of the Stagirite and 
their adherents looked down with as much contempt upon the 
Averroists as upon the Thomists. Both passed for them in like 
manner as barbarians ; they themselves, however, were for the most 
part prepossessed in favour of that interpretation of the Master 
which was closely allied to Stratonism, and which was best repre- 
sented among the commentators by Alexander of Aplirodisias. Here, 
too, one transmitted theory stood in opposition to the others. The 
conflict was especially severe in Padua, where the Averroists saw 
their fortress threatened by the successful activity of Pomponatius 
as a teacher. The main point of controversy was the problem 
of immortality. Neither party admitted a full, individual immor- 
tality, but Averroism believed that it possessed at least a compensa- 
tion for this in the unity of the intellect, while the Alexandrists 
attached even the rational part of the soul to its animal conditions, 
and regarded it as perishable with them. Connected with this were 
the discussions on theodicy, providence, destiny and freedom of the 
will, miracles and signs, in which Pomponazzi frequently inclined 
strongly to the Stoic doctrine. 

In the course of time this dependence upon commentators and 
their oppositions was also stripped off, and the way prepared for a 
pure, immediate apprehension of Aristotle. This succeeded best 
with Ccesalpinus, who avowed his complete allegiance to Aristotle. 
An equally correct understanding of the Peripatetic system was 
gained by the German Humanists from a philological standpoint, 
but following Melancthon's precedent they adopted this in their 
own doctrine only in so far as it agreed with Protestant dogma. 

4 In all these cases the adoption of Greek philosophy led to an 
opposition to Scholasticism as regards the real content or matter of 

of the " twofold truth." lu this the Averroists, especially, were ready, and so 
it came about that one of them, Nifo, had himself entrusted by the Pope with 
the refutation of Pomponazzi's doctrine of immortality. The latter, indeed, also 
covered himself with the same shield. 

öou me uenaissance : Mumamsmc jrerioa. [rARTiv. 

the opposing systems. Another line of Hamanism, which was more 
in sympathy with Roman literature, inclined to a predominantly 
formal opposition, of which John of Salisbury may be regarded as 
a mediaeval forerunner. The taste of the Humanists rebelled against 
the barbarous outward form of mediaeval literature. Accustomed to 
the polished refinement and transparent clearness of the ancient 
writers, they were not able to value rightly the kernel so full of 
character, which lay within the rough shell of the scholastic termi- 
nology. The minds of the Eenaissance, with their essentially aes- 
thetic disposition, had do longer any feeling for the abstract nature 
of that science of abstract conceptions. Thus they opened the battle 
in all directions, with the weapons of jest and of earnest ; instead of 
conceptions they demanded things; instead of artificially constructed 
words, the language of the cultivated world ; instead of subtle proofs 
and distinctions, a tasteful exposition that should speak to the 
imagination and heart of the living man. 

Laurentius Valla was the first to make this cry resound. Agric- 
ola took it up in lively controversy, and Erasmus also joined in. 
The models of these men were Cicero and Quintilian, and when at 
their hand the method of philosophy was to be changed, the scho- 
lastic dialectic was dislodged and in its place were introduced the 
principles of rhetoric and grammar. The true dialectic is the 
science of discourse.^ The " Aristotelian " logic therefore becomes 
the object of most violent polemic ; the doctrine of the syllogism is 
to be simplified and driven from its commanding situation. The 
syllogism is incapable of yielding anything new ; it is an unfruitful 
form of thought. This was later emphasised by Bruno, Bacon, and 
Descartes, as strongly as by these Humanists. 

But the more closely the dominance of the syllogism was con- 
nected with dialectical " Realism," the more nominalistic and termi- 
nistic motives connected themselves with the humanistic opposition. 
This shows itself in the cases of Vives and Nizolius. They are 
zealous against the reign of universal conceptions ; in this, according 
to Vives, lies the true reason for the mediaeval corruption of the 
sciences. Universals, Nizolius teaches,^ are collective names which 
arise by "comprehension," not by abstraction; individual things 
with their qualities constitute reality. It concerns us to apprehend 
these, and the secondary activity of the understanding which com- 
pares, is to be carried out as simply and unartificially as possible. 
Hence all metaphysical assumptions, which have made so great a 

1 Petr. Ramus, Dialect. Instit. , at the beg:innmg. 

2 Mar. Nizolius, De Ver. Princ, I. 4-7 ; III. 7. 

Chap. 1, § 28.] Warring Traditions : Humanists^ Ramus. 361 

difficulty in previous dialectic, must be banished from logic. Em- 
piricism can use only a purely formal logic. 

The "natural" dialectic, however, was sought in rhetoric and 
grammar, for, Ramus held, it should teach us only to follow in our 
voluntary thinking the same laws which, according to the nature of 
reason, control also our involuntary thinking, and present themselves 
spontaneously in the correct expression of this involuntary process 
of thought. In all reflection, however, the essential thing is to 
discover the point of view that is determinative for the question, 
and then to apply this correctly to the subject. Accordingly Eamus, 
following a remark of Vives,^ divides his new dialectic into the doc- 
trines of Inventio and Judicium. The first part is a kind of general 
logic, which yet cannot avoid introducing again in the form of the 
" loci " the categories, such as Causality, Inherence, Genus, etc., and 
thus, enumerating them without system, falls into the naive meta- 
physics of the ordinary idea of the world. The doctrine of judgment 
is developed by Ramus in three stages. The first is the simple de- 
cision of the question by subsuming the object under the discovered 
point of view ; here the doctrine of the syllogism has its place, 
which is accordingly much smaller than formerly. In the second 
place the judgment is to unite cognitions that belong together to a 
systematic whole, by definition and division ; its highest task, how- 
ever, it fulfils only when it brings all knowledge into relation to 
God, and finds it grounded in him. Thus natural dialectic culminates 
in theosophy.^ 

Slight as was the depth and real originality of this rhetorical 
system, it yet excited great respect in a time that was eager for the 
new. In Germany, especially, Eamists and anti-ßamists engaged 
in vehement controversy. Among the friends of the system, Jo- 
hannes Sturm is especially worthy of note, a typical pedagogue of 
Humanism, who set the task for education of bringing the scholar 
to the point where he knows things, and how to judge concerning 
them from a correct point of view, and to speak in cultivated 

5. A characteristic feature of this movement is its cool relation 
toward metaphysics ; this very fact proves its derivation from the 
Eoman popular philosophy. Cicero, to whom it especiall}'' attached 
itself, was particularly influential by virtue of his Academic Scepti- 
cism or Probabilism. Surfeit of abstract discussions alienated 
a considerable part of the Humanists from the great systems of 

1 Lud. Vives, De Causis Corr. Art. (first part of De DiscipUnis), III. 5. 

2 Cf. E. Laas, Die Pädagogik des ./. St. kritisch und Jiistorisch beleuchtet 
(Berlin, 1872). 

362 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV. 

antiquity also. The extension of religious unbelief or indifferent 
ism was an additional motive to make scepticism appear in many 
circles as the right temper for the cultivated man. The charm ol 
outer life, the glitter of refined civilisation, did the rest to bring 
about indifference toward philosophical subtleties. 

This scepticism of the man of the world was brought to its 
complete expression by Montaigne. With the easy grace and fine- 
ness of expression of a great writer, he thus gave French literature 
a fundamental tone which has remained its essential character. 
But this movement also runs in the ancient track. Whatever of 
philosophical thought is found in the " Essays " arises from Pyr- 
rhonism. Hereby a thread of tradition which had for a long time 
been let fall is again taken up. The relativity of theoretical opin- 
ions and ethical theories, the illusions of the senses, the cleft 
between subject and object, the constant change in which both are 
involved, the dependence of all the work of the intellect upon such 
doubtful data, — all these arguments of ancient Scepticism meet us 
here, not in systematic form, but incidentally in connection with 
the discussion of individual questions, and thus in a much more 
impressive manner. 

Pyrrhonism was at the same time revived in a much more scho- 
lastic form by Sanchez, and yet in a lively manner, and not without 
hope that a sure insight might yet at some time be allowed to man. 
He concludes individual chapters, and the whole work, with 
" Nescis f At ego nescio. Quid ? " To this great " Quid ? " he has 
indeed given no answer, and guidance to a true knowledge was a 
debt that he did not discharge. But he left no doubt as to the 
direction in which he sought it. It was the same which Montaigne 
also pointed out : science must free itself from the word-lumber of 
the wisdom of the schools, and put its questions directly to things 
themselves. Thus Sanchez demands a new knowledge, and has, 
indeed, a dim foreboding of it, but where and how it is to be sought 
he is not prepared to say. In many passages it seems as though he 
would proceed to empirical investigation of Nature, but just here he 
cannot get beyond the sceptical doctrine of outer perception, and if 
he recognises the greater certainty of inner experience, this innei 
experience in turn loses its value because of its indefiniteness. 

Charron comes forward with firmer step, since he keeps before 
him the practical end of wisdom. Like his two predecessors he 
doubts the possibility of certain theoretical knowledge; in this 
respect all three set up the authority of the Church and of faith : 
a metaphysics can be revealed only j the human power of knowl- 
edge is not sufi&cient for it. But, proceeds Charron, the human 

Chap. 1, § 28.] Warring Traditions : Sanchez, Oatholicism. 363 

knowing faculty is all the more sufficient for that self-knowledge 
which is requisite for the moral life. To this self-knowledge 
belongs, above all, the humility of the sceptic who has no confidence 
that he knows anything truly, and in this humility is rooted the 
freedom of spirit with which he everywhere withholds his theoretical 
judgment. On the other hand, the ethical command of righteous- 
ness and of the fulfilment of duty is known without a doubt in 
this self-knowledge. 

This diversion toward the practical realm, as might be expected 
from the general tendency of the time, was not permanent. The 
later Sceptics turned the theoretical side of the Pyrrhonic tradi- 
tion again to the front, and the effect which resulted from this 
tendency for the general tone of the time applied ultimately, for the 
most part, to the certainty of dogmatic convictions. 

6. The Church doctrine could no longer master these masses of 
thought which now made their way so powerfully into the life of 
this period, as it had succeeded in doing with the Arabian-Aristote- 
lian invasion: this new world of ideas was too manifold and too full 
of antitheses, and, on the other hand, the assimilative power of the 
Church dogma was too far exhausted. The Eoman Church limited 
itself, therefore, to defending its spiritual and external power with 
all the means at its disposal, and was only concerned to fortify its 
own tradition and make it as sure as possible within itself. In this 
changed form the Jesuits now performed the same task that in the 
thirteenth century had fallen to the mendicant orders. With their 
help the definitive and complete form of Church dogma was fixed 
against all innovations at the Council of Trent (1563), and Thomism 
declared to be authoritative in essentials for philosophical doctrine. 
Thereafter there could be no more any question as to changes of 
principle, but only as to more skilful presentations and occasional 
insertions. In this way the Church excluded itself from the fresh 
movement of the time, and the philosophy dependent upon it fell 
into unavoidable stagnation for the next following centuries. Even 
the short after-bloom which Scholasticism experienced about 1800 
in the universities of the Iberian peninsula bore no real fruit, 
Suarez was an important writer, clear, acute, accurate, and with a 
great capacity for a luminous disposition of his thoughts ; he sur- 
passes also, to a considerable degree, most of the older Scholastics in 
the form of his expression ; but in the content of his doctrine he is 
bound by tradition, and a like constraint will be understood as a 
matter of course in the case of the collective work of the Jesuits of 

Over against this form of religious tradition, another now made 

364 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV. 

its appearance in the Protestant churches. Here, too, the opposition 
claimed the older tradition, and put aside its mediaeval modifications 
and developments. The Keformation desired to renew original Chris- 
tianity as against Catholicism. It drew the circle of the canonical 
books narrower again ; putting aside the Vidgate, it recognised only 
the Greek text as authoritative ; it returned to the Nicene creed. The 
controversy over dogmas in the sixteenth century — theoretically 
considered — hinges upon the question, which tradition of Chris- 
tianity shall be the binding one. 

But the theological antithesis drew the philosophical antithesis 
after it, and here again a relation was repeated which had appeared 
at many points during the Middle Ages. In the doctrine of Augus- 
tine, the religious need found a deeper, richer satisfaction, and a 
more immediate expression than in the conceptions worked out by 
the Scholastics. Earnestness in the consciousness of sin, passionate 
longing for redemption, faith that was internal in its source and 
its nature, — all these were traits of Augustine's nature which 
repeated themselves in Luther and Calvin. But it is only in the 
doctrine of Calvin that the permanent influence of the great Church 
Father is shown ; and yet just by this means an antagonism between 
Thomism and Augustinianism was once more created, which evinced 
itself as especially important in the French literature of the seven- 
teenth century (cf. § 30 f.). For the Catholics under the guidance 
of Jesuitism, Thomas was the ruling authority; for the Keformed 
Churches, and for the freer tendencies in Catholicism itself, Augus- 
tine held the same position. 

German Protestantism followed other courses. In the develop- 
ment of the Lutheran dogma, Luther's genius was aided by the co- 
operation of Melancthon and thus of Humanism. Little as the 
theoretico-sesthetical and religiously indifferent nature of the 
Humanists^ might accord with the mighty power of Luther's soul 
with its profound faith, he was, nevertheless, obliged, when he would 
give his work scientific form, to accommodate himself to the neces- 
sity of borrowing from philosophy the conceptions with which to lay 
his foundations. Here, however, Melancthon's harmonising nature 
came in, and while Luther had passionately rejected scholastic 
Aristotelianism, his learned associate introduced humanistic Aris- 
totelianism as the philosophy of Protestantism, here, too, opposing 
the older tradition to the remodelled tradition. This original 
Aristotelianism had to be corrected in many passages, to be sure, by 

1 On the relation of the Reformation and Humanism cf. Th. Ziegler, Gesch. 
der Ethik, II. 414 ff. 

Chap. 1, § 28.] Warring Traditions : Protestantism. 365 

means of the Scriptures, and the combination of doctrines could not 
reach such an organic union as had been attained by the slow ripen- 
ing of Thomism in the Middle Ages ; but the Peripatetic system was 
in this instance treated rather as but a supplement to theology in tha 
department of profane science, and for this end, Melancthon knew 
how to sift, arrange, and set forth the material in his text-books with 
so great skill that it became the basis for a doctrine which was in 
the main one in its nature, and as such was taught at the Protestant 
universities for two centuries. 

7. But in Protestantism there were still other traditional forces 
active. Luther's work of liberation owed its origin and its success 
not least to Mysticism, — not indeed to that sublime, spiritualised 
form of viewing the world to which the genius of Master Eckhart 
had given expression, but to the movement of deepest piety which, 
as " practical Mysticism," had spread from the Ehine in the " League 
of the Prieuds of God," and in the " Brothers of the Common Life." 
For this Mysticism, the disposition, purity of heart, and the imita- 
tion of Christ were the sole content of religion; assent to dog- 
mas, the external works of holiness, the whole worldly organisation 
of Church life, appeared to be matters of indifference and even 
hindrances : the believing soul demands only the freedom of its own 
religious life, — a demand that transcends all these outward works. 
This was the inner source of the Reformation. Luther himself had 
not only searched Augustine, he had also edited the " German The- 
ology " : and his word let loose the storm of this religious longing, 
with which, in the conflict against Rome, an impulse of national 
independence was also mingled. 

But when the Protestant State Church became again consolidated 
in the fixed forms of a theoretical system of doctrine, and clung to 
this the more anxiously in proportion as it was obliged to struggle 
for its existence in the strife of Confessions, then the supra-confes- 
sional impulse of Mysticism became undeceived, as did also the 
national consciousness. The theological fixation of the thought of 
the Reformation appeared as its ruin, and as Luther had once waged 
his warfare against the "sophistry" of the Scholastics, so now a 
movement of Mysticism that was quietly stirring farther and wider 
among the people, directed itself against his own creation. In men 
like Oslander and Sckwenckfeld he had to contend against parts of 
his own nature and its development. But in this movement it 
became evident that the doctrines of mediaeval Mysticism had been 
quietly maintained and continued in legendary form amid all kinds 
of fantastic ideas and obscure imagery. The Mysticism which comes 
to light in the teachings of men like Sebastian Franck^ or in the 

366 The Renaissance : HumanisUo Period. [Part \X 

secretly circulated tracts of Valentine Weigel, has its support in th.« 
idealism of Eckhart, which transformed all the outer into the inner, 
all the historical into the eternal, and saw in the process of Nature 
and history but the symbol of the spiritual and divine. This con' 
stituted, though frequently in strange form, the deeper ground oi 
the battle which the Mystics of the sixteenth century waged in 
Germany against the " letter " of theology. 

8. Look where we will in the intellectual movement of the fif- 
teenth and sixteenth centuries, we see everywhere tradition arrayed 
against tradition, and every controversy is a battle between trans- 
mitted doctrines. The spirit of the Western peoples has now taken 
up into itself the entire material which the past offers for its cul- 
ture, and in the feverish excitement into which it is finally put by 
direct contact with the highest achievements of ancient science, it 
struggles upward to the attainment of complete independence. It 
feels sufficiently hardened to execute work of its own, and overflow- 
ing with its wealth of thought, it seeks new tasks. One feels the 
impulsive blood of youth pulsate in its literature, as though some- 
thing unheard of, something which had never before been, must 
now come into being. The men of the Renaissance announce to us 
nothing less than the approach of a total renovation of science and 
of the state of humanity. The warfare between the transmitted 
doctrines leads to a surfeit of the past; learned research into the 
old wisdom ends with throwing aside all book-rubbish, and full of 
the youthful joy of dawning, growing life, the mind goes forth into 
the cosmic life of Nature ever young. 

The classical portrayal of this temper of the Renaissance is the 
first monologue in Goethe's Faust. 

§ 29. Macrocosm and Microcosm. 

By Scotism and Terminism the faith -metaphysics of the Middle 
Ages had become disintegrated and split in twain : everything 
supersensuous had been given to dogma, and as the object of philos- 
ophy there remained the world of experience. But before thought 
had as yet had time to become clear as to the methods and special 
problems of this secular knowledge. Humanism, and with it above 
all, the Platonic Weltanschauung, burst in. No wonder that the solu- 
tion of the problem, which was itself at first seen but dimly, was first 
sought in connection with this theory : and this doctrine must have 
been the more welcome, especially in its Neo-Platonic form, as it 
showed the world of the supersensuous presageful in the back- 
ground, but made the particulars of the world of sense stand out 

CiiAi'. 1, § 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Bruno^ Boehme. 867 

distinctly in purposefully defined outlines. The supersensuous 
itself, and all therein that was connected with man's religious life, 
might be cheerfully set off to theology ; philosophy could dedicate 
itself to the task of being natural science, with all the calmer con- 
science in proportion as it followed the Neo-Platonic precedent of 
apprehending Nature as a product of spirit, and thus believed that 
in the conception of the deity it retained a point of unity for the 
diverging branches of science, the spiritual and the secular. Did 
theology teach how God reveals himself in the Scripture, it was now 
the business of philosophy to apprehend with admiration his revela- 
tion in Nature. On this account the beginnings of modern natural 
science were theosophical and thoroughly Neo-Platonic. 

1. The characteristic fact, however, is that in this revival of 
Neo-Platonism, the last dualistic motives which had belonged to the 
same were also completely set aside. They disappeared together 
with the specifically religious interest which had supported them, 
and the theoretical element of recognising in Nature the creative 
divine power came forward pure and unmixed.^ The fundamental 
tendency in the natural philosophy of the Eenaissance was therefore 
the fanciful or imaginative conception of the divine unity of the liv- 
ing All, the admiration of the macrocosm : the fundamental thought 
of Plotinus of the beauty of the universe has been taken up by no 
other time so sympathetically as by this ; and this beauty was now 
also regarded as a manifestation of the divine Idea. Such a view 
is expressed in almost entirely Neo-Platonic forms by Patrizzi, in a 
more original form and with strongly poetical quality by Giordano 
Bruno, and likewise by Jacob Boehme. With Bruno the symbol of 
the all-forming and all-animating primitive light is still dominant 
(cf. p. 245) ; with Boehme, on the contrary, we find that of the 
organism ; the world is a tree which from root to flower and fruit 
is permeated by one life-giving sap, and which is formed and ordered 
from within outward by its own germinal activity.^ 

In this inheres naturally the inclination to complete monism and 
pantheism. Everything must have its cause, and the last cause can 
be but one, — God.^ He is, according to Bruno, at the same time 
the formal, the efficient, and the final cause ; according to Boehme 
he is at once the rational ground and efficient cause (" Urgrund^' 
and *' Ursache") of the world (principium and causa with Bruno). 

1 In a certain sense this might also be expressed by saying that thereby the 
Stoic elements of Neo-Platonism came with controlling force into the fore- 

2 Cf. the remarkable agreement between Bruno, Delia Causa Pr. e. U., IL 
(Lag. L 231 f.) and Boehme, Aurora, Vorrede. 

8 Aurora. Chap. IIL 

368 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV 

Hence the universe is also nothing but " the essential nature of God 
himself made creatural." ^ And yet the idea of the transcendence 
of God is here, too, connected with this view, as it had been in Neo- 
Platonism. Boehme holds that God should be thought not as a 
force devoid of reason and " science," but as the " all-knowing, all- 
seeing, all-hearing, all-smelling, all-tasting" spirit: and Bruno adds 
another analogy ; for him God is the artist who works unceasingly 
and shapes out his inner nature to rich life. 

Harmony is accordingly, for Bruno also, the inmost nature of the 
world, and he who can apprehend it with the gaze of enthusiasm 
(as does the philosopher in the dialogues and poetic inventions Degli 
Eroici Furori), for him the apparent defects and imperfections of 
detail vanish in the beauty of the whole. He needs no special the- 
odicy ; the world is perfect because it is the life of God, even down 
to every detail, and he only complains who cannot raise himself to 
a view of the whole. The world-joy of the aesthetic Kenaissance 
sings philosophical dithyrambs in Bruno's writings. A universalistic 
optimism that carries everything before it prevails in his poetic 

2. The conceptions which lie at the basis of this unfolding of the 
metaphysical fantasy in Bruno had their source in the main in 
Nicolaus Cusanus, whose teachings had been preserved by Charles 
Bouille, though in his exposition they had to some degree lost their 
vivid freshness. Just this the Nolan knew how to restore. He not 
only raised the principle of the coincidentia oppositorum to the artis- 
tic reconciliation of contrasts, to the harmonious total action of 
opposing partial forces in the divine primitive essence, but above all 
he gave to the conceptions of the infinite and the finite a far wider 
reaching significance. As regards the deity and its relation to the 
world, the Neo-Platonic relations are essentially retained. God 
himself, as the unity exalted above all opposites, cannot be appre- 
hended through any finite attribute or qualification, and there- 
fore is unknowable in his own proper essence (negative theology) ; 
but at the same time he is still thought as the inexhaustible, infinite 
world-force, as the natura naturans, which in eternal change forms 
and " unfolds " itself purposefully and in conformity with law, into 
the natura naturata. This identification of the essence of God and 
the world is a general doctrine of the natural philosophy of the 
Renaissance ; it is found likewise in Paracelsus, in Sebastian Franck, 
in Boehme, and finally also with the whole body of the " Platonists." 
That it could also assume an extremely naturalistic form, and could 

1 Aurora, Chap. II. 

Chap. 1, § 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : liruno. 369 

lead to the denial of all transcendence, is proved by the agitative and 
boastfully polemical doctrine of Vanini.^ 

For the natura naturata, on the other hand, for the " universe " — 
the sum-total of creatures — the characteristic of true "infinity" is 
not claimed, but rather that of unlimitedness in space and time. 
This conception gained an incomparably clearer form and more 
fixed significance by the Copernican theory. The spherical form of 
the earth and its revolution about its axis had been a familiar idea 
to Cusanus as well as to the old Pythagoreans, perhaps, indeed, 
through them ; but only the victoriously proved hypothesis of the 
motion of the earth about the sun could furnish a rational basis for 
the completely new view of man's position in the universe, which is 
peculiar to modern science. The anthropocentric idea of the world 
which had ruled the Middle Ages became out of joint. Man, as 
well as the earth, must cease to be regarded as centre of the universe 
and centre of the world. Men like Patrizzi and Boehme also raised 
themselves above such " restriction " on the basis of the teaching of 
Copernicus, which for that reason was condemned by the dogmatic 
authorities of all confessions ; but the fame of having thought out 
the Copernican system to its end, both in natural philosophy and in 
metaphysics, belongs to Giordano Bruno. 

He developed from this system the theory that the universe forms 
a system of countless worlds, each of which moves about its central 
sun, leads its own proper life, grows from chaotic conditions to clear 
and definite formation, and again yields to the destiny of dissolution. 
The tradition of Democritus and Epicurus had perhaps a share in 
the formation of this conception of a plurality of worlds arising and 
perishing again ; but it is the peculiar feature of Bruno's doctrine, 
that he regarded the plurality of solar systems not as a mechanical 
juxtaposition, but as an organic living whole, and regarded the pro- 
cess of the growth and decay of worlds as maintained by the pulse- 
beat of the one divine All-life. 

3. While in this way universalism, with its bold flight into spatial 
and temporal boundlessness, threatened to claim the fantasy entirely 
for its own, there was an effective counterpoise in the Peripatetic- 
Stoic doctrine of the analogy betiveen macrocosm and microcosm, 
which found in man's nature the sum, the " quintessence " of the 
cosmical powers. We see this doctrine reviving in the most varied 

1 Lucilio Vanini (born 1585 at Naples, burned 1619 at Toulouse), a dissolute 
adventurer, wrote Amphitheairtim yEternce Providentia} (Lyons, 1(315) and De 
admirnndis naturce regime deceque mortalium arcanis (Paris, 1G16). 

2 Nicolaus Copernicus, De Hevoliitionibus Orbium Ca'Iestiiim (Nuremberg, 

370 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV, 

forms during the Kenaissance ; it controls entirely the theory ol 
knowledge at this period, and moreover the Neo-Platonic triple 
division is almost universally authoritative in connection with it 
furnishing a scheme for a metaphysical anthropology. One can know 
only what one himself is, is the mode in which this was expressed 
by Valentine Weigel : man knows the all in so far as he is the all. 
This was a pervading principle of Eckhart's Mysticism. But this 
idealism now took on a definite form. As body, man belongs to the 
material world ; indeed, he unites within himself, as Paracelsus, and 
following him Weigel and Boehme teach, the essence of all material 
things in finest and most compact form. Just on this account he is 
competent to understand the corporeal world. As intellectual being, 
however, he is of " sidereal " origin, and is therefore able to know 
the intellectual world in all its forms. Finally, as a divine " spark," 
as spiraculum vitae, as a partial manifestation of the highest princi- 
ple of life, he is also able to become conscious of the divine nature 
whose image he is. 

A more abstract application of this same principle, according to 
which all knowledge of the world is rooted in man's knowledge oj 
himself, is found in the thought of Campanella, involving not the 
Neo-Platonic separation of world-strata (although this too is present 
in Campanella), but the fundamental categories of all reality. Man 
— is the thought here too — knows in the proper sense only himself, 
and knows all else only from and through himself. All knowledge 
is perception (sentire), but we perceive, not the things, but only 
the states into which these set us. In this process, however, we 
learn by experience that inasmuch as we are, we can do something, 
we know something and will something, and further, that we find 
ourselves limited by corresponding functions of other beings. From 
this it follows that power, knowledge, and will are the " primali- 
ties " of all reality, and that if they belong to God in an unlimited 
degree, he is known as all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. 

4. The doctrine that all knowledge of God and of the world is 
ultimately locked up in man's knowledge of himself, is nevertheless 
only an epistemological inference from the more general metaphys- 
ical principle according to which the divine nature was held to b€ 
fully and entirely contained in each of its finite manifestations 
Giordano Bruno follows the Cusan also in holding that God is the 
smallest as well as the greatest, as truly the vital principle of the 
individual being as that of the universe. And accordingly everj 
individual thing, and not merely man, becomes a "mirror" of the 
world-substance. Each without exception is according to its essen 
tial nature the deity itself, but each in its own way, which if 

Chap. 1, § 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm: Campanella^ Bru7io. 371 

different from all the rest. This tliought Bruno incorporated in his 
conception of the monad. He understood by this the individual 
substance {Einzelwesen), which, as continually "formed" matter, 
constitutes one of tlie partial manifestations of the world-force, in the 
interaction of which the world-life consists. It is living from the 
beginning, and is imperishable ; it is corporeal as well as spiritual 
in its nature. Each monad is a form in which the Divine Being 
finds individual existence, a finite existence-form of the infinite 
essence. Since, now, there is nothing but God and the monads, the 
universe is animated even to the smallest nook and corner, and the 
infinite all-life individualises itself at every point to a special and 
peculiar nature. It results from this that each thing, in the move- 
ments of its life, follows in part the law of its special nature, and 
in part a more general law, just as a planet or heavenly body 
moves at the same time on its own axis and about its sun. Cam- 
panella, who took up this doctrine also in connection with the 
Copernican system, designated this striving toward the whole, this 
tendency toward the original source of all reality, as religion, and 
spoke in this sense of a " natural " religion, that is of religion as 
" natural impulse," — one would now perhaps say centripetal im- 
pulse, — which he with logical consistency ascribed to all things in 
general, and which in man was held to assume the special form of 
" rational " religion ; that is, of the striving to become one with God 
by love and knowledge. 

This principle of the infinite variability of the divine ground of 
the world which presents itself in a special form in every particular 
thing, is found in a similar form also with Paracelsus. Here, as 
with Nicolaus Cusanus, it is taught that all substances are present 
in everything, that each thing therefore presents a microcosm, and 
yet that each has also its special principle of life and activity. 
This special mind or sx)irit of the individual is called by Paracelsus 
the Archeus ; Jacob Boehme, to whom this doctrine passed over, calls 
it the Primus. 

With Bruno the conception of the monad connects itself in a very 
interesting manner, though without further effect upon his physical 
views, with that of the atom, which was brought to him, as to the 
earlier period, by the Epicurean tradition through Lucretius. The 
'^'smallest" — in metaphysics the monad, in mathematics the point 
— is in physics the atom, the indivisible spherical element of the 
corporeal world. Memories of the Pythagorean and Platonic theory 
of the elements, and of the related atomic theory of Democritus, 
became thus alive in the midst of Neo-Platonism ; the}' found also 
an independent revival with men like Basso, Seunert, and others, 

872 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV. 

and so led to the so-called corpuscular theory, according to which 
the corporeal world consists of inseparable atom-complexes, the coi- 
puscles. In the atoms themselves, the theory assumed in conneo' 
tion with their mathematical form an original and unchangeable 
law of action, to which, it held, the mode of action of the corpuscles 
is also to be traced.-^ 

5. Here the workings of mathematics assert themselves in the old 
Pythagorean form, or as modified by Democritus and Plato. The 
ultimate constituents of physical reality are determined by their 
geometrical form, and the qualitative determinations of experience 
must be traced back to this. The combination of elements presup- 
poses numbers and their order as the principle of multiplicity.* 
Thus spatial forms and number-relations again make their appear- 
ance as the essential and original in the physical world, and thereby 
the Aristotelian-Stoic doctrine of the qualitatively determined forces, 
of the inner Forms of things, of the qualitates occuUce, was displaced. 
As this latter doctrine had formerly gained the victory over the 
principle of Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, so it must in turn 
yield to this : and herein lies one of the most important prepara- 
tions for the origin of modern natural science. 

The beginnings of this are found already with Nicolaus Cusanus ; 
but now they receive an essential strengthening from the same 
source from which their presence in his thought is explained: 
namely, from the old literature, and in particular from the Neo- 
Pythagorean writings. Just for this reason, however, they still 
have the fantastic metaphysical garb of number-mysticism and numr 
ber-symbolism. The book of Nature is written in numbers ; the har- 
mony of things is that of the number-system. All is arranged by 
God according to measure and number ; all life is an unfolding of 
mathematical relations. But just as in antiquity, so here, this 
thought is unfolded at first as an arbitrary interpretation of concep- 
tions, and a mysterious speculation. The procedure of the world 
forth from God, from the construction of the Trinity on, — as, for 
example, in the attempt of Bouille, — is again to be conceived as the 
process of the transformation of unity into the number-system. Such 
fantasies were followed by men like Cardan and Pico. Eeuchlin 
added further the mythological creations of the Jewish Cabbala. 

6. Thus the principle which was destined for the most fruitful 
development made its entrance into the new world wrapped again 
in the old metaphysical fantasticalness, and fresh forces were 

1 Cf. K. Lasswitz, Geschichte des Atomismus, I. pp. 359 ff. (Hamburg and 
Leips. 1890). 

2 Cf . for this especially G. Bruno, De Triplici Minimo. 

Chap. 1, § 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm . Paracelsus. 373 

needed to strip off this covering, and free it for its right working. 
Meanwhile, however, it became mingled with quite other efforts, 
which likewise had their origin in the Neo-Platonic tradition. To 
the idea of a universal psychical life, to the fanciful spiritualisation 
of Nature, belonged also the impulse to interfere in the course of 
things with mysterious means, with conjurations and magic arts, 
and so to guide it according to the will of man. Here, too, a higher 
iiliought hovered before the fantastic impulse of the excited age, 
— the thought of mastering Nature by a knowledge of the forces 
working in it. But this thought was also received in the wrappings 
of ancient superstition. If, as was the case with the Neo-Platonists, 
the life of Nature was regarded as a dominance of spirits, as a mys- 
teriously connected system of internal forces, it was a proper aim 
to make these subject by knowledge and will. Thus magic became 
a favourite subject of thought in the Eenaissance, and science again 
concerned itself with the task of bringing system into superstition. 

Astrology, with its influences of the stars upon human life, the 
interpretation of dreams and signs, necromancy, with its conjura- 
tions of spirits, the predictions of persons in the ecstatic state^ — all 
these elements of the Stoic and Neo-Platonic divination were then in 
most luxuriant bloom. Pico and Eeuchlin brought them into con- 
nection with the number-mysticism ; Agrippa of Nettesheim adopted 
all the sceptical attacks against the possibility of rational science, 
in order to seek help in mystical illuminations and secret magic 
arts. Cardan proceeded with all seriousness to the task of deter- 
mining the laws of these operations, and Campanella conceded them 
an unusually wide space in his idea of the world. 

Physicians especially, whose vocation demanded an interference 
in the course of Nature and might seem permitted to expect special 
advantage in secret arts, showed an inclination toward these magic 
arts. From this point of view Paracelsus desired to reform medi- 
cine. He also proceeds from the sympathy of all things, from the 
idea of the universe as a spiritually connected system. He finds 
the essence of disease in the injuring of the individual vital prin- 
ciple, the Archeus, by foreign powers, and seeks the means where- 
with to free and strengthen the Archeus. Since this latter process 
must come about by a corresponding composition of materials, all 
sorts of magical drinks, tinctures, and other secret remedies must be 
brewed, and thus the arts of alchemy were set in motion, which, in 
spite of all its fantastic performances, ultimately yielded a number 
of useful results for chemical knowledge in the course of its incred- 
ibly extended pursuits. 

In this connection the fundamental metaphysical presupposition 

374 The Renaissance : Humanistic Period. [Pakt I\ 

of the unity of all vital force led of itself to the thought that there 
must be also a simple, most eflB.cacious, universal remedy for the 
strengthening of every Archeus whatever, a panacea against all 
diseases and for the maintenance of all the vital forces ; and con- 
nection with the macrocosmic efforts of magic nourished the hope 
that the possession of this secret would lend the highest magie 
power, and afford the most desirable treasures. All this was to be 
achieved by the " philosopher's stone " ; it was to heal all diseases, 
transmute all substances into gold, conjure all spirits into the power 
of its possessor. And thus the purposes which it was thought 
would be satisfied in the ventures of alchemy, were ultimately very 
real and sober. 

7. The introduction of this magical view of Nature into the subtle 
religious system of German Mysticism constitutes the peculiar feat- 
ure of Boehme's philosophy. He, too, is seized by the thought that 
philosophy should be knowledge of Nature ; but the deep earnest- 
ness of the religious need which lay at the basis of the German 
Reformation did not allow him to content himself with the separa- 
tion ci religious metaphysics and natural science, customary at his 
time, and he sought to work the two into one again. Similar efforts 
which tended to transcend the dogmatic, fixed form of Protestant- 
ism, and hoped to solve the problems of the new science with the 
aid of a Christian metaphysics, throve also by the side of the official 
Peripatetic system. Taurellus aimed to produce such a supra-con- 
fessional philosophy of Christianity, and with a true instinct for his 
purpose, adopted many elements of the Augustinian doctrine of the 
will, but was not able to work enough real material from the inter- 
ests of his time into these thoughts, and so came ultimately rathei 
to a complete separation of empirical research from all metaphysics. 
A similar process went on in the mystical movement, which grew 
with the popular opposition against the new orthodoxy all the more 
in proportion as the latter dried and hardened within itself. The 
mystical doctrines also remained suspended in vague generality until 
the teaching of Paracelsus was brought to them, at first by Weigel, 
and then completely by Boehme. 

In Boehme's doctrine Neo-Platonism assumes again a completely 
religious colouring. Here, too, man is regarded as the microcosm 
from and by which the bodily, the " sidereal," and the divine worlds 
can be known, if one follows the right illumination and is not mis- 
led by learned theories. Self-knowledge, nevertheless, is religious 
knowledge, which finds the opposition of good and evil as a funda« 
mental trait of human nature. The same opposition fills the whole 
world-, it rules in heaven as on earth, and since God is the sole 

Chap. 1, § 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Boehme. 375 

cause of all, this opposition must be sought in him also. Boehme 
extends the coincidentia oppositorum to the extreme limit, and finds 
the ground of duality in the necessity of the self-revelation of the 
divine Primordial Ground. As light can be revealed only in con- 
nection with darkness, so God's goodness can be revealed only in 
connection with his anger. Thus Boehme portrays the process of 
the eternal self-generation of God, describing how from the dark 
ground of Being within him the urgent impulse ("Drang"), or will, 
which has only itself for its object, attains self-revelation in the 
divine wisdom, and how that which has thus become revealed forms 
itself into the world. While the theogonic development thus passes 
over immediately into the cosmogonic, the effort is everywhere 
shown in this latter development to carry the fundamental religious 
antithesis into the physical categories of the system of Paracelsus. 
Thus three kingdoms of the world and seven forms, or "qualia" 
(" Qualen"), are constructed, which ascend from the material forces 
of attraction and repulsion to those of light and warmth, and from 
there on to those of the sensible and intellectual functions. To this 
portrayal of the eternal nature of things is then attached the history 
of the earthly world, which begins with the fall of Lucifer and 
the process of rendering the spiritual essence perceptible to the 
senses, and ends with the overcoming of the proud infatuation 
{"Vergafftsein") for the creature, with the mystical devotion of 
man to the deity, and ultimately with the restoration of the spiritual 
nature. All this is presented by Boehme in prophetic discourse, 
full of deep conviction, with a unique mingling of profundity and 
dilettantism. It is the attempt of the Eckhartian Mysticism to 
become master of the modern interests of science, and the first still 
tentatively uncertain step toward raising natural science into an 
idealistic metaphysics. But because this is made from the stand- 
point of the deepest religious life, the intellectualistic features of 
the older Mysticism retreat, with Boehme, more into the background. 
While with Eckhart, the world-process both in its arising and in its 
passing was regarded as a knowing process, with Boehme it is rather 
a struggling of the will between good and evil. 

8. In all these ways the result of the separation of philosophy 
from dogmatic theology always was that the knowledge of Nature 
that was sought took on the form of the older metaphysics. This 
procedure was inevitable so long as the desire for a knowledge of 
Nature could provide neither a material of facts which it had itself 
acquired, nor new conceptions to serve as forms for the elaboration 
of this material. As a prerequisite for this, it was necessary to see 
the inadequacy of metaphysical theories, and putting them aside, 

376 "fhe Renatiii>ance : Humanistic Period. [Part IV. 

to turn to empiricism. This service was rendered to the genesis of 
.modern thought by the tendencies of Nominalism and Terminism^ 
in part, also, by the rhetorical and grammatical opposition to the 
ßcience of the schools, and also by the revival of ancient Scepticism. 

The writings of Ludovico Vives must be regarded as a common 
starting-point for these various efforts ; but they prove also that 
the importance of these endeavours is essentially negative in char- 
acter. In place of the obscure words and arbitrary conceptions of 
metaphysics, a demand is made in nominalistic fashion for the im- 
mediate, intuitive apprehension of things themselves by experience : 
but the remarks as to the manner in which this should be scientifi- 
cally set about are meagre and uncertain ; he speaks of experiment, 
but without any very deep insight into its nature. Quite so lies 
the case at a later time with Sanchez. And if the artificial subtle- 
ties of the syllogistic method were attacked with great hue and cry, 
this line of thought had ultimately only the Kamistic fancies of 
" natural logic " to put in their stead. 

Further, this empiricism, just by virtue of its origin from Termin- 
ism, could move only with a very uncertain step in the presence of 
external Nature. It could not deny the background of Occam's 
dualism. Sense-perception was held to be, not a copy of a thing, 
but an inner state of the subject corresponding to the presence of 
the thing. These scruples could be only strengthened by the 
theories of ancient Scepticism, for this added the doctrine of the 
deceptions of the senses and the consideration of the relativity and 
change of all perceptions. Hence this empiricism of the Humanists 
now also threw itself more upon inner perception, which was univer- 
sally regarded as much surer than outer perception. Vives is most 
fortunate where he speaks the language of empirical psychology; 
men like Nizolius, Montaigne, and Sanchez shared this view, and 
Charron gave it practical significance. Strenuously as all these urge 
toward looking at things themselves, outer perception ultimately 
turns out comparatively empty. 

How little certain of itself, and how little fruitful in principles 
this empiricism was at that time, is shown best of all by its two 
main representatives in Italy, — Telesio and Campanella. The former, 
one of the most stirring and influential opponents of Aristotelianism^ 
is everywhere famous even in his own time (and also with Bruno 
and Bacon), as he who demanded most strongly that science 
should build only on the basis of facts perceived by the senses. He 
founded in Naples an academy which he called the Academia Cosen- 
Una, after the name of his home, and, in fact, contributed mii^.h 
toward the cultivation of the sense for empirical natural science. 

Chap. 1, § 29.] Macrocosm and Microcosm : Campanella. 377 

But if we look to see how he treats Nature "juxta propria principia," 

we are met by genuinely physical theories which from few observations 
hastily leap over to most general metaphysical principles quite after 
the fashion of the ancient Ionics. The dry -warm and the moist-cold 
are set forth as the two opposing fundamental forces, out of whose 
conflict both the macrocosmic and the microcosmic life are to be ex- 
plained. This same inner contradiction appears almost more promi- 
nent still in Campanella. He teaches the most pronounced sens- 
ualism. All knowledge is for him a "feeling" (sentire) ; even 
recollection, judgment, and inference are for him but modified 
forms of that feeling. But in his case also, sensualism tilts over 
into psychological idealism ; he is far too good a Nominalist not to 
know that all perception is but a feeling of the states of the percip- 
ient himself. Thus he takes his starting-point in inner experience, 
and following the principle of the analogy of macrocosmus and 
microcosmus, builds upon a simple apergu (cf, above) an extended 
ontology. Into this he then draws also the quite scholastic antith- 
esis of Being and Non-being (ens and non-ens), which, following the 
Neo-Platonic example, is identified with that of the perfect and 
imperfect, and between the two he spreads the variegated meta- 
physical picture of a world-system arranged in successive strata. 

So tenaciously do the long-wonted habits of metaphysical thought 
cling everywhere to the beginnings of the new research. 




Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie au 17™^ Siede. Paris, 1846. 
Kuno Fischer, Francis Bacon und seine Nachfolger. 2d ed., Leips. 1875. 
Ch. de Rgmusat, Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu\ 
Locke. 2 vols., Paris, 1875. 

Natural science acquired its decisive influence upon the develop- 
ment of modern philosophy by first gaining its own independence 
with the aid of a conscious use of a scientific method, and then from 
this position being able to determine the general movement of 
thought as regards both form and content. In so far the develop- 
ment of the method of natural science from Kepler and Galileo 
down to Newton is not indeed itself the evolution of modern philos- 
ophy, but is yet that series of events in reference to which this 
evolution constantly proceeds. 

For this reason the positive beginnings of modern philosophy are 
in general to be sought, not so much in new conceptions with new 
content, as in methodical reflection, out of which, with the progress 
of time, there resulted of course new material and so new points of 
view for the treatment of both theoretical and practical problems. 
But at first the points of departure of modern thought were in all 
cases where permanently fruitful conceptions of the task and thereby 
conditioned procedure of the new science grew out of the humanistio 
opposition against Scholasticism, and out of the excited metaphysical 
fantasies of the transitional period. 

In this consists from the outset an essential difference between 
modern and ancient philosophy. The former is as reflective in its 
beginning as the latter was naive, and this is self-explaining, since 
the former must develop out of those traditions which the latter 
created. In this way it is characteristic of the greater number of 
the systems of modern philosophy to seek the path to the real or 
" material " problems by considering the science of method and the 
theory of knowledge ; and in particular the seventeenth century witl 
respect to its philosophy may be characterised as a strife of methods 


Chap. 2.] Natural Science Period. 379 

WMle, however, the movement of the humanistic period had 
in the main taken place in Italy and Germany, the cooler and more 
considerate temper of the two western civilised peoples now became 
prominent. Italy was made dvimb by the counter-reformation, Ger- 
many was crippled by the ruinous war between the confessions. 
England and France, on the contrary, experienced in the seventeenth 
century the bloom of their intellectual civilisation, and between 
them the Netherlands became a flourishing seat of art and science. 

In the development of the method of natural science the lines of 
empiricism and of mathematical theory converged : in philosophical 
generalisation the two came forward in an independent attitude. 
The programme of the experience philosophy was laid down by Bacon, 
but the method which formed its fundamental thought was not car- 
ried out by him in the fruitful manner which he had anticipated. 
Much more comprehensive was the form in which Descartes brought 
together the scientific movement of his time to establish rationalism 
anew, by filling the scholastic system of conceptions with the rich 
content of the Galilean research. From this resulted far-reaching 
metaphysical problems, which in the second half of the seventeenth 
century called forth an extraordinarily vigorous movement of philo- 
sophical thought, — a movement in which the new principles entered 
into manifold antithetical combinations with the principles of mediae- 
val philosophy. Out of the Cartesian school rose Occasionalism, of 
which Geulincx and Malebranche are the chief representatives. But 
the complete issue of this development was found in the two great 
philosophical systems brought forward by Spinoza and Leibniz. 

The influence which the powerful development of theoretical phil- 
osophy exercised also upon the treatment of practical problems shows 
itself principally in the field of the philosophy of law (or right) . In 
this department Hobbes, who was in like measure a disciple of Bacon 
and of Descartes, and as such marks an important point in the line 
of development of methods and metaphysics above noted, takes the 
decisive position as the introducer of an ethical naturalism which is 
found in altered form even with his opponents, such as Herbert oj 
Cherbury and Cumberland. In these antitheses the problems of the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment are in process of preparation. 

The series of great natural scientists who exercised an immediate influence 
also upon philosophical questions was opened by Johann Kepler (1561-1630) 
of Weil, a town in Württemberg, who died in Eegensburg after a life spent in 
struggle with need and anxiety. Among his works (ed. by Frisch, Frankfurt, 
1858-71, 8 vols.), the most important are Mysterium Cosmographicum, Harmo- 
nice Mundi, Astronomia Nova seu Physica Coelestis Tradita Commentariis dt 
Motibus Stellce Martis. Cf . Chr. Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, 1. 182 ff. ; E. Eucken, 
Philos. ßlonatsh. , 1878, pp. 30 ff. — In immediate attachment to him stands 
Galileo Galilei (born 1564 at Pisa, died 1642 at Arcetri). His works wer« 

380 Philosophy of the Renaissance. [Part IV. 

published in 15 vols. (Florence, 1842-56) with a biographical supplementary 
volume by Arrago. Vols. 11-14 contain the Fisico-Mathematica ; among which 
we notice II Saggiatore (1623) and the dialogue on the Ptolemaic and the 
Copernican systems (1632). Cf. H. Martin, Galileo, les droits de la science 
et la methode des sciences physiques (Paris, 1668) ; P. Natorp, Gal. als Philo- 
soph. (P/ti7os. Monatsh., 1882, pp. 193 ff.). Isaac Newton (1642-1727) comes 
into consideration chiefly on account of his Philosophice Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica (1687 ; 2d ed. by Cotes, 1713 ; German by Wolfers, 1872) and 
his Optics (1704). — Of his contemporaries we notice the chemist, Robert Boyle 
(1626-1691; Chemista Scepticus ; Origo Formarum et Qualitatum; De Ipsa 
Natura) , and the Netherlander, Christian Huyghens (1629-1695 ; De Causa 
Gravitatis ; De Lumine) . 

Cf. W. Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences (Lond. 1837; German by 
Littrow, Leips. 1839 ff.) ; E. F. Apelt, Die Epochen der Geschichte der Mensch^ 
heit (Jena, 1845) ; E. Dühring, Kritische Geschichte der Principien der 
Mechanik (Leips. 1872) ; A. Lange, Gesch. des Materialismus, 2d ed., Iserlohn, 
1873 [Eng. tr. History of Materialism by E. C. Thomas, Lond., 4th ed., 1892] ; 
K. Lasswitz, Gesch. der Atomistik, 2 vols. (Hamburg and Leips. 1890) . 

Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount of St. Albans, was born in 
1561, studied in Cambridge, had a brilliant career under the reigns of Elizabeth 
and James I., until, as the result of political opposition, he was proceeded 
against, convicted of venality, and deposed from the position of Lord High 
Chancellor. He died 1626. The latest edition of his works is that by Spedding 
and Heath (Lond. 1857 ff.). Aside from the Fssays (Sermones Fideles) the 
main writings are De Dignilate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623 ; originally 
published rmder the title^ The Two Books of Fra'i £is Bacon on the Proflcience 
and Advancementof Learning, Divine and Human, 1605) and Novum Organon 
Scientiarum (1620; originally under the title, Cogitata et Visa, 1612).^ Cf. 
Ch. de Römusat, Bacon, Sa vie, son temps, sa philosophic et .son influence 
jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, 1854) ; H. Heussler, Fr. B. und seine geschichtliche 
Stellung (Breslau, 1889) ; [Bacon, by J. Nichol, in Blackwood's series, Edin. 
1888 : Ed. of the Novum Organum by Fowler, Oxford, 1878]. 

Ren6 Descartes (Cartesius), born 1596, in Touraine, and educated in the 
Jesuit school at La Fleche, was originally destined for a soldier and took part in 
the campaigns of 1618-1621 in the service of various leaders, but then betook 
himself for the first time to Paris, and later, withdrew for many years, at differ- 
ent places in the Netherlands, into a scientific solitude, which he kept in the 
most diligent and careful manner. After controversies in which his doctrine 
had become involved at the universities in that country had rendered this place 
of residence disagreeable, he accepted, in 1649, an invitation of Queen Christine 
of Sweden to Stockholm, where he died the following year. His works have 
been collected in Latin in the Amsterdam editions (1650, etc.), and in French 
by V. Cousin (11 vols., Paris, 1824 ff.) ; the important writings have been trans- 
lated into German by Kuno Fischer (Mannheim, 1863) [Eng. tr. of the Method, 
Meditations and Selections from the Principles by J. Veitch, Edin. and Lond., 
1st ed., 1850-52, 10th ed., "l890 ; of the Meditations by Lowndes, Lond. 1878, 
also in Joxir. Spec. Phil., Vol. IV., 1870, by W. R. Walker; and of the Bules for 
the Direction of the Mind, with selections from the Med.''s, The World, The 
Passions of the Soul, etc., by H. A. P. Torrey, N.Y. 1892]. The main works 
are Le Monde ou Tratte de la Lumiere (posthumously printed, 1654) ; Essays, 
16H7, among them the Discours de la Methode and the Dioptrics; Meditationes 
de Prima Philosophia, 1641, supplemented by the objections of various savants 
and Descartes' replies ; Principia Philosophice, 1644 ; Passions de VÄme, 1650. 
Cf . F. Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophie Cartesienne (Paris, 1854) ; X. Schmid- 

1 It is well known that very recently much noise has been made over the 
discovery that Lord Bacon vrrote Shakspere's works also, in his leisure hours. 
To fuse two great literary phenomena into one may have something alluring in 
it, but in any case a mistake has been made in the person. For it would be 
much more probable that Shakspere had incidentally composed the Baconian 
philosophy. [The Germans seem to take this "noise" much more seriously 
than Shakspere's countrymen. — Tr.] 

'Chap. 2.] Natural Science Period. 381 

schwarzenberg, B. D. und seine Beform der Philosophie (Nördlingen, 1859) ; 
G. Glogau in Zeitschr. f. Philos., 1878, pp. 209 ff. ; P. Natorp, Z>.'s Erkenntniss- 
theorie (Marburg, 1882) . [Descartes by J. P. Mahaffy in Blackwood's series, 
Edin. and Phila., 1881 ; W. Wallace, Art. Descartes in Unc. Brit. ; H. Sidgwick 
in Mind, Vol. VII. ; Ehodes in Jour. Spec. Phil., XVII. 

Between these two leaders of modern philosophy stands Thomas Hobbes, 
born 1588, educated at Oxford, who was early drawn over to France by his 
studies, and frequently afterwards returned thither, was personally acquainted 
with Bacon, Gassendi, Campanella, and the Cartesian circle, and died 1679. 
Complete edition of his works, English and Latin by Molesworth, Lond. 1839 ff. 
His first treatise, Elements of Law, Natural and Political (1639), was pub- 
lished by his friends in 1650, in two parts. Human Nature and De Corpore 
Politico. He published previously Elementa Philosophio} de Give, 1642 and 1647, 
and further Leviathan or The Matter, Form, and Authority of Government, 1651. 
A comprehensive statement is given in the Elementa Philosophice, I., De Cor- 
pore, II., De nomine, 1668 (both previously in English in 1655 and 1658. Cf. 
F. Tönuies in Vierteljahrschr. f. w. Philos., 1879 ff. [Hobbes, by G. C. Eobert- 
son in Blackwood's series, ¥Ain. and Phil. 1886, also Art. Hobbes, in Enc. 
Brit, by same author.] F. Tönnies. Hobbes (Stuttgart, 1896). 

Of the Cartesian School (cf. Bouillier, op. cit.) are to be noted the Jansen- 
ists of Port-Royal, from whose circles came the Logique ou Vart depenser (1662), 
ed. by Anton Arnauld (1612-1694), and Pierre Nicole (1625-1695) ; also the 
Mystics, Blaise Pascal (162.3-1662 ; Pensees sur la Beligion ; cf. the monographs 
by J. G. Dreydorff, Leips. 1870 and 1875), and Pierre Poiret (1646-1719 ; De 
Eruditione Triplici, Solida Superficiaria et Falsa. 

The development to Occasionalism proceeds gradually in Louis de la Forge 
{Traitede V Esprit Humain. 1666), Clauberg (1622-1665 ; De Conjunctione Corpo- 
ris et Animce inHomine), Cordemoy (Le Discernement du Corps et de VAme, 
1666), but finds its complete development independently of these thinkers in 
Arnold Geulincx (1625-1669 ; a university teacher in Loewen and Leyden). 
His main works are the Ethics (1665; 2d ed. with notes, 1675); Logic, 1662, 
and" Methodus, 1663. New ed. of his works by J. P. N. Land (3 vols., The 
Hague, 1891-3). Cf. E. Pfleiderer, A. Q. als Hauptvertreter der occ. Metaphysik 
und Ethik (Tübingen, 1882) ; V. van der Hseghen, G. Etude sur sa Vie, sa 
Philosophie et ses Ouvrages (Lüttich, 1886). 

From the Oratorium founded by Cardinal Berulle, a friend of Descartes, to 
which Gibieuf also belonged {De Libertate Dei et Creaturce, Paris, 1630), went 
forth Nicole Malebranche (1638-1715). His main work, De la Becherche de la 
Verite, appeared 1675, the Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et sur la Beligion in 
1688. Coll. works by J. Simon (Paris, 1871). 

Baruch (Benedict de) Spinoza, born in 1632 at Amsterdam in the commu- 
nity of Portuguese Jews, and later expelled from this community on account 
of his opinions, lived in noble simplicity and solitude at various places in Hol- 
land, and died at The Hague 1677. He had published an exposition of the 
Cartesian philosophy with an independent metaphysical appendix (1663) and 
the Tractatus Theologico-politicus (anonymously in 1670). After his death 
appeared in his Opera Posthuma (1677), his main work, Ethica More Geometrico 
Demonstrata, the Tractatus Politicus, and the fragment De Intellectus Emenda- 
tione. His correspondence and his recently discovered youthful work, Tractatus 
(brevis) de Deo et Homine ejusque Felicitate, also come into consideration. 
On the latter cf. Chr. Sigwart (Tübingen, 1870). The best edition of his works 
is that by Van Vloten and Land (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1882 f.). Cf. T. Camerer, 
Die Lehre Sp.'s (Stuttgart, 1877). [Spinoza, by J. Caird, Edin. 1888 ; Spinoza 
by Martineau, Lond. 1883 ; also in Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1886 ; F. 
Pollock, Spinoza, His Life and Phil., Lond. 1880 ; Seth, Art. Spinoza, in Enc. 
Brit. ; Arts, in Jour. Spec. Phil., Vols. 11 and 16, by Morris and Dewey ; Eng. 
tr. of prin. works by Elwes, Bohn Lib., 1884, of the Ethics by White, Lond. 1883, 
and of Selections by FuUerton, N.Y. 1892.] 

Of philosophical writers in Germany who attached themselves to the train of 
the movement among the two civilised peoples of the West are to be mentioned 
Joachim Jung (1587-1657; Logica Hamburgiensis, 1638); cf. G. E. Guhrauer, 

382 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

J. J. und sein Zeitalter (Stuttg. and Tub. 1859); the Jena mathematician, 
Erhard Weigel, the teacher of Leibniz and Puffendorf ; Walther von Tschim- 
hausen (1651-1708; Medicina Mentis sive Ärtis Inveniendi Proecepta Generalia, 
Amsterdam, 1687), and Samuel Puffendorf (1632-1694; under the pseudonym 
Severinus a Monzambano, De Statu Bei publicce Germanicce, 1667, German by 
H. Bresslau, Berlin, 1870 ; De Jure Naturce et Gentium, London, 1672). 

Leibniz belongs in this period, not only in point of time, but also as regards 
the origination and the motives of his metaphysics, while with other interests 
of his incredibly many-sided nature, he ranges on into the age of the Enlighten- 
ment ; cf. on this, Part V. Here, therefore, we have to consider principally his 
methodological and metaphysical writings : De Principio Individui, 1663 ; De 
Arte Combinatorial 1666 ; Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis, 1684 ; De 
Scientia Universali seu Calculo Philosophico, 1684 (cf. A. Trendelenburg, Mist. 
Beiträge zur Philos., III. 1 ff.); De Primce Philosgphice Emendatione, 1694; 
Systeme Nouveau de la Nature, 1695, with the three Eclaircissements connected 
with it, 1696 ; also the Monadologie, 1714, the Principes de la Nature et de la 
Grace, 1714, and a great part of his extended correspondence. Among the 
editions of his philosophical writings the excellent edition by J. E. Erdmann 
(Berlin, 1840) has now been surpassed by that of C. J. Gerhardt (7 vols., Ber- 
lin, 1875-91). — On the system as a whole cf. L. Feuerbach, Darstellung, Ent- 
wicklung und Kritik der Leihnizischen Philos. (Ansbach, 1837), A. Nourisson, 
La Philos. de L. (Paris, 1860); E. Wendt, Die Entwicklung der L.'' sehen Mo- 
nadenlehre bis 1695 (Berlin, 1886). [E. Dillmann, Eine neue Darst. der 
L.'' sehen Monadenlehre, Leips. 1891. See also the lit. on p. 444.] 

On the historical and systematic reZaf 10 re of the systems to one another: H. 
C. W. Sigwart, Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der cartes. 
Philos. (Tub. 1816) and Die Leibniz'' sehe Lehre von der prästabilirten Harmonie 
in ihrem Zusammenhang mit früheren Philosophemen (ib. 1822) ; C. Schaar- 
schmidt, Descartes und Spinoza (Bonn, 1850) ; A. Foucher de Careil, Leibniz, 
Descartes et Spinoza (Paris, 1863) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. und Geulincx (Tüb. 1884) ; 
E. Zeller, Sitz.-Ber. d. Berliner Akad, 1884, pp. 673 ff. ; F. Tönnies, Leibniz und 
Bobbes in Philos. Monatsh; 1887, pp. 357 ff. ; L. Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza 
(Berlin, 1890). [E. Caird, Art Cartesianism, in Enc. Brit., reprinted in "Vol. 2 
of his Essays, Lond. and N.Y. 1892 ; Saisset's Modern Patitheism.] 

To the founders of the philosophy of law (cf. C. v. Kaltenborn, Die Vorläufer 
des Hugo Grotius, Leips. 1848 ; and R. v. Mohl, Gesch. und Litteratur der 
Staatswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1855-58) belong isTicolo Macchiavelli (1469- 
1527 ; LI Principe, Discorsi sulla prima decade di Tito Livio ; [Works, tr. by C. 
E. Detmold, Boston, 1883.] Thomas More (1480-1535 ; De Optimo Beipublicoi 
Statu sive de Nova Lisula Utopia, 1516); Jean Bodin (1530-1597); SixLivresde 
la Bepublique, \bll ; an extract from the Heptaplomeres has been given by 
Guhrauer, Berlin, 1841) ; Albericus Gentilis (1551-1611 ; De Jure Belli, 1588) ; 
Johannes Althua (1557-1638 ; Politica, Groningen, 1610, cf. 0. Gierke, Unters, 
z. deutsch. Staats- u. Bechtsgesch., Breslau, 1880) ; Hugo de Groot (1583-1645 ; 
De Jure Belli et Pads, 1645; cf. H. Luden, H. G., Berlin, 1806). 

Of the Protestants who treat of the philosophy of law may be named, be- 
sides Melancthon, J. Oldendorf (Elementaris Introductio, 1539), Kic. Hemming 
{De Lege Natures, 1562), Ben Winkler (Principia Juris, 1615) ; of the Catho- 
lics besides Suarez, Rob. Bellarmin (1542-1021 ; De Potestate Pontificis in 
Temporalibus) and Mariana (1537-1624 ; De Bege et Begis histitutione) . 

Natural religion and natural morals in the seventeenth century found in 
England their main supporters in Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648 ; Tractatus 
de Veritate, 1624 ; De Beligione Gentilixim Errorumque apud eos Causis, 1663 ; 
on him Ch. de Rgmusat, Paris, 1873), and Richard Cumberland (De Legibus 
Naturce Disquisitio Philosophica, Lond. 1672). Among the Platonists or Neo- 
Platonists of England at the same time are prominent Ralph Cudworth (1617- 
1688 ; The Intellectual System of the Universe, Lond. 1678, Latin, Jena, 1733) 
and Henry More (1614-1687 ; Encheiridion Metaphysicum. His correspondence 
with Descartes is printed in the latter's works, Vol. X., Cousin's ed.). \_Phil. 
of Cudworth, by C. E. Lowrey, with bibliog., N.Y. 1884; TuUoch's Rational 
Theol. and Ghristiari Phil, in Eng. in 11 th Cent.'] Theophilus Gale and his 
son, Thomas Gale, may be added to the authors above. 

Chap. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Bacon. 383 

§ 30. The Problem of Method. 

All beginnings of modern philosophy have in common an impul- 
sive opposition against "Scholasticism," and at the same time a 
naive lack of understanding for the common attitude of dependence 
upon some one of its traditions, which they nevertheless all occupy. 
This fundamental oppositional character brings with it the conse- 
quence, that in all cases where it is not merely wants of the feelings, 
or fanciful views that are set over against the old doctrines, reflec- 
tion on new methods of knowledge stands in the foreground. Out of 
the insight into the unfruitfulness of the " syllogism," which could 
merely set forth in proof or refutation that which was already 
known, or apply the same to a particular case, arises the demand 
for an ars inveniendi, a method of investigation, a sure way to the 
discovery of the new. 

1. If now nothing was to be accomplished with the help of 
rhetoric, the nearest expedient was to attack the matter by the 
reverse method, proceeding from the particular, from the facts. 
This had been commended by Vives and Sanchez, and practised by 
Telesio and Campanella. But they had neither gained full confi- 
dence in experience nor known afterwards how to make any right 
beginning with their facts. In both lines Bacon believed that he 
could point out new paths for science, and in this spirit he set up 
his " New Organon " as over against the Aristotelian. 

Every-day perception — he confesses, admitting the well-known 
sceptical arguments — offers, indeed, no sure basis for a true knowl- 
edge of Nature ; in order to become an experience that can be used 
by science it must first be purified from all the erroneous additions 
which have grown together with it in our involuntary way of regard- 
ing things. These perversions or falsifications of pure experience 
Bacon calls idols, and presents his doctrine of these fallacious images 
in analogy with the doctrine of the fallacious conclusions in the old 
dialectic.^ There are first the "idols of the tribe" (idola trihus), 
the illusions that are given in connection with human nature in 
general, following which we are always suspecting an order and an 
end in things, making ourselves the measure of the outer world, 
blindly retaining a mode of thought which has once been excited by 
impressions, and the like; then the "idols of the cave" {idola 
specus) , by reason of which every individual by his natural disposi- 
tion, and his situation in life, finds himself shut into his cave ; ^ 

1 Nov. Org. I. 39 ff. 

2 Bacon's strongly rhetorical language, rich in imagery, aims by this term 
(of. De Augm. V. ch. 4) to recall Plato's well-known parable of the Cave {Bep. 

384 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Pakt TV. 

then the "idols of the market" (idola fori), the errors which are 
everywhere brought about by intercourse among men, especially by 
language, and by adherence to the word which we substitute for the 
idea; finally, the "idols of the theatre" {idola theatri), the illusory 
phantoms of theories which we credulously receive from human 
history and repeat without subjecting them to any judgment of our 
own. In this connection Bacon finds opportunity to direct a most 
violent polemic against the word-wisdom of Scholasticism, against 
the rule of authority, against the anthropomorphism of earlier 
philosophy, and to demand a personal examination of things them- 
selves, an unprejudiced reception of reality. Nevertheless he does 
not get beyond this demand; for the statements as to how the 
mera experientia is to be gained and separated from the enveloping 
husks of the idols are extremely meagre, and while Bacon teaches 
that one must not limit himself to accidental perceptions, but must 
set about his observation methodically, and supplement it by 
experiment ^ which he thinks out and makes for himself, this also is 
but a general designation of the task, and a theoretical insight into 
the essential nature of experiment is still wanting. 

Quite similar is the case with the method of Induction, which 
Bacon proclaimed as the only correct mode of elaborating facts. 
With its aid we are to proceed to general cognitions (axioms), in 
order that we may ultimately from these explain other phenomena. 
In this activity the human mind, among whose constitutional errors 
is over-hasty generalisation, is to be restrained as much as possible ; 
it is to ascend quite gradually the scale of the more general, up to 
the most general. Healthy and valuable as these prescriptions are, 
we are the more surprised to find that with Bacon their more de- 
tailed carrying out is completed in conceptions and modes of view 
which are entirely scholastic.^ 

All knowledge of Nature has for its end to understand the causes 
of things. Causes, however, are — according to the old Aristotelian 
scheme — formal, material, efficient, or final. Of these only the 
"formal" causes come into consideration; for all that takes place 
has its grounds in the " Forms," in the " natures " of things. Hence 
when Bacon's Induction searches for the "Form" of phenomena, 
e.g. for the Form of heat, Form is here understood quite in the 
sense of Scotism as the abiding essence or nature of phenomena. 
The Form of that which is given in perception is composed out of 

514), which is the more unfortunate as, in the Platonic passage, it is precisely 
the general limited nature of knowledge by the senses that is dealt with. 

1 Nov. Org. I. 82. 

2 Cf . the circumstantial exposition in the second book of the N'ov. Org. 

Chap. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Bacon. 385 

simpler " Forms " and their " differences," and these it is important 
to discover. To this end as many cases as possible in which the 
phenomenon in question appears, are brought together into a tabula 
prcesentice, and in like manner, those in which the phenomenon is 
lacking are brought together into a tabula absentim; to these is 
added, in the third place, a tabula graduum, in which the varying 
intensity with which the phenomenon appears is compared with the 
varying intensity of other phenomena. The problem is then to be 
solved by a progressive process of exclusion (exdusio) . The Form 
of heat, for example, is to be that which is everywhere present 
where heat is found, which is nowhere where heat is lacking, and 
which is present in greater degree where there is more heat, and 
in lesser degree where there is less heat.^ What Bacon presents 
accordingly as Induction is certainly no simple enumeration, but 
an involved process of abstraction, which rests upon the meta- 
physical assumptions of the scholastic Formalism ^ (cf . § 27, 3) ; the 
presage of the new is still quite embedded in the old habits of 

2. It is accordingly comprehensible that Bacon was not the man 
to bring to the study of Nature itself methodical or material 
furtherance : but this derogates nothing from his philosophical 
importance,^ which consists just in this, that he demanded the gen- 
eral application of a principle, to which he yet was unable to give 
any useful or fruitful form in the case of the most immediate 
object for its use : namely, the knowledge of the corporeal world. 
He had understood that the new science must turn from the endless 
discussion of conceptions back to things themselves, that it can 
build only upon direct perception, and that it must rise from this 
only cautiously and gradually to the more abstract, * and he had 
understood no less clearly that in the case of this Induction, the 
point at issue was nothing other than the discovery of the simple 

1 In which case it turns out that the Form of heat is motion, and, indeed, a 
motion which is expansive, and thus divided by inhibition and couimunicated 
to the smaller parts of the body [motus expansivus, cohibitus et nitens per partes 


2 Cf. Chr. Sigwart, Logik, II. § 93, 3. 

3 Cf. Chr. Sigwart in the Preuss. Jahrb., 1863, 93 ff. 

* The pedagogical consequences of the Baconian doctrine as contrasted with 
Humanism, with which, in general, the movement of natural science came in 
conflict in this respect, were drawn principally by Amos Comenius (1592-1671). 
His Didactica Magna presents the course of instruction as a graded ascent from 
the concrete and perceptive to the more abstract ; his Orbis Pictus aims to give 
for the school a perceptional basis for instruction about things ; his Jamta Lin- 
guarum Beserrata, finally, aims to have the learning of foreign languages 
arranged so as to be taught only as it is requisite as a means for acquiring 
knowledge about things. The pedagogical views of Rattich are similar (1571- 

386 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

elements of reality, from the " nature " of which, in their regular 
relation and connection, the whole compass of what we perceive is 
to be explained. Induction, he thought, will find the Forms by which 
Nature must be interpreted. But while in his cosmology he did not 
get far beyond an adherence to the traditional atomism, and even 
shut himself up against the great achievement of the Copernican 
theory, he demanded that his empirical principle should be applied 
also to knowledge of man. Not only the bodily existence in its 
normal and abnormal vital processes, but also the movement of 
ideas and of activities of the will, especially also the social and 
political system, — all these should be examined as to their mov- 
ing forces (''Forms") by the method of natural science, and ex- 
plained without prejudice. The anthropological and social naturalism 
which Bacon announces in the encyclopaedic remarks of his work 
De Augmentis Scientiarum, contains examples of programmes^ for 
many branches of knowledge, and proceeds everywhere from the 
fundamental purpose to understand man and all the activities of 
his life as a product of the same simple elements of reality which 
also lie at the basis of external Nature. 

Still another element comes to light in this anthropological inter- 
est. To understand man is not, for Bacon, an end in itself, any 
more than it is such to understand Nature. His entire thought is 
rather subordinated to a practical end, and this he conceives in the 
grandest form. All human knowledge has ultimately for its sole 
task to procure for man dominion over the world by his knowledge 
of the world. Knowledge is poiver, and is the only lasting power. 
While therefore magic with fantastic arts sought to make itself 
master of the working forces of Nature, this blind endeavour became 
clarified with Bacon to the insight that man can owe his mastery 
over things only to a sober investigation of their true essence. For 
him, therefore, the interpretatio naturae is only the means of 
subjecting nature to the human mind, and his great work for the 
" Eenovation of the Sciences " — Instauratio Magna, " Temporis Par- 
tus Maximus " — bears also the title De Regno Hominis. 

In this, Bacon expressed what was moving the heart of thousands 
at his time, under the impress of great events. With that series 
of discoveries beyond the seas, where through mistakes, adventures, 
and crimes, man had at last for the first time taken complete pos- 
session of his planet, with inventions such as those of the mariner's 
compass, of gunpowder, and of the art of printing,^ a mighty 

1 If we could therefore regard as accomplished all that Bacon sets before him 
in prospect, we might find with him the entire natural science of to-day. 

2 Cf. O. Peschel, Gesch. des Zeitalters der Entdeckungen, 2d ed., Leips. 1879 

Chap. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Bacon. 387 

change had been introduced within a short time into the greater as 
well as the lesser life of man. A new epoch of civilisation seemed 
to be opened, and an exotic excitement seized upon men's fancy. 
Unheard-of things should succeed; nothing was to be impossible 
any longer. The telescope disclosed the mysteries of the heavens, 
and the powers of the earth began to obey the investigator. 
Science would be the guide of the human mind in its victorious 
journey through Nature. By her inventions, human life should be 
completely transformed. What hopes in this respect set free the 
fancy for its flights we see from Bacon's Utopian fragment of the 
Nova Atlantis, and also from Campanella's Civitas Solis. The 
English Chancellor, however, held that the task of the knowledge 
of Nature was ultimately to make of invention, which had hitherto 
been for the most part a matter of chance, a consciously exercised 
art. To be sure, he gave life to this thought only in the fantastic 
picture of Solomon's house, in his Utopia ; he guarded himself from 
seriously carrying it out ; but this meaning which he attributed to 
the ars inveniendi made him an opponent of purely theoretical and 
" contemplative " knowledge ; just from this point of view did he 
combat Aristotle and the unfruitfulness of monastic science. In 
his hand philosophy was in danger of falling from the rule of a 
religious end under that of technical interests. 

But the issue proved again that the golden fruits of knowledge 
ripen only where they are not sought. In his haste for utility 
Bacon missed his goal, and the intellectual creations which have 
enabled natural science to become the basis of our external civilisa- 
tion proceeded from the superior thinkers, who, with pure disinter- 
ested thought, and without any eagerness to improve the world, 
desired to understand the order of Nature which they admired. 

3. His tendency toward the practical end of invention blinded 
Bacon to the theoretical value of mathematics. This value had at 
first come to consciousness in the fantastic forms which praised the 
number-harmony of the universe in Neo-Platonic exuberance (cf. 
§ 29, 5), imitating the Pythagorean methods. The great investiga- 
tors of Nature set out from a like admiration for the beauty and 
order of the universe ; but the new in their teachings consists in 
just this, that they no longer seek this mathematical significance of 
the cosmical order in symbolic number-speculations, but aim to 
understand and prove it from facts. Modern investigation of Nature 
was born as empirical Pythagoreanism. This problem had been seen 
already by Leonardo da Vinci ^ — to have been the first to solve it 

1 Cf. with regard to him as a philosopher, K. Prautl, Sitz.-Ber. der Mün- 
rhener Akad., 1885, 1 ff. 

388 The Henaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV, 

is the glory of Kepler. The psychological motive of his research 
was the philosophical conviction of the mathematical order of the 
universe, and he verified his conviction by discovering the laws of 
planetary motion by means of a grand induction. 

In this procedure it became evident, on the one hand, that the true 
task of induction in natural science consists in finding out that 
mathematical relation which remains the same in the entire series 
of the phenomena determined by measurement, and, on the other 
hand, that the object, in connection with which this task can be 
performed by research, is none other than motion. The divine 
arithmetic and geometry which Kepler sought in the universe was 
found in the laws of occurrence and change {^Geschehens). Proceed- 
ing from this principle, with a more distinct methodical conscious- 
ness, Galileo created mechanics as the mathematical theory of motion. 
It is extremely instructive to compare the thoughts which the latter 
presents in the Saggiatore with Bacon's interpretation of Nature. 
Both aim to analyse into their elements the phenomena given in per- 
ception, in order to explain phenomena from the combination of 
these elements. But where Bacon's Induction seeks the " Forms, " 
Galileo's method of resolution (analysis) searches out the simplest 
processes of motion capable of mathematical determination; and 
while interpretation with the former consists in pointing out how 
the natures co-operate to form an empirical structure, the latter 
shows in his method of composition (synthesis) that the mathemati- 
cal theory under the presupposition of the simple elements of 
motion leads to the same results which experience exhibits.^ From 
this standpoint experiment also acquires quite another significance : 
it is not merely a shrewd question put to Nature, but is the intelli- 
gent and intentional interference by which simple forms of occur- 
rence are isolated in order to subject them to measurement. Thus, 
all that Bacon had merely presaged receives with Galileo a definite 
significance usable for the investigation of Nature, by means of the 
mathematical principle and its application to motion ; and in accord- 
ance with these principles of mechanics Newton was able by his 
hypothesis of gravitation to give the mathematical theory for the 
explanation of Kepler's laws. 

With this, the victory of the principle of Democritus and Plato, 
that the sole object which true knowledge of Nature can deal with 
is what is capable of quantitative determination, was sealed in 3; 
completely new form ; but this time the principle was applied not 
to the Being, but to the Becoming or change in Nature. Scientific 

1 This methodical standpoint Hobbes makes entirely his own (cf . De Corp. « 
ch. 6), and indeed in expressly rationalistic antithesis to the empiricism of BacoOt 

Chap. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Gralileo, Hohhes, 389 

insight reaches as far as the mathematical theory of motion extends. 
Exactly this standpoint of the Galilean physics is taken in theoreti- 
cal philosophy by Hohhes} Geometry is the only certain discipline ; 
all knowledge of Nature is rooted in it. We can know only such 
objects as we can construct, so that we derive all further conse- 
quences from this our own operation. Hence knowledge of all 
things, in so far as it is accessible for us, consists in tracing back 
what is perceived to motion of bodies in space. Science has to 
reason from phenomena to causes, and from these latter in turn to 
their effects : but phenomena are, in their essence, motions ; causes 
are the simple elements of motion, and effects are again motions. 
Thus arises the apparently materialistic proposition : philosophy is 
the doctrine of the motion of bodies ! This is the extreme conse- 
quence of the separation of philosophy from theology, which began 
with the English Franciscans. 

The essential result for philosophy in these methodical begin- 
nings of natural research is, therefore, twofold: empiricism was 
corrected by mathematics, and the shapeless Pythagoreanism of the 
humanistic tradition was made by empiricism definite mathemati- 
cal theory. These lines meet and are bound together in Galileo. 

4. In mathematical theory, accordingly, was found that rational 
factor which Giordano Bruno had demanded in his treatment of the 
Copernican doctrine for a critical elaboration of sense perception.^ 
Eational science is mathematics. Proceeding from this conviction, 
Descartes undertook his reform of philosophy. Educated in the 
Scholasticism of the Jesuits, he had attained the personal convic- 
tion ^ that satisfaction for an earnest craving for truth was to be found 
neither in metaphysical theories nor in the learned polymathy of 
the empirical disciplines, but in mathematics alone ; and by follow- 
ing the pattern of mathematics, — himself, as is well known, a cre- 
ative mathematician, — he thought to transform all the rest of human 
knowledge : his philosophy aims to be a universal mathematics. In 
the generalisation of the Galilean principle requisite for this pur- 
pose, some of the factors which made the principle fruitful for the 
special tasks of natural research fell away, so that Descartes' teach- 
ing is not usually counted as an advance in the history of physics; 
but the power of his influence upon the philosophical development, 
in which he was the ruling mind for the seventeenth century and 
beyond, was all the greater. 

To those methodical thoughts which are common to Bacon and 

1 Cf. the beginning of De Corpore. 

2 G. Bruno, DelV Inf. Univ. e Mond. 1 in. (L. 307 f.;. 

3 Cf . the fine exposition in the Discours de la Methode. 

390 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

Galileo, Descartes added a postulate of the greatest importance : he 
demanded that the method of induction or resolution should lead to 
a single principle of highest and absolute certainty, from which after- 
wards, by the method of composition, the whole compass of experi- 
ence must find its explanation. This demand was entirely original, 
and had its root in the felt need for a systematic, connected whole 
of all human knowledge ; it rested ultimately upon his surfeit of 
the traditional reception of historically collected knowledge, and 
upon his longing for a new philosophical creation from one mould. 
Descartes will, then, by an inductive enumeration and a critical 
sifting of all ideas, press forward to a single, certain point, in order 
from this point to deduce all further truths. The first task of phil- 
osophy is analytic, the second synthetic. 

The classical carrying out of this thought is presented in the 
Meditations. The philosopher portrays his struggle after truth in 
a dramatic dialogue with himself. Proceeding from the principle 
" de omnibus dubitandum," the whole circuit of ideas is reviewed 
on all sides, and in the process we meet the whole apparatus of 
sceptical arguments. We experience the change of opinions and the 
deceptions of the senses too often, says Descartes, to permit of our 
trusting them. In the face of the variety of impressions which the 
same object makes under different circumstances, it is not possible 
to decide which of these impressions, and, indeed, whether any one 
of them, contains the true essence of the thing ; and the liveliness 
and sureness with which we can dream in our actual experience 
must excite in us the scruple which can never be completely set 
aside, as to whether we are not perhaps dreaming even when we 
believe that we are awake and perceiving. Meanwhile, at the basis 
of all the combinations which the imagination can produce lie the 
simple elementary acts of consciousness, and in connection with 
these we meet with truths of which we are undeniably obliged to 
say that we cannot help recognising them, as, for example, the 
simple propositions of arithmetic 2x2 = 4, and the like. But 
how if now we were so constituted that from our very nature we 
must necessarily err ? how if some demon had created us, whose 
pleasure it was to give us a Eeason that would necessarily deceive 
while it supposed itself to be teaching the truth ? Against such a 
delusion we should be defenceless, and this thought must make us 
mistrustful even with reference to the most evident utterances of 

After fundamental doubt has been thus pressed even to the far- 
thest extreme, it proves that the doubt breaks off its own point, 
that it itself presents a fact of completely imassailable certainty •, 

Chap. 2, § 30.] ProUem of Method : Descartes. 391 

in order to doubt, in order to dream, in order to be deceived, I must 
be. Doubt itself proves that I, as a thinking conscious being (res 
cogitans), exist. The proposition cogito sum is true as often as I 
think or pronounce it. And, indeed, the certainty of Being is con- 
tained in none of my activities except that of consciousness. That 
I go to walk I can imagine in my dream : ^ that I am conscious can- 
not be merely my imagination, for imagination is itself a kind of 
consciousness.^ The certainty of the Being or existence of conscious- 
ness is the one fundamental truth which Descartes finds by the 
analytic method. 

Rescue from doubt consists therefore in the Augustinian argument 
of the Reality of the conscious nature or essence (cf. § 22, 1). But 
its application with Descartes ^ is not the same as with Augustine 
himself and with the great number of those on whom his doctrine 
was influential just in the transition period. For Augustine, the 
self-certainty of the soul was valued as the surest of all experiences, 
as the fundamental fact of inner perception by means of which the 
latter obtains for the theory of knowledge a preponderance over 
outer perception. Thus — not to recall again Charron's moralising 
interpretation — Campanella particularly had employed the Augus- 
tinian principle when, not unlike the great Church Father, he gave 
to the elements of this experience of self the meaning of metaphysi- 
cal prime elements (cf. § 29, 3). In a completely analogous manner 
— not to speak of Locke ^ — Tschirnhaiisen, in a supposed adherence 
to Descartes, had later regarded self-knowledge as the experientia evi- 
dentissima,^ which is therefore to serve as the a posteriori beginning of 
philosophy (cf. below, No. 7), so that from it all further knowledge 
can be constructed a priori; for in self-knowledge is contained the 
threefold truth, that we are effected by some things well and by 
others ill, that we understand some and not others, and that in the 
process of ideation we occupy a passive attitude with reference to 

1 Descartes' reply to Gassendi's objection (V. 2) ; cf. Princ. Phil. I. 9. 

2 The ordinary translation of cogitate, cogitatio by "think" (Denken) is 
liable to occasion misunderstanding, since Denken in German [and the same is 
true of think, in English, at least in philosophical terminology] signifies a par- 
ticular kind of theoretical consciousness. Descartes himself elucidates the mean- 
ing of Gogitare (Med. III. ; Princ. Phil. I. 9), by enumeration: he understands 
by it to doubt, affirm, deny, understand, will, abhor, imagine, feel a sensation, 
etc. For that which is common to all these functions we have in German 
scarcely any word but " Bewusstsein " [consciousness]. The same is also true 
with regard to Spinoza's use of the term ; cf. his Princ. Phil. Cart. I., Prop. TV., 
Schol., and also Eth. II., Ax. III., and elsewhere. 

3 Who besides, at the outset, seems not to have known the historical origin of 
this argument. Cf. Obj. IV., and Besp. 

* Cf. below, §§ 33 f. 

^ Tschirnhausen, Med. Ment. (1695), pp. 290-94. 

892 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Fart IV. 

the outer world, — three points of attachment for the three rational 
sciences, ethics, logic, and physics. 

5. With Descartes, on the contrary, the proposition cogito sum 
has not so much the meaning of an experience, as rather that of the 
first fundamental rational truth. Nor is its evidence that of an infer- 
ence,^ but that of immediate intuitive certainty. The analytic method 
seeks here, as with Galileo, the simple, self -intelligible elements, out 
of which all else is to be explained ; but while the physicist discovers 
the perceptional elementary form of motion, which is to make com- 
prehensible all that takes place in the corporeal world, the meta- 
physician is hunting for the elementary truths of consciousness. In 
this consists the rationalism of Descartes. 

This rationalism expresses itself in the fact that the superiority 
of self-consciousness is found in its complete clearness and distinct- 
ness, and in the fact that Descartes propounded as his principle for 
the synthetic method the maxim, Everything must be true which is as 
clear and distinct as self-consciousness, i.e. which presents itself before 
the mind's vision as surely and underivably as the mind's own exist- 
ence. " Clear " is defined by Descartes ^ as that which is intuitively 
present and manifest to the mind, " distinct " as that which is en- 
tirely clear in itself and precisely determined. And those mental 
presentations — or ideas,^ as he calls them after the manner of later 
Scholasticism — which are in this sense clear and distinct, whose 
evidence is not to be deduced from any others, but is grounded 
solely in themselves, he calls innate ideas.^ With this expression 
he indeed incidentally connects also the psycho-genetic thought that 
these ideas are imprinted upon the human soul by God, but for the 
most part he desires to give only the epistemological significance of 
immediate, rational evidence. 

These two meanings are peculiarly mingled in Descartes' proofs 
for the existence of God, which form an integrant constituent of his 
theory of knowledge, in so far as this "idea" is the first for which, 
in the synthetic procedure of his method a clearness and distinct- 
ness or intuitive evidence of the " natural light," equal to that of 
self-consciousness, is claimed. The new (so-called Cartesian) proof 
which he introduces in this connection,^ has a multitude of scholastic 

1 Besp. ad Obj. II. 2 Princ. Phil. I. 45. 

3 [German Idee. I follow the ordinary English usage in spelling the word as 
used by Descartes without a capital.] 

* Cf. E. Grimm, D.''s Lehre von den angeborenen Ideen (Jena, 1873), and also 
P. Natorp, D.''s Erkenntnisstheorie (Marburg, 1882). That innatus is better 
translated by eingeboren than by the usual angeboren has been remarked by 
R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, p, 73. 

5 Med. III. 

Chai'. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Descartes. 393 

assumptions. He argues that the individual self-consciousness 
knows itself to be finite, and therefore imperfect (according to the 
old identification of determinations expressing value with ontological 
gradations), and that this knowledge can be derived only from the 
conception of an absolutely perfect being (^ens jnrfectissimum) . This 
latter conception which we find within us must have a cause which, 
nevertheless, is not to be found within our own selves, nor in any 
other finite things. For the principle of causality requires that at 
least as much Reality be contained in the caiise as there is in the 
effect. This — in the scholastic sense — realistic principle is now 
applied, in analogy to Anselm's argument, to the relation of the 
idea in the mind {esse in intellect u or esse objective) to the Real 
(esse in re or esse formaliter), in order to give the inference that we 
should not have the idea of a most perfect being if the idea had not 
been produced in us by such a being himself. This anthropologico- 
metaphysical proof has then with Descartes the significance that 
by it that former sceptical hypothetical phantom of a deceiving 
demon is again destroyed. For since the perfection of God involves 
his veracity, and it is impossible that he should so have created us 
that we should necessarily err, confidence in the lumen naturale, that 
is, in the immediate evidence of rational knowledge, is restored, and 
thus definitively grounded. Thus modern rationalism is introduced 
by Descartes by the circuitous route of Scholasticism. For this 
proof gives the charter for acknowledging with complete certainty 
as true all propositions which manifest themselves in clear and dis- 
tinct light before the reason. Here belong, firstly, all truths of 
mathematics, but here belongs also the ontological proof for the 
existence of God. For with the same necessity of thought — thus 
Descartes takes up Anselm's argument^ — with which the geometri- 
cal propositions with regard to a triangle follow from the definition 
of the triangle, it follows from the mere definition of the most Real 
being that the attribute of existence belongs to him. The possibility 
of thinking God suffices to prove his existence. 

In this way it follows from the criterion of clearness and distinct- 
ness, that of finite things also, and especially of bodies, so much can 
be known as is clearly and distinctly perceived. But this is for 
Descartes the mathematical element, and is limited to the quantitative 
determinations, while all the sensuous-qualitative elements in percep- 
tion are regarded by the philosopher as unclear and confused. On this 
account metaphysics and the theory of knowledge terminate for him, 
too, in a mathematical physics. He designates - the sensuous appre- 

1 Med. V. 2 ]iie(i_ VI. 

394 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

hension of tlie qualitative, " imagination " (imaginatio) . The appre- 
hension of that which can be mathematically constructed he terms, on 
the other hand, "intellectual" knowledge (intellectio) , and strongly as 
he knows how to prize the help which experience gives in the former, 
a really scientific insight rests, in his opinion, only upon the latter. 

The distinction between distinct and confused presentations 
(which goes back to Duns Scotus and farther) serves Descartes 
also to solve the problem of error, which results for him out of his 
principle of the veracitas dei, because it does not seem possible to 
see how, in accordance with that principle, perfect deity could so 
arrange human nature as to allow it to err at all. Here Descartes 
helps himself^ by a peculiarly limited doctrine of freedom, which 
might be consistent with either Thomistic determinism or Scotist 
indeterminism. It is assumed, that is, that only clear and distinct 
presentations exercise so cogent and compelling a power upon the 
mind that it cannot avoid recognising them, while with reference to 
the unclear and confused presentations it retains the boundless and 
groundless activity of the liberum arbitrium indifferentice (its farthest- 
reaching power, which in the Scotist fashion is set in analogy with 
the freedom of God) . Thus error arises when afiirmation and nega- 
tion follow arbitrarily (without rational ground) in the case of 
unclear and indistinct material for judgment.^ The demand which 
follows from this of withholding judgment in all cases where a suffi- 
ciently clear and distinct insight is not present recalls too distinctly 
the ancient inoxr] ("suspense") to permit us to overlook the rela- 
tionship of this theory of error, with the doctrines of the Sceptics 
and Stoics as to the o-vy^araöeo-ts (cf. pp. 167, 208) .^ In fact, Descartes 
recognised distinctly the will-factor in judgment (agreeing here, 
too, with the epistemology of Augustine and Duns Scotus), and 
Spinoza followed him in this, so far as to designate affirmation or 
denial as a necessary characteristic of every idea, and thus to teach 
that man cannot think without at the same time willing.^ 

6. Descartes' mathematical reform of philosophy had a peculiar 
fate. Its metaphysical results began a rich and fruitful develop- 
ment; its tendency as regards method, however, soon became sub- 

1 Med. IV. 

2 Error appears accordingly as an act of free will parallel to the act of sin, 
and thus as guilt ; it is the guilt or fault of self-deception. This thought was 
carried out particularly by Malebranche {Entret. III. f.) . 

3 This relationship extends consistently to Descartes' ethics also. From the 
clear and distinct knowledge of reason follows necessarily right willing and act- 
ing ; from the obscure and confused impulses of the sensibility result practically 
sin and theoretically error, by abuse of freedom. The ethical ideal is the 
Socratic-Stoic ideal of the rule of reason over the sensibility. 

^Eth. IL, Proji. 49. 

Chap. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Cartesians. 395 

jected to a misunderstanding which exactly reversed its meaning. 
The philosopher himself desired to see the analytical method em- 
ployed in a great proportion of instances, even in the case of par- 
ticular problems, and thought of the synthetic method as a progress 
in discovery from one intuitive truth to another. His disciples, 
however, confounded the creatively free intellectual activity, which 
Descartes had in mind, with that rigidly demonstrative system of 
exposition which they found in EucUcVs text-book of geometry. The 
monistic tendency of the Cartesian methodology, the fact that it set 
up a highest principle from which all other certainty should follow, 
favoured this exchange, and out of the new method of investigation 
there came into being again an ars demonstrandi. The ideal of 
philosophy appeared to be the task of developing from its funda- 
mental principle all its knowledge as a system of as rigidly logical 
consistency as that with which Euclid's text-book deduces geome- 
try with all its propositions from axioms and definitions. 

A request of this sort had been answered by Descartes with a 
tentative sketch, though with express reference to the doubtfulness 
of this transfer;^ but the allurement to find the significance of 
mathematics for philosophical method in the circumstance, that it is 
the ideal of demonstrative science, seems only to have been strength- 
ened thereby. At least, it was in this direction that the infl.uence 
of the Cartesian philosophy proved strongest for the following 
period. In all the change of epistemological investigations until 
far into the eighteenth century this conception of mathematics was 
a firmly established axiom for all parties. Indeed, it became even 
a lever for scepticism and mysticism, under the direct influence of 
Descartes, in the case of men like Pascal. Since no other human 
science, so the latter argued, neither metaphysics nor the empirical 
disciplines, can attain mathematical evidence ; man must be modest 
in his efforts after rational knowledge, and must the more follow 
the impulse of his heart toward presageful faith, and the feeling of 
tact which belongs to a noble conduct of life. The Mystic Poiret 
(influenced by Boehme), also, and the orthodox sceptic Huet,- 
turned away from Cartesianism because it could not pause in its 
programme of universal mathematics. 

Positive beginnings toward a transformation of the Cartesian 
method into the Euclidean line of proof oxe found in the Port-Royal 

1 Jiesp. ad Ohj. II. 

2 Pierre Daniel Huet (16.30-1721), the learned Bishop of Avranches, wrote 
Censurn Philosnphim CartesiancB (1680), and Trait!' de la Faiblesse de V Esprit 
Humain (1723). His Autobiotrraphy (1718) is also instructive on the point 
mentioned above. Cf. on him Ch. Bartholmess (Paris, 1850). 

396 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

logic and in the logical treatises of G-eulincx ; but in the system of 
Spinoza this methodical schematism stands before us complete and 
perfect as from one mould. He first gave an exposition of the Car- 
tesian philosophy " more geometrico," by developing the content of 
the system step by step in propositions, after first setting up defini- 
tions and axioms. Each of these propositions was proved from the 
definitions, axioms, and preceding propositions ; while corollaries 
and scholia giving freer elucidations were added to certain of the 
propositions. Into this same rigid, unwieldy form Spinoza pressed 
his own philosophy also in the Ethics, and believed that it was thus 
as surely demonstrated as the Euclidean system of geometry. This 
presupposed not only the flawless correctness of the demonstrative 
process, but also an unambiguous evidence and an unassailable 
validity of the definitions and axioms. A look at the beginning of 
the Ethics (and not only of the first, but also of the following 
books) sufiices to convince one of the naivete with which Spinoza 
brings forward the complicated and condensed constructions of 
scholastic thought as self-evident conceptions and principles, and 
thereby anticipates implicitly his whole metaphysical system. 

This geometrical method has, however, in Spinoza's thought — and 
in this consists its psycho-genetic justification — at the same time 
its material as well as formal significance. The fundamental re- 
ligious conviction that all things necessarily proceed from the 
unitary essence of God seemed to him to require a method of philo- 
sophical knowledge, which in the same manner should derive from 
the idea of God the ideas of all things. In the true philosophy the 
order of ideas ought to be the same as the real order of things.^ But 
from this it follows of itself that the real process of the procedure 
of things forth from God must be thought after the analogy of the 
logical procedure of the consequent from its ground or reason, and 
thus the character of the method which Spinoza fixed upon for the 
problem of philosophy involved in advance the metaphysical char- 
acter of its solution ; cf. § 31. 

7. Little as men dared, in the immediately following period, to 
make the content of the Spinozistic philosophy their own, its method- 
ical form exercised, nevertheless, an impressive influence : and the 
more the geometrical method became settled in the philosophy of 
the schools, the more the syllogistic procedure entered again with it, 
since all knowledge was to be deduced from the highest truths by 

1 The view that true knowledge as genetic definition must repeat the process 
by which its object arises was carried out especially by Tschirnhausen, who did 
not shrink from the paradox that a complete definition of laughter must be able 
to produce laughter itself ! (Med. Ment.- 67 f.) 

Chap. 2, § 30.] Problem of Method : Spinoza, Leibniz. 397 

regular inferences. Especially did the mathematically schooled 
Cartesians in Germany take up the geometrical method along this 
line : this was done by Jung and Weigel, and the academic impulse 
to the preparation of text-books found in this method a form with 
which it could have the utmost sympathy. In the eighteenth cen- 
tury Christian Wolff (cf. Part V.) pursued this line in the most 
comprehensive manner with his Latin text-books, and for the sys- 
tematisation of a firmly established and clearly thought out materia] 
there could be in fact no better form. This was shown when Puffen^ 
darf undertook to deduce the entire system of Natural Eight by the 
geometrical method, as a logical necessity from the single principle 
of the need of society. 

When this view was in process of coming into existence Leibniz 
came into sympathy with it under the especial influence of Erhard 
Weigel, and was at the beginning one of its most consistent sup- 
porters. He not only made the jest of giving this unwonted garb 
to a political brochure,^ but was seriously of the opinion that philo- 
sophical controversies would find their end for the first time when 
a philosophy could once make its appearance in as clear and certain 
a form as that of a mathematical calculation.^ 

Leibniz pursued this thought very energetically. The stimulus 
of Hobbes, who also — though with quite another purpose, cf . § 31, 2 
— declared thinking to be a reckoning with the conceptional signs 
of things, may have been added; the Art of Lull and the pains 
which Giordano Bruno had taken with its improvement were well 
known to him. In Cartesian circles, also, the thought of transform- 
ing the mathematical method to a regular art of invention had been 
much discussed : besides Joachim Jung, the Altorf Professor Joh. 
Christopher Sturm,^ had also exercised an influence upon Leibniz in 
this respect. Einally, the thought of expressing the fundamental 
metaphysical conceptions, and likewise the logical operations of 
their combination after the manner of the mathematical sign-lan- 
guage by definite characters, seemed to offer the possibility of writ- 
ing a philosophical investigation in general formulae, and by this 
means raising it beyond the capability of being expressed in a 
definite language — an effort toward a universally scientific lan- 
guage, a "Lingua Adamica" which likewise appeared at the time 

1 In the pseudonymous Specimen demonstrationum politicarum pro rege Polo- 
norum eligendo (1G69), he proved by "geometrical method" in sixty proposi- 
tions and demonstrations that tlie Count Palatine of Neuburg must be chosen 
king of the Poles. 

2 De Scientia Universali seu Calculo PhilosopMco (1084). 

^ The author of a Compendium Universalium seu Metaphysicce EucUdeoe. 

398 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

of Leibniz in numerous supporters.^ So, too, Leibniz busied himself 
to an extraordinary degree with the thought of a characteristica uni- 
versalis, and a method of philosophical calculus.^ 

The essential outcome of these strange endeavours was, that an 
attempt was necessarily made to establish those highest truths, 
from the logical combination of which all knowledge was to be 
deduced. So Leibniz, like Galileo and Descartes, must proceed to 
search out that which, as immediately and intuitively certain, forces 
itself upon the mind as self-evident, and by its combinations grounds 
all derived knowledge. In the course of these reflections Leibniz 
stumbled upon the discovery^ (which Aristotle had made before 
him), that there are two completely different kinds of this intuitive 
knowledge : universal truths self-evident to reason, and facts of 
experience. The one class has timeless validity ; the other, validity 
for a single instance : v^rit^s eternelles and virith de fait. Both have 
in common that they are intuitively certain, i.e. are certain in them- 
selves and not by deduction from anything else ; they are called, 
therefore, primce veritates, or, also, primce possibilitates, because in 
them the possibility of all that is derivative has its ground. For 
the "possibility" of a conception is known either by a "causal 
definition " which derives the same from the first possibilities, that 
is, a priori ; or by the immediate experience of its actual existence, 
that is, a posteriori. 

These two kinds of "primitive truths" — the rational and the 
empirical, as we see — Leibniz attached in a very interesting manner 
to the two Cartesian marks of intuitive self-evidence, clearness and 
distinctness. To this end he shifts to a slight extent the meaning 
of both expressions.* That idea is clear which is surely distin- 
guished from all others and so is adequate for the recognition of its 
object; that idea is distinct which is clear even to its particular 
constituent parts and to the knowledge of their combination. 
According to this, the a priori, " geometrical " or " metaphysical " 
eternal truths are clear and distinct ; while on the other hand the 
a posteriori, or the truths relating to facts, are clear, indeed, but not 
distinct. Hence the former are perfectly transparent, conjoined 
with the conviction of the impossiblity of the opposite, while in the 
case of the latter the opposite is thinkable. In the case of the 
former the intuitive certainty rests upon the Principle of Contradic- 

1 Such attempts had been projected hy J. J. Becker (1661), G. Dalgarn (1661), 
Mhanasius Kircher (1663), and J. Wilkins (1668). 

2 Cf. A. Trendelenburg, Historische Beiträge zu Philosophie, Vols. II., III. 
8 Meditationes de Cognitione Veritate et Ideis (1684). 

* lb. at the beginning, Erd's. ed., p. 79. 

■*HAP, 2, § 31.] Suhstayice and Causality. 399 

iion; iu the case of the latter the possibility guaranteed by the 
actual fact needs still an explanation in accordance with the Prin- 
ciple of Siifficient Reason. 

At the beginning, Leibniz intended this distinction only with 
reference to the imperfection of the human understanding. In the 
case of rational truths we see into the impossibility of the opposite ; 
with empirical truths this is not the case, and we must content our- 
selves with establishing their actuality : ^ but the latter also, in the 
natura rerum and for the divine understanding, are so grounded 
that the opposite is impossible, although it remains thinkable for 
us. If Leibniz compared this distinction with that of commensur- 
able and incommensurable magnitudes, he meant at the beginning 
that incommensurability lies only in man's limited knowing capacity. 
But in the course of his development this antithesis became for 
him an absolute one ; it gained metaphysical significance. Leibniz 
now distinguished realiter between an unconditional necessity, which 
involves the logical impossibility of the opposite, and a conditional 
necessity, which has " only " the character of a matter of fact. He 
divided the principles of things into those of which the opposite is 
unthinkable, and those of which the opposite is thinkable : he dis^ 
tinguished metaphysically, also, between necessary and contingent 
truths. This, however, cohered with metaphysical motives, which 
arose from an after-working of the Scotist theory of the contin- 
gency of the finite, and overthrew the geometrical method. 

§ 31. Substance and Causality. 

The real [as contrasted with formal] result of the new methods 
was in metaphysics, as in natural science, a transformation of the 
fundamental ideas of the nature of things, and of the mode of 
their connection in the processes of Nature : the conceptions of sub- 
stance and causality acquired a new content. But this change 
could not proceed so radically in metaphysics as in natural science. 
In this latter more limited realm, after the Galilean principle had 
once been found, it was possible in a certain measure to begin ah ovo 
and produce a completely new theory : in the more general philo- 
sophical doctrines the power and authority of tradition were much too 
great to make it possible or permissible that it should be completely 
set aside. 

This distinction asserted itself already in connection with the 
delicate relation sustained to religious conceptions. Natural science 

^ The Ariatoteliau distinction of Si6ti and on. 

400 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

could isolate itself absolutely from theology, and maintain toward 
it an attitude of complete indifference : metaphysics, by its concep- 
tion of the deity and by its theory of the mental or spiritual 
world, was brought again and again into hostile or friendly contact 
with the religious sphere of ideas. A Galileo declared that the 
investigations of physics, whatever their result might be, had not 
the least thing to do with the teaching of the Bible,^ and a Newton 
was not prevented by his mathematical natural philosophy from 
burying himself with the most ardent piety in the mysteries of the 
Apocalypse. But the metaphysicians, however indifferent their 
thought as regards religion, and however strictly they might prose- 
cute their science in the purely theoretical spirit, were still always 
obliged to consider that they had to do with objects concerning 
which the Church doctrine was fixed. This gave modern philosophy 
a somewhat delicate position: mediaeval philosophy had brought to 
the objects of Church dogma an essentially religious interest of its 
own as well ; modern philosophy regarded them, if at all, from the 
theoretical standpoint only. Hence those felt themselves most 
secure who, like Bacon and Hobbes, restricted philosophy also 
entirely to natural research, declined to enter upon a metaphysics 
proper, and were willing to let dogma speak the only words with 
regard to the deity and the super-sensible destiny of man. Bacon 
did this with large words behind which it is difficult to recognise 
his true disposition ; ^ Hobbes rather let it be seen that his natural- 
istic opinion, like the Epicurean, saw in ideas as to the supernatural 
a superstition resting upon a defective knowledge of Nature, — a 
superstition which by the regulation of the state becomes the bind- 
ing authority of religion.^ Much more difficult, however, was the 
position of those philosophers who held fast to the metaphysical 
conception of the deity in their very explanation of Nature ; Des- 
cartes' whole literary activity is filled with an anxious caution 
directed toward avoiding every offence to religion, while Leibniz 
could attempt to carry through in a much more positive manner the 
conformity of his metaphysics to religion ; and on the other hand 
the example of Spinoza showed how dangerous it was if philosophy 
openly brought to the front the difference between its conception of 
God and the dogmatic conception. 

1. The main difficulty of the case inhered in the circumstance 
that the new methodical principle of mechanics excluded all tracing of 

1 Cf. the letter to the Grand Duchess Christine, Op. II. 26 n. 

2 De Augm. Scient. IX., where the supernatural and incomprehensible is set 
forth as the characteristic and serviceable quality of faith. 

^ Leviathan, I. 6 ; cf. the drastic expression, ib. IV. 32. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance and Causality : Bacon. 401 

corporeal phenomena back to spiritual forces. Nature was despiritu- 
alised ; science would see in it nothing but the movements of smallest 
bodies, of which one is the cause of the other. No room remained 
for the operation of supernatural powers. So first of all, at one 
stroke, magic, astronomy, and alchemy, in which the Neo-Platonic 
ghosts and spirits had held sway, became for science a standpoint of 
the past. Leonardo had already demanded that the phenomena of the 
external world should be explained by natural causes only ; the great 
systems of the seventeenth century without exception recognise only 
such, and a Cartesian, Balthasar Bekker, wrote a book ^ to show that 
in accordance with the principles of modern science, all appear- 
ances of ghosts, conjurations, and magic arts must be reckoned as 
injurious errors, — a word of admonition which was very much in 
place in view of the luxuriant superstition of the Eenaissance. 

But with the spirits, teleology, also, was obliged to give place. 
The explanation of natural phenomena by their purposiveness 
always came ultimately in some way or other to the thought of a 
spiritual creation or ordering of things, and so was contradictory 
to the principle of mechanics. At this point the victory of the 
system of Democritus over the natural philosophy of Plato and 
Aristotle was most palpable ; this, too, was emphasised most forcibly 
by the new philosophy. Bacon counted the teleological mode of 
regarding Nature as one of the idols, and, indeed, as one of the 
dangerous idols of the tribe, — the fundamental errors which become 
a source of illusion to man through his very nature : he taught that 
philosophy has to do only with formal or efficient causes, and ex- 
pressed his restriction of philosophy to physics and his rejection of 
metaphysics precisely by saying that the explanation of Nature is 
physics if it concerns causae, efficientes, metaphysics if it concerns 
causce finales.^ In the case of Hobbes, who was the disciple of 
Bacon and Galileo, the same view is self -explaining. But Descartes, 
also, desires to see all final causes kept at a distance from the 
explanation of Nature — he declares it audacious to desire to know 
the purposes of God.^ Much more open, and keenest by far, is the 
polemic of Spinoza''' against the anthropomorphism of teleology. 
In view of his idea of God and God's relation to the world, it is 
absurd to speak of ends of the deity, and especially of such as have 
reference to men ; where all follows with eternal necessity from the 
■essential nature of the deity, there is no room for an activity accord- 
ing to ends. The English Neo-Platonists, such as Cudworth and 

1 Balthasar BeJcker (1634-1698), De Betoverte Wereld (1690). 

2 Be Augm. III. 4. s Med. IV. 
* Cf . principally Eth. I. Append. 

402 Tlie Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Pakt IV. 

Henry More, combated this fundamental mechanico-antiteleological 
feature of the new metaphysics with all the eloquence of the old 
arguments, but without success. The teleological conviction was 
obliged to renounce definitively the claim of affording scientific 
explanation of particular phenomena, and only in the metaphysical 
conception of the whole did Leibniz (cf. below. No. 8), and similarly 
a part of the English students of Nature, find ultimately a satisfac- 
tory adjustment between the opposing principles. 

With the exclusion of the spiritual from the explanation of 
Nature, still a third element of the old view of the world fell away, 
viz. the thought of the difference in kind and in value of the 
spheres of Nature, as it had been embodied most distinctly in 
the Neo-Platonic graded realm of things, following the ancient 
Pythagorean precedent. In this respect the fantastic natural 
philosophy of the Eenaissance had already done a forcible work of 
preparation. The Stoic doctrine of the omnipresence of all sub- 
stances at every point of the universe had been revived by Nicolaus 
Cusanus ; but it was in connection with the victory of the Coperni- 
can system, as we see in Bruno, that the idea of the homogeneity of 
all parts of the universe first completely forced its way to recogni- 
tion. The sublunary world could no longer be contrasted as the 
realm of imperfection, with the more spiritual spheres of the stellar 
heaven; matter and motion are alike in both. It was from this 
thought that Kepler and Galileo proceeded, and it became complete 
when Newton recognised the identity of force in the fall of the 
apple and the revolution of the stars. For modern science, the old 
distinction in essence and in value between heaven and earth exists 
no longer. The universe is one in nature throughout. This same 
view, moreover, presented itself in opposition to the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic development system of Matters and Forms. It did 
away with the whole army of lower and higher forces — the much 
combated qualitates occultce; it recognised the mechanical principle 
of motion as the only ground of explanation for all phenomena, and 
therefore, removed also the distinction in principle between the ani- 
mate and the inanimate. Though here Neo-Platonism had co- 
operated toward overcoming this antithesis by its view of the 
animation of the entire universe, the reverse task now arose for 
the Galilean mechanics, namely, that of explaining mechanically 
the phenomena of life also. The discovery of the mechanism of the 
circulation of the blood by Harvey^ (1626) gave to this tendency a 

1 In which he had been anticipated by Michael Servetus (burned 1553 in 
Geneva by Calvin's instrumentality). 

Chap. 2, §31.] Substance and Causality : Descartus, Locke. 403 

vigorous impulse ; Descartes expressed it in principle in liis state- 
ment that tlie bodies of animals are to be regarded scientifically as 
most complex automata, and their vital activities as mechanical 
processes. Hobbes and Spinoza carried out this thought more 
exactly ; a zealous study of reflex motions began in the medical 
schools of France and the Netherlands, and the conception of the 
soul as vital force became completely disintegrated. Only the 
Platonists and the adherents of the vitalism of Paracelsus and 
Boehme, such as Van Helmont, held fast to this conception in the 
old manner. 

2. This mechanistic despiritualisation of Nature corresponded 
completely to that dualistic theory of the world, which from episte- 
mological motives had been in course of preparation in terministic 
Nominalism, — the theory of a total difference between the inner and 
the outer loorld. To the knowledge of their qualitative difference 
was now added that of their real and causal separateness. The 
world of bodies appeared not only quite different in kind from that 
of mind, but also as entirely sundered from it in its existence 
and in the course of its motions. The doctrine of the intellectuality 
of the sense qxialities, revived in the philosophy of the Renaissance 
by the Humanists, had contributed an extraordinary amount toward 
sharpening the above antithesis. The doctrine that colours, tones, 
smells, tastes, and qualities of pressure, heat, and touch are not 
real qualities of things, but only signs of such in the mind, had 
passed over from the Sceptical and Epicurean literature into most oi 
the doctrines of modern philosophy with a repetition of the ancient 
illustrations. Vives, Montaigne, Sanchez, and Campanella were at 
one in this ; Galileo, Hobbes, and Descartes revived the teaching of 
Democritus, that to these qualitative differences of perception noth- 
ing but quantitative differences correspond in the natura rerum, and 
this in such a way that the former are the inner modes of mentally 
representing the latter. Descartes regarded sense qualities as ob- 
scure and confused ideas, while the conception of the quantitative 
determinations of the outer world, on account of its mathematical 
character, was for him the only clear and distinct idea of them. 

According to Descartes, therefore, not only the sensuous feelings, 
but also the contents of sensation, belong not to the spatial, but to 
the psychical world only, and represent in this sphere the geomet- 
rical structures of which they are the signs. In our examination of 
an individual object we can.^ to be sure, gain a knowled^-e of this 

^ Cf. Mpd. VT. which allows perhaps the plainest view of the very close 
relation which Descartes' physical r .v tacli haJ t'> experience. 

404 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Pakt IV. 

true mathematical essence of bodies only by the aid of perceptions, 
and in these perceptions the true mathematical essence is always 
alloyed with the qualitative elements of the "imagination." But 
just in this consists the task of physical research, to dissolve out 
this real essence of bodies from the subjective modes of our mental 
representation by means of reflection upon the clear and distinct ele- 
ments of perception. John Locke, who later adopted and made 
popular this view of Descartes, designated^ those qualities which 
belong to bodies in themselves as primary, and called those sec- 
ondary, on the other hand, which belong to a body only by virtue of 
its action upon our senses.^ Descartes allowed as primary qualities 
only shape, size, position, and motion, so that for him the physical 
body coincided with the mathematical (cf. below, No. 4). In order 
to maintain a distinction between the two, Henry More,^ on the con- 
trary, demanded that impenetrability, regarded as the property of 
filling space, should also be reckoned to the essential nature of bodies, 
and Locke,* in accordance with this view, took up " solidity " into 
the class of primary qualities. 

With Hobbes ^ these thoughts become modified more in accordance 
with the terministic conception. He regards space (siS phantasma 
rei existentis) and time (as phantasma motus) as also modes of men- 
tal representation, and it is just because we can therefore construct 
these ourselves that mathematical theory has the advantage of being 
the sole rational science. But instead of drawing phenomenalistic 
conclusions from this premise, he argues that philosophy can treat 
only of bodies, and must leave everything spiritual to revelation. 
Scientific thought consequently consists, for him, only in the imma- 
nent combination of signs. These are partly involuntary in percep- 
tions, partly arbitrary in words (similarly Occam, cf. § 27, 4). It 
is only by means of the latter that general conceptions and proposi- 
tions become possible. Our thinking is hence a reckoning with 
verbal signs. It has its truth in itself and stands as something 
completely heterogeneous by the side of the outer world to which 
it relates. 

3. All these suggestions become compressed in the system of 
Descartes to form the doctrine of the dualism of substances. The 
analytic method was intended to discover the simple elements of 
reality which were self-explanatory and not susceptible of farther 

^ Essay, Human Understanding, II. 8, § 23 f. 

2 As tertiary qualities, Locke added further the " powers " for the operation 
of one body upon others. 

8 Desc. (Euv. (C), X. pp. 181 ff. 

* Essay, II. 4. 

^ Human Nature, chs. 2-5 ; Leviathan, chs. 4ff. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance and Causality: Hohbes, Descartes. 405 

deduction. Descartes discovered that all that can be experienced is 
a species either of spatial or of conscious Being or existence. Spa- 
tiality, or the quality of filling space, and consciousness ("extension'" 
and "thought" according to the usual translation of extensio and cogi- 
tatio) are the ultimate, simple, original attributes of reality. All 
that is is either spatial or conscious. For these two prime predi- 
cates are related disjunctively. What is spatial is not conscious ; 
what is conscious is not spatial. The self-certainty of mind is only 
that of the personality as a conscious being. Bodies are real in so 
far as they have in themselves the quantitative determinations of 
spatial existence and change, of extension and motion. All things 
are either bodies or minds ; substances are either spatial or con- 
scious : res extensce and res cogitantes. 

The world falls thus into two completely different and completely 
separated realms : that of bodies and that of minds. But in the 
background of this dualism there stands in the thought of Descartes 
the conception of the deity as the ens perfectissimum or perfect sub- 
stance. Bodies and minds are ßnite things; God is infinite Being} 
The Meditations leave no doubt as to the fact that Descartes ac- 
cepted the conception of God quite in accordance with the inter- 
pretation of scholastic Realism. The mind in its own Being, which 
it recognises as a limited and imperfect one, apprehends with the 
same intuitive certainty the Reality of the perfect, infinite Being 
also (cf. above, § 30, 5). To the ontological argument is added the 
relation of God and the world in the form brought forward by 
Nicolaus Cusanus, namely, that of the antithesis of the infinite and 
the finite. But the above-mentioned relationship with the Realism 
of the Middle Ages appears most distinctly in the development of 
metaphysics that succeeded Descartes: for the pantheistic conse- 
quences of this presupposition, which had been carefully held back 
in the scholastic period, were now spoken out with complete clear- 
ness and sureness. And if we find in the doctrines of Descartes' 
successors a strong similarity with those which in the Middle Ages 
could lead but a more or less repressed existence, this is intelligible 
even without the assumption of a direct historical dependence, 
merely by the pragmatic connection and the logical necessity of the 

4. The common metaphysical name of "substance," applied to 
God in the infinite sense, and to minds and bodies in a finite sense, 
could not permanently cover the problems which were hidden be- 

1 So likewise Malebranche said (Bech. III. 2, 9 a. E.) that God could properly 
be called only Celui qui est, he is Vetre sans restriction, tout etre infini est 

406 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

neath it. The conception of substance had come into a state of flux, 
and needed further re-shaping. It had almost lost touch with 
the idea of "thing," the category of inherence; for just the combi- 
nation of a multiplicity of determinations into the idea of a unitary 
concrete entity, which is essential to this category, was completely 
lacking in Descartes" conception of finite substances, since these 
were held to be characterised by one fundamental quality, spatiality 
or consciousness. All else that was found in substances must there- 
fore be regarded as a modification of its fundamental quality, of its 
attribute. All qualities and states of bodies are modes of their spa- 
tiality or extension: all qualities and states of mind are modes of 
consciousness {modi cogitandi). 

It is involved in this that all particular substances belonging to 
either class, all bodies on the one hand and all minds on the other, 
are alike in their essence, their constitutive attribute. But from 
this it is only a step farther to the idea in which this likeness is 
thought as metaphysical identity. All bodies are spatial, all minds 
are conscious ; individual bodies are distinguished from one another 
only by different modes of spatiality (form, size, situation, motion) ; 
individual minds are distinguished from one another only by differ- 
ent modes of consciousness (ideas, judgments, activities of will). 
Individual bodies are modes of spatiality, individual minds are 
modes of consciousness. In this way the attribute obtains meta- 
physical preponderance over individual substances, which now 
appear as its modifications ; the res extensce become modi extensionis; 
the res cogitantes, modi cogitationis. 

Descartes himself drew this conclusion only in the domain of nat- 
ural philosophy, to which in general he restricted the carrying out of 
his metaphysical doctrine in its principles. Here, however, the 
general conception of modification took on, of itself, a definite sig- 
nificance, and one capable of apprehension by perception or imagina- 
tion, viz. that of limitation {determinatio) . Bodies are parts of space, 
limitations of the universal space-filling quality or extension.^ Hence 
for Descartes the conception of body coincides with that of a limited 
spatial magnitude. A body is, as regards its true essence, a portion 
of space. The elements of the corporeal world are the " corpuscles,^' ^ 

1 Cf. Princ. Phil. II. 9 f., where, at the same time, it appears quite clearly 
that this relation of the individual body to universal space is made equivalent 
to that of individual and species. 

2 For the corpuscular theory, Descartes found many suggestions in Bacon, 
Hobbes, Basso, Sennert, and others. The variety in the development of this 
theory, which rests upon the dialectic between the mathematical and the physi- 
cal momenta, has more interest for natural science than for philosophy. An 
excellent exposition is found in Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] iSuhstance and Causality . MalebraiicTie. 407 

i.e. the firm spatial particles which realiter are no longer divisible ; 
as mathematical structures, however, they are infinitely divisible j 
that is, there are no atoms. From these presuppositions follow, 
likewise, for Descartes, the impossibility of empty space, and the 
infinitude of the corporeal world. 

For the mental world the analogous claim was pronounced by 
Malebranche. In connection with the epistemological motives (cf. 
below, No. 8) which made it seem to him that no knowledge of 
things is possible except in God, he came ^ to the conception of the 
raison universelle, which, as being alike in all individual minds, can- 
not belong to the modes of the finite mind, but is rather that of 
which finite minds are themselves modifications, and can, just on 
tliis account, be none other than an attribute of God. God is in so 
far the " place of minds " or spirits, just as space is the place of 
bodies. Here, also, as the expression proves, the relation which 
obtains in conceptions between the universal and the particular 
underlies the thought, and following the analogy of the Cartesian 
conception of space and body this relation is thought in percep- 
tional or picturate terms as participation.^ All human insight is a 
participation in the infinite Reason, all ideas of finite things are but 
determinations of the idea of God, all desires directed toward the 
particular object are but participations in that love toward God as 
the ground of its essence and life, which necessarily dwells in the 
finite mind. To be sure, Malebranche came into a very critical 
situation by thus making the finite mind disappear completely in 
the universal divine mind, as its modification. For how, in accord- 
ance with this, should he explain the self-subsistence and self- 
activity which it seemed were quite notoriously present in those 
inclinations and volitions of man which opposed God ? In this 
difficulty nothing availed but the word " freedom," in using which 
Malebranche was indeed obliged to confess that freedom was an 
impenetrable mystery.^ 

5. In this course of thought pursued by Malebranche appears 
clearly the inevitable logical consistency with which the attributes, 
which were regarded by Descartes as the common essence belonging 
to either of the two classes of finite substances, could ultimately be 
thought only as the attributes of the infinite substance or deity. But 
precisely in this point consists the fundamental motive of Spi- 
nozism, which developed along this line out of Cartesianism directly 
and at the outset, and at the same time developed to the farthest 

1 Sech, de la Ver. III. 2, 6 ; Entret. I. 10. 

2 Recall the Platonic u^deiis I a Cf. above, p. SOI, note 2. 

408 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

consequence. Spinozism likewise holds as firmly to the qualitative 
as to the causal dualism of spatiality and consciousness. The spa- 
tial and the spiritual worlds are entirely heterogeneous and abso- 
lutely independent of each other. But the whole endless series of 
bodies, with their divisions, forms, and motions, are only the modes 
of extension, just as the endless series of minds with their ideas 
and volitions are only the modes of consciousness. Hence these 
finite " things " are no longer entitled to the name of " substance." 
That only can be called substance, whose attributes are extension 
and consciousness themselves, viz. the infinite existence or Being, 
the deity. But its essence, in turn, cannot be exhausted in these 
two attributes which are accessible to human experience ; the ens 
realissimum, involves within itself the actuality of the infinite num- 
ber of all possible attributes. 

The ultimate ground of this position also lies in the scholastic- 
realistic conception of the most real being. Spinoza's definition of 
substance or the deity, as the essence (essentia) which involves its 
own existence, is only the condensed expression of the ontological 
proof for the existence of God : the " ase'itas " is preserved in the 
term " causa sid " ; substance as that " quod in se est et per se con- 
cipitur" is again but another transcription of the same thought. 
Proceeding from these definitions, the proof for the oneness and 
infinitude of substance ^ followed as a matter of course. 

That, however, we have here to do with an entirely realistic 
course of thought becomes clearly manifest from Spinoza's doctrine 
of the nature of substance itself and of its relation to the attributes. 
For the Spinozistic system says absolutely nothing of substance or 
of the deity farther than the formal determinations contained in the 
conception of the ens realissimum, of absolute Being. Every predi- 
cate expressing any content is, on the contrary, expressly denied: 
and in particular Spinoza is especially careful to refuse ^ to the divine 
essence the modifications of consciousness, such as intellectual cog- 
nition [intellectus, Erkenntnisse and will. Just as little of course 
does he recognise the modifications of extension as being predicates 
of the divine essence, though he had no polemical inducement to 
express this especially. God himself is therefore neither mind 
nor body ; of him it can only be said, that he is. It is evident that 
the old principle of negative theology is here present with a changed 
form of expression. Knowledge of all finite things and states leads 
to two highest universal conceptions : space-filling quality or exten- 
sion, and consciousness. To both of these a higher metaphysical 

1 Mh. I. Props. 1-14. 2 lb. I. 31. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance and Causality: Spinoza. 409 

dignity is ascribed than to finite things ; they are the attributes, 
and the things are their modes. But if the process of abstraction 
now rises from these two determinations, the last which contain any 
content, to the most general, to the ens generalissimum, then all 
definite content falls away from the conception of this being, and 
only the empty Form of substance is left. For Spinoza, also, the 
deity is all and thus — nothing. His doctrine of God lies quite 
along the path of Mysticism.^ 

But if God is thus the general essence of finite things, he does 
not exist otherwise than in them and with them. This applies first 
of all to the attributes. God is not distinct from them, and they are 
not distinct from him, just as the dimensions of space are not dis- 
tinct from space itself. Hence Spinoza can say also that God con- 
sists of countless attributes, or Deus sive omnia ejus attributa.^ And 
the same relation is afterwards repeated between the attributes and 
the modes. Every attribute, because it expresses the infinite essence 
of God in a definite manner, is again infinite in its own way ; but 
it does not exist otherwise than with and in its countless modifica- 
tions. God then exists only in things as their universal essence, 
and they only in him as the modes of his reality. In this sense 
Spinoza adopts from Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno the 
expressions natura naturans and natura 7iaturata. God is Nature : 
as the universal world-essence, he is the natura naturans; as sum- 
total of the individual things in which this essence exists modified, 
he is the natura naturata. If in this connection the natura naturans 
is called occasionally also the efficient cause of things, this creative 
force must not be thought as something distinct from its workings ; 
this cause exists nowhere but in its workings. This is Spinoza's 
complete and unreserved pantheism. 

Finally this relation is repeated yet again in the distinction which 
Spinoza establishes between the infinite and the finite modes.^ If 
each of the countless finite things is a mode of God, the infinite 
connection or coherence which exists between them must also be 
regarded as a mode, and, indeed, as an infinite mode. Spinoza affirms 
three of these.* The deity as the universal world-thing appears in 
individual things, which are finite modes ; to them corresponds as 

iTo this corresponds also his theory of cognition with its tliree stages, 
which sets "■intuition,'''' as the immediate apprehension of the eternal logical 
resulting of all things from God, as knowledge suh specie ceternitatis, above 
perception and the activity of the intellect. 

2 Which, however, is in nowise to be interpreted as if the attributes were 
self-subsistent prime realities and "God" only the collective name for them 
(as K. Thomas supposed, Sp. als Metaphysiker, Königsberg, 1840). Such a 
crassly nominalistic cap-stone would press the whole system out of joint. 

* Eth. I. 23 and 30 ff. i Ep. 64 (Op. II. 219). 

410 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

infinite mode the universe. In the attribute of extension the finite 
modes are the particular space-forms ; the infinite mode is infinite 
space, or matter ^ itself in its motion and rest. For the attribute of 
consciousness, the intellectus inßnitus^ stands beside the particular 
functions of ideation and will. Here Spinoza reminds us imme- 
diately of the realistic pantheism of David of Dinant (cf. § 27, 1). 
His metaphysics is the last word of mediaeval Realism.^ 

6. With these motives relating to the problem of the qualitative 
difference of substances modern philosophy struggled out of its 
dualistic presuppositions to a monistic adjustment ; but at the 
same time, still more powerful motives became mingled in the 
process, — motives which grew out of the real and causal separation 
of the spatial and the conscious worlds. At first, indeed, it was the 
principles of mechanics themselves which demanded the attempt to 
isolate completely the course of events in each of the two spheres 
of finite substances. 

This succeeded in the corporeal world in a relatively simple 
manner. In this domain, the idea of cause had acquired a completely 
new significance through Galileo. According to the scholastic con- 
ception (which even in Descartes' Meditations, in a decisive passage, 
was still presented with axiomatic validity) causes were substances 
or things, while effects, on the other hand, were either their activities 
or were other substances and things which were held to come about 
only by such activities : this was the Platonic-Aristotelian concep- 
tion of the aiTM. Galileo, on the contrary, went back to the idea of 
the older Greek thinkers (cf, § 5), who applied the causal relation 
only to the states — that meant now to the motions of substances — 
not to the Being of the substances themselves. Causes are motions, 
and effects are motions. The relation of impact and counter-impact, 
of the passing over of motion from one corpuscle to another,* is the 
original fundamental form of the causal relation, the form which is 
clear to perception or imagination (anschaulich), is intelligible in 

1 This equivalence holds good with Spinoza as well as with Descartes. 

2 This intellectns infinitus appears again in the ethical part of the Spinozistic 
system as amor intellectualis quo dens se ipsum amat. In both cases Male- 
branche's " raison tmiverselle " amounts to the same thing. 

3 Geulincx also, in a manner similar to that of Spinoza and Malebranche, 
regards finite bodies and minds as only "limitations," '■'■prcecisiones'''' of the 
universal infinite body and the divine mind. Cf. Met. p. 56. If we think away 
limitation from ourselves, he says, ib. 237 ff., there is left — God. 

* Hence for Descartes the mechanical principle excluded possibility of action 
at a distance, just as it excluded empty space. This forced him to the artificial 
hypotheses of the vortex theory, by which he aimed to give a physical ground for 
the Copernican view of the world (popular exposition by Fontenelle, Entretiens 
sur la Pluralite des Mondes, 1686). The grounds on which this doctrine was 
displaced by the Newtonian theory of gravitation are no longer pliiloso<Dhical> 
but purely physical in their nature. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance and Causality : Galileo, Descartes. 411 

itself, and explains all others. And the question as to the nature 
of this fundamental relation was answered by the principle of 7nath- 
ematical equality, which, in turn, passed over into that of metaphysi- 
cal identity. So much motion in the cause, so much in the effect 
also. Descartes formulated this as the law of the conservation of 
motion in Nature. The sum of motion in Nature remains always 
the same : what a body loses in motion it gives to another. As 
regards the amount of motion, there is in Nature nothing new, 
especially no impulse from the spiritual world.^ Even for the king- 
dom of organisms this principle was carried through, at least as a 
postulate, though as yet with very weak grounds. Animals, also, 
are machines whose motions are evoked and determined by the 
mechanism of the nervous system. Descartes thought of this 
mechanism more precisely (and with him Hobbes and Spinoza) as 
a motion of finest (gaseous) substances, the so-called spiritus ani- 
males,^ and sought the point of transition from the sensory to the 
motor nervous system in man, in a part of the brain which has no 
correlative, i.e. is a single and not a paired organ, the pineal gland or 

The other part of the task proved much more difficult : namely, 
that of understanding the mental life without any relation to the 
corporeal world. Easy and clear to perception as was the action of 
one body upon another, it did not yield a mode of representing an 
incorporeal connection between different minds, that could be used 
scientifically. Spinoza, for example, expressed the general meta- 
physical postulate very energetically, when he promised in entering 
upon the third book of the Ethics, that he would treat the actions 
and desires of man as if lines, surfaces, and bodies were the subject 
of discussion ; for the important thing is neither to asperse them nor 
to deride them, but to understand them. But the solution of this 
problem was limited in advance to investigating the causal connec- 
tion between the activities of consciousness in the individual mind: 
dualism demanded a psychology free from all physiological constitu- 
ents. It is all the more characteristic of the predominance of the 
spirit of natural science in the seventeenth century, that it attained 
this psychology demanded by the theory, only in the most limited 
degree. And even the beginnings toward this are ruled by the 
endeavour to apply the methodical principle of mechanics, which 

1 Hence Hobbes excluded from physics the Aristotelian and Thomistic concep- 
tion of the unmoved mover, while Descartes, who in this point also proceeded 
more metaphysically, made motion to have been communicated to matter at the 
beginning by God. 

2 An inheritance from the physiological psychology of the Greeks, in particu- 
lar from that of the Peripatetics. 

412 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

was celebrating its triumphs in the theory of outer experience, to 
the comprehension of the inner world also. 

For just as the investigation of Nature from Galileo to Newton 
directed its energies toward finding out the simple fundamental 
form of corporeal motion, to which all complex structures of outer 
experience could be reduced, so Descartes desired to establish the ! 
fundamental forms of psychical motion, out of which the multiplic- , 
ity of inner experiences would become explicable. In the theoreti- '■ 
cal domain this seemed attained by establishing the immediately i 
evident truths (the innate ideas) ; in the practical field there grew 
out of this demand the new problem of a statics and a mechanics of 
the movements of feeling {Gemiithshewegungen) . In this spirit Des- \ 
cartes and Spinoza produced their natural history of the emotions '| 
(^Affecte) and passions,^ the latter author by combining the thoughts 
of the former with those of Hobbes. Thus Descartes derives the : 
whole host of particular passions, as species and sub-species, from ij 
the six fundamental forms of wonder (admiratio), love, and hate, / 
desire (desir), pleasure and pain [or joy and sadness. Lust und l\ 
Unlust'] (Icetitia — tristitia) ; thus Spinoza develops his system of Fl 
the emotions out of desire, pleasure, and pain (appetitus, Icetitia, ■ 
tristitia) by pointing out the ideational processes in connection 
with which these emotions have become transferred from their 
original object, the self-preservation of the individual, to other 
*' ideas." 

A peculiar side-attitude is taken in this regard by the two English i 
thinkers. For Bacon and Hobbes, a mechanical conception of the ■ 
mental is the more natural in proportion as they endeavour to 
draw the mental more closely into the circle of the physical. Both, 
that is, regard the empirical psychical life, and therefore, also, the 
sphere of consciousness which in Descartes' system was to have - 
nothing to do with the corporeal world, as something which essen- 
tially belongs thereto ; on the other hand, there is set over against 
the whole world of perception rather a something spiritual [spirit- 
ual in the religious sense. Geistliches'] than a something mental or 
intellectual [_Geistiges]. Ideas and volitions as they are known by I 
experience are held to be at bottom activities of the body also, and 
if besides these we speak yet of an immortal soul (spiraculum) , of 
a spiritual world and of the divine mind or spirit, this should fall 
to the province of theology. But according to this view the natural 
science theory cannot be characterised much otherwise than as an 

1 Descartes, Les Passions de VÄme: Spinoza, Mh. III., and Tract. Brev. IL 
6 ff. Cf . below, No. 7. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance and Causality : Descartes^ Hohhes, 413 

anthropological materialism; for it aims to understand tlie entire 
series of empirical psychical activities as a mechanical process con- 
nected with the bodily functions. This problem was propounded by 
Bacon ; Hobbes attempted to solve it, and in doing so became the 
father of the so-called associational psychology. With the same 
outspoken sensualism as Campanella, of whose deductions his own 
frequently remind us, — especially with regard to the mechanism of 
ideas, — he seeks to show that sense-impressions give the only ele- 
ments of consciousness, and that by their combination and trans- 
formation memory and thought also come about. In the practical 
domain the impulse toward self-preservation and the feelings of 
pleasure and pain which arise in connection with impressions are 
then characterised analogously as the elements out of which all 
other feelings and activities of will arise. Hobbes, too, projected 
thus a "natural history" of the emotions and passions, and this 
was not without influence upon that of Spinoza, whose theory of 
the emotions is always looking towards the other attribute [i.e. 

From these presuppositions of method the denial of the freedom 
of the will in the sense of indeterminism followed with inexorable 
consistency for Hobbes and for Spinoza. Both attempted — and 
Spinoza did it in the baldest form that can be conceived — to exhibit 
the strict necessity which prevails even in the course of the process 
of motivation : they are types of determinism. For Spinoza, there- 
fore, there is no freedom in the psychological sense. Freedom can 
mean only, on the one hand, metaphysically, the absolute Being of 
the deity determined by nothing but itself, and, on the other hand, 
ethically, the ideal of the overcoming of the passions through 

7. In this it became already evident that in the presence of the 
facts of psychology, that absolute separation between the corporeal 
and the mental world which metaphysics demanded was not to be 
maintained. But Descartes himself met quite the same experience. 
The nature of the mind itself might, indeed, explain the clear and 
distinct ideas and the forms of the rational will which resulted 
from these, but it could not explain the obscure and confused ideas, 
and the emotions and passions connected with them. These present 
themselves rather as a disturbance of the mind^ (perturbationes 
animi), and since this perturbation which gives occasion for the 

1 This is the interest, not only ethical, but also theoretical, which induced Des- 
cartes to treat states psychologically so different as emotions and passions, from 
the same point of view and in one line. Cf. for the following Passions de l'Äme, 
L, and Meds. V. and VI. 

414 The Renaissance : Natural Science jPeriod [Part IV. 

abuse of freedom (cf. above, § 30, 5) cannot be due to God, its 
origin must be sought ultimately in an influence exercised by the 
body. In the disturbances of the feeling there is, therefore, for 
Descartes an indubitable fact, which cannot be explained from the 
fundamental metaphysical principles of his system. Here, there- 
fore, the philosopher sees himself forced to recognise an exceptional 
relation, and he adjusts this for himself in a way that had been 
foreshadowed by the anthropology of the Victorines (cf. § 24, 2). 
The nature (natura) of man, he teaches, consists in the inner union 
of two heterogeneous substances, a mind and a body, and this marvel- 
lous (i.e. metaphysically incomprehensible) union has been so 
arranged by God's will that in this single case the conscious and 
the spatial substances act upon each other. Animals remain, for 
Descartes, bodies ; their " sensations " are only nervous movements, 
out of which stimulations of the motor system arise in accordance 
with the reflex mechanism. In the human body, however, the 
mental substance is present at the same time, and in consequence 
of this co-existence the storm of the animal spirits in the pineal 
gland excites a disturbance in the mental substance also, which 
manifests itself in the latter as an unclear and indistinct idea, i.e. 
as sense-perception, as emotion, or as passion.^ 

With the disciples, the systematic impulse was greater than with 
the master. They found in this influxus physicus between mind 
and body the vulnerable point in the Cartesian philosophy, and ex- 
erted themselves to set aside the exception which the philosopher 
had been obliged to assert in the anthropological facts. This, how- 
ever, did not go on without effecting a new, and in a certain sense 
regressive, alteration in the conception of causality, in that the 
metaphysical moment once more gained preponderance over the me- 
chanical. The immanent causal processes of the spatial and of the 
conscious worlds were regarded as intelligible in themselves; but 
the transcendent causal process from one of these worlds into the 
other formed a problem. No difficulty was found in the idea that 
one motion transformed itself into another or that one function of 

1 On this Descartes then builds his Ethics. In such perturbations the mind 
occupies a passive attitude, and it is its task to free itself from these in clear 
and distinct knowledge. Spinoza carried out this intellectualistic morals in an 
extremely grand and impressive manner (Eth. IV. and V. ) . The antithesis of an 
active and passive attitude of the finite mind is indeed gained from the stand- 
point of his metaphysics only artificially (Eth. III., Def. 2) : but he carried 
through with compelling consistency the thought, that the overcoming of the 
passions follows from a knowledge of them, from the insight into the necessary 
divine system of all things ; he taught that human nature must perfect itself in 
the blessedness of the active emotions which consist only in the activity of the 
pure impulse toward knowledge (Eth. V. 15 ff.), and thus set up an ideal of 
life which reaches the height of the Greek öeupla. 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance anä Causality : Greulincx. 415 

consciousness — for example, a thougkt — should pass over into an- 
other : but it seemed impossible to understand how sensation should 
come out of motion, or motion out of will. Physical and logical caus- 
ality seemed to offer no difiiculty ; so much the greater was that 
presented by psycho-physical causality. In the case of the latter the 
consciousness dawned that the relation of equality or identity 
between cause and effect, by means of which mechanical and logi- 
cal dependence seemed intelligible, does not exist. Hence an 
inquiry must here be made for the principle by which the two ele- 
ments of the causal relation, cause and effect, which do not in them- 
selves belong together, are connected with each other.^ Where this 
principle was to be sought could not be a matter of doubt for the 
disciples of Descartes : God, who produced the union of the two 
substances in man's nature, has also so arranged them that the 
functions of the one substance are followed by the corresponding 
functions of the other. But on this account these functions in 
their causal relation to one another are not properly, and in their 
own nature, ef&cient causes, but only occasions in connection with 
which the consequences determined by divine contrivance appear in 
the other substance, — not causae, effi,cientes,\m.t causae occasionales. 
The true " cause " for the causal connection between stimuli and 
sensations, and between purposes and bodily movements, is God. 

Such considerations are multiplied in the whole development of 
the Cartesian school. Clauberg brings them into use for the theory 
of perceptions, Cordemoy for that of purposive motion ; their full 
development is attained in the " Ethics " of Geulincx. Yet in the 
latter author doubt is not entirely excluded as to whether God's 
causality in this connection is regarded as a special intervention in 
each individual case, or as a general and permanent arrangement. 
In some passages, indeed, the former is the case,^ but the spirit of 
the doctrine, taken as a whole, doubtless involves the latter. Geu- 
lincx expresses himself most clearly in the illustration of the clocks : ® 
as two clocks which have been made alike by the same artificer 
continue to move in perfect harmony, " absque ulla causalitate qua 
alterum hoc in altero causat, sed propter meram dependentiam, qua 
utrumque ab eadem arte et simili industria constitutum est," so the 

1 That the fundamental difficulty in all causal relations was in this actually 
stumbled upon, first became clear at a later time through Hume. Cf. § 34. 

2 For example, in the analogy of the chüd in the cradle, Eth. 123. It seems, 
besides, that the first edition of the Ethics (1665), in fact, introduced more the 
deus ex machina, while the annotations added in the second edition (1675) pre» 
sent throughout the profounder view. 

^ Mh., p. 124, note 19. 

416 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

corresponding functions of mind and body follow each other in 
accordance with the world-order once determined by God.^ 

8. This anthropological rationale of Occasionalism fits from the 
beginning into a more general metaphysical course of thought. The 
Cartesian system already contained the premises for the inference 
that in the case of all that takes place in finite substances, the effi- 
cient principle derives, not from these substances themselves, but from 
the deity. Thinking in minds takes place by means of the inborn 
ideas which God has given them; to the corporeal world he has 
communicated a quantum of motion which changes only in its dis- 
tribution among the individual corpuscles, but in the case of the 
individual body it is, so to speak, only temporarily concealed. 
Minds can create new ideas as little as bodies can create new mo- 
tion ; the sole cause is God. 

The Cartesians had all the more occasion to emphasise the sole 
causality of God, as their doctrine encountered violent contradiction 
in the orthodoxy of both Confessions, and became involved in the 
theological controversies of the time. Friend and foe had quickly 
recognised the relationship of Cartesianism with the doctrine of 
Augustine ; ^ and while on this account the Jansenists and the 
Fathers of the Oratory, who lived in the Augustinian-Scotist atmos- 
phere, were friendly to the new philosophy, the orthodox Peripa- 
tetics, and especially the Jesuits, made war upon it all the more 
violently. Thus the old opposition between Augustianism and Thom- 
ism came out in the controversy over Cartesianism. The conse» 
quence was that the Cartesians brought into the foreground as far 
as possible those elements in which their doctrine was allied to the 
Augustinian. So Louis de la Forge ^ attempted to prove the com- 
plete identity of Cartesianism with the doctrine of the Church 
Father, and emphasised especially the fact that according to both 
thinkers the sole ground of all that takes place in bodies as well as 
minds is God. Just this was later designated by Malebranche * as 
the sure mark of a Christian philosophy, while the most dangerous 

^ If, therefore, Leibniz, when he later claimed for his "pre-established har- 
mony " {^clairc. 2 and 3) this same analogy in frequent use at that time, characj- 
terised the Cartesian conception by an immediate dependence of the two clocks 
Upon one another, and the Occasionalistic by a constantly renewed regulation of 
the clocks on the part of the clock-maker, this was applicable at most to some 
passages in the first edition of the Ethics of Geulincx. 

2 Kinship and opposition apply also to still other points. Descartes and the 
priests of the Oratory (Gibieuf, Malebranche) are at one against Thomism in 
the Augustinian and Scotist doctrine of the boundless freedom of the deity ; 
they maintain again that the good is good because God so willed it, not per se 
(of. § 26, 2, 3), etc. 

8 Trait, de VEspr. Hum., Pref. * Recherche, VI. 2, 3. 

Chap, 2, § 31.] Substance and Oausality : Occasionalism. 417 

error of heathen philosophy consists in the assumption of metaphys- 
ical self-subsistence and capacity for spontaneous action on the part 
of finite things. 

With Geidincx, likewise, all finite things are deprived of the 
causal moment or element of substantiality. In this he proceeds 
from the principle ^ that one can himself do that only of which he 
knows how it is done. From this it follows in the anthropological 
field, that the mind cannot be the cause of the bodily movements — 
no one knows how he sets to work even but to raise his arm ; it 
follows farther in the cosmological field, that bodies which have no 
ideas whatever cannot operate at all, and finally, for the theory of 
knowledge, that the cause of perceptions is to be sought not in the 
finite mind — for this does not know how it comes to perceive — - 
nor in bodies ; therefore it is to be sought only in God. He pro- 
duces in us a world of ideas which in its wealth of qualities is much 
richer and more beautiful than the actual corporeal world itself.^ 

The epistemological motif finds finally with Malebranche ^ a still 
more profound apprehension. Cartesian dualism makes a direct 
knowledge of the body by mind absolutely impossible : such a knowl- 
edge is excluded not only because no influxics physicus is possible 
between the two, but also because, in view of the total heterogeneity 
of the two substances, it is not possible to see how even an idea of 
the one is thinkable in the other. In this respect, also, mediation 
is possible only through the deity, and Malebranche takes refuge in 
the Neo-Platonic world of Ideas in God. Man does not know bodies ; 
he knows their Ideas in God. This intelligible corporeal loorld in God 
is, on the one hand, the archetype of the actual corporeal world cre- 
ated b}^ God, and on the other hand, the archetype of those ideas 
which God has communicated to us of this actual corporeal world. 
Our knowledge is like the actual bodies, just as two magnitudes 
which are equal to a third are equal also to each other. In this 
sense Malebranche understood that philosophy teaches that we 
behold all things in God. 

9, Quite different was the solution which Spinoza gave to the 
Occasionalistic problems. The explanation of any mode of the one 
attribute by a mode of the other was excluded by the conception of 

1 Eth., p. 113 ; Met., p. 26. 

2 The remnant of self-activity in finite beings that remains in the system of 
Geulincx consists in the immanent mental activity of man. Cf. Eth. 121 f. 
The " autology," or insiyectio sui, is, therefore, not only the epistemological 
starting-point of the system, but also its ethical conclusion. Man has nothing 
to do in the outer world. Vbi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis. The highest virtue is 
a modest contentment, submission to God's will — humility, dei^pectio snU 

« Bech. III. 2. 

418 The Menaissance : Natural Science Pei'iod. [Part IV, 

tlie attribute as tie had defined it (see above, No. 5) ; it held of the 
attribute as of substance/ in se est et per se conciintur. Accordingly 
there could be no question of the dependence of the spatial upon 
consciousness, or vice versa; the appearance of such a dependence 
which presents itself in the anthropological facts needed, therefore, 
another explanation, and as a matter of course this was to be sought 
by the aid of his conception of God. If, however, the doctrine that 
God is the sole cause of all that takes place is for this reason found 
also with Spinoza, his agreement with the Occasionalists exists only 
in the motive and the word, but not in the meaning or spirit of the 
doctrine. For according to Geulincx and Malebranche, God is the 
creator ; according to Spinoza, he is the universal essence or nature 
of things ; according to the former, God creates the world by his 
will ; according to the latter, the world foUoivs necessarily from the 
nature of God [or is the necessary consequence of the nature of God]. 
In spite of the likeness in the word causa, therefore, the causal rela- 
tion is really thought here in a sense entirely different from that 
which it has there. With Spinoza it means not, "God creates the 
world," but, " he is the world." 

Spinoza always expresses his conception of real dependence, of 
causality, by the word " follow " {sequi, consequi) and by the addi- 
tion, " as from the definition of a triangle the equality of the sum 
of its angles to two right angles follows." The dependence of the 
world upon God is, therefore, thought as a mathematical consequence} 
This conception of the causal relation has thus completely stripped 
off the empirical mark of "producing" or "creating" which played 
so important a part with the Occasionalists, and replaces the percep- 
tional idea of active operation with the logico-mathematical relation 
of ground and consequent [_or reason and consequent; Ch'und und 
Folge']. Spinozism is a consistent identification of the relation of 
cause and effect with that of ground and consequent. The causality 
of the deity is, therefore, not in time, but is eternal, that is, timeless ; 
and true knowledge is a consideration of things sub quadam ceterni- 
tatis specie. This conception of the relation of dependence resulted 
of itself from the conception of the deity as the universal essence or 
nature : from this nature all its modifications follow timelessly, just 
as all propositions of geometry follow from the nature of space. 
The geometrical method knows no other causality than that of the 
" eternal consequence " ; for rationalism, only that form of depend- 
ence which is peculiar to thought itself, namely, the logical proced- 

1 Eth. I., Prop. 10. 

2 Cf. Schopenliauer, JJeher die vierfache Wtirsel des Satzes vom zureichende^ 
Grunde, eh. 6. [Fourfold Boot, etc., Bohn Lib.J 

Chap. 2, § ;51.] Substance Und Causality : Spinoza. 419 

uro of tho consequent from its antecedent reason, passes as in itself 
Intelligible, and on this account as the schema also for events or 
vosuiic processes : ^ real dependence also should be conceived neither 
Miecluinically nor teleologically, but only logico-mathematically. 

But now, as in geometry, all follows indeed from the nature of 
space, and yet each particular relation is fixed by other particular 
determiuatious, so, too, in the Spiuozistic metaphysics the neces- 
sary procedure of things forth from God consists in the determina- 
tion of every individual finite entity by other finite things. The 
sum of finite things and the modes of each attribute form a chain 
of strict determination, a chain without beginning and Avitliout end. 
The necessity of the divine nature rules in all ; but no mode is nearer 
to the deity, or farther from the deity, than is any other. In this 
the thought of Nicolaus Cusanus of the incommensurability of the 
finite with the infinite asserts itself — no series of stages of emana- 
tion leads from God down to the world : everything finite is deter- 
mined again by the finite, but in all God is the sole ground of their 
essence or nature. 

If this is the case, the unity of essence must appear also in the 
relation of the attributes, however strictly these may be separated 
qualitatively and causally. It is still the same divine essence which 
exists here in the form of extension, and there in the form of con- 
sciousness. The two attributes are then necessarily so related to 
each other that to every mode of the one a definite mode of the 
other corresponds. This correspondence or parallelism of the attri- 
butes solves the enigma of the connection of the two worlds : ideas 
are determined only by ideas, and motions only by motions ; but it 
is the like cosmic content of the divine essence which forms the con- 
nection of the one class, and also that of the other ; the same con- 
tent is in the attribute of consciousness as in the attribute of 
extension. This relation is presented by Spinoza in accordance 
with the scholastic conceptions of the esse in intellectu and the esse 
in re. The same that exists in the attribute of consciousness as 
object {objective) , as the content of our ideas, exists in the attribute 
of extension as something actual, independent of any idea or mental 
representation { formaliter). - 

1 Spinoza's pantheism has therefore the closest resemblance to the scholastic 
mystical Bealism of Scotus Eri.^ena (cf. § 23, 1), only that in the latter's 
system it is still more the case that the logical relation of the general to the 
particular forms the only schema ; from this resulted, in his case, the emanistic 
character which is lacking in Spinoza. 

2 But neither of these two modes of existence is more original than the other, 
or forms a prototype for the other: both express equally the nature of God 
(ezprimere). Hence an idealistic interpretation of Spinoza is as incorrect as 
a materialistic, although both might be developed out of his system. 

420 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

Spinoza's conception, then, is this : every finite thing as a mode 
of the divine essence, e.g. man, exists in like measure in both attri- 
butes, as mind and as body: and each of its particular functions 
belongs also in like measure to both attributes, as idea and as 
motion. As idea, it is determined by the connection of ideas, as 
motion by that of motions ; but in both, the content is the same by 
virtue of the correspondence of the attributes. The human mind is 
the idea (Idee) of the human body, both as a whole and in detail.^ 

10. The conclusion of this movement of thought which had 
passed through so many divarifications was reached in the meta- 
physical system of Leibniz, — a system which is equalled by none 
in the entire history of philosophy in all-sidedness of motives and 
in power of adjustment and combination. It owes this importance 
not only to the extensive learning and the harmonising mind of its 
author, but especially to the circumstance that he was at home in 
the ideas of ancient and mediaeval philosophy with as deep and fine 
an understanding of their significance as he had for the conceptions 
formed by the modern study of Nature.^ Only the inventor of the 
differential calculus, who had as much understanding for Plato and 
Aristotle as for Descartes and Spinoza, who knew and appreciated 
Thomas and Duns Scotus as well as Bacon and Hobbes, — only he 
could become the creator of the " pre-established harmony." 

The reconciliation of the mechanical and the teleological views of the 
world, and with this the uniting of the scientific and the religious 
interests of his time, was the leading motive in the thought of Leib- 
niz. He wished to see the mechanical explanation of Nature, the 
formulation of which in its scientific conceptions he himself essen- 
tially furthered, carried through to its full extent, and at the same 
time he cast about for thoughts by the aid of which the purposeful 
living character of the universe might nevertheless remain compre- 
hensible. The attempt must therefore be made — an attempt for 
which there were already intimations in the doctrine of Descartes — 
to see whether the whole mechanical course of events could not be 
ultimately traced back to efficient causes, whose purposeful nature 
should afford an import and meaning to their working taken as a 
whole. The whole philosophical development of Leibniz has the 
aim to substitute for the corpuscles, " entelechies," and to win back 
for the indifferent God of the geometrical method the rights of the 
Platonic airta.. The ultimate goal of his philosophy is to under- 

1 The difficulties wMcli arose in this connection from self-consciousness, and 
those also from the postulate of the countless attributes, Spinoza did not solve ; 
of. the correspondence with Tschirnhausen, Op. II. 219 f . 

2 Cf. Syst. JSfouv. 10. 

Chap. 2, § o I.] Substance and Causality : Leibniz. 421 

stand the mechanism of the cosmic processes as tlio means and phe- 
nomenal form by which the living content or import of the world 
realises itself. For this reason he could no longer think " cause " as 
only "Being," could no longer think God merely as ens perfectissi- 
mnni, could no longer think "substance " as characterised merely by 
an attribute of unchangeable existence, and could no longer think its 
states merely as modifications, determinations, or specifications of 
such a fundamental quality : cosmic processes or change became 
again for hin\ active icorkiiig (Wirken) ; substances took on the 
meaning of forces,^ and the philosophical conception of God also 
had, for its essential characteristic, creative force. This was Leib- 
niz' fundamental thought, that this creative force evinces itself in 
the mechanical system of motions. 

Leibniz attained this dynamical standpoint first in his theory of 
motion, and in a way which of itself required that the same stand- 
point should be carried over into metaphysics.^ The mechanical 
problem of inertia and the process begun by Galileo of resolving 
motion into infinitely small impulses, which together formed the 
starting-point for the authoritative investigations in natural science 
by Huyghens and Newton, led Leibniz to the principle of the infini- 
tesimal calculus, to his conception of the " vis viva, " and es- 
pecially, to the insight that the essential nature of bodies, in which 
the ground of motion is to be sought, consists not in extension, nor 
yet in their mass (impenetrability), but in their capacity to do 
work, — in force. But if substance is force, it is sujjer-spatial and im- 
material. On this account Leibniz finds himself compelled to think 
even corporeal substance as immaterial force. Bodies are, in their 
essential nature, force ; their spatial form, their property of filling 
space and their motion are effects of this force. The substance of 
bodies is jne^ophysical.^ In connection with Leibniz' doctrine of 
knowledge this purports that rational, clear, and distinct cognition 
apprehends bodies as force, while sensuous, obscure, and confused 
cognition apprehends them as spatial structures. Hence, for Leib- 
niz, space is neither identical with bodies (as in Descartes), nor the 
presupposition for them (as with Newton), but a force-product of 
substances, a j^)7iceuo?/ieno?i bene fandatum, an order of co-existence, — 

1 La substance est un gtre capable d'action. Princ. de la Nat. et de la Grace, 
1. Cf. Syst. JVouv. 2 f., "Force primitive." 

2 Sijst. Xouv. 3. 

8 With this the co-ordination of the two attributes, extensio and cogitatio, was 
again abolished ; the world of consciousness is the truly actual, the world of 
extension is phenomenon. Leibniz sets the intelligible world of substances over 
against the phenomena of the senses or material world in a completely Platonio 
fashion {Xouv. Ess. IV. 3). Cf. § 33 f. 

422 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Pakt IV. 

not an absolute reality, but an ens mentale} And the same holds 
true, mutatis mutandis, of time. From this it follows further, that 
the laws of mechanics which refer to these spatial manifestations 
of bodies are not rational, not " geometrical " truths, but truths 
which relate to matters of fact, and are contingent. They could be 
thought otherwise [i.e. the opposite is not inconceivable]. Their 
ground is not logical necessity, but — purposiveness or appropriate- 
ness. They are lois de convenance; and have their roots in the choix 
de la sagesse.^ God chose them because the purpose of the world 
would be best fulfilled in the form determined by them. If bodies 
are machines, they are such in the sense that machines are purpos- 
ively constructed works.^ 

11. Thus again in Leibniz, but in a maturer form than in Neo- 
Platonism, life becomes the principle for explaining Nature; his 
doctrine is vitalism. But life is variety, and at the same time unity. 
The mechanical theory led Leibniz to the conception of infinitely 
many individual forces, metaphysical points,^ as likewise to the 
idea of their continuous connection. He had originally leaned 
toward the atomic theory of Democritus and the nominalistic meta- 
physics ; the Occasionalist movement, and above all, the system of 
Spinoza, made him familiar with the thought of the All-unity ; and 
he found the solution, as Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno had 
found it before, in the principle of the identity of the part with the 
whole. Each force is the world-force, the cosmic force, but in a 
peculiar phase ; every substance is the world-substance, but in par- 
ticular form. Hence Leibniz gives to the conception of substance 
just this meaning : it is unity in plurality.^ This means that every 
substance in every state " represents " the multitude of other sub- 
stances, and to the nature of "representing" belongs always the 
unifying of a manifold.^ 

With these thoughts are united, in the system of Leibniz, the 

1 Cf. chiefly the correspondence with des Bosses. 

2 Princ. 11. 3 lb. 3. 

* Sijst. Nouv. 11. 5 Monad. 13-16. 

6 Leibniz is here served a very good turn (cf. op. cit.) by the ambiguity in 
the word " representation'''' (which applies also to the German " vorstellen'''' [and 
to the English "representation"]), in accordance with which the word means, 
on the one hand, to supply the place of or serve as a symbol of, and on the 
other hand, the function of consciousness. That every substance "repre- 
sents" the rest means, therefore, on the one hand, that all is contained in all 
(Leibniz cites the ancient a-v/MTrvoia vavra and also the omnia ubique of the 
Renaissance), and on the other hand, that each substance "perceives" all the 
rest. The deeper sense and justification of this ambiguity lies in the fact that 
we cannot form any clear and distinct idea whatever of the unifying of a 
manifold, except after the pattern of that kind of connection which we expe- 
rience within ourselves in the function of consciousness ("synthesis " in Kant's 
phraseology) . 

Chap. 2, § 31.] Substance and Causality : Leibniz. 423 

postulates whicli had been current in the metaphysical movement 
since Descartes; namely, that of the isolation of substances with 
reference to one another, and that of the correspondence of their 
functions having its origin in the common world-ground. Both motifs 
are most perfectly brought out in the Monadology. Leibniz calls his 
force-substance monad, — an expression which might have come to 
him along various lines of Renaissance tradition. Each monad is 
with reference to the rest a perfectly independent being, which can 
neither experience nor exercise influence. The monads "have no 
windows," and this " windowlessness " is to a certain extent the 
expression of their " metaphysical impenetrability." ^ But this 
quality of being completely closed to outward influence receives 
first of all a positive expression from Leibniz in his declaration 
that the monad is a purely internal principle : ^ substance is hence a 
force of immanent activity : the monad is not physical, hut psychical 
in its nature. Its states are representations {Vorstellungen), and 
the principle of its activity is desire {appitition) ,th& "tendency" to 
pass over from one representation to another.^ 

Each monad is nevertheless, on the other hand, a " mirror of the 
world " ; it contains the whole universe as a representation within 
itself ; in this consists the living unity of all things. But each is 
also an individucd, distinct from all others. Eor there are no two 
substances in the world alike.* If now the monads are not distin- 
guished by the content which they represent, — for this is the same 
with all,^ — their difference can be sought only in their mode of 
representing this content, and Leibniz declares that the difference 
between the monads consists only in the different degree of clearness 
and distinctness with which they " represent " the universe. Descartes' 
epistemological criterion thus becomes a metaphysical predicate by 
reason of the fact that Leibniz, like Duns Scotus (cf. p. 331), con- 
ceives of the antithesis of distinct and confused as an antithesis in 
the force of representation or in intensity. Hence the monad is re- 
garded as active in so far as it represents clearly and distinctly, as 
passive in so far as it represents obscurely and confusedly : ^ hence, 
also, its impulse {appetition) is directed toward passing from obscure 

1 Monad. 7. Cf. Syst. Nouv. 14, 17. 

2 Monad. 11. 3 Ha. 15-19. 

* Leibniz expressed this as the principium identitatis indiscernibilium 
(Monad. 9). 

^ Here, to be sure, Leibniz overlooked the fact that no real content is reached 
in this system of mutual representation of substances. The monad a represents 
the monads b, c, d, . . . x. But what is the monad b? It is in turn the repre- 
sentation of the monads a, c, d., . . . x. The same is true for c, and so on in 

** Monad. 49. 

424 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

to clear representations, and the " clearing up " of its own content is 
the goal of its life. To this above-mentioned intensity of the repre- 
sentations Leibniz applies the mechanical principle of infinitely- 
small impulses : he calls these infinitely small constituent parts of 
the representative life of the monads peirtespe?•cep^^■o??s/ and needs 
this hypothesis to explain the fact, that according to his doctrine the 
monad evidently has very many more representations than it is con- 
scious of (cf. below, § 33). In the language of to-day t\\e petites i^er- 
ceptions would be unconscious meyital states (^Vorstellungen). 

Of such differences in degree of clearness and distinctness there 
are infinitely many, and in accordance with the law of continuity — 
natura non facit saltum — the monads form an uninterrupted graded 
series, a great system of development, which rises from the " simple " 
monads to souls and minds.^ The lowest monads, which represent 
only obscurely and confusedly, i.e. unconsciously, are therefore only 
passive ; they form matter. The highest monad, which represents 
the universe with perfect clearness and distinctness, — just for this 
reason there is but one such, — and is accordingly pure activity, is 
called the central monad — God. Inasmuch as each of these monads 
lives out its own nature, they all harmonise completely with each 
other at every moment ^ by virtue of the sameness of their content, 
and from this arises the appearance of the action of one substance 
upon others. This relation is the harmonie prMtablie des substances 
— a doctrine in which the principle of correspondence, introduced 
by Geulincx and Spinoza for the relation of the two attributes, 
appears extended to the totality of all substances. Here as there, 
however, the principle as carried out involves the uninterrupted 
determination in the activity of all substances, the strict necessity 
of all that takes place, and excludes all chance and all freedom in 
the sense of uncaused action. Leibniz also rescues the conception 
of freedom for finite substances only in the ethical meaning of a 
control of reason over the senses and passions.* 

The pre-established harmony — this relationship of substances in 
their Being and life — needs, however, a unity as the ground of its 
explanations, and this can be sought only in the central monad. 
God, who created the finite substances, gave to each its own content 

1 lb. 21. 

"^ Princ. 4. In this connection the "soul" is conceived of as the central 
monad of an organism, in that it represents most distinctly the monads consti- 
tuting this, and accordingly only with a lesser degree of distinctness the rest of 
the universe. Monad. 61 If. 

^ Syst. Nouv. 14. 

* Eo magis est libertas quo magis agitur ex ratione, etc. Leibniz, De Libert. 
COp., Erd. ed., 669). 

Chap. 2, § 32.J Natural Right. 425 

in a particular grade of representative intensity, and thereby so 
arranged all the monads that they should harmonise throughout. 
And in this necessary process in which their life unfolds, they 
realise the end of the creative Universal Spirit in the whole 
mechanical determination of the series of their representations. 
This relation of mechanism to teleology makes its way finally, also, 
into the epistemological principles of Leibniz. The deity and the 
other monads sustain the same relation to each other as the infinite 
and finite substances sustain in the system of Descartes. But for 
the rationalistic conception of things, only the infinite is a necessity 
of thought, while the finite, on the contrary, is something " contin- 
gent," in the sense that it might also be thought otherwise, that the 
opposite contains no contradiction (cf. above, § 30, 7). Thus the 
antithesis of eternal and necessary truths takes on metaphysical 
significance : only God's Being is an eternal truth; he exists, accord- 
ing to the principle of contradiction, with logical or absolute necessity. 
Finite things, however, are contingent ; they exist only in accordance 
with the principle of suflicient reason, by virtue of their determina- 
tion by another; the world and all that belongs to it has only 
conditioned, hypothetical necessity. This contingency of the world, 
Leibniz, in agreement with Duns Scotus,^ traces back to the will oj 
God. The world might have been otherwise ; that it is as it is, it 
owes to the choice which God made between the Ta.a,nj possibilities.^ 
Thus in Leibniz all threads of the old and the new metaphysics 
run together. With the aid of the conceptions formed in the school 
of mechanics he formulated the presages of the philosophy of the 
Eenaissance into a systematic structure, where the ideas of Greece 
found their home in the midst of the knowledge acquired by moderD 

§ 32. Natural Right. 

The Philosophy of Right of the Eenaissance was also dependent^ 
on the one hand, upon the stimulus of Humanism, and on the other, 
upon the needs of modern life. The former element is shown not 
only in the dependence upon ancient literature, but also in the re- 
vival of the ancient conception of the state, and in the attachment 
to its traditions ; the latter make their appearance as a theoreti- 
cal generalisation of those interests, in connection with which the 

1 The relations of Leibniz to the greatest of the Scliolastics are to be recog- 
nized not only in this point, but also in many others ; though as yet they have 
unfortunately not found the consideration or treatment that they deserve. 

2 Cf., however, in addition, below, § 35. 

426 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

secular states during this period took on the form of autonomous 

1. All these motives show themselves first in Maccliiavelli. In 
his admiration of Rome, the Italian national feeling speaks imme- 
diately, and it was from the study of ancient history that he gained 
his theory of the modern state, at least as regards its negative side. 
He demanded the complete independence of the state from the 
Church, and carried Dante's Ghibelline doctrine of the state to its 
farthest consequence. He combats the temporal sovereignty of the 
Papacy as the permanent obstacle to an Italian national state, and 
so that separation between the spiritual and the secular, which is 
common to all the beginnings of modern thought, is completed for 
the practical field in his system, as it had been before with Occam 
and Marsilius of Padua (cf. p. 328). The consequence of this, 
however, as with the iSTominalists just mentioned, was that the state 
was conceived not teleologically, but in purely naturalistic fashion, 
as a product of needs and interests. Prom this fact is explained 
the singleness of aim and regardlessness with which Macchiavelli 
carried out his theory of the acquisition and preservation of princely 
power, and with which he treated politics solely from the point of 
view of the warfare of interests. 

The relation of church and state, moreover, excited an especial 
interest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, because it played 
a part that was always important and often decisive in the conflicts 
and shiftings of confessional oppositions. Here an interesting 
exchange of conceptions came about. The Protestant view of the 
world, which in accordance with its first principle changed the 
mediaeval distinction in value between the spiritual and the secular, 
and removed the ban of the "profane" from the secular spheres 
of life, saw in the state also a divine order; and the Reformation 
Philosophy of Right, under the lead of Melancthon, limited the right 
of the state more by the right of the invisible, than by the claims 
of the visible Church ; indeed, the divine mission of the magistrates 
afforded a valuable support for the Protestant State-church. Much 
less could the Catholic Church feel itself under obligation to the 
modern state ; and although it thereby departed from Thomism, it 
allowed itself to be pleased by such theories as those of Bellarmin 
and Mariana, in which the state was conceived of as a work of 
human composition or as a compact. Por with this theory the state 
lost its higher authority, and to a certain extent its metaphysical 
root ; it appeared capable of abolition ; the human will which had 
created it might dissolve it again, and even its supreme head was 
deprived of his absolute inviolability. While the Protestants re- 

Chap. 2, § 32.] Natural Right : MaccMavelli, Reformers. 427 

garded the state as an immediate divine order, for the Catholics, as 
Deing a human arrangement, it needed the sanction of the Church 
and ought not to be regarded as valid where this was lacking ; but 
it should retain this sanction only when it placed itself at the service 
of the Church. So Campanella taught that the Spanish Empire 
(monarchia) had as its task to place the treasures of foreign parts 
of the world at the disposal of the Church for her contest with the 

2. But in time these oppositions in the philosophy of rights 
yielded to confessional indifferentism, which had attained the mas« 
tery in theoretical science also, and since the state was regarded as 
essentially an order of earthly things, the relation of man to God 
fell outside its sphere of action. Philosophy demanded for the 
citizen the right which she claimed for herself, the right of a free, 
individual attitude toward the religious authorities of the time, and 
became thereby the champion of toleration. The state has not to 
trouble itself about the religious opinion of individuals, the right of 
the citizen is independent of his adherence to this or that confes- 
sion: this demand was the necessary result of the confessional 
controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which had 
heaved and tossed so passionately to and fro. In this view unbe- 
lieving indifference, and positive conviction which had to defend 
itself against political authority of the opposite creed, came to an 

In this spirit Macchiavelli had already written against the sole 
authority of the Koman Church ; but it was by Thomas More that 
the principle of toleration was first proclaimed in its completeness. 
The inhabitants of his happy island belong to the most varied con- 
fessions, which all live peacefully side by side without any polit- 
ical importance being attributed to the variety of their religious 
views. They have even united upon a common worship, which each 
party interprets in its own sense, and supplements by special forms 
of worship. So, too, Jean Bodin, in his Heptaplomeres, makes 
highly educated typical representatives, not only of the Christian 
confessions, but also of Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Heathen- 
dom, find a form of worshipping God, which is equally satisfactory 
to all. Finally, in a more abstract manner, Hugo Grotius com- 
pletely separated divine and human right in the sharp distinctness 
with which he presented the principles of the philosophical science 
of rights, basing divine right upon revelation and hiiman right upon 
reason; demanding at the same time, however, an equally sharp 
and thoroughgoing separation of the spheres of life to which they 

428 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

But the classical '' Doomsday Book " for the toleration movement 
was Spinoza's Theolog ico-political Tractate, which went to the root of 
the much-treated matter. Utilising many thoughts and examples 
from the older Jewish literature influenced by Averroism, this work 
demonstrated that religion, and especially the religious documents, 
have neither the province nor the design of teaching theoretical 
truths, and that the essence of religion consists not in the recogni- 
tion of particular dogmas, but in the disposition and the will and 
action determined by it. From this it follows incontestably that 
the state has still less ground or right to trouble itself about the 
assent of its citizens to particular dogmas, and that it should rather 
by virtue of its real authority restrain every attempt toward a con- 
straining of the conscience, which may proceed from any of the 
ecclesiastically organised forms of religious life. The mystically 
profound religious nature of Spinoza alienated him from the dog- 
matic government of the churches and from belief in the literal 
statements of their historical documents. He asserted the principle 
that religious books, like all other phenomena of literature, must be 
historically explained as to their theoretical import, that is, must be 
understood from the point of view of the intellectual condition of 
their authors, and that this historical criticism takes away from 
those former theoretical views their binding and normative signifi- 
cance for a later time. 

3. With the political and churchly political interests became 
associated the social. No one gave them a more eloquent expression 
than Thomas More. After a thrilling portrayal of the misery of 
the masses the first book of the Utopia comes to the conclusion that 
society would do better if instead of the Draconian justice with which 
she punishes the violation of her laws, she should stop the sources of 
crime. The author maintains that the greater part of the guilt for 
the wrong-doing of the individual is due to the perverted arrange- 
ment of the whole. This latter consists in the inequality of property 
brought about by the use of money, for this inequality gives occasion 
to all the aberrations of passion, of envy, and of hatred. The ideal 
picture of the perfect state of society upon the island of Utopia, 
which More sketches in contrast to the present condition, is in its 
main features an imitation of the ideal state of Plato. This human- 
istic revival is, however, distinguished from its prototype in a 
manner characteristic for modern socialism, by its abolition of class- 
distinctions, which seemed necessary to the ancient thinker in conse- 
quence of his reflection upon the actually given difference in the 
intellectual and moral status of individuals. In an abstraction 
that was a prototype for the succeeding development More proceeded 

Chap. 2, § 32.] Natural Bight : Spinoza, More, Bacon. 429 

from the thought of the equality of all citizens before the law, and 
changed into an equality of claim or title for all citizens those forms 
of community which Plato had demanded of the ruling classes as a 
renunciation of the natural impulses toward an individual sphere of 
interests. With Plato the preferred classes were to renounce all 
private property in order to devote themselves entirely to the gen- 
eral weal : with More the abolition of private property is demanded 
as the surest means for doing away with crime, and is based upon 
the equality of title which all have to the common possession. But 
at the same time the English Chancellor still holds fast to the ideal 
model of the ancient philosopher, in so far as to treat this entire 
equality in the division of material interests, as the indispensable 
basis for making it possible to all citizens to enjoy in like measure 
the ideal goods of society, science, and art. A normal working day 
of six hours for all members of society will be enough, he thinks, to 
satisfy all external needs of the community: the remaining time 
should remain free for every one for nobler employment. With these 
characteristics the programme for all the higher forms of modern 
socialism grows in the thought of More out of the Platonic project. 

But the spirit of the Kenaissance was animated by much more 
worldly interests. Stimulated by the magic of discoveries, dazzled 
by the glitter of inventions, it set itself the task of transforming by 
its new insights the whole outer condition of human society as 
related to the natural conditions of life, and saw before itself an 
ideal of comfort for human life, which should develop from a com- 
plete and systematic use of the knowledge and control of Nature 
made possible by science. All social injuries will be healed by 
raising human society, by means of the scientific advancement of 
external civilisation, beyond all the cares and all the need which 
now vex it. A few inventions like the compass, the art of printing, 
and gunpowder, says Bacon, have sufl&ced to give human life new 
motion, greater dimensions, mightier development. What trans- 
formations stand before us when invention once becomes an intel- 
ligently exercised art ! The social problem is thus transferred to 
an improvemeyit of the material condition of society. 

In Bacon's New Atlantis ^ a happy island-people in carefully 
guarded seclusion is brought before us, which by skilful regula- 
tions receives information of the progress in civilisation made by 
all other peoples, and at the same time, by the systematic prosecu- 
tion of research, discovery, and invention, raises to the highest 

1 The title of this Utopia and much else in it is a reminiscence of Plato's 
fragment, Critias (113 f.). 

430 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

point the control of Nature for the practical interests of human life. 
All kinds of possible and impossible inventions are related in fan- 
tastic prophecy/ and the whole activity of the " House of Solomon " 
is directed toward improving the material state of society, while the 
portrayal of the political relations is only superficial and unim- 

In Campanella's State of the Sun, on the other hand, in which the 
after-effects of More's Utopia are very noticeable, we come to a com- 
plete project of the socialistic future state, which is even pedanti- 
cally ordered down to all of its minor relations. This state does not 
shrink in any direction from the most extreme violence to the free- 
dom of the individual's life. From the mathematically delineated 
plan of the imperial city to the division of hours for daily work 
and enjoyment, the determination of professions, the pairing of the 
men and women, the astrologically predetermined hour for sexual 
unions, — all takes place here from an arrangement by the state for 
the welfare of the whole, and an extended, carefully worked out 
system of bureaucracy (in which there is an admixture of metaphys- 
ical motives)^ is built up upon the graded knowledge of the citizens. 
The more any one knows, the more power he ought to have in the 
state, in order to rule and improve by his knowledge the course of 
Nature. The points of view in this improvement look essentially 
toward external civilisation in Campanella's system also. With 
him, indeed, four hours of daily labour should suffice on the average, 
to assure the good cheer of society, and upon this prosperity all 
should have a like claim. 

4. In spite of all that is fantastic and whimsical,^ the thought 
nevertheless asserts itself in Campanella's State of the Sun, still 
more than in More's Utopia, that the state should be an artificial 
product of human insight for the removal of social injuries. Neither 
writer desired to set up a mere creation of fancy, any more than did 
Plato ; they believe in the possibility of realising " the best political 
constitution " by rational reflection upon an order of social relations 

1 In addition to the microscope and the telescope, the microphone and tele- 
phone are not wanting ; there are giant explosive materials, flying-machines, 
all sorts of engines with air and water power, and even ' ' some kinds ' ' of 
perpetual motion ! But the author lays special value upon the fact that by 
better culture of plants and animals, by unsuspected chemical discoveries, by 
baths and air-cures, diseases are to be banished and life prolonged ; experiments 
on animals are also introduced in the interest of medicine. 

2 Beneath the supreme ruler, — Sol or Metaphysicus, — who must embody all 
knowledge within himself, stand first of all three princes, whose spheres of 
activity correspond to the three " primalities " of Being, Power, Wisdom and 
Love (cf. § 29, 3), etc. 

8 Pantastic is especially the strong element of astrological and magical super- 
stition ; whimsical, his monkish rude treatment of the sexual relations. 

Chap. 2, § 32.] Natural Right : Campanella, Grrotius. 431 

that shall be in accordance with Nature. In this, to be sure, they 
encountered much opposition. Cardanus combated Utopias on 
principle, and in their stead commended to science the task of 
comprehending the necessity with which the actual states of history 
develop in their special definite nature, out of the character, the 
relations of life, and the experiences of peoples ; he would have 
them regarded as natural products like organisms, and would apply 
to their conditions the medical categories of health and disease. 
In a larger way, and free from the Pythagorean astrology in which 
the mathematician Cardanus indulged, but with a strongly con- 
structive fancy, the practical statesman Bodin attempted to under- 
stand the manifold character of historical reality as manifested in 
political life. 

But the tendency of the time was much more toward seeking a right 
founded in Nature for all times and relations alike, and to be recog- 
nised by reason alone : although a man like Albericus Gentilis desired 
to reduce the principles of private right to physical laws by analogies 
of childlike crudeness. A firmer and more fruitful ground was 
gained when human nature, instead of general " Nature," was taken 
as a starting-point. This was done by Hugo Grotius. Like Thomas 
Aquinas, he found the fundamental principle of natural right in the 
social need, and found the method for its development in logical 
deduction. That which reason recognises as agreeing with man's 
social nature and following therefrom — in this consists the jus 
naturale^ — that cannot be changed by any historical mutation. 
The thought of such an absolute right, which exists only by its 
foundation in reason, and which exists independently of the politi- 
cal power and rather as the ultimate ground of this power, was 
brought home to Grotius by the analogy of international law with 
which his investigation was primarily concerned. On the other 
hand, however, by virtue of this material principle, private right be- 
came the authoritative presupposition for political right also. The 
satisfaction of individual interests, protection of life and property, 
appeared as the essential end to be subserved by the ordering of 
rights. Formally and methodically, on the contrary, this philo- 
sophical system of rights was entirely deductive ; it aimed only to 
draw the logical consequences of the principle of society. In like 
manner Hohhes also regarded the corpus politicum as a machine 
capable of being deduced from the conception of its end by x^ure 
intellectual activity, and the philosophical doctrine of rights as a 
perfect demonstrable science. At the same time this field seemed 

1 De Jure Bell, et Pac. 1. 1, 10. 

432 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. CPart IV. 

adapted in a pre-eminent degree to the application of the geometri- 
cal method, and Puffendorf introduced the whole apparatus of this 
method by combining Grotius and Hobbes, and developing the whole 
system synthetically from the thought that the individual's instinct 
toward self-preservation could be rationally and successfully fulfilled 
only by satisfying his social need. In this form natural right per- 
sisted as the ideal of a "geometrical" science until far on into 
the eighteenth century (Thomasius, Wolff, indeed, even to Fichte 
and Schelling), and survived the general decline of the Cartesian 

5. Looking now at the contents rather than at the form, we find 
that the ultimate ground of public life and of social coherence was 
placed in the interests of individuals : the mechanics of the state 
found in the character of the impulses of the individual man that 
self-intelligible and simple element,^ out of which the complex 
structures of life viewed as a subject of law and rights {Rechtslehens) 
might be explained in accordance with the Galilean principle. With 
this the doctrine of the state also went back to the Epicurean theory of 
social atomism ^ (cf. pp. 174 f.), and the synthetic principle by which 
the origin of the state was to be understood was the contract. From 
Occam and Marsilius down to Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte, this con- 
tract theory was dominant in political philosophy. Grotius and 
Hobbes devoted themselves to carrying it out in the most careful 
manner. To the political contract by which the individuals unite 
themselves to a community of interests, is attached the contract of 
sovereignty or subjection, by means of which the individuals hand 
over their rights and authority to the magistracy. This proved to 
be a general frame in which the most varied political theories fitted. 
While Grotius, and likewise Spinoza, found the interests of the 
citizens to be best guaranteed by an aristocratic republican constitu- 
tion, Hobbes could deduce from the same presupposition his theory 
of a purely secular absolutism, according to which the political power 
should be inviolably united in one personality, the universal will in 
the individual will of the sovereign. 

In closest connection with the contract theory appears the devel- 
opment of the conception of sovereignty. The source of all power, 
according to this theory, is the popular will, from which the politi- 
cal contract and the contract of submission have proceeded; the 
proper bearer of the sovereignty is the people. Meanwhile the con- 

1 The term '■'■ conatus'''' applies in this sense to both domains, the physical 
and the psychical, with Hobbes and Spinoza. 

2 As in the theoretical domain, so also in the practical, the principle of 
Democritus and Epicurus obtains with great efforts a late victory. 

Chap. 2, § 32.] Natural Bight : Contract Theory. 433 

tract and the transfer of right and power completed thereby, are 
regarded by some writers as irrevocable, and by others as capable 
of recall. So Bodin, in spite of his doctrine of popular sovereignty, 
maintains the unlimited character and unconditional authority of 
the royal power, the inviolability of the ruler and the unjustifia- 
bility of all opposition against him ; with Hohhes the sovereignty 
of the people is still more completely absorbed into that of the 
monarch, whose will here stands quite in the sense of the Vetat c'est 
moi as the sole source of rights in the positive political life. In oppo- 
sition to this view, and decidedly more consistent in view of their 
presupposition, the " monarchomachischen [opposed to an absolute 
monarchy] theories," whose chief representative besides Buchanan 
(1506-1582) and Languet (1518-1581) was Althus of Lower Sax- 
ony, maintained that the governmental contract becomes liable to 
dissolution as soon as the sovereign ceases to rule rightly, i.e. in the 
interest and according to the will of the people. If the contract is 
broken on one side, it is no longer binding for the other party; 
in this situation the sovereignty returns again to its original bearers. 
If man has made the state with a purpose and under reflection, then 
he abolishes it again when it becomes evident that it has failed to 
fulfil its purpose. Thus the Eenaissance is already providing iu 
advance the theory of revolution.^ 

All these theories, however, received their especial colouring from 
motives growing out of the particular relations of church and state, — 
a colouring which depended upon the question whether the unre- 
stricted power of the ruler was felt as dangerous or as beneficial in 
consequence of his relation to the Confessions. The most radical 
standpoint in real politics was taken by Hohhes by virtue of his 
religious indifferentism : religion is a private opinion, and only that 
opinion which the sovereign professes has political standing or value. 
No other religion or Confession can be tolerated in public life. 
Hobbes gave the philosophical theory for the historical cujus regio 
illius religio. And Spinoza attached himself to him in this. He 
stood for freedom of thought and against all compulsion of con- 
science, but for him religion was only a matter of knowledge and 
disposition ; for the public manifestation of religious feeling in the 
church and in public worship, it was in the interest of order and 
peace that only the form fixed by the magistracy should obtain. In 
a more positive sense the Protestant Philosophy of Right declared for 

^ These principles were defended with special application to the English con- 
ditions of the seventeenth century, and to the right of the "Kevolution" of 
that time by the poet John 3Iilton (Defensio pro Populo Anglicano, 1651), and 
by Algernon Sidney (Discourses of Government, 1683). 

434 The Renausance : Natural Science Period. [Pakt IV. 

the sovereignty in ch.urcli and state of the kingdom existing by the 
grace of God ; while in this school, also, as for example in the case 
of Althus, the sovereignty of the people was defended as over 
against a magistracy holding another creed. The same motive was 
decisive where the Jesuits maintained that the magistracy might be 
removed and that the assassination of the prince was excusable 
(cf. above). 

6. In the case of Hohhes the rationale of the contract theory 
rested on more general motives. If the social and political life was 
to be comprehended from the point of view of " human nature," the 
English philosopher found the fundamental, all-determining charac- 
beristic of human nature in the impulse toioard self-preservation or 
egoism, the simple, self-evident principle for explaining the entire- 
volitional life. Here his materialistic metaphysics and sensualistic 
psychology (cf. § 31) made it appear that this instinct toward self- 
preservation, in its original essence, was directed only toward the 
preservation and furtherance of the sensuous existence of the indi- 
vidual. All other objects of the will could serve only as means to 
bring about that supreme end. Agreeably to this principle, also,, 
there was no other norm of judgment for man as a natural beings 
chan that of furtherance or hindrance, of profit or of harm: the 
distinction of good and evil, of right and wrong, is not possible 
upon the standpoint of the individual, but only upon the social 
standpoint, where the common interest instead of the individual's 
interest forms the standard. So egoism became the principle of all 
practical philosophy ; for if the individual's instinct toward self- 
preservation was to be restricted and corrected by the command of 
the state, yet this state itself was regarded as the most ingenious 
and perfect of all the contrivances which egoism had hit upon to 
attain and secure its satisfaction. The state of nature, in which the 
egoism of each stands originally opposed to the egoism of every 
other, is a ivar of all against all: to escape this the state was 
founded as a contract for the mutual warrant of self-preservation. 
The social need is not original : it only results necessarily as the- 
most efficient and certain means for the satisfaction of egoism. 

Spinoza adopted this doctrine, but gave it a more ideal signifi- 
cance by introducing it into his metaphysics. " Suum esse con- 
servare " is for him also the quintessence and fundamental motive 
or all willing. But since every finite mode belongs equally to both 
attributes, its impulse toward self-preservation is directed as well 
toward its conscious activity, i.e. its Jcnoidedge, as toward its main- 
tenance in the corporeal world, i.e. its poiver. This individual 
striving, interpreted along the lines of the Baconian identity of 

Chap. 2, § 32.] Natural Right : Hohhes^ Cambridge Men. 435 

knowledge and power, forms for Spinoza the ground of explanation 
for the empirical life of the state, in accordance with the principle 
that each one's right extends as far as his power. In this process 
of explanation Spinoza moves mainly in the lines of Hobbes, and 
deviates from, him only, as noticed above, in his view as to the best 
form of constitution. This same complication of conceptions, how- 
ever, presents itself to Spinoza as affording also a starting-point for 
his mystico-religious ethics. For since the true "esse" of every 
finite thing is the deity, the only perfect satisfaction of the impulse 
toward self-preservation is to be found in "love to God." That 
Malebranche, who spoke so vehemently of the "atheistical Jew," 
taught the same in slightly different words — "mit ein bischen 
anderen Worten" — has already been mentioned (§ 31, 4). 

7. Hobbes' theory of egoism — the "selfish system," as it was 
later termed for the most part — found vigorous opposition among 
his countrymen.^ The reduction of all activities of the will, without 
any exception, to the impulse toward self-preservation excited both 
ethici^l revolt and the theoretical contradiction of psychological expe- 
rience. The warfare against Hobbes was undertaken primarily by 
the Neo-Platonist school of Cambridge, whose chief literary repre- 
sentatives were Ealph Cudworth and Henry Moi^e. In this contro- 
versy the antithesis of «^uo-ts and Ö€o-ts developed after the ancient 
prototype. For Hobbes, right and moral order arose from social 
institution; for his opponents they were original and immediately 
certain demands of Nature. Both parties opposed the lex naturalis 
to the theological dogmatic grounding of practical philosophy : but 
for Hobbes natural law was the demonstrable consequence of intel- 
ligent egoism ; for the " Platonists " it was an immediate certainty, 
Innate in the human mind. 

Cumberland proceeded against Hobbes in the same line. He 
would have man's social nature regarded as being as original as his 
egoism : the " benevolent " altruistic inclinations, whose actual ex- 
istence is not to be doubted, are objects of direct self-perception 
which have an original independence of their own ; the social need 
is not the refined product of a shrewd self-seeking, but — as Hugo 
Grotius had conceived of it — a primary, constitutive characteristic 
of human nature. While egoism is directed toward one's own 
private weal, the altruistic motives are directed toward the uni- 
versal weal, without which private weal is not possible. This 
connection between the welfare of the individual and that of the 

^ Cf. J. TuUoch, Bational Theology and Christian Fhilosophy in England in 
the 17th Cent. (Lond. 1872). 

436 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV. 

public, which in Hobbes appeared as due to the shrewd insight 
of man, is regarded by Cumberland as a provision of God, whose 
commandment is hence considered to be the authoritative principle 
for obeying those demands which express themselves in the benevo- 
lent inclinations. 

To the side of this natural morality of reason, which was thus 
defended against orthodoxy on the one hand and sensualism on the 
other, came the natural religion of reason, which had been set up 
by Herbert of Cherhury in opposition to these same two positions. 
Eeligion also shall be based neither upon historical revelation nor 
upon human institution ; it belongs to the inborn possession of the 
human mind. The consensus gentium — so argues Herbert in the 
manner of the ancient Stoics — proves that belief in the deity is 
a necessary constituent of the human world of ideas, a demand 
of reason ; but on this account that only which corresponds to those 
demands of the reason can stand as true content of religion, as 
contrasted with the dogmas of religions. 

Thus the questions of practical philosophy which appear in 
English literature in the very lively discussion excited by Hobbes, 
gradually became transferred to the psychological realm. What is 
the origin of right, morals, and religion in the human mind ? — so 
runs the problem. With this, however, the movements of the 
philosophy of the Enlightenment are introduced- 




In addition to the literature cited on p. 348, cf . 

Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the 18th Cent. Lond. 1876. 

J. Mackintosh, On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy during the 17th and 

18th Centuries. Edm. 1872. 
Ph. Damiron, Memoires pour servir ä VHistoire de la Philosophie au 18^^ Siede. 

3 vols., Paris 1858-64. 
"E. Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz. München, 1873. 
Also H. Hettner, Litteraturgeschichte des 18. Jahr. 3 parts. 

The natural rhythm of intellectual life brought with it the result 
that in the modern as in the Greek philosophy a first cosmologico- 
metaphysical period was followed by a period of an essentially 
anthropological character, and that thus once more the newly 
awakened, purely theoretical efforts of philosophy must yield to a 
practical conception of philosophy as "world-wisdom." In fact, all 
features of the Greek sophistic movement are found again with 
ripened fulness of thought, with broadened variety, with deepened 
content, and, therefore, also, with added energy in their antitheses 
in the Philosophy of the Enlightenment, which coincides approxi- 
mately in time with the eighteenth century. In the place of Athens 
now appears the whole breadth of the intellectual movement among 
European civilised peoples, and scientific tradition counts now as 
many thousands of years as it then counted centuries ; but the 
tendency as a whole and the objects of thought, the points of view 
and the results of the philosophising, show an instructive similarity 
and kinship in these two periods so widely separated in time and 
so different in the civilisations which formed their background. 
There prevails in both the same turning of thought toward the 
subject's inner nature, the same turning away from metaphysical 
subtlety with doubt and disgust, the same preference for an em- 
pirical genetic consideration of the human psychical life, the same 
inquiry as to the possibility and the limits of scientific knowledge, 


438 Philosophy of the Enlightenment. [Part V. 

and the same passionate interest in the discussion of the prob- 
lems of life and society. No less characteristic, lastly, for both 
periods is the penetration of philosophy into the broad circles of 
general culture and the fusion of the scientific with the literary 

But the basis for the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century 
was given in the general features of a secular view of life, as they 
had been worked out during the Renaissance by the fresh move- 
ments in art, religion, politics, and natural research. While these 
had found their metaphysical formulation in the seventeenth cen- 
tury, the question now came again into the foreground, how man 
should conceive, in the setting of the new Weltmisdiauung, his own 
nature and his own position : and in the presence of the value set 
upon this question, the interest in the various metaphysical concep- 
tions in which the new Weltanschauung had been embodied, retreated 
more and more decidedly into the background. Men contented 
themselves with the general outlines of metaphysical theories, in 
order to employ themselves the more thoroughly with the questions 
of human life ; and all the doctrines of the Enlightenment which 
offer such a vehement polemic against speculation are, in truth, 
working from the beginning with a metaphysics of the " sound com- 
mon sense " which at last raised its voice so high, and which ulti- 
mately only assumed as self-evident truth that which had fallen to 
it from the achievements of the labour of preceding centuries. 

The beginnings of the philosophy of the Enlightenment are to be 
sought in England, where, in connection with the well-ordered con- 
iitions which followed the close of the period of the revolution, a 
powerful upward movement of literary life claimed philosophy also 
in the interests of general culture. From England this literature 
was transplanted to France. Here, however, the opposition of the 
ideals which it brought with it to the social and political status, 
worked in such a way that not only was the presentation of the 
thoughts more excited and vehement from the outset, but the 
thoughts themselves also take on a sharper point, and turn their 
negative energy more powerfully against the existing conditions in 
Church and state. At first from France, and then from the direct 
influence of England,^ also, Germany received the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, for which it had already received an independent 
preparation in a more theoretical manner: and here these ideas 
found their last deepening, and a purification and ennobling as well, 

1 Cf . G. Zart, Der Einfiuss der englischen Philosophen auf die deutsche Philos, 
des 18. Jahrh. (Berlin, 1881). 

Plulosopliy of the Enlightenment. 439 

as they came to au end in the German poetry with which the 
Benaissance of classical Humanism was completed. 

John Locke became the leader of the English Enlightenment by 
finding a popular form of empirico-psychological exposition for the 
general outlines of the Cartesian conception of the world. While 
the metaphysical tendency of the system brought forth an idealistic 
after-shoot in Berkeley, the anthropologico-genetic mode of con- 
sideration extended quickly and victoriously to all problems of 
philosophy. Here the opposition between the sensualistic associa- 
tional psychology and the nativistic theories of various origin con- 
tinued to have a decisive influence upon the course of development. 
It controlled the vigorous movement in moral philosophy, and the 
development of deism and natural religioyi, which was connected 
with it ; and it found its sharpest formulation in the epistemological 
field, where the most consistent and deepest of English thinkers, 
David Hume, developed empiricism to positivism, and thereby called 
forth the opposition of the Scottish school. 

The pioneer of the French Enlightenment was Pierre Bayle, whose 
Dictionnaire turned the views of the cultivated world completely in 
the direction of religious scepticism ; and it was along this line 
chiefly that the English literature was then taken up in Paris. 
Voltaire was the great writer, who not only gave this movement its 
most eloquent expression, but also presented the positive elements 
of the Enlightenment in the most emphatic manner. But the 
development pressed with much greater weight toward the negative 
side. In the common thinking of the Encyclopaedists became com- 
pleted step by step the change from empiricism to sensualism, from 
naturalism to materialism, from deism to atheism, from enthusiastic 
to egoistic morals. In opposition to such an Enlightenment of the 
intellect, whose lines all converge in the positivism of Condillac- 
there appeared in Rousseau a. feeling-philosophy of elemental power, 
leading to the intellectual shaping of the Mevolution. 

Germany was won for the Enlightenment movement by the 
Leibnizian philosophy and the great success which Wolff achieved, 
in his activity as a teacher, in developing and transforming it, but 
here, in consequence of the lack of a unifying public interest, the 
tendency toward individual culture was predominant. For the ends 
of this individual culture, the ideas of the " philosophical century " 
were elaborated in psychological and epistemological as well as in 
the moral, political, and religious fields with great multiplicity, but 
without any new creation of principles until fresh life and higher 
points of view were brought by the poetical movement and the great 
personalities of its bearers, Lessing and Herder, to the dry intelli- 

440 Philosophy of the Enlightenment. [Part V. 

gence with which a boastful popular philosophy had extended itself, 
especially in connection with the Berlin Academy.^ This circum- 
stance kept the German philosophy of the eighteenth century from 
losing itself in theoretico-sceptical self-disintegration like the Eng- 
lish, or from being shattered in practical politics like the French : by 
contact with a great literature teeming with ideas a new great 
epoch of philosophy was here prepared. 

John Locke, born 1632, at Wrington near Bristol, was educated at Oxford, 
and became involved in the changeful fortunes of the statesman Lord Shaftes- 
bury. He returned home from exile in Holland with William of Orange in 
1688, filled several high political offices under the new government which he 
also often publicly defended, and died while living in the country at leisure, in 
1704. His philosophical work bears the title An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) ; besides this are to be mentioned Some Thoughts on 
Education (1693), The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and, among his 
posthumous works, Of the Conduct of the Understanding. Cf. Fox Bourne, 
The Life of J. L. (Lond. and N.Y. 1876); Th. Fowler, J. L. (Lond. 1880); 
[Zroc^e, by A. C. Fräser, Blackwood series, Edin. and Phila. 1890, and article 
Locke in Enc. Brit.; T. H. Green in his Int. to Hume; J. Dewey, Leibniz'' s 
New Essays, Chicago, 1888 ; Edition of his works by Low, 1771, also ed. Lond. 
1853 ; Philos. wks. in Bohn Lib. Grit. ed. of the Essay by Fräser, 1894]. 

George Berkeley was born in Killerin, Ireland, in 1685, took part as a clergy- 
man in missionary and colonisation attempts in America, became Bishop of 
Cloyne 1734, and died 1753. His Theory of Vision (1709) was a preparation 
for his Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). This main 
work was later followed by the Three Dialogues betioeen Hylas and Philonous, 
and by Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher. Edition of his works by Fräser, 
4 vols., Lond. 1871 ; the same writer has also given a good exposition of his 
thought as a whole (Blackwood series, Edin. and Lond. 1881). Cf. Collyns 
Simon, Universal Immaterialism, Lond. 1862. 

The Associational Psychology found its chief supporters in Peter Brown 
(died 1735 Bishop of Cork ; The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Un- 
derstanding, 1719), David Hartley (1704-1757 ; De Motus Sensus et Idearum 
Qeneratione, 1746 ; Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expec- 
tations, 1749), Edward Search, pseudonym for Abraham Tucker (1705-1774 ; 
Light of Nature,! Yols., Lond. 1768-1777), Joseph Priestley (1733-1804 ; Hart- 
ley's Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the Association of Ideas, 
1775; Disquisitions relating to flatter and Spirit, 1777), John Home Tooke 
(1736-1812 ; 'ETred irrepbevTa or The Diversions of Parley, 1798 ; cf. Stephen, 
Memoirs of J. H. T., Lond. 1813), Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802 ; Zoonomia or 
the Laws 'of Organic Life, 1794-1796), finally, Thomas Brown (1778-1820; 
Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, 1804 ; posthumously, the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1820, delivered in Edinburg). Cf. Br. 
Schoenlank, iZarfZf ?/ M. Priestley als Begründer des Associationismus (Halle, 1882); 
L. Ferri, Sulla Dottrina Psichologica delV Associazione, Saggio Storico e Critico 
(Rome, 1878) [Fr. tr. Paris, 1883. Cf. also Hartley and James Mill by G. 
S. Bower, Lond. 1881. For bibliography for the writers mentioned in this and 
the following paragraphs consult Porter's appendix to Eng. tr. Ueberweg's 
Hist. Phil.^. 

Of the opponents to this movement who Platonise in the older manner, 
Richard Price (1723-1791) became known especially by his controversy with 
Priestley : — 

Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity (1777); Price, Letters on 
Materialism and Philosophical Necessity; Priestley, Free Discussions of the 
Doctrines of Materialism (1778). 

1 Cf. Ch. Bartholmess, Histoire Philosophique de V Academic de PrussBt 
Paris, 1859. 

Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 441 

Among the English moral philosophers, Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, 1671-1713) takes a most important place. His writings were collected 
under the title, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times (1711). 
Cf. G. V. Gizycki, Die Philosophie 8h.'' s (Leips. and Heidelberg, 1876). — After 
him various groups diverge. The intellectualistic tendency is represented by 
Samuel Clarke (1675-1729; A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God, 1705; Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, 1715; cf. his 
correspondence with Leibniz) and William WoUaaton (1659-1724 ; The Belig- 
ion of Nature Delineated, 1722). — The morality based on feeling was repre- 
sented by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747 ; Inquiry into the Original of our 
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1725 ; A System of Moral Philosophy, 1755 ; cf. 
Th. Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Lond. 1882) ; Henry Home, pseud, 
for Lord Kames (1696-1782 ; Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural 
Beligion, 1751 ; Elements of Criticism, 1762) ; Edmund Burke (1730-1797 ; 
Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beauti- 
ful, 1756) ; Adam Ferguson (1724-1816 ; Institutions of Moral Philosophy, 
1769), and in a certain sense also, Adam Smith (1723-1790 ; Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, 1759) ; the principle of authority was defended by Joseph Butler 
(1692-1752 ; Sermons upon Human Nature, 1726) {^Butler, in Blackwood series 
by W. L. Collins, 1881], and William Paley (1743-1805; Principles of Moral 
and Political Philosophy, 1785). The ethics of the associonational psychology 
was developed chiefly by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832 ; Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789 ; Traite de Legislation Civile et 
Penale, brought together by E. Dumont, 1801 ; Deontology, ed. by J. Bowring, 
1834; works in 11 vols., Edin. 184.3). — In a peculiar isolated position appears 
Bernhard de Mandeville (1670-1733 ; The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices 
made Public Benefits, 1706, later with illustrative dialogues, 1728 ; Inquiry into 
the Origin of Moral Virtue, 1732 ; Free Thoughts on Beligion, Church, Govern- 
ment, 1720). On him cf. P. Sakmann (Freiburg, 1898). 

The literature of Deism coincides, for the most part, with the above-named 
literature of moral philosophy ; but in addition to those named the following 
writers are also prominent : John Toland (1670-1722 ; Christianity not Myste- 
rious, 1696 ; Letters to Serena, 1704 ; Adeisidcemon, 1709 ; Pantheisticon, 1710) ; 
Anthony Collins (1676-1729; A Discourse of Free Thinking, 1713) ; Matthew 
Tindal (1656-1733 ; Christianity as Old as the Creation, 1730) ; Thomas Chubb 
(1679-1747 ; A Discourse concerning Beason with Begard to Beligion, 1730) ; 
Thomas Morgan (died 1743 ; The Moral Philosopher, 3 parts, 1737 ff.) ; finally, 
Lord Bolingbroke (1672-1751) ; works ed. by Mollet in 5 vols., 1753 f. ; cf. 
F. V. Raumer, Abhandl. der Berl. Akad. 1840). — Cf. V. Lechler, Geschichte des 
englischen Deismus (Stuttgart and Tüb. 1841). 

England's greatest philosopher is David Hume, born, 1711, in Edinburg, and 
educated there. After he had spent some time as merchant, he lived for several 
years in France, occupied in study, and composed his work of genius, the 
Treatise on Human Nature (printed 1739 f.). The failure of this book induced 
him to work it over and publish it under the title Inquiry concerning Human 
Understanding, as a second volume of his more successful Essays, Moral, Politi- 
cal and Literary (1748), and to add An Inquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751), and also The Natural History of Beligion (1755). As librarian 
of the Advocates' Library in Edinburg he fomid opportunity to write his History 
of England. After a stay in Paris, where he received great honour and came 
into connection with Rousseau among others, he was for some time Under- 
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, but finally returned to Edinburg, where 
he died, 1776. The Dialogues concerning Natural Beligion and some smaller 
treatises appeared posthumously. Ed. of his works by Green and Grose in 
4 vols. (Lond. 1875). His autobiography was published by his friend, Adam 
Smith (1777). Cf. J. H. Burton, Life and Correspondence of D. H. (Edin. 
1846-50); E. Feuerlein in the Zeitschr. ''Der Gedanke"" (Berlin, 1863 f.) ; 
E. Pfleiderer, Empirismus und Skepsis in D. H.''s Philosophie (Berlin, 1874) ; 
T. Huxley, D. H. (Lond. 1879) ; Fr. Jodl, Leben u. Philosophie D. H.'s (Halle, 
1872) ; A. Meinong, Hume-Studien (Vienna, 1877, 1882) ; G. v. Gizycki, Die 
Ethik D. H.'s (Breslau, 1878). [W. Knight, Blackwood series, 1886; esp. 
Int. by T. H. Green in his ed. of the works. Selby-Bigge eds. of the Treatise 
;J1888) and the Enquiry (with Introd. 1894), Clar, Press, are excellent. 

442 Philosophy of the Enlightenment. [Part V. 

The Scottish School was founded by Thomas Reid (1710-1796, Professor 
at Glasgow ; Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 
1764 ; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1785 ; Essays on the Active 
Poioers of Man, 1788, complete ed. by W. Hamilton, Edin. 1827). [Selections 
ed. by E. H. Sneath, N.Y. 1892, contains bibliog. Cf. A. Seth, Scottish Philoso- 
phy, Edin. and Lond. 1885, and art. Beid in Enc. Brit.'] Besides James 
Oswald (died 1793, Ajjpeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Beligion, 1766) 
and James Beattie (died 1805, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 
1770), the school had its chief academical and literary representative in Dugald 
Stewart (1753-1828, Professor in Edinburg; Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind, 3 parts, 1792-1827 ; ed. of his works by "W. Hamilton, 10 vols., 
Edin. 1854 f£.). 

Pierre Bayle, the type of sceptical polyhistory, born 1647 at Carlat, led 
a life disquieted by twice changing his Confession, was finally a professor in 
Sedan and Eotterdam, and died 1706. His influential life work is embodied in 
his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1695 and 1697). Cf. L. Eeuerbach, P. 
Bayle nach seinen für die Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit interessan- 
testen Momenten, Ansbach, 1833. 

Of the works of Voltaire (Francois Arouet le Jeune, 1694-1778 ; the main 
events of his literary life are his flight to London, his stay with the Marquise 
du Chätelet iu Jirey, his visit with Frederick the Great in Potsdam, and his 
rest in old age at the country seat Ferney, near Geneva), the following are 
principally to be considered here : Lettres sur les Anglais (1784), Metaphysique 
de Newton (1740), Elements de la Philosophie de Newton mis ä la Portee de 
tout le Monde (1741), Examen important de Mylord Bolingbroke (1736), Gan- 
dide oil sur V Optimisme (11 bl), Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764), Le Philosophe 
Ignorant (1767), Beponse cm Systeme de la Nature (1777), the poem Les 
Sy Sternes, etc. Cf. E. Bersot, La Philosophie de V. (Paris, 1848); D. F. Strauss, 
V. (Leips. 1870); J. Morley, V. (Lond. and N.Y. 1872). 

More sceptical in metaphysical aspects appear natural scientists and mathe- 
maticians such as Maupertuis (1698-1759 ; active in connection with the 
Berlin Academy ; Essai de Philosophie Morale, 1750 ; Essai de Cosmologie, 
1751 ; controversial writings between him and the Wolffian, S. König, collected 
Leips. 1758), or d'Alembert {Melanges de Litterature, d'' Histoire et de Philoso- 
phie, 1752); othi^rs proceed more naturalistically, such as Buffon (1708-1788; 
Histoire Naturelle Generale et Particidiere, 1749 ff.) and Jean Battiste Robinet 
(1735-1820 ; De la Nature, 1761 ; Considerations Philosophiques de la Grada- 
tion Naturelle des Formes d'Etre 1767). 

Sensualism appears in connection with materialism in Julien Offrai de 
Lamettrie (1709-1751 ; Histoire Naturelle de V Arne, 1745; U Homme Machine, 
1748 ; U Art de Jouir, 1751 ; (Eitvres, Berlin, 1751 ; on him F. A. Lange, Gesch. 
des Mater., I. 326 ff. [Eng. tr. Hist, of Mater., Vol. IL 49 ff.] ; Nöree Qugpat, 
Paris, 1873); it appears solely as psychological theory with Charles Bonnet 
(1720-1793 ; Essai de Psychol<>gie, 1755 ; Essai A^ialytique sur les Facultes de 
V Arne, 1759; Considerations sur les Corps Organises, 1762; Contemplation de 
la Nature, 1764 ; PalingenesifS Philosophiques, 1769), and with a positivistic 
pointing in Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780 ; Essai sur P Origine de la 
Connaissance Humaine, 1746; Traite des Systemes, 1749; Traite des Sensa- 
tions, 1754 ; Logique, 1780 ; Langue des Calcids in the complete edition, Paris, 
1798; cf. F. Rethore, C. ou VEminrisme et le Bationalisme, Paris, 1864). The 
last representatives of these theories are, on the one hand, Pierre Jean George 
Cabanis (1757-1808 ; Les Bapports du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, 1802 ; 
CEuvres, Paris, 1821-25), on the other side, Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de 
Tracy (1754-1836; Elements d'' Ideologie, in 4 parts, 1801-15, together 1826). — 
Cf. Fr. Picavet, Les Ideologues (Paris, 1891). 

The literary concentration of the Enlightenment movement in France was the 
Encyclopaedia {Encyclopedic ou Dictionnaire Ba.isnnnkdes Sciences, des Arts et 
des Metiers, 28 vols., 1752-1772, supplemcuL dud moex, 7 \ols., extending to 1780). 
Besides d'Alembert, who wrote tne introduction, the editor and intellectual 
head of the circle from which it proceeded was Denis Diderot (1713-1784; 
Pensees Philosophiques, 1746 ; Pensees sur P Interpretation de la Nature, 1754 ; 
of the posthumous publications the Promenade d''un Sceptique, the Entretien 

Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 443 

ff Alembert et de Diderot, and the Beve d'' Alembert are to be emphasised; 
worthy of mention also is the Essai de Peinture ; CEuvres Completes, Paris, 
1875, 20 vols. ; cf. K. Eosenkranz, Z>., sein Leben und seine Werke, Leips. 1866 ; 
J. Morley, D. and the EncyclopiBdists, Lond. 1878). Further collaborators upon 
the Encyclopsedia (aside from Voltaire and Eousseau, who became separated 
from the work at an early date) were Turgot (article Existence), Daubenton, 
Jaucourt, Duclos, Grimm, Holbach, etc. From the same circle {'■'■Les Philo- 
sophes''^) proceeded later the Systeme de la Nature (pseud, author, Mirabeau, 
1770), which is in the main to be attributed to Dietrich von Holbach (1723-1789, 
from the Palatinate ; Le ban Sens ou Idees Naturelles opposees aux Idees Sur- 
naturelles, 1772 ; Elements de la Morale Universelle, 1776, etc.). [On the 
Systeme de la Nature cf. Lange, Hist, of Mat., 11. 92 ff.] With him co-oper- 
ated Grimm (1723-1807 ; Correspondance Litteraire, 1812), the mathematician 
Lagrange, the Abb6 Galiani, Naigeon, and others ; the concluding chapter, 
"Abr6g6 du Code de la Nature." is perhaps from Diderot's pen; Helv^tius 
wrote a very popular exposition, " Vrai Sens du Systeme de la Nature," 1771. 
The same writer (Claude Adrien Helv^tius, 1715-1771) gave the sharpest expres- 
sion to the morals of the sensualistic associational psychology in his much read 
book. Be V Esprit (1758 ; cf. also his posthumous work, De V Homme de ses 
Facultes et de son Education, 1772). 

The theory of English constitutionalism was adopted in France by Montes- 
qmeu (1689-1755 ; Lettres Persanes, 1721 ; De V Esprit des Lois, 1748). Social 
problems were treated on tiie one side by the so-called Physiocrats such as 
Quesnay ( Tableaux ^conomiques, 1758) ; Turgot (Beflexions sur la Forma- 
tion et la Distribution des Bichesses, 1774, opposed by Galiani, Dialogues sur le 
Commerce des Bles) and others, on the other side by the Communists such as 
MoreUy ( Code de la Nature, 1755) , and Mably, the brother of Condillac (De 
la Legislation ou Principes des Lois, 1776. 

The most notable figure of the French Enlightenment was Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (born, 1712, in Geneva, died, 1778, in Ermenonville after an adven- 
turous life, which towarid the end was troubled by melancholy and hallucinations 
of persecution). His main writings — aside from the autobiographical Confes- 
sions [tr., Lond, 1876] — are Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts (1750), Dis- 
cours sur rOrigine et les Fondemens de VInegalite parmi les Hommes (1773), 
La Nouvelle Heloise (1761), ^mile ou sur V Education (1762) [abr. tr., Boston, 
1885], Du Contrat Social (1762). Cf. F. Brockerhoff, B., sein Leben und seine 
Werlce (Leips. 1863 and 1874) ; E. Feuerlein in "Der Gedanke " (Berlin, 1866) ; 
L. Moreau, J. J. B. et le Siecle Philosophique (Paris, 1870) ; J. Morley, J. J. B. 
(Lond. 1873) ; R. Fester, B. und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie (Stuttgart, 
1890) ; [E. Cah-d, B. in Essays, Vol. L]. 

The philosophical theory of the Revolution was developed chiefly by 
Charles Francois de St.-Ijambert (1716-1803 ; Principes des Moeurs chez toutes 
les Nations ou Catechisme Universel, 1798), Const. Fr. Chasseboeuf Comte de 
Volney (1757-1820 ; Les Buines, 1791 ; La Loi Naturelle ou Principes Phy- 
siques de la Morale, deduits de I' Organisation de V Homme et de V Univers ou 
Catechisme du Citoyen FrauQais, 1793), Marie Jean Ant. Nie. de Condorcet 
(1743-1794 ; Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique dti Progres de VEspHt Humain, 
1795), Dominique Garat (1749-1833; cf. Conte Bendu des Seances des Jßcoles 
Normales, II. 1-40). Cf. L. Ferraz, La Philosophie de la Bevolution (Paris, 

Gottfried "Wilhelm Leibniz, the many-sided founder of German philosophy, 
was born, 1646, in Leipsic, studied there and at Jena, received his degree in 
Altorf, and was then, through his acquaintance with Boyneburg, drawn into the 
diplomatic service of the Elector of Mayence. In this service, pursuing political 
and scientific plans of his own, he travelled as a member of an embassy to Paris 
and London, with an incidental visit to Spinoza in The Hague, and then entered 
the service of the court of Hanover and Brunswick as librarian and court his- 
torian. In all these positions he was active in his public and diplomatic capacity 
in the interests of the German national spirit and of peace between the Confes- 
sions. Later he lived at the court of the first Prussian Queen Sophie Charlotte, 
a Hanoverian princess, in Charlottenberg and Berlin, where the Academy was 
founded under his direction ; afterwards he lived for some time in Vienna, to 

444 Philosophy of the Enlightenment. [Part V. 

consult archives. Here lie gave the stimulus for the foundation of an academy, 
a project vrhich was later carried out, and the St. Petersburg Academy was also 
due to his influence. He died, 1716, at Hanover. The manifold nature of his 
activity, and the way in which his life was split up, is shown also in the fact that 
his scientific views are, for the most part, deposited only in fragmentary essays, 
and in an incredibly extensive correspondence. The best edition of his philo- 
sophical writings is the most recent by C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875-90). 
The metaphysical treatises have been cited above (p. 382). For his influence 
upon the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the following come chiefly into con- 
sideration, aside from the correspondence with Bayle and Clarke: Essais de 
Theodicee siir la Bonte de Dieu, la Liherte de V Homme et V Origine du Mal 
(Amsterdam, 1710), and the Nouveaux Essais sur VEntendement Humain, first 
published in 1765, by Raspe. Cf. G. E. Guhrauer, G. W. Frhr. v. L. (Breslau, 
1842) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. als Patriot, Staatsmann und Bildungsträger (Leips. 
1870); art. L. in Ersch und Gruber'' s Enc, by W. Windelband; L. Feuer- 
bach, Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der L.''schen Phil. (Ansbach, 1844) ; 
E. Nourisson, La Philosophie de L. (Paris, 1860) ; L. Grote, L, und seine Zeit 
(Hanover, 1869) ; 0. Caspari, L.'s Philosophie (Leips. 1870) ; J. T. Merz, L. 
(Lond. 1884) ; [J. Dewey, Leibniz'' s New Essays, Chicago, 1888 ; art. Leibniz 
in Enc. Brit. , by Sorley ; Eng. tr. of Imp. Phil. Works, by G. M. Duncan, New 
Haven, 1890 ; of the New Essays, by A. G. Langley, Lond. and N.Y. 1893]. 

Among the most influential " Enlighteners " in Germany was Leibniz's con- 
temporary and fellow-countryman. Christian Thomasius (1655-1728 ; Einlei- 
tung zur Vernunftlehre, Ausführung der Vernunftlehre, both in 1691 ; Einl. zur 
Sittenlehre, 1692 ; Ausführung d. Sittenlehre, 1696 ; Fundamenta Juris Natures 
et Gentium ex Sensu Gommuni Deducta, 1705 ; cf. A. Luden, C. Th., Berlin, 1805). 

The centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century was 
formed by the teaching and school of Christian Wolff. He was bom, 1679, 
in Breslau, studied at Jena, was Privat-docent at Leipsic, and taught in Halle 
until he was driven away in 1723 at the instigation of his orthodox opponents ; 
he then became Professor at Marburg. In 1740 Frederick the Great called him 
back to Halle with great honour, and he was active there untü his death in 
1754. He treated the entire compass of philosophy in Latin and German text- 
books ; the latter all bear the title Vernünftige Gedanken ["Rational Thoughts," 
treating psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy, 
ethics, politics, etc.] ; in detail: von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, 
1712 ; von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen über- 
haupt, 1719 ; von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, 1720 ; vom gesellschaftlichen 
Leben der Menschen, 1721 ; von den Wirkungen der Natur, 1723 ; von den 
Absichten der natürlichen Dinge, 1724 ; von den Theilen der Menschen, Thiere 
und Pflanzen, 1725. The Latin works, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica, 
1718 ; Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, 1728 ; Cosmologia, 1731 ; Psycholo- 
gia Empirica, 1732 ; Rationalis, 1734 ; Theologia Naturalis, 1736 ; Philosophia 
Practica Universalis, 1738 ; Jus Naturce, 1740 ff. ; Jus Gentium, 1749 ; Philo- 
sophia Moralis, posthumously pub., 1756. — Cf . K. G. Ludovici, Ausführlicher 
Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der WolfT sehen Philosophie (Leips. 1736 fi.)# 
Also W. L. G. V. Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik 
bei den Deutschen von Leibniz an (Halle, 1799). 

Among the Wolffiana may be named, perhaps, G. B. Bilfinger (1693-1750, 
Dilucidationes Philosophicas, de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, etc., 1725) 
M. Knutzen (died 1751 ; Systema Causarum Efficientium, 1746 ; cf. B. Erd 
mann, M. Kn. und seine Zeit, Leips. 1876) ; J. Chr. Gottsched (1700-1766 
Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweissheit, 1734) ; Alex. Baumgarten (1714- 
1762; Metaphysica, 1739; JEsthetica, 1750-58). 

As representatives of the geometrical method appear M. G. Hansch (1683- 
1752 ; Ars Inveniendi, 1727) and G. Ploucquet (1716-1790 ; cf. A. F. Bock, 
Sammlung von Schriften, welche dem logischen Calcül des Hernn P. betreffen, 
Frankfort and Leips. 1766) ; as opponents of the same, Pierre Crousaz (1663- 
1748; Logik, 1712 and 1724; Lehre vom Schönen, 1712), Andreas Rüdiger 
(1671-1731 ; De Sensu Veri et Falsi, 1709 ; Philosophia Synthetica, 1707) and 
Chr. A. Crusius (1712-1775 ; Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, 
1745 ; Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, 
1747.) An eclectic intermediate position is taken by J. Fr. Budde (1667-1729; 

Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 445 

Institutiones Philosophice Eclecticoe, 1705) and by the historians of philosophy, J. J, 
Brucker and D. Tiedmann, and also by Joh. Lossius {Die physichen Ursachen 
des Wahren, 1775) and A. Platner (1744-1818 ; Philosophische Aphorismen, 
1776 and 1782). 

Of more independent importance are J. H. Lambert (born, 1728, at Mtil- 
hausen, died, 1777, in Berlin ; Kosmologische Briefe, 1761 ; Neues Organon, 
1764 ; Architektonik, 1771) and Nie. Tetens (1736-1805 ; Philosophische Ver- 
suche über die Menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickhing, 1776 f. ; cf . Fr. Harms, 
Ueber die Psychologie des N. T., Berlin, 1887). Both stand in literary connec- 
tion with Kant (cf. Part VI. eh. 1), whose pre-critical writings belong like- 
wise in this setting ; these are principally Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und 
Theorie des Himmels, 1755 ; Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicce 
Nova Dilucidatio, 1755 ; Monadologia Physica, 1756 ; Die falsche Spitzfindig- 
keit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, 1762 ; Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund 
zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763 ; Versuch, den Begriff der nega- 
tiven Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, 1763 ; Ueber die Deutlichkeit der 
Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral, 1764 ; Beobachtungen über 
das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, 1764 ; Träume eines Geistersehers, 
erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, 1766 ; De Mundi Sensibilis atque 
Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, 1770. Cf. K. Zimmerman, Lambert der Vor- 
gänger Kantus, 1879. [On Lambert and Tetens, cf. A. Eiehl, Der philoso- 
phische Eriticismus, Leips. 1876. For the pre-critical writings of Kant, E. 
Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow, Lond., and N.Y. 
1889, Fischer's Kant; Cohen, Die systematischen Begr^e in Kant's vorkrit- 
ischen Schriften, and the works cited in first par., p. 536.] 

Deism found a vigorous and instructive support in Germany among numer- 
ous Wolffians, though nothing new in principle was added. Characteristic of 
this was the translation of the Bible by Lorens Schmidt. The standpoint of 
historical criticism of the biblical writings was maintained by Salomon Semler 
(1725-1791). The sharpest consequences of the deistic criticism were drawn 
by Samuel Reimarus (1699-1768 ; Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahr- 
heiten der natürlichen Beligion, 1754 ; Betrachtung über die Triebe der Thiere, 
1760, especially his Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes, 1767 
[not pub.], from which Lessing edited the " Wolfenbüttler Fragmente," and, 
in more recent time, Dav. Fr. Straviss edited an extract, Leips. 1862). Joh. 
Chr. Edelmann was a Spinozistic free-thinker (1698-1767). Cf. K. Mönckeberg, 
Beimarus und Edelmann (Hamburg, 1867). 

The movement of the so-called Pietism, allied to Mysticism, which was 
begun by Spener (1635-1705), and carried forward with organising energy 
by Aug. Herrn. Francke (1663-1727), had only an indirect influence upon phil- 
osophy during this period ; at a still farther distance stand the more isolated 
members of mystic sects such as Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714) and Conrad 
Dippel (1673-1734). 

Empirical psychology was represented among the Germans in the eigh- 
teenth century by numerous names, comprehensive collections, text-books, and 
special investigations. There are Casimir von Creuz (1724-1770), Joh. Gottl. 
Krüger (Versuch einer experimentalen Seelenlehre, 1756), J. J. Hentsch (Ver- 
such über die Folge der Veränderung der Seele, 1726), J. Fr. Weiss (De Natura 
Animi et Potissimum Cordis Humani, 1761), Fr. v. Irwing (Erfahrungen 
und Untersuchungen über den Menschen, \111 ff.) et al. The '■^ Magazin zur 
Erfahrungsseelenlehre,'''' edited by Moritz (1785-1793), formed a place for col- 
lecting contributions to this favourite science. Further literature in K. Fortlage, 
System der Psychologie, I. 42 f. 

A theory of art upon the basis of empirical psychology is found in Baum- 
garten's pupil, G. Fr. Meier (1718-1777), and especially in Joh. Georg Sul- 
zer (1720-1779 ; Theorie der angenehmen Empfindungen, 1762 ; Vermischte 
Schriften, 1773 ff. ; Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste, 1771-1774, a 
lexicon of aesthetics) . 

Of the Popular Philosophers may be mentioned Moses Mendelssohn 
(1729-1786 ; Briefe über die Empfindungen, 1755 ; Ueber die Evidenz in den 
Metaphysischen Wissenschaften, 1764 ; Phcedon, 1767 ; Morgenstunden, 1785 ; 
Werke, ed. by Brasch, Leips. 1881), the book-dealer Fr. Nicolai (1733-1811), 
who published successively the Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften, the 

446 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. I 

Briefe die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend, the Allgemeine deutsche Biblio- 
thek, and the Neue Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek ; further J. Aug. Eberhard 
(1738-1809), Joh. Bernh. Basedow (1723-1790), Thomas Abbt (1738-1766), 
Job. Jac. Engel (1741-1802; editor of the Philosoph für die Welt), J. J. H. 
Feder (1740-1821), Chr. Meiners (1747-1810), Chr. Garve (1742-1798). 

A highly interesting position personally is occupied by Frederick the Great, 
the Philosopher of Sanssouci. On him, cf . Ed. Zeller, Fr. d. Ghr. als. Philosoph 
(Berlin, 1886). 

Of Lessing's writings those of chief importance for the history of philosophy 
are the Hamburger Dramaturgie, the Erziehung des menschen Geschlechts, 
the Wolfenbüttler Fragmente, and the theological controversial writings. Cf. 
ßob. Zimmerman, Leibniz und Lessing (Studien und Kritiken, I. 126 ff.) ; 
E. Zirngiebl, Der Jacobi- Mendelssohn'' sehe Streit über Lessing''s Spinozismus 
(Munich, 1861) ; C. Hebler, Lessing- Studien (Bern, 1862) ; W. Dilthey (Preuss. 
Jahrb. 1879). [Eng. tr. of the Ham. Dram, and Education of Human Pace 
in BohnLib.; of Laoccoon, by Phillimore, Lond, 1875 ; cf. Sime, Lessing, Lond. 
1873, 1879.] 

Among Herder's writings belong in this period, lieber den Ursprung der 
Sprache, 1772 ; Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774 ; 
Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele, 1778 ; Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 ff. [Eng. tr., Lond. 1800] ; 
Gott, Gespräche über Spinoza''s System, 1787 ; Briefe zur Beförderung der 
Humanität, 1793 ff. (on his later philosophical literary activity, cf. below, Part 
VI. ch. 2). Cf. R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken (Berlin, 
1877-85) ; E. Melzer, H. als Geschichtsphilosoph (Neisse, 1872) ; M. Kronen- 
berg, H.'s Philosophie (Heidi. 1889) [art. Herder in Enc. Brit. by J. Sully]. 

Cf. also J. Witte, Die Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen (Bonn, 1880). 



"The proper study of mankind is man." This word of Pope's 
is characteristic of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, not 
only in the practical sense that this philosophy finds the ultimate 
end of all scientific investigation to be always man's " happiness," 
but also, in the theoretical point of view, in so far as this philosophy, 
as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the 
actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the 
principle,^ that prior to all metaphysical considerations and contro- 
versies the general question must be decided of how far human 
insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible only by exact exhi- 
bition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the 
course of development by which it is brought about, — from that 
time epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was brought into the 
front rank of philosophical interests, and at the same time empirical 
•psychology was recognised as the authoritative and decisive court of 
last resort for epistemology. The legitimate reach of human ideas 
should be judged by the way in which they arise. Thus experiential 
psychology with all the tacit assumptions which are customary in 
it becomes at once the basis of the whole philosophical view of the 
world, and the favourite science of the age, and is at the same time 
the instrument of mediation, between science and general literature. 
As in this latter field, the predominant characteristic among both 
Englishmen and Germans was tha.t of depicting minds and reflect- 
ing or viewing one's self in the literary looking-glass, so philosophy 
should draw only the image of man and of the activities of his con- 
sciousness. Societies for the "observation of man" were founded, 
all sorts of dilettante accounts of remarkable experiences were gar- 
nered in large "magazines," and the government of the French 
Republic in its ofiicial system of instruction,^ replaced "philoso- 
phy " by the sounding title, "Analyse de I'entendement humain." 

1 Introduction to the Essay. Cf. M. Drobisch, Locke, Der Vorläufer KanVs 
{Zeitschr. f. exacte Philosophie, 1861). 

* Cf . the highly amusing Seance» des Ecoles Normal, first year. 


448 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

While accordingly among the theoretical questions of the Enlight- 
enment philosophy, those as to the origin, development, and know- 
ing power of human ideas stood uppermost, these were from the 
beginning placed beneath the presupposition of popular metaphysics, 
viz. that of naive realism. There, "without," is a world of things, 
of bodies or of who knows what else, — and here is a mind which is 
to know them. How do the ideas, which reproduce within the mind 
that world of things, get into it ? This way of stating the problem 
of knowledge, which is like that of the ancient Greeks, controls the 
theoretical philosophy of the eighteenth century completely, and 
attains in it both most perfect formulation and decisive disintegra- 
tion. Just in this respect the Cartesian metaphysics with its dualism 
of conscious and corporeal substances takes a controlling position 
through the entire age of the Enlightenment, and the popular 
empirical mode of expression in which it was presented by Locke, 
made this author the leader of the new movement. The methodical 
and metaphysical considerations which had reached a great develop- 
ment, and one full of character in Descartes' important disciples, 
were now translated into the language of empirical psychology, and 
so arranged for the comprehension of the ordinary mind. 

In connection with this, however, the terminism which was in- 
herent in all modern philosophy, and which had been fostered 
especially in England (Hobbes), forced its way victoriously to the 
surface; the qualitative separation of the content and forms of 
consciousness from the " outer world," to which alone they were 
nevertheless held to relate, was carried farther and deeper, step by 
step, until it at last reached its extreme consequence m Hume's 
positivism. To the scientific dissolution which metaphysics thus 
experienced, corresponded in turn a popularly practical and preten- 
tiously modest turning away from all speculation of more than 
ordinary refinement, or an all the more express profession of 
adherence to the truths of sound common sense. 

Whatever metaphysical interest remained vigorous in the En- 
lightenment literature attached itself to the religious consciousness 
and to those endeavours which hoped to attain out of the strife of 
religious Confessions to a universal and rational conviction. In the 
deism which extended over Europe from the English free-thinking 
movement, the positive views of the world and of life of the En- 
lightenment period became concentrated, and while these convic- 
tions at the outset developed out of the connection with the natural 
science metaphysics of the preceding century, and in consequence 
of this devoted an especially lively interest to the problems of 
teleology, they became shifted with time more and more from the 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Cambridge Platonists. 449 

metaphysical to the moral, from the theoretical to the practical 

§ 33. Innate Ideas. 

With regard to the question as to the origin of ideas the philoso- 
phy of the Enlightenment found already in the field the sharply 
pronounced antithesis of Sensualism and Rationalism. 

1. The first of these had been defended by Hobbes on the theo- 
retical as also upon the practical domain, inasmuch as he held man, 
in so far as he is an object of scientific knowledge, to be an entirely 
sensuous being, bound to the sensations and impulses of the body. 
All ideas, in his view, have their origin in the activity of the senses, 
and the mechanism of association was held to explain the arising of 
all other psychical structures from these beginnings. Such doctrines 
seemed to bring in question the super-sensuous dignity of man, and 
that not only in the eyes of the orthodox opponents of Hobbes ; the 
same motive determined the Neo-Platonists also to lively opposi- 
tion. Cudworth especially had distinguished himself in this respect ; 
in his combating of atheism ^ he had Hobbes in mind as one of his 
main opponents, and in opposition to the doctrine that all human 
ideas arise from the operation of the outer world upon the mind, 
he appeals especially to mathematical conceptions. The corporeal 
phenomena never completely correspond to these ; the most we can 
say is that they resemble them.^ In treating the conception of God, 
on the other hand, he lays claim to the argument of the consensus 
gentium, and carries it out^ in most extensive manner to show that 
this idea is innate. In like manner, Herbert of Cherbury had already 
grounded all the main doctrines of natural religion and morals by 
the aid of the Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine of the communes notitim. 

The doctrine of innate ideas was conceived in a somewhat differ- 
ent sense by Descartes ^ and his disciples. Here the psychological 
question as to the origin of ideas was less in mind, although this 
question, too, at a decisive passage in the Meditations {Med. III.) 
received the answer that the innateness of the idea of God was 
to be conceived of as a sign which the creator had imprinted upon 
his creature; but on the whole the great metaphysician had laid 
more weight upon the point that the criterion of innateness consists 
in immediate evidence or certainty. Hence he had finally extended 
the designation (almost stripped of the psychological meaning be- 

^ In the Systema Intellertuale, especially at the close, V. 5, 28 ff, 

2 lb. V. 1, 108 ff. (p. 905 ff. Mosh.). 

3 The whole fourth chapter is devoted to this task. 

* Cf. E. Grimm, Descartes'' Lehre von den angeborenen Ideen, Jena, 1873. 

450 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V« 

longing to it at the outset) of the Latin idece. mnatce to all that 
lumine naturali dare et distincte percipitur. Direct assent had been 
adduced by Herbert of Cherbury also as the characteristic mark of 
innate ideas. -^ 

2. Lockers polemical attitude toward the maintenance of innate 
ideas has, indeed, an epistemological purpose, but is really deter- 
mined only by the psycho-genetic point of view. He asks primarily 
only whether the soul at its birth brings complete knowledge into 
the world with it, and finds this question deserving of a negative 
answer.- In consequence of this the development of the thesis 
"No innate principles in the mind" in the first book of Locke's 
Essay is directed less against Descartes than against the English 
Neo-Platonists.^ It combats first of all the consensus gentium, by an 
appeal to the experience of the nursery and of ethnology ; it finds 
tlmt neither theoretical nor practical principles are universally 
known or acknowledged. Nor does it except from this demonstra 
tion (with an express turn against Herbert) even the idea of God, 
since this is not only very different among different men, but is even 
entirely lacking with some. Nor does Locke allow the evasion 
suggested by Henry More,* that innate ideas might be contained in 
the soul not actually, but implicitly : this could only mean, accord- 
ing to Locke, that the soul is capable of forming and approving 
them, — a mark which would then hold for all ideas. The imme- 
diate assent, finally, which was held to characterise that which is 
innate, does not apply in the case of the most general abstract 
truths, just where it is wanted ; and where this immediate assent 
is found it rests upon the fact that the meaning of the words and of 
their connection has been already apprehended at an earlier time.^ 

Thus the soul is again stripped of all its original possessions : at 
birth it is like an unwritten sheet (cf. p. 203), — white paper void 
of all characters.^ In order to prove this positively, Locke then 
pledges himself to show that all our " ideas''^ arise from experience- 
Here he distinguishes simple and complex ideas in the assumption 
that the latter arise out of the former : for the simple ideas, how- 

1 De Veritate (1656), p. 76. 

2 In which, moreover, Descartes completely agreed with him, for it was Des- 
cartes' opinion also that it was not to be assumed that the mind of the child 
pursues metaphysics in its mother's womb. Op. (C.) VIII. 269. 

3 Cf. (and also for the following) G. Geil, Die Abhängigkeit Lockers von 
Descartes (Strassburg, 1887). 

* H. More, Antidot, adv. Ath. I. 3 and 7, and Locke, I,. 2, 22. Cf. Geil, op. 
cit. p. 49. 

6 Locke, I. 2, 23 f. 6 ib. n. 1, 2. 

■^ The term "idea" had lost its Platonic sense already in later Scholasticism 
and taken on the more general meaning of any mental modification whatever 
C Vorstellung) . 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Locke. 451 

ever, he announces two different sources : sensation and reflection, 
outer and inner perception. Under sensation he understands the 
ideas of the corporeal world, brought about by the medium of the 
bodily senses ; under reflection, on the other hand, the knowledge 
of the activities of the soul itself called out by the above process. 
Psycho-genetically, therefore, these two kinds of perception are so 
related that sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for 
reflection, — as regards their matter or content the relation is, that 
all content of ideas arises from sensation, while reflection, on the 
contrary, contains the consciousness of the functions performed in 
connection with this content. 

3. To these functions, however, belonged also all those by means 
of which the combination of the elements of consciousness into 
complex ideas takes place, i.e. all processes of thought. And here 
Locke left the relation of the intellectual activities to their original 
sensuous contents in a popular indefiniteness which gave occasion 
to the most various re-shapings of his teaching soon after. For, on 
the one hand, those activities appear as the ^^ faculties " of the mind, 
which in reflection becomes conscious of these its own modes of 
functioning (as for example, the capacity of having ideas itself,^ 
" perception," is treated as the most original fact of reflection, to 
xmderstand which every one is sent to his own experience) ; on the 
other hand, the mind, even in these relating activities, such as 
recollecting, distinguishing, comparing, connecting, etc., is regarded 
throughout as passive and bound to the content of the sensation. 
Hence it was possible for the most various views to develop out of 
Locke's doctrine, according to the varying degree of self-activity 
which was ascribed to the mind in its process of connecting its 

Of particular interest in this connection, by reason of the problems 
of epistemology and metaphysics derived from the Middle Ages, was 
the development of the abstract ideas out of the data of sensation. 
Like the greater part of English philosophers, Locke was an ad- 
herent of Nominalism, which professed to see in general concepts 
nothing but internal, intellectual structures. In explaining these 
general ideas, however, Locke made more account of the co-opera- 
tion of "signs," and in particular of language. Signs or words, 
when attached more or less arbitrarily to particular parts of ideas, 
make it possible to lay special stress upon these parts and bring 
them out from their original complexes, and thereby render possible 
the farther functions by which such isolated and fixed contents of 

1 Essay, II. 9, 1 f. 

452 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V 

consciousness are put into logical relations to one another.^ Hence 
for Locke, as formerly for the Epicureans, and then for the Ter- 
minists, logic was coincident with the science of signs, semiotics.^ 
By this means room was gained for a demonstrative science of con- 
ceptions and for all abstract operations of the knowing mind, quite 
in the spirit of Occam, in spite of the sensualistic basis upon which 
all content of ideas was held to rest. None of these determinations 
were philosophically new, nor has their exposition in Locke any 
originality or independent power of thought : it is, however, smooth 
and simple, of agreeable transparency and easy to understand; it 
despises all scholastic form and learned terminology, glides skilfully 
over and away from all deeper problems, and thus made its author 
one of the most extensively read and influential writers in the history 
of philosophy. 

4. Strongly as Locke had emphasised the independent existence 
of inner experience by the side of the outer (as followed from his 
metaphysical attachment to Descartes, on which see below, § 34, 1), 
he yet made the dependence of reflection upon sensation, as regards 
origin and content, so strong that it proved the decisive factor in 
the development of his doctrine. This transformation to complete 
sensualism proceeded along different paths. 

In the epistemological and metaphysical development of Nomi- 
nalism this transformation led with Locke's English successors to 
extreme consequences. Berkeley ^ not only declared the doctrine of 
the Reality of abstract conceptions to be the most extraordinary of 
all errors in metaphysics, but also — like the extreme Nominalists 
of the Middle Ages — denied the existence of abstract ideas within 
the mind itself. The illusory appearance of such ideas arises from 
the use of words as general terms ; but in truth, even in connection 
with such a word, we always think merely the sensuous idea, or the 
group of sensuous ideas, which at the beginning gave rise to that 
term. Every attempt to think the abstract alone shatters upon the 
sensuous idea, which always remains as the sole content of intellectual 
activity. Eor even the remembered ideas and partial ideas which 
can be separated out, have no other content than the original sense- 

1 The development of these logical relations between the ideational contents 
which have been singled out and fixed by means of the verbal signs, appears 
with Locke, under the name of the lumen naturale. Descartes had understood 
by this as well intuitive as also demonstrative knowledge, and had set all this 
natural knowing activity over against revelation ; Locke, who treats the intuitive 
with terministic reserve (cf. § 34, 1), restricts the signification of the "light of 
nature" to the logical operations and to the consciousness of the principles 
which obtain in these, according to the nature of the thinking faculty. 

2 Essay, IV. 21, 4. 

3 Princ. of Human Knowledge, 5 ff. 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Berkeley^ Hume. 453 

impressions, because an idea can never copy anything else than 
another idea. Abstract ideas, therefore, are a fiction of the schools ; 
in the actual activity of thought none but sensuous particular ideas 
exist, and some of these can stand for or represent others similar to 
them, on account of being designated by the same term, 

David Hume adopted this doctrine in its full extent, and on the 
ground of this substituted for Locke's distinction of outer and inner 
perception another antithesis with altered terminology, viz. that 
of the original and the copied. A content of consciousness is either 
original or the copy of an original, — either an ^'impression" or an 
" idea." All ideas, therefore, are copies of impressions, and there 
is no idea that has come into existence otherwise than by being a 
copy of an impression, or that has any other content than that 
which it has received from its corresponding impression. It ap- 
peared, therefore, to be the task of philosophy to seek out the orig- 
inal for even the apparently most abstract conceptions in some 
impression, and thereby to estimate the value for knowledge which 
the abstract conception has. To be sure, Hume understood by im- 
pressions by no means merely the elements of outer experience; 
he meant also those of inner experience. It was, therefore, accord- 
ing to Locke's mode of expression, the simple ideas of sensation 
and reflection which he declared to be impressions, and the wide 
vision of a great thinker prevented him from falling into a short- 
sighted sensualism. 

5. A development of another sort, which yet led to a related goal, 
took place in connection with the aid of physiological psychology. 
Locke had only thought of sensation as dependent upon the activity 
of the bodily senses, but had regarded the elaboration of sensation 
in the functions underlying reflection as a work of the mind ; and 
though he avoided the question as to immaterial substance, he had 
throughout treated the intellectual activities in the narrower sense 
as something incorporeal and independent of the body. That this 
should be otherwise regarded, that thinkers should begin to consider 
the physical organism as the bearer or agent not only of the simple 
ideas, but also of their combination, was easily possible in view of 
the indecisive ambiguity of the Lockian doctrines, but was still 
more called out by one-sided conclusions drawn from Cartesian and 
Spinozistic theories. 

Descartes, namely, had treated the whole psychical life of the 
animal as a mechanical process of the nervous system, while he had 
ascribed the human psychical life to the immaterial substance, the 
res cogitans. The more evident the completely sensuous nature of 
human ideation now seemed in consequence of Locke's investigation, 

454 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part "V: 

the nearer lay the question whether it was possible to maintain the 
position, that the same processes which in the animal seemed capa- 
ble of being understood as nervous processes, should be traced back 
in the case of man to the activity of an immaterial psychical sub- 
stance. — From another side, Spinoza's parallelism of the attributes 
worked in the same direction (cf. above, § 31, 9). According to 
this view a process in the bodily life corresponds to every process of 
the psychical life, without either process being the cause of the 
other, or one process being the original and the other the derived. 
(Such, at least, was the thought of the philosopher himself.) This 
had now been conceived of at first by its opponents as materialism, 
as if Spinoza meant that the fundamental process was the bodily, 
and the psychical process only its accompanying phenomenon. But 
among its adherents also, both physicians and natural scientists, 
such as the influential Boerhave of Leyden, a mode of thought in- 
clining strongly toward materialism soon substituted itself for the 
master's doctrine. This took place in connection with the expe- 
riences of experimental physiology which, following Descartes' 
stimulus, employed itself largely with a study of reflex movements. 

It is interesting that the consequences of these combinations of 
thought appeared in literary form first in Germany. Here as early 
as 1697 a physician named Pancratius Wolff taught in his Cogita- 
tiones Medico-leg ales that thoughts are mechanical activities of the 
human body, especially of the brain, and in the year 1713 appeared 
the anonymous Correspondence concerning the Nature of the Soul 
{Briefwechsel vom Wesen der Seele), ^ in which, screened by pious 
refutations, the doctrines of Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes are car- 
ried out to an anthropological materialism. A distinction of degree 
only is recognised between the psychical life of the animal and that 
of man ; ideas and activities of the will are without exception re- 
garded as functions of excited nerve-fibres, and practice and educa- 
tion are given as the means by which the higher position of man 
is reached and maintained. 

In England the procedure was more cautious. In a way similar 
to that in which Locke had carried out the Baconian programme, men 
now studied primarily the internal mechanism of the psychical activ- 
ities, and the development of the higher out of the elementary states 
according to purely psychological laws : such was the work of Peter 
Brown in the epistemological field, and that of others upon the 
domain of the activities of the will. In the same manner proceeded 

1 Of which Lange gives an account, Gesch. des Mat., I. 319 ff. (2d ed. [Eng. 
tr.. History of Materialism, II. 37 ff.] ). 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Hartley, Lamettrie. 455 

David Hartley also, who brought into common use the expression 
association ^ (which had already been used before this) for the com- 
binations and relations which arise between the elements. He wished 
to conceive these relations, which he analysed with all the care of a 
natural scientist, solely as psycMcal processes, and held fast to their 
complete incomparableness with material processes, even with the 
most delicate forms of corporeal motion. But he was also a physi- 
cian, and the connection of the mental life with the states of the 
body was so clear to him that he made the constant correspondence 
of the two and the mutual relationship of the psychical functions 
and the nervous excitations, which, at that time, were termed " vibra- 
tions,^' ^ the main subject-matter of his psychology of association. 
In this work he held fast to the qualitative difference between the 
two parallel series of phenomena and left the metaphysical question, 
as to the substance lying at their basis, undecided : but with refer- 
ence to causality he fell insensibly into materialism, in that he con- 
ceived of the mechanism of the nervous states as ultimately the 
primary event, and that of the psychical activities as only the phe- 
nomenon accompanjäng this event. To simple nervous excitations 
correspond simple sensations or desires ; to complex, complex. This 
scientific theory, to be sure, involved him in serious contradictions 
with his pious faith, and the "Observations" show how earnestly 
and fruitlessly he struggled between the two. Quite the same is 
true of Priestley, who even made the farther concession to material- 
ism of letting fall the heterogeneity between the psychical and 
bodily processes, and desiring to replace psychology completely by 
nerve physiology. On this account he also abandoned entirely the 
standpoint of inner experience defended by the Scots, but at the 
same time desired to unite with his system the warmly supported 
conviction of a teleological deism. 

Anthropological materialism was worked out in its baldest form 
by the Frenchman, Lamettrie. Convinced by medical observations 
upon himself and others of the complete dependence of the mind 
upon the body, he studied the mechanism of life in animals and men, 
following Boerhave's suggestions, and Descartes' conception of the 
former seemed to him completely applicable to the latter also. The 
distinction between the two, which is only one of degree, permits 
for human psychical activities also no other explanation than that 
they are mechanical functions of the brain. On this account it is 

^ In the later, especially the Scottish literature, and in particular with Thomas 
Brown, the expression " association " is often replaced by suggestion. 

2 Instead of this term Erasmus Darwin introduced the expression, "motions 
of the sensorium." 

456 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

an encroachment of metaphysics to ascribe to the "mind" a sub- 
stantiality of its own in addition to that of matter. The conception 
of matter as that of a body which is in itself dead and needs mind 
or spirit as its moving principle, is an arbitrary and false abstrac- 
tion: experience shows that matter moves itself and lives. It is 
just Descartes' mechanics which has proved this, says Lamettrie, 
and therefore the inevitable consequence of this mechanics is mate- 
rialism. And that all psychical life is only one of the functions of 
the body, is evident from the fact that not a single content is found 
in the mental life which is not due to the excitation of some one of 
the senses. If we think of a man as the Church Father Arnobius 
proposed, — so writes Lamettrie,^ to establish his sensualism which 
had developed from Locke, — who from his birth on had been excluded 
from all connection with his kind, and restricted to the experience 
of a few senses, we should find in him no other ideational contents 
than those brought to him through just these senses. 

6. Less important in principle, but all the more widely extendecj 
in the literary world, were the other re-shapings which Locke's 
doctrine experienced in France. Voltaire, who domesticated it 
among his countrymen by his Lettres sur les Anglais, gave it a com- 
pletely sensualistic stamp, and even showed himself — though with 
sceptical reserve — not disinclined to entrust to the Creator the 
power of providing the I, which is a corporeal body, with the 
capacity of thinking also. This sceptical sensualism became 
the fundamental note of the French Enlightenment.^ Condillac, 
who at the beginning had only expounded Locke's doctrine .and 
defended it against other systems, professed his adherence to this 
sceptical sensualism in his influential Traiti des Sensations. 
Whatever the mind may be, the content of its conscious activities 
is derived solely from sense-perception. Condillac develops the 
theory of associational psychology in connection with the fiction 
of a statue, which, equipped only with capacity of sensation, receives 
one after another the excitations of the different senses which are 
added to it, and by this means gradually imfolds an intellectual 
life like that of man. Here the fundamental idea is that the mere 
co-existence of different sensations in the same consciousness brings 
with it of itself the sensation of their relation to each other and to the 

1 At the close of the Histoire Naturelle de VAme. Cf. also above, p. 225, 
note 1. 

2 The same mode of thought asserts itself also in the beginnings of aesthetic 
criticism in the form of the principle that the essence of all art consists in the 
"imitation of beautiful Nature." The type of this conception was E. Batteux 
(1713-1780) with his treatise, Les Beaux Arts reduits a un meme Principe 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Condillac, Diderot. 457 

object or the self. In accordance with this principle the process is 
depicted by which all the manifold psychical activities become 
unfolded out of perception : in the theoretical series, by virtue of the 
differences in intensity and in repetition of sensations, there grow 
successively attention, recognising recollection, distinction, com- 
parison, judgment, inference, imagination, and expectation of the 
future ; and finally with the help of signs, especially those of 
language, arise abstraction and the grasping of general principles. 
But in addition to sensation, perception has also the feeling-element 
of pleasure and pain, and out of this, in connection with the move- 
ment of ideas, develop desire, love and hate, hope, fear,^ and — as 
the result of all such changes of the practical consciousness — 
finally, the moral will. So knowledge and morality grow upon the 
soil of the sensibility. 

This systematic construction had great success. The systematic 
impulse, which was repressed in the metaphysical field (cf. § 34, 7), 
threw itself with all the greater energy upon this "analysis of the 
human mind " as a substitute ; and as Condillac himself had already 
woven many acute observations into his exposition of the develop- 
ment process, so a whole throng of adherents found opportunity to 
take part in the completion of this structure by slight changes and 
shiftings of the phases, by innovations in nomenclature and by 
more or less valuable deductions. The Government of the Revolu- 
tion recognised as philosophy only this study of the empirical 
development of intelligence, and Destutt de Tracy gave it later the 
name " Ideology." ^ So it came about that at the beginning of our 
century philosophers were in France usually called ideologists. 

7. With reference to the nature of the mind in which these trans- 
formations of sensation (sentir) were held to take place, a great part 
af the ideologists remained by Condillac's positivistic reserve ; others 
went on from Voltaire's problematical to Lamettrie's assertive mate- 
rialism, — at first, in Hartley's fashion emphasising the thorough- 
going dependence of combinations of ideas upon nervous processes, 
then with express maintenance of the materiality of the psychical 
activities. This development is most clearly to be seen in the case 
of Diderot. He set out from the position of Shaftesbury and Locke, 
but the sensualistic literature became more potent from step to step 

1 In the development of the practical series of conscious acts, the influence of 
Descartes' and Spinoza's theory of the emotions and passions asserted itself 
with Condillac and his disciples, as also in part among the English associa- 
tional psychologists. 

2 It is not impossible that this nomenclature in case of de Tracy was intended 
to he the counterpart to Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre," — Science of Knowl- 
edge (cf. below, Part VI. ch. 2). 

458 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

in the Editor of the Encyclopgedia ; he followed up the hypotheses 
of hylozoism^ (of. below, § 34, 9), and finally took part in the com- 
position oi the Systhne de la Nature. This work set forth the 
human psychical activities within the framework of its metaphysics 
as the fine invisible motions of the nerves, and treated their genetic 
process just as Lamettrie had done. Among the later ideologists 
Cabanis is prominent in this respect by the newness of his physio- 
logical point of view ; he takes account of the progress of natural 
science in so far as to seek the conditions of the nerves, to which 
man's psychical states (le moral) must be referred, no longer merely 
in mechanical motions, but in chemical changes. Ideation is the 
secretion of the brain, just as other secretions are produced by other 

In opposition to this, another line of ideology held fast to Locke's 
principle that all content of ideas may indeed be due to the senses, 
but that in the functions directed toward combining such content 
the peculiar character of the mind's nature shows itself. The leader 
of this line of thought was Bonnet. He, too, in a manner similar to 
that of Condillac, adopts the mode of consideration commended by 
Lamettrie, adverting to Arnobius, but he is much too well-schooled 
as an investigator of Nature to fail to see that sensation can never 
be resolved into elements of motion, that its relation to physical 
states is synthetic, but not analytic. Hence he sees in the mechanism 
of the nervous system only the causa occasionalls for the spontaneous 
reaction of the mind, and the substantiality of the mind seems to him 
to be proved by the unity of consciousness. He connects with this 
theory all sorts of fantastic hypotheses." Religious ideas speak in 
his assumption of the immaterial mind-substance, but sensualism 
admits an activity of this substance only in connection with the 
body ; for this reason, in order to explain immortality and the un- 
interrupted activity of the mind. Bonnet helps himself by the 
hypothesis of an aethereal body which is joined essentially with the 
soul and takes on a coarser material external organism, according to 
its dwelling-place in each particular case. 

This union of sensualism with the maintenance of self-subsistent 
substantiality and capacity of reaction on the part of the mind 
passed over to Bonnet's countryman, Rousseau, who combated with 
its aid the psychological theories of the Encyclopaedists. He found 
that this characteristic quality of the mind, the unity of its function, 
evinces itself in feeling {sentiment) , and opposed this original natu- 

1 The decisive transition-writing is d'' Alemberf s Dream. 

2 In the Falingenesies Philosophiques. 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Bonnet^ Rousseau, Reid. 459 

ralness of its essence to the cold and indifferent mechanism of ideas, 
which would debase the mind to an unconditional dependence upon 
the outer world. The feeling of individuality rebelled with him 
against a doctrine according to which there is nothing in man's 
consciousness but the play, as if upon an indifferent stage, of a mass 
of foreign contents accidentally coming together, which unite and 
then separate again. He wished to bring out the thought that it is 
not the case that the mental life merely takes place within us, but 
that it is rather true that we are ourselves present as actively deter- 
mining personalities. This conviction dictated Eousseau's opposi- 
tion to the intellectualistic Enlightenment, which in the sensualism 
of Condillac and of the Encyclopaedists wished to regard man's inner 
life as only a mechanical product of sensational elements excited 
from without : to psychological atomism Rousseau opposes the 
principle of the Monadology. 

In the same manner, and perhaps not without influence fronx 
Bousseau in his arguments, St. Martin raised his voice against the 
prevailing system of Condillac ; he even came out of his mystical 
retreat to protest in the sessions of the Ecoles Normales ^ against 
the superficiality of sensualism. The ideologists, he says, talk a 
great deal about human nature ; but instead of observing it they 
devote their energies to put it together {composer). 

8. The Scottish philosophers are the psychological opponents of 
sensualism in all its forms. The common ground on which this 
contrast developed is that of psychology regarded as philosophy. 
For Reid, also, and his disciples seek the task of philosophy in the 
investigation of man and his mental capacities ; indeed, they fixed 
still more energetically and one-sidedly than the various schools of 
their opponents the methodical point of view that all philosophy 
must be empirical psychology. But this view of the human physi- 
cal activity and its development is diametrically opposed to that 
of the sensualists. The latter hold the simple, the former the com- 
plex, the latter the individual ideas, the former the judgments, the 
latter the sensuous, the former the internal, the latter the particular, 
the former the general, to be the original content of the mind's 
activity. Eeid acknowledges that Berkeley's idealism and Hume's 
scepticism are as correct consequences from Locke's principle as is 
Hartley's materialism ; but just the absurdity of these consequences 
refutes the principle. 

In opposition to this, Reid will now apply the Baconian method 
of induction to the facts of inner perception in order to attain by an 

^ Seances des Ec. Norm., III. 61 Ö. 

460 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

analysis of these to the original truths, which are given from the 
beginning in connection with the nature of the human mind, and 
which assert themselves in the development of its activities as 
determining principles. Thus, putting aside all help of physiology, 
the fundamental science psychology shall be perfected as a kind of 
natural science of inner observation. In the solution of this task, 
Reid himself, and after him especially Dugald Stewart, develop a 
considerable breadth and comprehensiveness of vision in the appre- 
hension of the inner processes and a great acuteness in the analysis 
of their essential content : a multitude of valuable observations on 
the genetic processes of the mental life is contained in their exten- 
sive investigations. And yet these investigations lack in fruitful- 
ness of ideas as well as in energetically comprehensive cogency. 
For they everywhere confuse the demonstration of that which can 
be discovered as universally valid content in the psychical func- 
tions, with the assumption that this is also genetically the original 
and determining : and since this philosophy has no other principle 
than that of psychological fact, it regards without criticism all that 
can in this manner be demonstrated to be actual content of mental 
activity, as self-evident truth. The sum-total of these principles is 
designated as common sense, and as such is held to form the supreme 
rule for all philosophical knowledge. 

9. In the philosophy of the German Enlightenment all these 
tendencies mingle with the after-workings of the Cartesian and 
Leibnizian rationalism. The twofold tendency in the method of 
this latter system had taken on a fixed systematic form through 
the agency of Christian Wolff. According to him, all subjects 
should be regarded both from the point of view of the eternal 
truths and from that of the contingent truths : for every province 
of reality there is a knowledge through conceptions and another 
through facts, an a priori science proceeding from the intellect and 
an a posteriori science arising from perception. These two sciences 
were to combine in the result in such a way that, for example, em- 
pirical psychology must show the actual existence in fact of all 
those activities which, in rational psychology, were deduced from 
the metaphysical conception of the soul, and from the " faculties " 
resulting from this conception. On the other hand, following Leib- 
niz's precedent, the distinction in value of the two modes of knowl- 
edge was so far retained as to regard only the intellectual knowledge 
as clear and distinct insight, while empirical (or, as they said at 
that time, historical) knowledge was regarded as a more or less 
obscure and confused idea of things. 

Psychologically, the two kinds of knowledge were divJ-^ed, in 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Wolffs Lambert. 461 

accordance with the Cartesian model, into the ideoe innatce and the 
idece adventitice. Yet Wolff himself, agreeably to the metaphysical 
direction of his thought, laid less weight upon the genetic element. 
But the opposite was the case with his adherents and opponents, 
who were already standing under the influence of the French and 
English theories. The general course of the development was that 
the importance which Leibniz and Wolff had conceded to empiricism 
was increased more and more by the penetration of the Lockian 
principles. The psychological method gained the preponderance 
over the metaphysico-ontological step by step, and within the psy 
chological method increasing concessions were made to sensualism, 
of such a nature that ultimately not only earnest men of science 
like Rüdiger and Lossius, but especially a great part of the "popu- 
lar philosophers " supported completely the doctrine that all human 
ideas arise from sense-perception. The motley and irregular series 
of stages in which this process completed itself has only a literary- 
historical interest,^ because no new arguments came to light in con- 
nection with it. 

Only one of these men used the psychologico-epistemological 
dualism which prevailed in the German philosophy of the Enlighfc 
enment, to make an original and fruitful turn. Heinrich Lambert, 
who was fully abreast of the natural science of his time, had 
[grown into intelligent sympathy with the mathematico-logical 
[method as completely as he had into an insight into the worth of 
[experience: and in the phenomenology of his New Organon, in 
[attempting to fix the limits for the psychological significance of 
phese two elements of knowledge, he disposed the mixture of the 
; priori and a posteriori constituents requisite for knowing reality, 
*in a way that led to the distinction of form and content in ideas. The 
content-elements of thought, he taught, can be given only by per- 
ception : but their mode of connection, the form of relation which 
is thought between them, is not given from without, but is a proper 
activity of the mind. This distinction could be read out of Locke's 
ambiguous exposition : ^ but no one had conceived it so sharply and 
precisely from this point of view as Lambert. And this point of 
view was of great importance for the genetic consideration of the 
ideas of the human mind. It followed from it, that it was neither 
possible to derive the content from the mere form, nor the form of 
knowledge from the content. The first refuted the logical rational 
— , . — — », 

1 Cf. W. Windelband, Gesch. d. neueren Philosophie, I. §§ 53-55. 

2 Cf. the demonstration in G. Hartenstein, Locke''s Lehre von der mensch 
lichen Erkenntniss in Vergleichung mit Leibniz' Kritik derselben (Leips 
1861, Abhandl. ^ sächs. Ges. d. Wissensch.). 

462 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V, 

ism with, which Wolff would spin all ontology and metaphysics out 
from the most general principles of logic, and ultimately from the 
one principle of contradiction ; the other took the basis away from 
sensualism, which thought that with the contents of perception the 
knowledge also of their relations was immediately given. Out of 
this grew for the " improvement of metaphysics " the task of dis- 
solving out these relating forms from the total mass of experience, 
and of making clear their relation to content. But Lambert sought 
in vain for a single unifying principle for this purpose/ and his 
^^ Architektonik^^ finally contented itself with, making a collection 
of them not based on any internal principle. 

10. While all these theories as to the origin of human ideas were 
flying about in the literary market, the reconciling word upon the 
problem of innate ideas had been long spoken, but was waiting in a 
manuscript in the Hanoverian library for the powerful effect which 
its publication was to produce. Leibniz, in his Nouveaux Essais, provided the Lockian ideology with a critical commentary in 
detail, and had embodied within it the deepest thoughts of his phi- 
losophy and the finest conclusions of his Monadology. 

Among the arguments with which Locke combated the doctrine 
that ideas were innate, had been that with which he maintained 
that there could be nothing in the mind of which the mind knew 
nothing. This principle had also been pronounced by him ^ in the 
form that the soul thinks not always. By this principle the Car- 
tesian definition of the soul as a res cogitans was brought into ques- 
tion : for the essential characteristic of a substance cannot be denied 
it at any moment. In this sense the question had been often dis- 
cussed between the schools. Leibniz, however, was pointed by his 
Monadology to a peculiar intermediate position. Since, in his view, 
the soul, like every monad, is a " representing " power, it must have 
perceptions at every moment : but since all monads, even those 
which constitute matter, are souls, these perceptions cannot pos- 
sibly all be clear and distinct. The solution of the problem lies, 
therefore, again in the conception of unconscious representations or 
petites perceptions (cf. above, § 31). The soul (as every monad) 
always has ideas or representations, but not always conscious, not 
always clear and distinct ideas ; its life consists in the development 
of the unconscious to conscious, of the obscure and confused to clear 
and distinct ideas or representations. 

In this aspect Leibniz now introduced an extremely significant 

1 This is best seen in his interesting correspondence with Kant, printed iff 
the works of the latter. 

2 Essay II. 1, 10 f. 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Leibniz. 463 

conception into psychology and epistemology. He distinguished 
between the states in which the soul merely has ideas, and those in 
which it is conscious of them. The former he designated as percep- 
tion, the latter as apperception} He understood, therefore, by 
apperception the process by which unconscious, obscure, and con- 
fused representations are raised into clear and distinct consciousness, 
and thereby recognised by the soul as its own and appropriated by 
self-consciousness. The genetic process of the psychical life consists 
in the changing of unconscious into conscious representations or ideas, 
in taking up perceptions into the clearness and distinctness of self- 
consciousness. In the light of the Monadology Leibniz's methodo- 
logical view of the empirical or contingent truths (cf. § SO, 7) took 
on a peculiar colouring. The fact that the monads have no windows 
makes it impossible to conceive of perception metaphysically as a 
working of things upon the soul : ^ the ideas of sense, or sense-pres- 
entations, must rather be thought as activities which the soul, by 
virtue of the pre-established harmony, develops in an obscure and 
confused manner (as petites perceptions), and the transformation 
which takes place in them can be regarded only as a process of 
making them distinct and of clearing them up, — as a taking up into 
self-consciousness, as apperception. 

Sensibility and understanding, the distinction between which with 
Leibniz coincides with that of different degrees of clearness and 
distinctness, have, therefore, in his view, the same content, only 
that the former has in obscure and confused representation 
what the latter possesses as clear and distinct. Nothing comes 
into the soul from without; that which it consciously represents 
has been already unconsciously contained within it : and on the 
other hand, the soul cannot bring forth anything in its conscious 
ideas which has not been within it from the beginning. Hence 
Leibniz must decide that in a certain sense, that is, unconsciously, 
all ideas are innate ; and that in another sense, that is, consciously, no 
idea is innate in the human soul. He designates this relation, which 
had been previously sketched in the principles of the Monadology, 
by the name virtual innateness of ideas. 

This thought, which is at once treated as the controlling point of 
view at the opening of the JSfew Essays, is carried out especially 
with reference to the universal or eternal truths. This was indeed 
the burning question : here the one party (the Neo-Platonists, and 
in part the Cartesians) maintained that these were innate "actu- 

^ Princ. de la Nat. et de la GrcLce, 4, where the relationship with the Lockian 
;ji reflection comes out strongly ; Nouv. Ess. II. 9, 4. 
2 2^^ E. IV. 4. 5- 

464 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part "V. 

ally," as fully formed {feHige) truths; the others (Hobbes, and 
in part Locke) would explain them from the co-operation of sensa- 
tional elements. Leibniz, however, carries out the thought that 
such principles are contained already in perception, as petites percep-> 
tions, that is, as the involuntary forms of relating thought, but that 
after this unconscious employment of them they are apperceived, 
that is, raised to clear and distinct consciousness and so recognised 
in connection with experience. The form of the soul's activity 
which is afterwards brought to clearness and distinctness of intel- 
lectual apprehension as a universal principle, an eternal truth, 
inheres already in the sensuous representation, though unclear and 
confused. Hence while Locke had appropriated for his own use the 
scholastic principle nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, 
Leibniz adds thereto nisi intellectus ipse} 

11. When the Nouveaux Essais were printed in 1765, they excited 
great attention. Lessing was translating them. That the life of 
the soul transcends all that is clear and distinctly conscious, and is 
rooted in obscurely presaged depths, was an insight of the highest 
value for the literature which was just struggling out of the intel- 
lectual dryness of the Enlightenment, and out of insipid correctness 
to an unfolding full of genius, — and an insight all the more valua- 
ble as coming from the same thinker that Germany honoured as the 
father and hero of its Enlightenment. In this direction Leibniz 
worked especially upon Herder : we see it not only in his aesthetic 
views,^ but still more in his prize essay '' On the Knowing and Feel- 
ing of the Human Soul." 

Under the preponderance of the methodological point of view, the 
Leibnizo-Wolffian school had strained the opposition between rational 
and empirical knowledge as far as possible, and had treated under- 
standing and sensibility as two separate faculties. The Berlin 
A-cademy had wished to see the mutual relation of these two sepa- 
rated powers, and the share which each has in human knowledge, 
investigated: Herder played the true Leibniz — as the latter had 
developed himself in the Nouveaux Essais — against the prevailing 
system of the schools when he emphasised in his treatise the living 
unity of man's psychical life, and showed that sensibility and under- 
standing are not two different sources of knowledge, but only the 
different stages of one and the same living activity with which the 
monad comprehends the universe within itself. All the ideas with 
which the soul raises itself in its development, step by step; from the 
consciousness of its immediate environment to the knowledge of 

1 Nouv. Ess. II. 1,2. 2 cf, principally the fourth Kritische Wäldchen. 

Chap. 1, § 33.] Innate Ideas : Herder, Kant. 465 

the harmony of the universe, are innate within the soul as internal 
powers. This deeper unity of sensibility and understanding, Herder 
called feeling ; and in this also in his inquiry as to the "Origin of 
Language," he found the function which embraces all senses like a 
unity, and by means of which the psycho-physical mechanism of 
producing and hearing sounds {Tönens and Hörens) is raised to 
become the expression of thought. 

12. More important still was another effect of the work of Leib- 
niz. It was no less a thinker than Kant who undertook to build up 
the doctrine of the Nouveaux Essais into a system of epistemology 
(cf. § 34, 12). The Königsberg philosopher was stimulated by that 
work to one of the most important turns in his development, and 
completed it in his Inaugural Dissertation} He had already grown 
out of the Wolffian school-metaphysics and had been long employed 
with the examination of the empirical theories, and yet could not 
satisfy himself with them.^ On the contrary, he was proceeding in 
the direction of establishing metaphysics upon a new basis, and was 
following Lambert's attempts to make a beginning at the work in 
connection with the distinction of form and content in knowledge. 
Now Leibniz showed with reference to the " eternal truths " that 
they inhered already as involuntary relating forms within sense 
experience itself, to be raised and brought to clear and distinct con- 
sciousness by the reflection of the understanding. This principle of 
virtual innateness is the nerve of Kant's Inaugural Dissertation : the 
metaphysical truths lie in the soul as laws of its activity,^ to enter 
into active function on occasion of experience, and then to become 
object and content of the knowledge of the understanding. 

Kant now applies this point of view in a new and fruitful manner 
to sensuous knowledge. From methodical reasons he opposed this to 
intellectual knowledge much more sharply even than the Wolffians : 
but on this account the question for him was, whether there are 
perhaps in the world of the senses just such original form-relations 
as had been pointed out in the intellectual world by Leibniz and 
recognised by Kant himself (cf. § 8, and the whole Sectio IV. of the 
treatise De mundi sensibilis et intelUgibilis forma et principiis) : and 
thus he discovered the " pure Forms of the sensibility " — sjoace a7id 
time. They are not innate in the ordinary sense, but acquired, yet 
not abstracted from the data of sensibility, but ab ipsa mentis. 

1 The dependence of this essay upon the Nouveaux Essais has been shown by 
W. Windelband, Vierteljahrschr. f. wissensch. Philos., I., 1876, pp. 234 fi. 

2 This is best proved by the essay which apparently stands farthest removed 
from metaphysics. The Dreams of a Ghost Seer. Cf. also Part VI. ch. 1. 

^ De Mundi Sens, et Int., § 6: dantiir per ipsam naturam intellectus. Cf. 
§ 8, also the corollary to § 3. 

466 The Enlightenment: Theoretical Questions. [PartV. 

actione secimdum perpetuus leges sensa sua coordinante [from the 
very action of tlie mind co-ordinating its sensations according to 
perpetual laws], and like the intellectual Forms they are recognised 
by attending to the mind's activity on occasion of experience, — +:he 
business of mathematics. 

Another formulation was given to the principle of virtual innate- 
ness by Tetens. He wrote his essays on human nature and its 
development under the impression received from Kant's Inaugural 
Dissertation. He, too, declares that the '' acts of thought " are the 
first original relation-thoughts ( Verhältnis sgedanJcen) : we learn 
them by applying them when we think; and thus they prove 
themselves to be the natural laws of thought. The universal prin- 
ciples which lie at the basis of all philosophical knowledge are, 
accordingly, " subjective necessities " in which the essential nature 
of the thinking soul itself comes to consciousness. 

§ 34. Knowledge of the Outer World. 

The background of all these theories is their epistemologicai pur- 
pose. This, however, assumes from the beginning a somewhat 
narrower place under the presupposition of the naive realism which 
became attached to the Cartesian metaphysics. The principle of 
the cogito ergo sum made the self-knowledge of the mind's nature 
appear as the original certainty, as that which was self-evident and 
immediately free from doubt ; but the greater the difference in kind 
which was conceived to exist between the world of consciousness 
and that of space and bodies, the greater the difficulties that pre- 
sented themselves with reference to the possibility of knowing this 
latter world. This fact was taught at once by the metaphysical 
development immediately after Descartes (cf. § 31), and the same 
was now repeated in the most various forms in connection with the 
translation of these same thoughts into the language of empirical 
psychology and sensualism. 

There is thus in the epistemology of modern philosophy from its 
beginning a superiority attributed to inner experience, by virtue of 
which knowledge of the outer icorld hecomes problematical. In this an 
after- working of the Terminism, with which the Middle Ages had 
ended, asserts itself throughout the whole extent of modern thought 
as a determining mode of view: the heterogeneity of the outer 
and inner worlds gives the mind a proud feeling of a substantial 
quality peculiar to itself as contrasted with things, but at the same 
time a certain degree of uncertainty and doubtfulness in orienting 
itself in this world which is to it strange and foreign. In this way 

Chap. 1, § 34,] Knowledge of the Outer World : Loche. 467 

the very statement of the fundamental problem in the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment shows itself to be an echo of that deepening 
of the mind within itself, that placing of consciousness upon an inde- 
pendent basis over against the outer world, with which the ancient 
philosophy ended its course. In this was rooted the power of the 
Augustinian spirit over modern philosophy, 

1. The preponderance of the inner experience asserts itself very 
strongly also with Locke, although in principle he placed sensation 
and reflection upon an equality psychologically, and in his genetic 
theory even made the latter dependent upon the former. But in 
assigning the epistemological values this relation is at once reversed 
in the spirit of the Cartesian principles. For the dualism of finite 
substances which the great French metaphysician had propounded is 
quietly introduced by Locke in conjunction with the dualism of the 
sources of experience : sensation is designed to furnish knowledge of 
the corporeal outer world, reflection to give knowledge of the activities 
of the mind itself : and in this consideration it is naturally found 
that the latter is much more suited to its task than the former. 
Our knowledge of our own states is intuitive and the most certain of 
all; and with a knowledge of our states we are at the same time 
perfectly and undoubtedly sure of our own existence also, Locke 
presents this doctrine of the certainty of knowledge of self with 
an almost verbal adherence to Descartes,^ With reference to our 
knowledge of the corporeal world, on the other hand, his attitude 
is much more reserved. Such a knowledge is possible only through 
sensation ; and although it still deserves the name knowledge, it yet 
lacks complete certainty and adequacy. Primarily, it is only the 
presence of the idea in the mind that is intuitively certain ; that a 
thing corresponds to the idea is not intuitively certain, and demon- 
stration can at most teach that there is a thing there, but can 
predicate nothing concerning this thing. 

To be sure, Locke is not at all in agreement with himself on this 
point. In connection with his theory of the ideas of sensation, he 
adopts the doctrine of the intellectual nature of the sense qualities 
quite in the form worked out by Descartes (cf. § 31, 2), designates 
them happily by the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 
adds, as tertiary qualities, such powers as express the relation of one 
body to another, declares primary qualities to be those which really 
belong to bodies in themselves, and reckons, also, impenetrability 
in this class, in addition to those assigned to it by Descartes, As 
compared with the doctrine of Hobbes, this is in its essence a 

1 Essay IV, 9, 3. 

468 The Enlightenment : theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

decided relapse into the mode of thought of Democritus and Epicurus, 
as is shown, also, in the fact that Locke follows the theory of 
images in tracing stimulations to the affection of the nerves oj 
minute particles streaming out from objects.^ On the whole, there- 
fore, the fundamental Cartesian basis of mathematical knowledge 
of Nature is here reaffirmed and even more widely extended. 

But Locke's decision in connection with his analysis of the idea 
of substance has an entirely different purport. Like Occam, he 
distinguishes from intuitive knowledge and knowledge given by 
sensation, demonstrative knowledge: this has to do, not with the 
relation of ideas to the outer world, but with the relation of ideas 
to one another. In its value as knowledge it stands after the intui-= 
tive, but superior to the sensitive.^ Demonstrative thinking is then 
conceived of entirely terministically, something as in the case of 
Hobbes, as a reckoning with concept signs. The necessity attach- 
ing to the demonstration holds only within the world of ideas ; it 
concerns, as one class, general or abstract ideas to which no proper 
reality corresponds in natura rerum. If ideas are once present, 
judgments may be formed concerning the relations which exist 
between them, quite apart from any reference to the things them- 
selves; and it is with such judgments alone that demonstrative 
knowledge has to do. Such "complex" ideas are thought-things^ 
which, after they have been fixed by definition, can enter into the 
union with others determined in each case by the respective con- 
tents, without thereby acquiring any relation to the outside world. 
Among these modes of union, that which is expressed by the idea 
of substance (the category of inherence) is conspicuous in an especial 
manner. For all other contents and relations can be thought only 
as belonging to some substance. This relation, therefore, has Eeality, 
i — the idea of substance is, according to Locke's expression, ectypal, 
— but only in the sense that we are forced to assume a real substrate 
for the modes given in particular ideas, without being able to make 
any assertion as to what this substrate itself is. Substance is the 
supporter, itself unknown, of known qualities, which we have occa- 
sion to assume belong together. 

This view that substances are unknowable does not, indeed, 
hinder Locke from taking in hand at another passage,^ in an entirely 
Cartesian fashion, a division of all substances into " cogitative and 
incogitative." On the other hand, he applies the view to his treat- ; 

1 Essay, II. 8, 7 ff. Cf. also B. Rüttenauer, Zur Vorgeschichte des Idealismus ] 
und Kriticismus (Freiburg, 1882), and Geil, op. cit., pp. 66 ff. 

2 Ib. IV. 2. 

sib. n. 23,29; IV. 10, 9. 

DuAp. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Berkeley. 469 

ment of the cogito ergo sum. This principle he carries over entirely 
from the metaphysical realm into that of empirical psychology. 
Self-certainty is for him that of the " internal sense " ; intuition in 
this case refers only to our states and activities, not to our essence • 
it shows us, indeed, immediately and without doubt, that we are, 
but not what we are. The question as to the substance of the soul 
(and accordingly the question also as to its relation to the body) is 
as incapable of an answer as the question as to the " what " of any 
substance whatever. 

Nevertheless, Locke holds it to be possible to gain a demonstrative 
certainty of the existence of God. For this purpose he adopts the 
first of the Cartesian proofs (cf. § 30, 5) in a somewhat modified 
form, and adds the ordinary cosmological argument. An infinite, 
eternal, and perfect being must be thought, an ultimate cause of 
finite substances of which man intuitively knows himself to be one. 
So manifold and full of contradictions are the motifs which cross 
in Locke's doctrine of knowledge. The exposition, apparently so 
easy and transparent, to which he diluted Cartesianism, glides over 
and away from the eddies which come up out of the dark depths of 
its historical presuppositions. But as the ambiguous, indeterminate 
nature of his psychology unfolded itself in the antithesis in the fol- 
lowing developments, so, too, this epistemological metaphysics offered 
points of departure for the most varied transformations. 

2. The very first of these shows an audacious energy of one-sided- 
ness in contrast with the indecisiveness of Locke. Berkeley hmnght 
the ascendency of inner experience to complete dominance by putting 
an end to the wavering position which Locke had taken upon the 
question as to the knowledge of bodies. This he did with the aid 
of his extreme Nominalism and with a return to the doctrines of 
Hobbes. He demolished the conception of corporeal substance. Ac- 
cording to the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, it was 
held that a part of that complex of ideas which perception presents 
us as a body should be separated out, and another part retained as 
alone real; but this distinction, as Hobbes had already taught 
(cf. § 31, 2), is in the nature of the case erroneous. The "mathe- 
matical " qualities of bodies are as truly ideas within us as the 
sense qualities, and Berkeley had demonstrated exactly this point 
with analogous arguments in his Theory of Vision. He attacks the 
warrant of the distinction of Descartes (and of Democritus). But 
while, according to this view, all qualities of bodies without excep- 
tion are ideas in us, Locke has retained as their real supporter a 
superfluous unknowable "substance" ; in a similar way others speak 
of matter as the substrate of sensible qualities. 

470 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

But in all these cases, says Berkeley, it is demanded of us to 
regard an abstraction as the only actual reality. Abstract ideas, 
however, do not exist, — they do not exist even in the mind, to say 
nothing of existing in natura rerum. Locke was then quite right in 
saying that no one could know this "substance " : no one can even 
think it ; it is a fiction of the schools. For the naive consciousness, 
for "common sense," whose cause Berkeley professes to maintain 
against the artificial subtlety of philosophers, bodies are just exactly 
what is perceived, no more and no less ; it is only the philosophers 
who seek for something else behind what is perceived, — something 
mysterious, abstract, of which they themselves cannot say what it 
is. For the unper verted mind, body is what one sees, touches, 
tastes, smells, and hears : its esse is percipi. 

Body is then nothing but a complex of ideas. If we abstract from 
a cherry all the qualities which can be perceived through any of the 
senses, what is left ? Nothing. The idealism which sees in a body 
nothing farther than a bundle of ideas is the view of the common 
man ; it should be that of philosophers also. Bodies possess no 
other reality than that of being perceived. It is false to suppose 
that there is in addition to this a substance inherent within them, 
which "appears " in their qualities. They are nothing but the sum 
of these qualities. 

In reply to the question that lies close at hand, in what the differ- 
ence consists between the " real " or actual body an-d that which is 
only imagined or dreamed of, if all bodies are only perceived, 
Berkeley answers with a spiritualistic metaphysics. The ideas 
which constitute the existence of the outer world are activities of 
spirits. Of the two Cartesian worlds only one has substantial 
existence ; only the res cogitantes are real substances, the res extensce 
are their ideas. But to finite spirits the ideas are given, and the 
origin of all ideas is to be sought only in the infinite Spirit, in God. 
The reality of bodies consists, therefore, in this, that their ideas are 
communicated by God to finite spirits, and the order of succession 
in which God habitually does this we call laws of Nature. Hence 
Bishop Berkeley finds no metaphysical difficulty in supposing that 
God under certain circumstances departs from the usual order for 
some especial end, and in this case man speaks of miracles. On the 
other hand, a body is unreal which is presented only in the indi- 
vidual mind according to the mechanism of memory or imagination, 
and without being at the same time communicated to the mind by 
God. And finally, since the actual corporeal world is thus changed 
into a system of ideas willed by God, the purposiveness which its 
arrangement and the order of its changes exhibit gives rise to no 
further problem. 

Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Collier. 471 

The parallelism between this inference from Locke and that 
which Malebranche had drawn from Descartes is unmistakable ; and 
Malebranche and Berkeley are also at one in holding that God alone 
is the active force in the world, and that no individual thing is 
efficiently operative (cf. § 31, 8). It is extremely interesting to see 
how the extreme Eealism of the Frenchman and the extreme 
Nominalism of the Englishman amount to the same thing. The 
grounds on which the views are based could not be more different : 
the result is the same. For what still separated the two could be 
easily removed out of the way. This was proved by a contemporary 
and countryman of Berkeley's, Arthur Collier (1680-1732) in his 
interesting treatise Clavis Universalis} Malebranche,^ indeed, as a 
Cartesian, had not directly demurred to the reality of the corporeal 
world, but had held that we could understand the knowledge of this 
world by man, only on the hypothesis that the ideas of bodies in 
God are the common original, in accordance with which God pro- 
duces, on the one hand, the actual bodies, and, on the other, the 
ideas of these bodies in finite minds. Collier showed now that in 
this theory the reality of the corporeal world played a completely 
superfluous role : since no actual relation between the corporeal 
world and human ideas is assumed, the value of human ideas for 
knowledge remains quite the same if we posit only an ideal cor- 
poreal world in God, and regard this as the real object of human 

The idealism, which proceeded in this way from the cogito ergo 
sum along several paths, was attended by still another paradox as 
a by-product, which is occasionally mentioned in the literature of 
the eighteenth century without any definite name or form. Each 
individual mind has certain, intuitive knowledge only of itself and 
of its states, nor does it know anything of other minds except 
through ideas, which refer primarily to bodies and by an argument 
from analogy are interpreted to indicate minds. If, however, the 
whole corporeal world is only an idea in the mind, every individual 
is ultimately certain only of his own existence ; the reality of all 
else, all other minds not excluded, is problematical and cannot be 
demonstrated. This doctrine was at that time designated as 
Egoism, now it is usually called Solipsism. It is a metaphysical 

1 The alternative title of the book reads, A New Inquiry after Truth, being 
a Demonstration of the ISfon-Existence or Impossibility of an External World 
(Lond. 1123). It was edited together with Berkeley's treatise in the German 
" Collection of the Principal Writings which deny the Beality of their own 
Body ( ! !) and of the whole Corporeal World," by Eschenbach (Eostock, 1756). 

2 Whose doctrine had become known in England by the agency especially of 
?ohn Norris {Essai d''un Theorie du Monde Ideal, Lond. 1704). 

472 Tlie Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V- 

sport which must be left to the taste of the individual; for fehe 
solipsist refutes himself by beginning to prove his doctrine to 

Thus, following in the train of the Meditations, in which Descartes 
recognised self-consciousness as the rescuing rock in the sea of 
doubt, the result was finally reached which Kant later characterised 
as a scandal to philosophy ; namely, that a proof was demanded for 
the reality of the outer world, and none adequate could be found. 
The French materialists declared that Berkeley's doctrine was an 
insane delusion, but was irrefutable. 

3. The transformation of Locke's doctrine by Berkeley leads 
farther in a direct line to Hume's theory of knowledge. To the 
nominalistic denial of abstract ideas the penetrative and profound 
Scot attached his distinction of all intellectual functions into im- 
pressions, and ideas which are copies of impressions ; and coincident 
with his distinction is that of intuitive and demonstrative knowl- 
edge. Each kind of knowledge has its own kind of certainty. 
Intuitive knowledge consists simply in the affirmation of actually 
present impressions. What impressions I have, I can declare with 
absolute certainty. I can make no mistake in this, in so far as I 
keep within the bounds of simply stating that I have a perception 
possessing this or that simple or complex content, without adding 
any conceptions which would put any interpretation upon this 

As among the most important of these impressions which have 
immediate intuitive certainty Hume reckons the relations in space 
and time of the contents of sensation, — the fixing of the co-exist- 
ence or succession of elementary impressions. The spatial order in 
which the contents of perception present themselves is undoubtedly 
given immediately with the contents themselves, and we likewise 
possess a sure impression as to whether the different contents are 
perceived at the same time or in succession. Contiguity in space 
and time is therefore intuitively given together with the impres- 
sions, and of these facts the human mind possesses a knowledge 
which is perfectly certain and in nowise to be questioned. Only, 
in characterising Hume's doctrine, it must not be forgotten that 
this absolutely certain matter-of-fact quality, which belongs to 
impressions, is solely that of their presence as mental states. In 
this meaning and restriction intuitive knowledge embraces not only 
the facts of inner experience, but also those of outer experience, but 
at the price of recognising that the latter are properly only species 
of the former, — a knowledge, that is, of mental states. 

Contiguity in space and time is, however, but the most elementary 

Chap. ]; § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Hume. 473 

form of association between perceptions ; besides this Hume reckons 
two other laws, those of resemblance (or contrast, respectively) and 
causality. As regards the former of these two forms of relation, 
we have a clear and distinct impression of the likeness or unlike- 
ness of sensations, and of the different degrees of these ; it consists 
in the knowledge of the degree of resemblance in our own (sensi- 
tive) action, and belongs therefore to the impressions of the inner 
sense, which Locke called reflection. On this is based, consequently, 
a demonstrative knowledge of complete certainty; it concerns the 
forms of that comparison between magnitudes which we perform 
upon the given contents of our ideas, and is nothing but an analysis 
of the regularity with which this takes place. This demonstrative 
science is mathematics ; it develops the laws of equality and propor- 
tion with reference to numbers and space, and Hume is inclined to 
concede a still higher epistemological value to arithmetic than to 

4. But mathematics is also the sole demonstrative science; and is 
that just because it relates to nothing else than the possible rela- 
tions between contents of ideas, and asserts nothing whatever as to 
any relation of these to a real world. In this way the terministic 
principle of Hobbes (cf. § 30, 3) is in complete control with Hume, 
but the latter proceeds still more consistently with his limitation of 
this theory to pure mathematics. For Hume declares that no asser- 
tion respecting the external world is capable of demonstration ; all 
our knowledge is limited to the ascertaining and verifying of 
impressions, and to the relations of these mental states to each 

Hence it seems to Hume an unauthorised trenching of thought 
beyond its own territory, when the resemblance between ideas is 
interpreted as meaning metaphysical identity ; this is the case in 
every employment of the conception of substance. Whence is this 
conception ? It is not perceived, it is not found as a content either 
in particular sensations or in their relations ; substance is the 
unknown, indescribable support of the known contents of ideas. 
Whence this idea for which no impression is to be found in the 
whole circuit of sensations as its necessary original ? Its origin is 
to be sought in reflection. It is the copy of a frequently repeated 
conjunction of ideas. By the repeated being together of impres- 
sions, by the custom of the like ideational process there arises by 
virtue of the law of association of ideas the necessity of the idea of 
their co-existence, and the feeling of this associative necessity of the 

1 Treat. I. 2, 1 ; I. 3, 1. 

474 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions [Part V. 

ideational process is thought as a real belonging together of the 
elements of association, i.e. as substance. 

The thought-form of inherence is thus psychologically explained, 
and at the same time epistemologically rejected; nothing corre- 
sponds to it further than the feeling of a likeness in the ideational 
conjunction ; and since we can never know anything of existence 
except by immediate sense-perception, the Eeality of the idea of 
substance is incapable of proof. It is clear that Hume thus makes 
Berkeley's doctrine his own, so far as it concerns corporeal things. 
But Berkeley had but half done his work upon the idea of substance. 
He found that bodies are only complexes of sensations ; that their 
being is identical with their being perceived ; that there is no sense 
or meaning in hypostatising their belonging together, as an unknown 
substance : but he let the psychical substances, spirits, the res cogi- 
tantes, stand ; he regarded them as the supports or agents in which 
all these ideational activities inhere. Hume's argument applies to 
this latter class also. What Berkeley showed of the cherry is true 
also of the " self." Inner perception, also (such was the form which 
it had actually taken on already with Locke; cf. above. No. 1), 
shows only activities, states, qualities. Take these away, and noth- 
ing remains of Descartes' res cogitans either : only the " custom " of 
constant conjunction of ideas in imagination is at the basis of the 
conception of a "mind"; the self is only a " bundle of perceptions."^ 

The same consideration holds also, mutatis mutandis, for causality, 
that form under which the necessary connection between contents 
of ideas is usually thought : but this is neither intuitively nor de- 
monstratively certain. The relation of cause and effect is not per- 
ceived ; all that we can perceive by the senses is the relation in 
time, according to which one regularly follows the other. If, now, 
thought interprets this sequence into a consequence, this post hoc 
into a propter hoc^ this too has no basis in the content of the ideas 
causally related to each other. From a " cause " it is not possible 
to deduce logically its " effect " ; the idea of an effect does not con- 
tain within it that of its cause. It is not possible to understand 
the causal relation analytically,^ Its explanation is, according to 

^ Treat. I., Part PV. The objectionable consequences which resulted from 
this for religious metaphysics perhaps occasioned Hume, when working over 
his Treatise into the Essays, to let drop this which cut most deeply of all his 

2 In this respect Hume had a forerunner in his countryman Joseph Glanvil 
(1636-1680), who combated the mechanical natural philosophy from the stand- 
point of orthodox scepticism in his Scepsis Scientifica, 1665. 

3 The same thought lay already at the basis of the Occasionalistic meta- 
physics (cf. § 31, 7); for the essential reason for its taking refuge in mediation 
by the will of God was the logical incomprehensibility of the causal relation. 

Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World: Hume. 47? 

Hume, to be gained by means of association of ideas. Through the 
repetition of the same succession of ideas, and the custom of finding 
them follow each other, an inner necessity or compulsion arises of 
imagining and expecting the second after the first ; and the feeling 
of this inner necessity with which one idea calls up another is inter- 
preted as a real objective necessity, as if the object corresponding 
to the first idea forced that corresponding to the other to a real 
existence in natura rerum. The impression in this case [of which 
the idea of cause and effect is a copy] is the necessary relation 
between the ideational activities [activities of the "imagination"], 
and from this arises, in the idea of causality, the idea of a neces- 
sary relation between the ideational contents [i.e. that A causes B ; 
whereas the case really is that the idea of A causes the idea of B, 
i.e. recalls it by the law of association]. 

[In view of the extreme condensation of the above statement, a fuller outline 
of Hume's discussion of causality may be useful. As found in the Treatise it 
is briefly as follows: All knowledge as to matters of fact ("probability"), if 
it goes beyond the bare present sensation, depends on causation. This contains 
three essential elements, — contiguity, succession, and necessary connection. We 
can explain the first two (i.e. can find the impression from which they come), 
but no impression of sensation can be found for the third and most impor- 
tant. To aid in the search for its origin we examine the principle both in its 
general form and in its particular application, asking (1), why we say that 
whatever begins to exist must have a cause, and (2), why we conclude that 
a particular cause must necessarily have a particular effect. 

(1) Examination of the first gives the negative result that the principle is not 
intuitively or demonstratively certain (the opposite is not inconceivable) , hence 
it is not derived purely a priori, i.e. by analysing relations between ideas ; 
therefore it must be from experience. — (2) But how from experience? Taking 
for convenience the second question stated above, the particular instead of the 
general, it is evident (a) that the senses cannot tell that a particular effect will 
follow a given cause ; they are limited to the present. Nor (6) can such knowl- 
edge as to future events be gained by reasoning on experience, as this would 
involve knowing that instances of which we have had no experience must 
resemble those of which we had experience (would assume the uniformity of 
Nature), (c) Therefore the principle apparently must come from the only 
remaining faculty, imagination. This seems at first impossible, in view of the 
strong belief which attaches to these ideas (e.g. that fire will burn), in contra- 
distinction from ordinary ideas of fancy. The question as thus shifted now 
becomes : (3) How explain the fact that we believe that a particular effect will 
follow a given cause ? The only difference between the ideas of the senses and 
memory (in which we believe) and those of fancy (in which we do not) is that 
of the feeling joined with them. The ideas of memory are more strong and 

The same was also recognised by Kant in his '■^Attempt to introduce the Concep» 
tion of Negative Quantities into Philosophy " (cf. the general remark at the close) 
in a manner essentially in agreement with Hume. And finally, Thomas Brown 
(On Cause and Effect), who also is not disinclined to Occasionalism (cf. op. cit., 
pp. 108 ff.), in a very interesting way deduces psychologically, and at the same 
time rejects epistemologically (ib. 184 ff.), the demand for an "explaining" or 
"understanding" of the actual succession of facts in time. Perception shows 
causes and effects roughly. The explanation of the process consists, then, in its 
analysis into particular, simple and elementary causal relations. By this means 
the illusion arises as if these latter must be yet again made analytically com- 

476 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V^ 

lively. Hence the problem is, What makes the idea {e.g. that fire will bum) so 
"lively" that I believe in it ? and the solution is, that as I find this beUef 
arising not from a single instance, but only from the constant conjunction of 
the two impressions, the liveliness must be due to custom, i.e. to the habitual 
association of the ideas. " All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of 
sensation.' ' 

This same doctrine explains the origin of the idea of necessary connection. 
For this does not arise from one instance, but from several. Kepetition dis- 
covers nothing new, nor does it produce anything new in the objects, but it does 
produce something in the mind, viz. a determination to pass from one object to 
its usual attendant. The idea of necessity must arise from some impression. 
There is no external impression that can give rise to it, hence it must be an im- 
pression of reflection, and the only one available is that propensity which custom 
produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. Necessity is 
something that exists in the mind, not in objects. This is confirmed by compar- 
ative psychology (animals infer from experience through custom), by the theory 
of probabilities, and (in the Inquiry) by the freedom of the will, since belief 
may be reached in all these without necessarily holding to any objective neces- 
sary connection. — Tr.] 

In this way, Hume's theory of knowledge disintegrates the two 
fundamental conceptions about which the metaphysical movement 
of the seventeenth century had revolved. Substance and causality 
are relations between ideas, and cannot be proved or substantiated 
either by experience or by logical thought: they rest upon the 
fictitious substitution of impressions derived from reflection, for 
those of sensation. But with this, the ground is completely taken 
from under the feet of the ordinary metaphysics, and in its place 
appears only epistemology. The metaphysics of things gives place 
to a metaphysics of knowledge. 

6. Hume's contemporaries characterised this result of his investi- 
gations — especially out of regard for its consequences with respect 
to religious metaphysics (cf . § 35, 6) — as Scepticism : yet it is 
essentially different from those doctrines to which this name his- 
torically belongs. The settling of facts by sense-experience is, for 
Hume, intuitive certainty; mathematical relations pass for demon- 
strative certainty : but, as for all alleged assertions by means of 
conceptions ["by abstract reasoning"] with reference to a reality 
other than that belonging to ideas [" concerning matter of fact and 
existence"], Hume cries, "Into the fire with it!" There is no 
knowledge of what things are and how they work : we can say only 
what we perceive by sensation, what arrangement in space and time 
and what relations of resemblance we experience between them. 
This doctrine is absolutely consistent and honest empiricism: it 
demands that if the only source of knowledge is perception, nothing 
further shall be mingled with this than what it actually contains. 
With this, all theory, all examination of cause, all doctrine of the 
"true Being" behind "phenomena" is excluded.^ If we characterise 

1 Berkeley is, therefore, correctly understood only from the point of view of 

Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Hume. 477 

this standpoint as Positivism, in accordance with the terminology of 
our century, we may say that its systematic basis was established 
by Hume. 

But England's deepest thinker gave to this radical theory of 
knowledge a characteristic supplement. The associations of ideas 
which lie at the basis of the conceptions of substance and causality 
are, indeed, attended by neither intuitive nor demonstrative certainty; 
instead of this, however, they are accompanied by a conviction which 
has its roots in feeling, a natural belief, which, unperverted by any 
theoretical reflections, asserts itself victoriously in man's practical 
procedures, and is completely adequate for the attainable ends of 
life and for the knowledge relating to these. On this rests the 
experience of daily life. To question this never came into Hume's 
mind : he only wishes to prevent this from playing the role of an 
experimental science, for which it is inadequate. With the entire 
earnestness of philosophical depth he unites an open vision for the 
needs of practical life. 

7. For the reception of this positivism the intellectual temper 
was less favourable in England than in France. Here the renuncia- 
tion of any attempt at a metaphysics of things lay already prepared 
in the fundamental sceptical tendency which had made its appear- 
ance so repeatedly from the Cartesian philosophy ; and the preva- 
lence of this temper had been especially furthered by Bayle, whose 
criticism was, indeed, in principle directed chiefly against the rational 
grounding of religious truths ; but at the same time applied to all 
knowledge reaching beyond the sensuous, and therefore to all meta- 
physics. Besides this, there was in the Erench literature a freer 
tendency that belongs to men of the world, which had likewise been 
furthered by Bayle, and at the same time by the influence of Eng- 
lishmen, — a tendency which would strip off the fetters of the system 
of the schools, and demanded the immediate reality of life instead of 
abstract conceptions. Thus Bacon's doctrine, with its limitation 
of science to physical and anthropological experience, became more 
efficacious in France than in his own home. The " point de Systeme " 
meets us here at every step ; no one any longer wishes to know 
anything of the " causes premieres," and this Baconian platform 
with all its encyclopaedic and programmatic extension was laid down 
by d'Alembert as the philosophical basis of the Encyclopxjedia} 

Hume : his idealism is lialf positivism. He lays especial weight upon the point 
that behind the ideas of bodies we are not still to seek for something abstract, 
something existent in itself. If this principle be extended to minds, we have 
Hume's doctrine ; for with the fall of Berkeley's spiritualistic metaphysics, the 
order of phenomena willed by God, to which he had reduced causality, falls also. 
1 In the Discours Preliminaire. 

478 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

In Germany the Wolffian system was opposed with the ^'point de 
Systeme " by men like Crousaz and Maupertuis on grounds of taste, 
and, in fact, the pedantry of this text-book philosophy offered many 
points of attack. In contrast with this the German Popular Philos- 
ophy prided itself upon its absence of system; as developed by 
Mendelssohn it would refrain from all subtleties as to that which 
cannot be experienced, and employ itself the more with that which 
is useful for men. And, lastly, we find a fine example of harmony 
with this temper in Kaufs Dreams of a GJiost-Seer, where he lashes 
the architects of various artificial worlds of thought with sharp 
irony, and pours out copious scorn upon metaphysical endeavour 
with a gallows-humour which touches his own inclination in a 
most sensitive point. Among the German poets Wieland is in this 
same spirit the witty anti-metaphysician. 

8. A very peculiar turn was taken by positivism, finally, in the 
later doctrine of Condillac. In him converge the lines of the French 
and the English Enlightenment, and he finds a positivistic synthesis 
of sensualism and rationalism, which may be regarded as the most 
perfect expression of modern terminism. His Logic ^ and his post- 
humous Langue des Calculs developed this doctrine. It is built up 
essentially upon a theory of ''signs" (signes).^ Human ideas are all 
of them sensations, or transformations of such, and for these no 
especial powers of the soul are needed.^ All knowledge consists in 
the consciousness of the relations of ideas, and the fundamental 
relation is that of equality. The business of thinking is only to 
bring out the relations of equality between ideas.* This is done by 
analysing the complexes of ideas into their constituent elements 
and then putting them together again : decomposition des pMno- 
mhies and composition des idees. The isolation of the constituent 
elements which is requisite for this can, however, be effected only 
with the aid of signs or language. All language is a method for 
the analysis of phenomena, and every such method is a " language." 
The different kinds of signs give different " dialects " of the human 
language: as such Condillac distinguishes five, — the fingers (ges- 
tures), sound-language, numbers, letters, and the signs of the infini- 
tesimal calculus. Logic, as the universal grammar of all these 

1 A text-book for " Polish professors." 

2 After the Langrie des Calculs became known, the Institute of Paris and the 
Berlin Academy gave out, almost at the same time, the theory of signs as the 
subject for their prizes. At both places a great number of elaborations were 
presented, mostly of very inferior value. 

3 This Condillac maintains against Locke, and indeed already in his Tratte 
des Sensations, and his school do the same against tbe Scots. 

* In these determinations lie suggestions from Hobbes as well as from Hume. 

Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Condillac. 479 

languages, determines, therefore, mathematics also, and indeed the 
higher as well as the elementary, as special cases. 

All science thus contains only transformations. The thing to be 
done is always to make out that the unknown, which one is seeking, 
is really something already known; that is, to find the equation 
which shall put the unknown x equal to a composition of ideas : it 
is just for this end that the structures of perception must be 
previously decomposed. It is evident that this is but a new 
generalising mode of expression for Galileo's doctrine of the method 
of resolution and composition; but it rises here upon a purely 
sensualistic basis ; it denies the constructive element which Hobbes 
had so sharply emphasised and makes of thinking a reckoning with 
only given quantities. In doing this it rejects all thought of a 
relation of these data to metaphysical reality, and sees in scientific 
knowledge only a structure built up of equations between contents 
of ideas in accordance with the principle le m^me est le mime. The 
human world of ideas is completely isolated within itself, and truth 
consists only in the equations that can be expressed within this 
world by " signs." 

9. Indifferent as this Ideology professed to be metaphysically, its 
sensualistic basis, nevertheless, involved a materialistic metaphysics. 
Even though nothing was to be said as to the reality corresponding 
to sensations, there still remained in the background the popular 
idea that sensations are produced by bodies. On this account the 
cautious restraint that belonged to these positivistic consequences 
of sensualism needed only to be neglected to convert the anthropo- 
logical materialism, which had developed in the psychological 
theories, into a metaphysical and dogmatic materialism. And so 
Lamettrie spoke out with coquettish recklessness what many others 
did not dare to confess to themselves, to say nothing of confessing 
or defending it openly. 

But other lines of thought in natural science, independently of 
ideology, were also driving toward materialism. Lamettrie had 
very rightly seen that the principle of the mechanical explanation 
of Nature would ultimately tolerate nothing in addition to matter 
moved by its own forces ; long before Laplace gave the well-known 
answer that he did not need the " hypothesis of the deity " French 
natural philosophy had attained this standpoint. That the world 
of gravitation lives in itself was Newton's opinion also; but he 
believed that the first impulse for its motions must be sought in an 
action of God. Kant went a step farther when he cried in his 
Natural History of the Heavens. " Give me matter, and I will build 
you a world." He pledged himself to explain the whole universe 

480 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

of the fixed stars after the analogy of the planetary system,^ and 
traced the origination of the individual heavenly bodies out of a 
fiery -fluid primitive condition solely to the opposed working of tha 
two fundamental forces of matter, attraction and repulsion. But 
Kant was convinced that the explanation which is sufficient for solar 
systems shatters when applied to the blade of grass and the 
caterpillar ; the organism seems to him to be a miracle ( Wunder) in 
the world of mechanics. 

The French philosophy of Nature sought to overcome this obstacle 
also, and to put the problem of organisation out of the world. Among 
the countless atom-complexes, it taught, there are also those which 
possess the capacity of preserving and propagating themselves. 
Bufon, who pronounced and carried through with full energy this 
frequently expressed thought, gave to such atom-complexes the name 
organic molecules, and by assuming this conception all organic life 
might be regarded in principle as an activity of such molecules, which 
develops according to mechanical laws, in contact with the external 
world.^ This had been already done by Spinoza, of whose theory of 
Nature Buffon frequently reminds us ; the latter, also, speaks of God 
and " Nature " as synonyms. This naturalism found in mechanics, 
accordingly, the common principle for all corporeal occurrence. 
But if now ideology taught that ideas and their transformations 
should be regarded as functions of organisms, if it no longer was 
regarded as impossible, but more and more seemed probable, that 
the thing which thinks is the same that is extended and moves, 
if Hartley and Priestley in England and Lamettrie in France 
showed that a change in consciousness is a function of the nervous 
system, — it was but a step from this to teach that ideas with all 
their transformations form only a special case of the mechanical 
activity of matter, only a particular kind of its forms of motion. 
While Voltaire had expressed the opinion that motion and sensation 
might perhaps be attributes of the same unknown substance, this 
hylozoism changed suddenly into decided materialism as soon as 
the dependence of the psychical upon the physical was given the 
new interpretation of a likeness in kind between the two, and it is 
often only by soft and fine shades of expression that the one is 

1 The suggestion for this brilliant astro-physical hypothesis, to which Lam- 
bert also came very near in his Kosmologischen Briefen, and which was devel- 
oped later in a similar manner by Laplace, was due perhaps to a remark by 
Buffon. Cf. 0. Liebmann, Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, 2d ed., p. 376. 

2 This principle of Buffon was further developed later by Lamarck (Philoso- 
phie Zoologique, Paris, 1809), who attempted to explain the transformation 
of organisms from the lower to the higher forms by a mechanical influence of 
the outer world, by adaptation to the environment. 

Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Materialism, 481 

converted into the other. This transition is presented in the 
writings of Mobinet. He gives a metaphysical flight to the philos- 
ophy of Nature. Finding support in the development system of the 
Leibnizian Monadology, he regards the graded scale of things as an 
infinite multiplicity of forms of existence, in which the two factors 
of corporeality and psychical function are mixed in all the different 
relations possible, so that the more the nature of a particular thing 
unfolds in the one direction, the less is its activity in the other. 
This holds true, also, according to Eobinet, in the case of the vital 
movements of individual creatures ; the force which they use men- 
tally is lost physically, and conversely. Eegarded as a whole, 
however, the psychical life appears as a special form which the 
fundamental material activity of things is able to assume, to be later 
translated back again into its original form. Kobinet thus regards 
ideas and activities of the will as mechanical transformations of the 
nervous activity which can be changed back again into that. Noth- 
ing takes place psychically which was not predisposed in the physi- 
cal form ; and the body, accordingly, receives in psychical impulses 
only the reaction of its own motion. 

In the Systeme de la Nature materialism appears at last undis- 
guised as a purely dogmatic metaphysics. It introduces itself with 
the Epicurean motive of wishing to free man from fear of the super- 
sensuous. It shall be shown that the supersensuous is only the 
invisible form of activity of the sensuous. No one has ever been 
able to think out anything of a supersensuous character that was 
not a faded after-image of the material. He who talks of idea and 
will, of soul and God, thinks of nervous activity, of his body and 
the world over again in an abstract form. For the rest, this "Bible 
of Materialism" presents no new doctrines or arguments in its pain- 
fully instructive and systematically tedious exposition : yet a certain 
weight in its conception taken as a whole, a greatness of stroke in 
drawing the lines of its Weltanschauung, a harsh earnestness of pre- 
sentation, is not to be mistaken. This is no longer a piquant play 
of thoughts, but a heavy armed attack upon all belief in the imma- 
terial world. 

10. In spite of psycho-genetic opposition, the problem of knowl- 
edge as conceived by the supporters of " innate ideas " was not all 
too unlike the view which obtained with the sensualists. The dual- 
istic presupposition assumed by both classes made it difficult for 
the latter to understand the conformity which the ideas called out 
in the mind by bodies bear to the bodies themselves. But it seemed 
almost more difficult still to understand that the mind should cog- 
nise a world independent of it, by means of the development of the 

482 The Enliglitenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

thought-forms which are grounded in its own nature. And yet 
exactly this is an assumption so deeply rooted in human thought, 
that it passes for the most part as self-evident and a matter of 
course, not only for the naive consciousness, but also for philo- 
sophical reflection. It was the mission of the Terminism, whose 
after-workings were active in modern philosophy, to shake this fun- 
damental dogmatic conviction, and push forward for consideration 
the question as to the ground of that conformity between necessity 
of thought, on the one hand, and reality on the other. Even Des- 
cartes had found it necessary to support the knowing power of the 
lumen naturale by the veracitas dei, and thereby had shown the only 
way which the metaphysical solution of the problem could take. 

To be sure, where that philosophical impulse was lacking which 
directs its davfid^eiv — its wonder — upon just that which is appar- 
ently self-evident and a matter of course, the difficulty just men- 
tioned Aveighed less heavily. This was the case with Wolff, in spite 
of all his power of logical clearness and systematic care, and with 
the Scots, in spite of all their fineness of psychological analysis. 
The former proceeds to deduce, more geometrico, an extensive ontol- 
ogy, and a metaphysics with its parts relating to God, to the world, 
and to the soul, all from the most general formal laws of logic, — 
from the principle of contradiction and that of sufficient reason (and 
this second principle is even to be reduced to the first). Wolff, 
indeed, stands so completely within the bounds of this logical 
schematism that the question never seems to occur to him at all, 
whether his whole undertaking — namely, that of spinning "a sci- 
ence of all that is possible, in so far as it is possible " out of logical 
propositions — is authorised in the nature of the case. This problem 
was concealed for him the more as he confirmed every rational 
science by an empirical science [^e.g. Rational by Empirical Psychol- 
ogy, etc.], — an agreement, indeed, which was possible only because 
his a j)riori construction of metaphysical disciplines borrowed from 
experience step by step, though the loan was unnoticed. Neverthe- 
less, this system, which was blessed with so many disciples, had the 
great didactic value of setting up and naturalising strictness in 
thought, clearness of conceptions, and thoroughness in proof, as the j 
supreme rules for science, and the pedantry which unavoidably stole ) 
in with these found a sufficient counterpoise in other intellectual 
forces. i 

The Scottish philosophy contented itself with seeking out the j 
principles of sound common sense. Every sensation is the sign — ; 
Eeid too, thinks as terministically as this — of the presence of an 
object J thinking guarantees the reality of the subject; whatever 


Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Leibniz. 483 

actually comes into being must have a cause, etc. Such principles 
are absolutely certain; to deny them or even to doubt them is 
absurd. This is especially true, also, of the principle that what the 
understanding recognises clearly and distinctly is necessarily so. 
In this is formulated the general principle of a philosophical atti- 
tude which is called dogmatism (after Kant), unconditional confi- 
dence in the agreement of thought with reality. The above examples 
of the particular principles show how eclecticaily this common sense 
sought to gather its fundamental truths from the different systems 
of philosophy. In this respect the "gesunde Menschenverstand" 
[sound common sense] of the German popular philosophers was 
entirely in accord with it. Mendelssohn, like Keid, was of the 
opinion that all extremes in philosophy were errors, and that the 
truth lay in the mean position : every radical view has a germ of 
truth which has been forced artificially to a one-sided and diseased 
development. A sound, healthy thinking (Nicolai, especially, lays 
weight on this predicate) does justice to all the different motives 
and so finds as its philosophy — the opinion of the average man. 

11. In the mind of Leibniz the problem was solved by the 
hypothesis of the pre-established harmony. The monad knows the 
world because it is the world: the content which it represents is 
from the beginning the universe, and the law of the monad's activity 
is the law of the world. On account of its " having no windows " 
it has no experience at all in the proper sense : nevertheless the 
possibility of knowing the world is so established in its very essence 
that all its states must be regarded as just such a knowledge. There 
is, accordingly, no difference between intellect and sensibility, either 
as regards the objects to which they refer, or as regards the way in 
which consciousness relates itself to these objects : the only differ- 
ence is that sensibility cognises the indistinct phenomenal form, 
while intellect cognises the true essence of things. From a scientific 
point of view, therefore, knowledge by the senses was treated partly 
as the imperfect, preliminary stage, partly as the indistinct anti-type 
for the intellect's insight : the " historical " sciences were regarded 
either as preparations for the philosophical, or as lower appendages. 

From this relation a peculiar consequence resulted. The sensuous 
mode of representation, too, has a certain peculiar perfection of its 
own, which differs from the clearness and distinctness of intellectual 
knowledge in apprehending the phenomenal form of its object with- 
out any consciousness of grounds or reasons : and in this perfection, 
characteristic of sensuous knowledge, Leibniz ^ had set the feeling oj 

1 Cf. esp. Princ. de la Nat. et de la Grace, 17. 

484 The Enlightenment: Theoretieai Questions. [Part V. 

the beautiful. When, now, one of Wolff's disciples, Alexander Baum- 
garten, in whom the architectonic impulse toward systematisation 
was developed to a particularly high degree, wished to place by the 
side of logic as the science of the perfect use of the intellect, a corre- 
sponding science of the perfection of sensation, an aesthetics, this dis- 
cipline took on the form of a science of the beautiful.^ Thus aesthetics,^ 
as a branch of philosophical knowledge, grew up, not out of interest 
in its subject-matter, but with a decided depreciation of it ; and as a 
" step-sister " [lit. posthumous : nachgeborene Schwester'] of logic she 
was treated by the latter with very little understanding for her own 
■peculiar nature, and with a cool intellectual pedantry. Moreover, 
this last-named rationalist, who followed Leibniz in regarding the 
actual world as the best, and therefore, as the most beautiful among 
all possible worlds, could set up no other principle for the theory of 
art than the sensualistic one of imitating Nature, and developed 
this principle essentially into a tedious poetics. But in spite of this, 
it remains Baumgarten's great service to have treated the beautiful 
again, and for the first time in modern philosophy, in a systematic 
way from the general conceptions of philosophy, and by so doing to 
have founded a discipline that was destined to play so important a 
part in the further development of philosophy, especially in that of 

12. The Leibnizo- Wolffian conception of the relation between 
sense and understanding, and especially the geometrical method 
introduced for rational knowledge, encountered numerous opponents 
in the German philosophy of the eighteenth century, whose opposi- 
tion proceeded not only from the incitements of English and French 
sensualism and empiricism, but from independent investigations as to 
the methodical and epistemological relation between mathematics and 

In this latter line Rüdiger, and, stimulated by him, Crusius, con- 
tended most successfully against the Wolffian doctrine. In opposi- 
tion to Wolff's definition of philosophy as the science of the possible, 
Eüdiger asserted that its task is to know the actual. Mathematics, 
and, therefore, also a philosophy which imitates the methods of 
mathematics, have to do only with the possible, with the contradic- 
tionless agreement of ideas with one another; a true philosophy 
needs the real relation of its conceptions to the actual, and such a 

1 Cf, H. Lotze, Gesch. der Aesthetik in Deutschland (Munich, 1868). 

2 The name "aesthetics" was then adopted at a later time by Kant, after 
some resistance at first, for the designation of the philosophical doctrine of the 
beautiful and of art, and from him passed over to Schiller, and through the 
latter' s writings into general use. 

Chap. 1, § 34.] Knowledge of the Outer World : Kant. 485 

relation is to be gained only by perception. Crusius made this 
point of view his own ; and although he thought in a less sensual- 
istic manner than his predecessor, he yet criticised in a quite similar 
manner from that point of view the effort of the geometrical method 
to know reality by employing only logical forms. He rejected the 
ontological proof for the existence of God, since out of conceptions 
alone existence can never be inferred ; existence (as Kant expressed 
it) cannot be dug out of ideas. In the same line, also, was the 
exact distinguishing between the real relation of causes and effects 
and the logical relation of ground and consequent, which Crusius 
urged in his treatment of the principle of ground or reason. For 
his own part he used this difference between real and ideal grounds 
to oppose the Leibnizo-Wolfi&an determinism, and especially to set 
up the Scotist conception of the unrestricted free will of the 
Creator, in opposition to the Thomist conception of the relation 
between the divine will and the divine intellect, which the rational- 
ists maintained. The turning away from natural religion, which 
lay in all these inferences, made the stricter Protestant orthodoxy 
favourably disposed toward the doctrine of Crusius. 

The investigation as to the fundamental difference in method 
between philosophy and mathematics, that cut deepest and was 
most important in results, was that undertaken by Kant, whose 
writings very early refer to Crusius. But in his prize treatise On 
the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals he 
brings a decisive statement. The two sciences are related as oppo- 
site in every respect. Philosophy is an analytic science of concep- 
tions, mathematics a synthetic science of magnitudes: the former 
receives its conceptions, the latter constructs its magnitudes ; the 
former seeJcs definitions, the latter sets out from definitions ; the 
former needs experience, the latter does not ; the former rests upon 
the activity of the understanding, the latter upon that of the sensibil- 
ity. Philosophy, therefore, in order to know the real, must proceed 
zetetically: it must not try to imitate the constructive method of 

With this fundamental insight into the sensuous character of the 
cognitive foundations of mathematics, Kant exploded the system of 
the geometrical method. Por, according to his view, sensibility and 
understanding can no longer be distinguished as lower and higher 
grades of clearness and distinctness in knowledge. Mathematics 
proves that sensuous knowledge can be very clear and distinct, and 
many a system of metaphysics proves that intellectual knowledge 
may be very obscure and confused. The old distinction must there- 
fore be exchanged for another, and Kant attempt? a substitute by 

486 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

defining sensibility as the faculty of receptivity, understanding as 
that of spontaneity. He does this in his Inaugural Dissertation, and 
upon this builds a new system of epistemology/ leaning upon the 
psychological principle of virtual innateness (cf. § 33, 12). 

The main outlines of the system are the following : the Forms of 
the sensibility are space and time ; those of the understanding are 
the most general conceptions. Out of reflection upon the one class 
arises mathematics ; upon the other class, metaphysics ; — both a priori 
sciences of unconditional certainty. But Forms of (receptive) sen- 
sibility give only the necessary knowledge of the appearance of 
things in the human mind {mundus sensibilis phmnomenon) ; the 
Forms of the understanding, on the contrary, give adequate knowl- 
edge of the true essential nature of things {mundus intelligihilis nou- 
menon). That these Forms of the understanding are able to do this 
is due to the fact, that the understanding, as well as things them- 
selves, has its origin in the divine mind; that we, therefore, by 
means of it, see things to a certain extent " in God." ^ 

§ 35. Natural Eeligion. 

The epistemological motives which ruled the eighteenth century 
were not in general favourable to metaphysics : if, in spite of this, 
they brought their sceptical and positivistic tendency to complete 
expression in but few instances, this was due to the religious inter- 
est which expected from philosophy a decision as to its problems. 
The religious unrest and wars from which Germany, France, and 
England had suffered, and the quarreling over dogmas which had 
been connected with them, had been followed already in the seven- 
teenth century by a feeling of surfeit and disgust for the distinc- 
tions in creeds : the " wretched century of strife," as Herder called 
it, longed for peace. In England the temper of the Latitudinarians 
extended itself, and on the continent efforts toward union were taken 
up again and again in spite of frequent failure. Bossuet and Spinola 
on one side, and Leibniz on the other, worked long in this direction : 
the latter projected a sy sterna theologicum, which should contain the 
fundamental doctrines of Christianity common to all three Confes- 
sions, and when the negotiations with the Catholics no longer 

1 The system of the Inaugural Dissertation is only one stage in Kant's 
development ; he gave it up again forthwith ; hence it belongs in his pre-critical 
time and in this period. 

^ This doctrine, presented with an appeal to Malebranche (Sectio IV.), is 
accordingly just the system of the pre-established harmony between knowledge 
and reality which Kant later rejected so energetically (Letter to M. Herz, 
Feb. 21, 1772). 

Chap. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Locke, Deism. 487 

•offered any hope, he attempted, at least, to employ his relations to 
the courts of Hanover and Berlin to bring about a union between 
the Lutherans and the Reformed body, — this, too, indeed without 
any immediate result. 

Locke, on the other hand, in his three Letters concerning Tolera- 
tion, brought together the thoughts of the toleration movement into 
tlie theory of the "free church in the free state," — into the demand 
that the modern state, raised above all Church tutelage, should tol- 
erate and protect every religious belief as personal opinion, and 
every religious society as a free association, in so far as it does not 
threaten to disturb political order. 

But the more the union was thwarted by the resistance of theo- 
logians, the more nourishment came to the life of the Mystic sects, 
whose supra-confessional tendencies were in harmony with the efforts 
toward union, and which spread in the eighteenth century with a 
multitude of interesting manifestations. The Pietism founded by 
Spener and Francke kept nearest to the Church life, and was there- 
fore most successful. This, nevertheless, allows a certain indif- 
ference toward dogmatic faith to appear, but in compensation lays 
all the more weight upon the increase of personal piety and upon 
the purity and religious colouring of conduct. 

1. In connection with all these movements stands the tendency 
of the Enlightenment philosophy toward establishing the universal, 
"■ true " Christianity by means of philosophy. True Christianity is in 
this sense identified with the religion of reason, or natural religion, 
and is to be dissolved out from the different forms of positive, 
historical Christianity. At first, such a universal Christianity was 
still allowed the character of a revealed religion, but the complete 
agreement of this revelation with reason was maintained. This 
was the position taken by Locke and Leibniz, and also by the 
latter's disciple, Wolff. They conceive the relation between natural 
and revealed religion quite in accordance with the example of 
Albert and Thomas (cf. p. 321) : revelation is above reason, but in 
harmony with reason; it is the necessary supplement to natural 
knowledge. That is revealed which the reason cannot find out of 
itself, but can understand as in harmony with itself after the revela- 
tion has taken place. 

Proceeding from this idea, the Socinians had already taken a step 
further. They, too, recognised very vigorously the necessity of 
revelation; but they emphasised, on the other hand, that nothing 
can be revealed that does not prove accessible to rational knowledge. 
Hence only what is rational in the religious documents is to be 
regarded as revealed truth ; i.e. reason decides what shall be held to 

488 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part "V. 

be revelation. From this standpoint the Socinians separated the 
Trinity and the Incarnation from the content of revelation, and 
in general transferred revelation from the realm of theoretical 
truths to an entirely different field. They comprehend religion 
under the characteristic of law, and this constitutes their peculiar 
position. What God reveals to man is not a metaphysics, but a law. 
This he did in Moses, and so in Christ he gave a new law. But if 
religion objectively is law-giving, subjectively it is fulfilling the 
law, — not an acceptance of theoretical doctrines, nor even merely a 
moral disposition, but subjection to the law revealed by G-od and 
a keeping of all its prescriptions. This alone has been made by 
God the condition of eternal blessedness — a juridical conception of 
religion, which, with its resort to the principle of the boundless 
authority of what is determined by divine power, seems to contain 
strongly Scotist elements. 

2. If, however, the criterion of revelation is ultimately to lie 
solely in the rationality of the same, the completely consistent 
result of this theory is, that historical revelation should be set aside 
as superfluous, and natural religion alone retained. This was done 
by the English Deists; and Toland is their leader in so far as he 
first undertook to strip Christianity, i.e. the universal religion of 
reason, of all mysteries, and reduce it, as regards the knowledge 
which it contains, to the truths of the "natural light," i.e. to a 
philosophical theory of the world. But the content which the 
Enlightenment philosophy sought to give to this, its religion of 
Nature, had two sources, — theoretical and practical reason. As 
regards the first. Deism contains a metaphysics based upon natural 
philosophy ; in the second aspect it involves a theory of the world 
from the point of view of moral philosophy. In this way the natural 
religion of the Enlightenment was involved in the movement of 
theoretical, and also in that of practical problems : these its two 
elements stood in close connection, but found each a particular 
development, so that they could diverge and become mutually 
isolated. The relation between these two constituents was as 
determining in its influence for the history of natural religion as 
was the common relation which they sustained to the positive 

The complete union of the two elements is found in the most 
important thinker of this movement, Shaftesbury. The centre oi 
his doctrine and of his own nature is formed by what he himself 
called enthusiasm, — enthusiasm for all that is true, good, and beau- 
tiful, the elevation of the soul above itself to more universal values, 
the living out of the whole peculiar power of the individual by the 

Chap. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Toland, Shaftesbury. 489 

devotion to something higher. Nor is religion anything else : a 
life of increased and enhanced personality, a knowing one's self to 
be one with the great connected all of reality. But this noble pas • 
sion, like every other, grows from admiration and strong emotion to 
love. The source of religion is, therefore, objectively as well as 
subjectively, the harmony and beauty and perfection of the universe ; 
the unavoidable impression received from this perfection awakens 
enthusiasm. With a warm heart Shaftsbury portrays the order of 
things, the purposiveness of their inter-play, the beauty of their 
formation, the harmony of their life, and shows that there is noth- 
ing in itself evil — nothing which entirely misses its mark. What- 
ever appears an evil in one system of individuals, proves itself in 
another, or in a higher connection, to be still a good, as a necessary 
member in the purposeful structure of the whole. All imperfection 
of the particular vanishes in the perfection of the universe ; every 
discord is lost in the harmony of the world. 

This universal optimism, whose theodicy is in its conceptions com- 
pletely Neo-Platonic in character, knows therefore but one proof 
for the existence of God, the physico-theological. Nature bears 
everywhere the marks of the artist, who has unfolded the loveli- 
ness of his own nature in the charm of phenomena with the highest 
intelligence and sensitiveness. Beauty is the fundamental concep- 
tion of this Weltanschauung. Its admiration of the universe is 
essentially aesthetic, and the taste of the cultivated man is, for 
Shaftsbury, the basis of both religious and moral feeling. For 
this reason his teleology also is the tasteful one of artistic apprehen- 
sion ; like Giordano Bruno he seeks the purposiveness of the uni- 
verse in the harmonious beauty of each of its individual structures. 
All that is petty and utilitarian in teleological thought is here 
stripped off, and a wave of poetic world-glorification that carries all 
before it goes through Shaftesbury's writings. It was on this 
account that they worked so powerfully upon the German poets, 
upon Herder,^ and upon Schiller.^ 

3. Few, indeed, of the philosophers of the Enlightenment stand 
upon this height. Voltaire and Diderot^ allowed themselves at 
first to be swept along to such an enthusiastic view of the world. 
Maupertnis and Robinet had also something of the universalistic 
tendency ; in Germany, Reimarus in his reflections concerning the 
mechanical instincts of animals, shows at least a sensibility for the 
artistically delicate detailed work of Nature and for the internal 

1 Herder, Vom Erkennen und Empfinden. 

2 Schiller, Philisophische Briefe (Julius). 

^ Particularly in the Pensees PhilosoDhiQues. 

490 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V , 

end which she realises in her organic structures. But the great 
mass of the philosophical writers of the eighteenth century is so 
controlled by the anthropological interest and the practical aims of 
philosophy that it investigates rather the uses which the arrangement 
of the universe and the activities of its parts yield for the wants of 
man; and if those of higher temper have in view principally the 
furthering and perfecting of the moral nature, they still do not 
despise the point of view of usefulness and every-day '' happiness." 

Thus aesthetic teleology is cut off by the Stoic doctrine of utility, 
and the technical analogy, with which men like Leibniz, Newton, 
and Clarke had thought of the subordination of mechanism to teleol- 
ogy, could not but be favourable to this utilitarian conception. For 
the purposiveness of machines consists just in yielding an advan- 
tage, just in the fact that their product is something else, something 
in addition to their own working. And this analogy was quite 
welcome also to the '' Enlighteners," who frequently praised the 
harmony of their philosophy with natural science ; they employed 
this mode of view as against the conception of miracle found in 
positive religion. Reimarus, too, held that only bunglers need to 
assist their machines afterwards, and that it is unworthy of perfect 
intelligence to come into such a position. But if it was asked what 
the end of the world-machine is, the answer of the Enlightenment 
was, the happiness of man, or perhaps at most, that of created beings 
in general. This trade in the small wares of usefulness {NiltzUcli- 
keitsJcrämerei) was carried out in the most tasteless manner in the 
German Enlightenment. Wolff's empirical teleology {Designs of 
Natural Things) excites one's mirth by the petty points of view 
which he assigns to the creative intelligence, and the Popular Phil- 
osophers vied with each other in portraying in broad and pleasing 
pictures the neat and comfortable way in which this universe is 
fitted up for the homo sapiens, and how well one may live in it if 
he bears himself well. 

A nobler thought, even at that time, was that of Kant, when in 
his Natural History of the Heavens he adopted the Leibnizo-ISTew- 
tonian conception, but left behind all that talk about the use of the 
world for man, and directed his look toward the perfection which 
displays itself in the infinite multiplicity of the heavenly bodies, 
and in the harmony of their systematic constitution ; and with him, 
by the side of the happiness of creatures, appears always their 
ethical perfecting and elevation. But he, too, esteems the physico- 
theological ^ proof for the existence of God as that which is the most 

1 This term points back into the seventeenth century, and seems to have 

Chap. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Kant, Leibniz. 491 

impressive for man, though he grants strict cogency as little to this 
as to the cosmological and ontological. The popular philosophy, on 
the contrary, had its favourite just in this proof, and it forms a gen- 
eral characteristic of natural religion. 

4. The presupposition of this course of thought was the convic- 
tion that the world is really so perfect and purposive as to support 
the proof in question. Believing souls brought this conviction with 
them, and the literature of the eighteenth century proves that it was 
assumed without question in wide circles as a valid premise of the 
argument ; sceptical minds demanded that this also should be dem- 
onstrated, and so roused the problems of theodicy. In most cases 
the Enlightenment philosophy resorted here to the same (ancient) 
arguments which Shaftesbury brought into the field, but the scep- 
tical-orthodox method, of pointing to the limited nature of human 
knowledge and to the darkness in the ways of Providence, was not 

A new turn was given to theodicy by Leibniz. He had been 
brought by Bayle's incisive criticism to the necessity of adding 
experimental proof to his system of Monadology by showing the 
perfection of the universe. Setting in motion to this end the high- 
est conceptions of his metaphysics, he attempted to show that the 
actual presence of evil in the world does not make out a case against 
its having originated from an all-good and all-powerful creative 
activity. Physical es^il, he maintains, is a necessary consequence 
of moral evil in the ethical world order ; it is the natural punish- 
ment of sin. Moral evil, however, has its ground in the finiteness 
and limitation of creatures, and this latter is metaphysical evil. As 
a finite thing the monad has obscure and confused sensuous repre- 
sentations or ideas, and from these follow necessarily the obscure 
and confused sensuous impulses, which are the motives to sin. The 
problem of theodicy is thus reduced to the question. Why did God 
create or permit metaphysical evil ? 

The answer to this question is very simple. Finiteness belongs 
to the conception of a created being; limitation is the essential 
nature of all creatures. It is a logical necessity that a world can 
exist only out of finite beings which reciprocally limit each other 
and are determined by their creator himself. But finite beings are 
imperfect. A world that should consist of nothing but perfect 
beings is a contradiction in terms. And since it is also an " eter- 
nal," that is, a conceptional or rational truth, that out of metaphy si- 
arisen from the Neo-Platonic circles in England. Samuel Parker published in 
1669 Tentamina Physico-theologica de Deo, and William Derham, in 1713, a 
Physico-theology . 

492 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

cal evil follows first moral and further physical evil, that out of 
finiteness follows sin, and out of sin sorrow, it is then a logical 
necessity that a world without evil is unthinkable. However much, 
therefore, the goodness of God might desire to avoid evil, the 
divine wisdom, the ^'■region des verites eternelles/' makes a world 
without evil an impossibility. Metaphysical truths are independ- 
ent of the divine will ; the latter in its creative activity is bound 
to them. 

But, on the other hand, the goodness, which belongs to the con- 
ception of God as truly as does his wisdom, is a guarantee that the 
evils are as few as possible. The world is contingent, i.e. it may be 
thought as being other than it is. There is an infinite number of 
possible worlds, none of them entirely without evil, but some 
affected with much more numerous and heavy evils than others. 
If now from among all these possible worlds, which God's wisdom 
spread out before him, he created this actual world, it can only have 
been the choice of the best that guided him in so doing; he has 
made real the one which contains the least and the fewest evils. 
The contingency of the world consists in the fact that it exists, not 
with metaphysical necessity, but through a choice exercised among 
many possibilities ; and since this choice proceeds from the all-good 
will of God, it is unthinkable that the world is any other than the 
best. Theodicy cannot proceed to deny the evil in the world, for 
evil belongs to the very idea of the world ; but it can prove that this 
world contains as little evil as is in any way possible in accordance 
with metaphysical law. God's goodness would gladly have pro- 
duced a world without evil, but his wisdom permitted him only the 
best among possible worlds. 

Hence arises the common expression, optimism. Whether this 
experimental proof of the physico-theological view of the world 
succeeds, may be left undecided. The eighteenth century con- 
ceived of the matter as though it was the essential aim of Leibniz 
to prove that the world is the most perfect that can be thought ; 
that he did this only under the presupposition of the metaphysical 
necessity of evil, was, in characteristic fashion, scarcely noted in 
the literature of that time, which itself was through and through 
" optimistic " in its thought. In a historical aspect the most note- 
worthy thing in this theodicy is the peculiar mixture of Thomist 
and Scotist metaphysics. The world is such as it is only because 
God has so willed it ; by virtue of his omnipotence he might have 
chosen another ; but in the choice of the possibilities before him 
the divine will is bound to the divine intellect as the "eternal 
truths." Above all reality hovers the fate prescribed by logic. 

Chap. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Voltaire^ Diderot 493 

5. In the forms hitherto developed the teachers of natural religion 
believed that they could attain along the physico-theological path to 
the conception of the deity as creative intelligence, and for this 
phase of the development the name Deism is customarily employed. 
The conception of God as personality, which survived in this pro- 
cedure as the last remnant from positive religion, offered a hold for 
the moral side also of natural religion, and in turn found in that its 
support. But where only the theoretical element was pursued, nat- 
ural religion found itself involved in the course of development 
taken by naturalistic metaphysics, and found in this finally its 
downfall. Toland already gave a completely pantheistic turn to the 
admiration of Nature, which for him constituted the essential con- 
tent of religious feeling, and with the hylozoism which developed 
among the French natural scientists (cf. § 34, 9) the transcendence 
of God, as well as his personality, was at an end ; and when then 
the complete dominance of the mechanical explanation of Nature 
was proclaimed, when the organic world also was recognised as in 
principle the product of the universal mechanism of Nature, the 
physico-theological proof lost its power over the mind. In addition 
to this the premises of the argument were questioned. The Lisbon 
earthquake (1755) which shocked all Europe made many waver in 
their ideas of the perfection and adaptedness of the world's ar- 
rangement ; the indifference with which Nature destroys human life 
and all its content of ends and worth seemed to speak much more 
for a blind necessity in all that takes place than for a teleological 
disposition of the world-process. Voltaire, in whom this revolution 
in point of view became complete, began in Candide to make sport 
of the " best of possible worlds," and the element of natural philos- 
ophy in natural religion crumbled to pieces. 

The Systeme de la Nature drew the last consequences with its 
atheism and materialism. All adaptation, all order of Nature, is only 
a phenomenon in the human mind. Nature itself knows only the 
necessity of atomic motion, and in it there are no worth-determina- 
tions, which are dependent upon ends or norms of value. Nature's 
conformity to law is active with the same rigour in those things 
which appear to us aimless or unpurposive, irregular or anomalous, 
as in the things which we judge with reference to their agreement 
with our designs or customs, and approve as purposeful. The wise 
man should make this indifference of Nature his own ; he should see 
through the relativity of all conceptions of ends; there is no real 
norm or order. This principle was applied by Diderot to aesthetics. 
The correctness of Nature is accordingly the only thing that art 
should display, the only thing that it should grasp and give back ; 

494 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

beauty is one of those valuations which have no objective validity. 
Materialism knows only an art void of ideals, only the indifferent 
copy of any reality whatever. 

6. While the foundations of Deism based on natural philosophy 
were thus crumbling from within, its epistemological basis began 
also to waver ; for all attacks upon the possibility of a metaphysics 
struck also at that of a natural religion, which indeed in its contents 
exhibited but a survival of religious metaphysics. In this respect 
the Baconian system was the most dangerous foe of the deistic doc- 
trine. It allowed religion to stand only as revelation and combated 
the possibility of knowing its doctrines by the aid of reason, or even 
of merely bringing them into accord with reason. No one supported 
this standpoint more energetically than Pierre Bayle. He worked 
systematically to show that all dogmatic doctrines were contrary to 
reason ; he laid bare their contradictions with penetrating keenness ; 
he sought to prove that they were absurd for the natural reason. 
But he uncovered, also, the weak points in Deism ; he denied the 
cogency of the philosophical arguments for the existence of God and 
the immortality of the soul, and took special occasion in connection 
with the problems of theodicy to prove the inadequacy of the " nat- 
ural light " : even in controversy with Leibniz he was not worsted. 
Religion is, therefore, possible for him only as positive revelation 
in contradiction with philosophical knowledge. He defends with 
all keenness the twofold truth. And therefore, although perhaps 
for himself he might have credit for a faith contrary to reason, — 
his writings and especially the articles of his much read Dictionnaire 
were not less dangerous to the theoretical doctrines of positive relig- 
ion than to those of Deism. 

Finally Hume, also, on epistemological grounds dissolved the 
union which the other English empiricists and nominalists, and 
indeed, even the materialists, like Hartley and Priestley, sought to 
maintain with natural religion. If there is no metaphysics of things 
at all, philosophical religion falls also. Hume, indeed (as Cleanthes 
in the dialogue), acknowledges in the spirit of his practical prob- 
abilism that the world on the whole makes the incontestable impres- 
sion of purposiveness and rational order, and finds, therefore, that 
that belief, on which all our experience rests, is applicable also to 
the (physico-theological) assumption of a unity in creation and in 
the direction of the whole. But from the standpoint of science 
(as Philo) he cannot regard this belief as capable of being estab- 
lished by reason. In particular he asserts, in accordance with the 
principles of the theory of probability, that it is quite explicable, 
«ven on the hypothesis of a purely mechanical theory, that amid 

Chajp. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Bayle, Hume. 495 

the countless combinations of atoms, one which was durable, pur- 
posive, and well ordered should at last come about and become fixed. 
So the case remains with a problematical decision. Natural religion 
is a reasonable mode of view for the practical man, but it should 
not profess to be a scientific doctrine. 

7. The more the metaphysical factor in Deism retreated for these 
or other reasons, the more the " true Christianity," which Deism 
professed to be, became restricted to a moral conviction. This had 
been already prepared by Herbert of Cherbury, who stood farther 
removed from natural philosophy, and had been quite definitely 
expressed by Spinoza. According to this view the essence of 
religion consists in moral action, and the religious life has for its 
true content, deliberation upon duty, and the seriousness of a con- 
duct of life detertnined by this. This in itself alone gave but very 
pale and vanishimg lines for a Weltanschauung. There remained an 
indefinite idea of an all-good God, who created man for happiness, 
who should be worshipped by a virtuous life, and who will exercise 
an equalising justice in an eternal life, so that such virtue will 
receive the reward which is lacking to it here. No one will fail to 
notice the pure, noble thought which lived in this moralising Deism, 
or the high value which belongs to it historically, because in opposi- 
tion to the one-sidedness and strife of confessional zeal it brought 
the ideals of toleration and philanthropy, respect for the purely 
human appreciation of the ethical disposition, and modesty in per- 
sonal opinion, to a position of honour in literature and social life. 
But, on the other hand, it is also true that there has never been a 
more meagre form of religious life than this. Its religion has no 
taste of earth, and with the mysteries which the Enlightenment 
would not tolerate, understanding for the depths of religious life 
v/as lost also. There is nothing more of anxiety for the soul's salva> 
tion, of the struggle for redemption, of the ardent feeling of deliver- 
ance. Deism, therefore, failed in vital religious power ; it was an 
artificial product of cultured society, and when the German En- 
lighteners wrote books to preach the deistic morals to children, 
they only proved how little they understood of real religion. 

Among the great mass of the supporters of this standpoint in 
the ^'popular philosophy " all possible degrees of uncertainty prevail 
as to how far those moral remnants of the religious view of the 
world are still capable of a theoretical grounding, and how far they 
are to be regarded as merely constituents of the ethical conscious- 
ness. Full clearness on this point rules in Voltaire's later thought. 
Here he has been so far seized upon by Bayle's scepticism as to 
acknowledge no longer any metaphysical authorisation: the deity 

496 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

and immortality are now for him only valid as postulates of the 
moral feeling ; faith in them is regarded as only the condition for 
moral action. If this belief should perish, the motives for honest 
conduct, and thus the foundations of social order, would, he thinks, 
perish with it : si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait Vinventer. 

8. Different as are these individual forms in which natural relig- 
ion developed, they all agree on one point, — in their depreciatory 
criticism of positive religions. Only that is regarded as true in 
these religious, in which they all agree with each other and with 
natural religion ; all that is taught beyond this, with an appeal to a 
special revelation, the deists turn from the door, and it was pre- 
cisely in this respect that they called themselves free thinkers. The 
claims made by the revelational doctrine encountered, therefore, an 
especially vigorous contradiction. Collins refuted the proof from 
prophecy, Woolston the proof from miracles, — both by seeking to 
give for the corresponding accounts in the religious documents a 
natural explanation so far as possible. This attempt, which aimed 
not to involve in doubt the credibility of the biblical narratives, but 
to explain them by purely natural causes, frequently in a very fan- 
tastic fashion and excluding all that is mysterious and supernatural, 
has been characterised and employed in Germany especially as 
rationalistic interpretation. It was here, too, that Meimarus, in his 
Schutzsclirift, proceeded in the sharpest manner against the possi- 
bility of revelation, which he declared to be superfluous, unthinkable, 
and untrue. Others directed their criticism against individual doc- 
trines of dogmatics. Diderot attacked the moral attributes in the 
Christian conception of God, and Voltaire exercised his wit in un- 
sparing derision of the dogmas and ceremonies of all religions and 

But in his case also there was at bottom the earnest thought, 
that all these additions of the positive religions were so many 
obscurations and corruptions of the true religion, for which, like 
the other deists, he felt called to contend. They were filled with 
the conviction that natural religion is an inheritance of all men, a 
conviction set within the nature of man himself, and that it was, 
therefore, the original state of the religious life. From this point 
of view all positive religions appear as depraved forms which have 
entered in the course of history, and a progress in the history of 
religion consists, therefore, in every case in nothing but a return 
to the primitive, pure, and uncorrupted religion. Hence according 
to Tindal the true Christianity, which coincides with Deism, is as 
old as creation. Jesus did not bring a revelation, he only rehabili- 
tated the true worship of God in the face of the decay of the 

Chap. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Deists^ Hume. 49T 

ancient religions ; but the Christian churches have again corrupted 
his work, and free-thinking desires to return to him. So, too, Lessing 
distinguished between Christianity and the religion of Christ. 

If now it was asked, what were the causes that brought about 
this distortion of true religion, the Enlighteners were entirely 
devoid of any historical comprehension for these : what they held 
to be false seemed to them possible only through voluntary inven- 
tion. They were so strongly convinced of the evidence that their 
Deism was the only true system, that all other teachings seemed to 
them explicable only by lying and deceit, and that the proclaimers 
of these seemed to have acted only in their own interests. It is 
then the general doctrine of the deists that the historical basis of 
positive religions is invention and deceit. Even Shaftesbury knew 
no other way of explaining how enthusiasm, which constitutes true 
religion, could be distorted to the fanaticism of superstition. The 
hatred of priests felt by the Enlighteners was most sharply ex- 
pressed on this point also in the Schutzschrift of Eeimarus. 

9. Such incapacity to do justice to the historical nature of posi- 
tive religions agreed well with the universal lack in historical sense 
and understanding which was peculiar to the whole philosophy of 
the Enlightenment. This had its ground in the fact that modern 
thought had made its growth, hand in hand with natural science, 
in investigating that which is either timelessly or always valid. 
Only in a few instances was this ban broken through. 

This was done first and with clearest consciousness by David 
Hume. While he found that religion cannot be based upon demon- 
strative rational knowledge, he showed also that the question as 
to the origin of religion in the human mind must be completely 
separated from the speculative investigation. This new question 
he treated solely in accordance with psychological principles, as a 
"Natural History of Religion.'^ He shows how in the primitive 
apprehension of Nature and in the feelings of fear and hope, of 
terror and of blessing, which are associated with it, and in the com- 
parison of the course of Nature with the vicissitudes of human life, 
there lay the incitements to the formation of ideas of higher beings, 
and to worship designed to appease or to flatter. The natural, 
primitive form of religion is, therefore, polytheism, which thinks 
and treats these higher powers in a completely anthropomorphic 
manner. But the manifold forms assumed by myth fuse in accord- 
ance with the laws of the association of ideas ; myths pass over into 
each other, and ultimately the whole body of religious ideas becomes 
condensed into the belief in a single divine being, to whom the pur- 
poseful order of the universe is due, — a faith, to be sure, which 

498 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V. 

cannot preserve itself in a pure form, but is associated in various 
ways with its original presuppositions. The history of religion is 
the gradual transformation of polytheism into monotheism, and its 
result coincides with that teleological view of the world which 
Hume had developed as the view of the intelligent man, not, indeed, 
capable of scientific proof, but bound up with the natural feeling of 

This mode of apprehending the subject from the point of view of 
psychology and the history of civilisation was reinforced by that 
from the point of view of philology and the history of literature, 
which found expression in the historical biblical criticism founded by 
Salomon Semler. This began to carry out the thought formulated 
by Spinoza/ that the biblical books must be treated just as other 
writings as regards their theoretical contents, their origin, and their 
history ; that they must be understood from the point of view of 
their time and the character of their authors. Semler directed par- 
ticiilar attention to the point that the different parties of the early 
Christians find expression in the books of the New Testament. 
While it may be that the hypotheses to which he came in this 
respect have been left behind by later science, it is nevertheless true 
that a scientific way out of the radicalism into which the deistie 
movement had run was here shown, and Semler therefore raised his 
voice against the spokesmen of the Enlightenment. 

Lessing took part in these questions from still another side. He 
was certainly not the man to make his conviction bend to a tenet ; 
he saw through and rejected, as few others, the limitation which 
will find its sole truth in that which has been transmitted histori- 
cally; but he guarded himself well from playing the judge, who 
now, after thousands of years, shall decide as to the genuine- 
ness of the three rings. But it is not merely this that separates 
him from the great mass of the Enlighteners ; he is himself a deep, 
religious nature, and, like Herder,^ sees in religion a living relation 
of man to God, and God to man. Hence religion is not possible with- 
out revelation, and the history of religions is the series of the revela- 
tions of God, is the education of the human race by God. Lessing 
assumes the well-planned succession of these revelations to be such. 

1 In what degree Spinoza's writings were known to the religious Enlighteners 
in Germany appears, among other things, from the interesting fact that Lorenz 
Schmidt, the leader of the Wertheim translation of the Bible, is the anonymous 
editor of a book in which, under the mask of a "Refutation of the Doctrine of 
Spinoza by the Famous Philosopher Christian Wolff," an excellent translation 
of Spinoza's Ethics is offered, and finally only a few paragraphs from Wolff's 
German writings are appended (printed Frankfort and Leips. 1744). 

2 Cf. Herder's treatise on the Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts. 

Chap. 1, § 35.] Natural Religion : Lessing, Herder. 499 

that the deeper meaning of each is unfolded more clearly and dis- 
tinctly in that which follows. So even the New Testament, the 
second elementary book, over which the more advanced scholar now 
"stamps and glows," gives us a premonition of an eternal gospel. 
In carrying out this thought of Origen's,' Lessing indicates in but 
a tentative manner indefinite lines which lie in the direction of a 
mystico-speculative interpretation of dogmas. 

Education of the Human Bace, § 72 ff. 



The natural religion of the eighteenth, century sought in morals 
the support which a metaphysics of the natural-science sort could 
not permanently afford it. This was possible by reason of the fact, 
that in the meantime this branch also of philosophical investigation 
had won its complete independence of positive religion. And in 
fact, this freeing process, which had already begun in the train of 
the religiously indifferent metaphysics of the seventeenth century, 
had completed itself in a relatively speedy and simple manner. But 
the peculiar character of the new age asserted itself here also, in the 
very early transfer of the point of interest in these investigations to 
the psychological domain ; and here philosophy encountered the lit- 
erary inclination of the age, which was directed toward a profounder 
employment of man with himself, toward an overhauling of his feel- 
ings and an analysing of his motives, and toward the "sentimental" 
fostering of personal relations. The individual revelling in his own 
inner life, the monad enjoying self, is the characteristic phenomenon 
of the age of the Enlightenment. The individualism of the Renais- 
sance, which in the seventeenth century had been repressed by exter- 
nal forces, now broke forth again with a more inward power from 
the stiff dignity of ceremonious, formal life : bounds were to be 
broken through, externalities cast away, and the pure, natural life 
of man brought out. 

But the more important the individual thus became to himself, and 
the more many-sided his view in weighing questions regarding the 
import of his true happiness, the more morality, society, and the 
state became to him a problem. How comes the individual — so 
runs the fundamental practical question of the Enlightenment phil- 
osophy — to a life connected with others, which extends in influence 
and authority beyond the individual himself ? Through all the ani- 
mated discussions of these problems goes, as a tacit assumption, the 
view that the individual in his natural (as it was always conceived) 
determinate character is the original datum, is that which is self- 


Chap. 2.J Practical Questions. 501 

intelligible, and that all the relations which go beyond the individual 
are to be explained from him as a starting-point. In so far the natu- 
ralistic metaphysics of the seventeenth century — thought here more 
after the analogy of atomism, there more after that of the Monad- 
ology — forms the background for the morals of the eighteenth. 

The constantly progressing process in which these presuppositions 
became more clear and distinct brought with it the result, that the 
principles of ethics found a valuable clearing up in the discussions 
of this period, For inasmuch as the ethical life was regarded 
as something added to the natural essence of the individual, as some- 
thing that must first be explained, it was necessary, on the one hand, 
to establish by an exact discrimination what the thing to be ex- 
plained really is, and on the other hand, to investigate on what the 
worth and validity of the ethical life rests : and the more morality 
appeared to be something foreign to the natural essence of the indi- 
vidual, the more the question as to the motives which induce man 
to follow ethical commands asserted itself, side by side with the 
question as to the ground of the validity of those commands. And 
so three main questions appeared, at the beginning much involved, 
and then becoming complicated anew : what is the content of 
morality ? on what rests the validity of the moral laws ? what 
brings man to moral action ? The principles of morals are set forth 
according to the three points of view of the criterion, the sanction, 
and the motive. This analysis and explanation, however, showed 
that the various answers to these separate questions were capable of 
being combined with each other in the most various ways : so the 
clearing and separating process above named results precisely from 
the motley variety and changing hues exhibited by the doctrines of 
moral philosophy in the eighteenth century. Shaftesbury stands in 
the centre of the movement as the mind that stimulates in all direc- 
tions and controls in many lines ; while, on the other hand, the move- 
ment reaches no definite conclusion in this period, on account of the 
differences in the statements of the question (cf . § 39) . 

A typical feature of the fundamental individualistic tendency of 
this ethics was the repeatedly renewed consideration of the relation 
of virtue and happiness : the final outcome, expressed more or less 
sharply, was that the satisfaction of the individual's impulses was 
raised to be the standard of value for the ethical functions. The 
system of practical philosophy built up upon this principle is 
Utilitarianism, the varied development of which forms the centre in 
the complicated courses of these reflections. 

But out of this arose the much more burning question, as regards 
the political and social order, — the question^ namely, as to the value 

502 The ^Enlightenment : Practical Questions. 1[Fa^t V, 

for happiness of the social union, of public institutions and their 
historical development. That which exists and has come into being 
historically has lost once more its immediate validity and naive 
valuation : it should justify itself before the critical consciousness, 
and prove its right to existence by the advantages which it yields 
for the happiness of individuals. From this point of view was 
developed the political and social philosophy of the eighteenth cen- 
tury; upon this standpoint this philosophy assumed its critical 
attitude toward historical reality, and in accordance with this 
Standard, finally, it examined the results of the historical progress of 
human civilisation. The worth of civilisation itself and the relation 
of Nature and history became thus a problem which received its most 
impressive formulation from Rousseau, and which, in opposition to 
the movements excited by him, and in conjunction with the con- 
vulsions of the Revolution, gave form to the beginnings of the 
Philosophy of History. 

§ 36. The Principles of Morals. 

Fr. Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), 

W. W. III. Vol. 1. 
H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (4th ed., Lond. and N.Y, 1890). 
[J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II.] 
[W. L. Courtney, Constructive Ethics (Lond. 1886).] 

The most fruitful incitements to the discussion of ethical prob- 
lems proceeded in both positive and negative directions from Hobbes. 
The ''selfish system" propounded by him extended its influence 
throughout the entire eighteenth century. It was carried out into 
all of its consequences, and was an ever-powerful stimulus to draw 
out opposing theories, which just for this reason were also dependent 
upon it. In a certain sense this is true of Cumberland, who indeed 
defended the validity of ethical laws as eternal truths in opposition 
to psychological relativity, and yet at the same time would have the 
universal welfare regarded as their essential and determining con- 

1. The position of Locke with reference to these questions is still 
less definitely formulated than his attitude with regard to theoreti- 
cal questions. No doubt the treatment of practical principles 
occupies almost the larger space in his attack upon "innate ideas," 
as is natural from the fact that his opposition is there directed 
against the Platonism of the Cambridge school. But the positive 
indications upon ethical subjects (and indeed there is nothing that 
goes beyond indications), which are found scattered through his 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Locke. 503 

writings, do not in any important degree transcend mere psycholo- 
gism. Locke regards the moral judgment as demonstrative knowl- 
edge, because it lias for its object a relation, namely, the agreement 
or non-agreement of a man's action with a law ["conformity or 
disagreement men's voluntary actions have to a rule, to which they 
are referred, and by which they are judged of "].^ Accordingly the 
imperative character seems essential for ethics. The existence of 
sucii norms, however, presupposes not only a law-giver, but also his 
power to visit obedience to his laws with a reward, and disregard of 
them with punishment ; for only through the expectation of these 
consequences, Locke holds, can a law work upon the will. 

If the philosopher was certain of not deviating from the " com- 
mon sense " of the average man with such principles, he was equally 
secure in the three instances which he adduces of the law-giving 
authority, — public opinion, the state, and God. And in the high- 
est of these instances he found again the point of attachment for 
the remnant of Cartesian metaphysics which his empiricism had 
preserved. For identically the same will of God is known by reve- 
lation and by the " natural light " (according to Locke's philosophy 
of religion; cf. § 35, 1). The law of God is the law of Nature. But 
its content is, that the order of Nature fixed by God attaches inju' 
rious consequences to certain actions, and useful consequences to 
others, and that therefore the former are forbidden, the latter com- 
manded. Thus the moral law gains a metaphysical root without 
losing its utilitarian content. 

2. The need of a metaphysical basis of morals asserted itself also 
in other forms, and in part in a still stronger degree, though it was 
common to the whole Cartesian school to regard right will as the 
necessary and inevitable consequences of right insight. In this 
respect Cartesianism was seconded by the whole throng of Platonists, 
who were so hostile to it in natural philosophy — at first, Henry 
More^ and Cudworth,^ later, especially, Richard Price.* They all 
proceeded from the thought that the moral law is given with the 
inmost nature of reality which has proceeded forth from God, and 
that it is therefore written with eternal and unchangeable letters in 
every reasonable being. With much enthusiasm but with few new 
arguments, they defended the Stoic-Platonic doctrine in its Christian- 
theistic transformation. 

1 Cf. JSssay cone. Hum. Un., II. 28, 4 ff. 
^ Enckeiridion Ethicum (1667). 

^ Whose Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality was first pub- 
lished by Chandler, in 1731. 

* Questions and Difficulties in Morals ''Lond. 1758). 


504 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

This inteUectualism, in connection with rationalistic metaphysics, 
took a direction that was widely removed from the Scotist recourse 
to the divine will which had been revived by Descartes and still 
more by Locke, and instead of this proceeded to determine the 
content of the moral law solely by metaphysical relations, and, 
accordingly, in the last instance, by logical criteria. Just in this 
appeared its contrast to all the psychologically influenced theories, 
which, in some form or other, always returned to feelings of pleas- 
ure and pain as the central nerve of ethical determinations. This 
is clearest in the case of Clarke, who professed to find the objective 
principle of morals in the " fitness " of an action to its determining 
relations, and who claimed for the knowledge of this fitness a self- 
evidence analogous to the knowledge of mathematical truth, and in 
the Cartesian spirit was convinced that the feeling of obligation, 
by which the will is determined to the appropriate action, develops 
inevitably from such an insight into the fitness of things. Ethical 
inferiority, accordingly, appeared quite in the ancient fashion (cf. 
§ 7, 6) to be the result of ignorance or of erroneous opinion. Wol- 
laston, stimulated by Clarke, gave to the same thought the turn, 
that since every action involves a (theoretical) judgment as to its 
underlying relations, the decision as to whether the act is right or 
wrong in the ethical sense depends upon the rightness (correctness) 
or wrongness of this judgment. 

3. Pierre Bayle takes a peculiar position with reference to these 
questions : he supports a rationalism without any metaphysical hack- 
ground. In his case the interest of fixing morals upon a firm basis, 
as opposed to all dependence upon dogmatic doctrines, was active in 
the strongest and most radical manner. While in declaring meta- 
physical knowledge in general to be impossible he opposed the 
rational grounding of natural religion as well as that of positive 
dogma, he yet gave back with full hands to the "reason" in the 
practical domain what he had taken from it in the theoretical realm. 
Incapable of knowing the essence of things, the human reason is, 
according to him, completely furnished with the consciousness oJf 
its duty : powerless without, it is complete master of itself. What 
it lacks in science it has in conscience : a knowledge of eternal and 
unchangeable truth. 

The ethical reason, Bayle holds therefore, remains everywhere 
the same, however different men, peoples, and times may be in theii 
theoretical insight. He teaches for the first time with clear con- 
sciousness the practical reason^ s complete independence of the theo- 
retical; but this, too, he is glad to bring to its sharpest point with 
reference to theology. Eevelation and faith are regarded by him in 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Clarhe^ Bayle. 506 

the Catholic manner as essentially theoretical illumination, and just 
on this account they seem to him to be indifferent for morality. He 
admired the ethical excellence of ancient heathenism, and believed 
in the possibility of a morally well-ordered community of atheists. 
While, therefore, his theoretical scepticism might seem favourable 
to the Church, his moral philosophy was necessarily attacked as her 
most dangerous foe. 

If the ethical principles were in this discussion proclaimed by 
Bayle also as " eternal truths," he did it in the original Cartesian 
sense, where interest centered not so much about the psychological 
question of innateness, as rather about the epistemological point of 
view of immediate evidence not brought about through the medium 
of logic. In this sense the virtual innateness of ethical truths was 
held of course by Leibniz, and it was in the spirit of both that Vol- 
taire, who approached Bayle's standpoint the more in proportion as 
his attitude toward metaphysics became more sceptical (cf. § 35, 5), 
said of the ethical principles that they were innate in man just as 
his limbs were : he must learn to use both by experience. 

4. Bayle very likely had the support of general opinion when he 
ascribed to the ethical convictions a worth exalted above all change 
and all difference of theoretical opinions; but he was successful, 
perhaps, just because he treated those convictions as something 
known to all, and did not enter upon the work of bringing their 
content into a system, or of expressing them as a unity. Whoever 
attempted this seemed hardly able to dispense with a principle 
taken either from metaphysics or from psychology. 

Such a determination of the conceptions of morality by a principle 
was made possible by the metaphysics of Leibniz, though it was only 
prepared by him incidentally and by way of indications, and was 
first carried out by Wolff in systematic, but also in cruder forms. 
The Monadology regards the universe as a system of living beings, 
whose restless activity consists in unfolding and realising their 
original content. In connection with this Aristotelian conception 
the Spinozistic fundamental idea of the " suum esse conservare " (cf. 
§ 32, 6) becomes transformed into that of a purposeful vocation 
or destiny, which Leibniz and his German disciples designated as 
•perfection} The " law of Nature," which for this ontology also is 
coincident with the moral law, is the striving of all beings toward 
perfection. Since now every process of perfecting, as such, is con- 
nected with pleasure, and every retrogression in life's development 
with pain, there follows from this the ancient identification of the 
ethically good with well-being or happiness. 

1 Leibniz, Monad. 41 ft". 

506 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

Natural law, therefore, demands of man tliat he should do all 
that serves his perfection, and forbids all that threatens to bring 
him loss in his perfection. From this thought Wolff develops the 
whole system of duties, bringing to his aid especially the principle 
of mutual furtherance: man needs for his own perfecting other 
men, and works toward his owa perfection in helping them toward 
the fulfilment of their vocation. In particular, however, it followed 
from these premises that man must know what truly conduces to 
his perfecting ; for not all that is momentarily felt to be a further- 
ance of life proves truly and permanently a step toward perfection. 
Hence morality is throughout in need of ethical knowledge, — of 
right insight into the nature of man and things. From this point of 
view the enlightenment or ^'clearing up" of the understanding appears 
the pre-eminent ethical task. With Leibniz this follows immediately 
from the conception of the monad.^ The monad is the more perfect, 
— and perfection Leibniz defines in genuine scholastic fashion as 
grandeur de la realite x>ositive, — the more it shows its activity in 
clear and distinct representations ; the natural law of its develop- 
ment is the clearing up of its original obscure representative content 
(ef. § 31, 11). Wolff's circumstantial deduction takes rather the 
form of pointing out in experience the useful consequences of 
knowledge. It remains thus quite within the setting of the homely 
aim which the German teacher-philosopher {Kathederphilosoph) set 
before his scientific work, viz. to make philosophy usable and prac- 
tically efiicient, by clearness of conceptions and plainness of proofs. 

5. This tendency Wolff had adopted from his teacher Thomasius, 
the father of the Enlighteners, a man who was indeed wanting in 
the pre-eminence that characterised the mind of Leibniz, but was 
given all the more an understanding for the wants of his time, a 
capacity for agitation, and a spirit for efforts toward the public 
good. Intellectual movements of the Eenaissance that had been 
checked in the seventeenth century revived again at its close. 
Thomasius would transplant philosophy from the lecture hall into 
real life, — put it into the servi(3e of the general weal ; and since he 
understood little of natural science, his interest turned toward 
criticism of public institutions. Eeason only should rule in the life 
of the whole, as weU as in that of the individual : so he fought honour- 
ably and victoriously against superstition and narrowness, against 
torture and witch-trials. Enlightenment in the sense of Thomasius 
is hence far from having the metaphysical dignity which Leibniz 
gave it. It gains its value for individuals and for society first by 
the uses which it yields and which can be expected from it alone. 

1 Cf . Leibniz, Monad. 48 ff. 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Wolffs Thomasius. 507" 

Perfection and utility are accordingly the two characteristics which 
with Wolff make Enlightenment an ethical principle. The former 
comes out more strongly in connection with the general metaphysical 
basis ; the latter in the particular building out of the system. And 
in the same way this duality of criteria goes through Wolff's school 
and the whole popular philosophy, — only, the more superficial the 
doctrines become, the broader the space taken by utility. Even 
Mendelssohn gives as the reason for turning aside from all deeper 
and more refined subtilty, that philosophy has to treat only just so 
much as is necessary for man's happiness. But because this eudee- 
monism of the Enlightenment had from the outset no higher point 
of view than that of the education and welfare of the average man, 
it fell into another limitation, the most jejune philistinism and sen- 
sible, prosaic commonplace. This might be in place and most 
beneficial in effect in a certain stratum of popular literature, not 
high, indeed, but broad; but when such a success on the part of the 
Enlighteners "went to their heads," when they applied the same 
measuring rod to the great phenomena of society and history, when 
this excessive pride of the empirical understanding would allow 
nothing to stand except what it had known "clearly and distinctly," 
then the noble features of the Enlightenment became distorted to 
that well-intentioned lack of comprehension, as type of which 
Friedrich Nicolai, with all his restless concern for the public good, 
became a comic figure.^ 

6. The great mass of the German Enlighteners did not suspect 
how far they were wandering from the living spirit of the great 
Leibniz with this dry utility of abstract rules. Wolff, indeed, had 
already let the pre-established harmony fall metaphysically also, 
and so proved that the finest meaning of the Monadology had re- 
mained hidden from him. Hence he and his successors had no 
comprehension for the fact, that Leibniz's principle of perfection 
made the unfolding of the content of the individual life and the shap- 
ing out of its dimly felt originality, the task of the ethical life, in 
the same degree as his metaphysics asserted the peculiar nature of 
each individual being in the face of all others. This side of the 
matter first came into power in Germany, when the period of genius 
dawned in literature, and the passionate feeling of strongly indi- 
vidual minds sought its own theory. The form which it then found 
in Herder's treatises, and likewise in Schiller's Philosophical Letters, 
was, however, much more strongly determined by another doctrine 

1 Cf. Fichte, Fr. NicolaVs Leben und sonderbare Meinungen (1801), W. W. 
VIII. 1 ff. 

508 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

than it was by Leibniz, — by a doctrine which, in spite of the dif- 
ference in the conceptions in which it was carried out, had in its 
ethical temper the closest relationship with that of the German 

Shaftesbury had given to the idea of perfection a form that was 
less systematic but all the more impressive and clear to the imagi- 
nation. The ancient conception of life, in accordance with which 
morality coincides with the undisturbed unfolding of man's true and 
natural essence, and therefore with his true fortune, was directly 
congenial to him and became the living basis of his thought. Hence, 
with Shaftesbury, the ethical appears as the truly human, as the 
flower of man's life, as the complete development of his natural 
endowments. In this is fixed at the outset Shaftesbury's attitude 
toward Cumberland and Hobbes. He cannot, like the latter, regard 
egoism as the sole fundamental characteristic of the natural man ; 
he rather agrees with the former in recognising the altruistic incli- 
nations as an original inborn endowment. But neither can he see 
in these inclinations the sole root of morality ; to him morality is 
the completion of the entire man, and therefore he seeks its principle 
in symmetrical development and in the harmonious interaction of the 
two systems of impulses. This theory of morals does not demand 
the suppression of one's own weal in favour of that of others ; such 
a suppression appears to it to be necessary only in the lower stages 
of development : the fully cultivated man lives as truly for himself 
as for the whole,^ and just by unfolding his own individual charac- 
ter does he set himself as a perfect member in the system of the 
universe. Here Shaftesbury's optimism expresses itself most fully 
in his belief, that the conflict between the egoistic and the altruistic 
motives, which plays so large a part in the lower strata of humanity, 
must be completely adjusted in the ripe, mature man. 

But for this reason the ethical ideal of life is with this thinker 
an entirely personal one. Morality consists for him, not in the 
control of general maxims, not in the subordination of the individ- 
ual's will to norms or standards, but in the rich and full living out 
of an entire individuality. It is the sovereign personality which 
asserts its ethical right, and the highest manifestation in the ethical 
realm is the virtuosoship, which allows none of the forces and none 
of the lines of impulse in the individual's endowment to be stunted. 

1 Pope compared this relation with the double motion of the planets about the 
jun and their own axes (Essay on Man, III. 314 ff.). Moreover, it was through 
the same poet that Shaftesbury's theory of life worked on Voltaire, while 
Diderot (in his work upon the Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit) attached 
himself directly to Shaftesbury. 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Shaftesbury^ RutcJieson. 509 

but brings all the manifold relations into harmony in a perfect con- 
duct of life, and thus brings about both the individual's happiness 
and his most efficient working for the welfare of the whole. Th"as 
the Greek ideal of the kalokagathia finds a new expression in the 
Weltanschauung of the Monadology (cf . § 7, 5) . 

7. While the moral principle has thus with Shaftesbury already 
received an sesthetical colouring in its contents, this colouring ap- 
pears consistently in a yet stronger degree when he deals with the 
question as to the source of knowledge for ethical tasks. This source, 
by metaphysicians and sensualists alike, was found in rational knowl- 
edge either of the nature of things or of the empirically useful : in 
both cases principles resulted that were capable of demonstration 
and universally valid. The morals of virtuososb.ip, on the contrary, 
must take its individual life-ideal from the depths of the individual 
nature ; for it morality was grounded upon feeling. The ethical 
judgments by which man approves those impulses which Nature has 
implanted within him to further his own and others' weal, or, on the 
other hand, disapproves the " unnatural " impulses that work against 
those ends, — these judgments rest on man's ability to make his 
own functions the object of study, i.e. upon "reflection" (Locke); 
they are not merely, however, a knowledge of one's own states, but 
are emotions of reflection, and as such they form within the " inner 
sense " the moral sense. 

Thus the psychological root of the ethical was transplanted from 
the field of intellectual cognition to the feeling-side of the soul, and 
set in the immediate vicinity of the aesthetic. The good appeared 
as the beautiful in the world of will and action : it consists, like the 
beautiful, in a harmonious unity of the manifold, in a perfect devel- 
opment of the natural endowments ; it satisfies and blesses as does 
the beautiful; it is, like the beautiful, the object of an original 
approval fixed in man's deepest nature. This parallel ruled the 
literature of the eighteenth century from Shaftesbury on : " taste " 
is the fundamental faculty ethically as aesthetically. This was 
perhaps most distinctly expressed by Hutcheson, but with a turn 
which to some degree led away again from Shaftesbury's individual- 
ism. For he understood by the "moral sense" — in the purely 
psychological meaning of " innateness " — an original faculty, essen- 
tially alike in all men, and with the function of judging what 
is ethically to be approved. The metaphysical accessories of the 
Platonists and Cartesians were gladly thrown overboard, and in 
their stead he held fast the more eagerly — especially in opposition 
to the "selfish system" — to the principle that man possesses a 
natural feeling for the good as for the beautiful, and declared the 
analysis of this feeling to be the business of philosophy. 

510 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [PartV. 

The carrying over of this principle into the theoretical domain 
led in the Scottish School (cf . § 33, 8) to making the True parallel with 
the Good and the Beautiful, as the object of original approval, and 
thus assuming in "common sense" a kind of "logical sense." But 
the principle of feeling as source of knowledge was proclaimed in a far 
more pronounced manner by Rousseau, who based his deism upon 
the uncorrupted, natural feeling ^ of man, in opposition to the cool 
intellectual analysis with which the purely theoretical Enlighten- 
ment treated the religious life. This feeling-philosophy was carried 
out in a very indefinitely eclectic manner by the Dutch philosopher, 
Franz Hemsterhuys (of Groeningen, 1720-1790), and with quaint 
singularity by the talented enthusiast, Hamann, the " Wizard of the 
North." 2 

8. It was, however, in the fusion of ethical and aesthetic investiga- 
tions that the above theory of the feelings, prepared by Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson, made its influence most felt. The more the eudse- 
monistic morals was treated in a manner intelligible to the common 
mind, the more convenient it was for it to be able to invest the 
moral commands, as the object of a natural pleasure, with the garb 
of grace and attractiveness, and to be permitted to commend the 
good to the taste as something akin to the beautiful. The Scottish 
School, also, was not far from this mode of view, and Ferguson 
developed Shaftesbury's ideas in this manner with especial reference 
to the Leibnizian fundamental conception of perfection. The effect 
of this complication of thought for msthetics, however, was that the 
beginnings toward a metaphysical treatment, which Shaftesbury 
had brought to the problems of the beautiful from the system of 
Plotinus, became completely overshadowed by the psychological 
method. The question asked was not, what the beautiful is, but 
how the feeling of the beautiful arises ; and in the solution of this 
question the explanation of the aesthetic was brought into more or 
less close connection with ethical relations. This shows itself, too, 
in the case of those writers upon aesthetics who stood closer to 
the sensualistic psychology than did the Scots. Thus Henry Home 
conceives of the enjoyment of the beautiful as a transition from the 
purely sensuous pacification of desires to the moral and intellectual 
joys, and holds that the arts have been "invented" for that refine- 
ment of man's sensuous disposition which is requisite for his higher 

1 Cf. the creed of the Savoyard Vicar in ]£mile, IV. 201 ff. 

2 Johann Georg Hamann (of Königsberg, 1730-1788 ; collected writings ed. 
by Gildemeister, Gotha, 1867-73) combines this line of thought with a pietism 
not far removed from orthodoxy in his thoughtful, but illogical and unclear 
form of expression. 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Home, Burke. 511 

destiny. He seeks, therefore, the realm of the beautiful in the 
higher senses, hearing and especially sight, and finds as the basis, 
a taste common to all men for order, regularity, and combination of 
the manifold into a unity. When he then further distinguishes 
between the "intrinsic" beauty which is immediately an "object 
of sense," and the beauty of "relation," these relations look essen- 
tially toward what is for the common good ethically, in the ser- 
vice of which beauty is thus placed.^ Even Edmund Burke, in his 
effort to derive the aesthetic from elementary states of sensation 
in accordance with the method of associatio7ial psychology, is very 
strongly dependent upon the form given to the problems by contem- 
porary moral philosophy. His attempt to determine the relation 
of the beautiful to the sublime — a task at which Home, also, had 
laboured, though with very little success ^ — proceeds from the 
antithesis of the selfish and the social impulses. That is held to 
be sublime which fills us with terror in an agreeable shudder, "a 
sort of delightful horror," while we are ourselves so far away that 
we feel removed from the danger of immediate pain : that is beau- 
tiful, on the contrary, which is adapted to call forth in an agreeable 
manner the feelings either of sexual love or of human love in 

In a manner similar to that of Home, Sulzer placed the feeling of 
the beautiful midway between that of the sensuously agreeable and 
that of the good, forming thus a transition from the one to the other. 
The possibility of this transfer he found in the intellectual factor 
which co-operates in our apprehension of the beautiful : it appeared 
to him — following the view of Leibniz (cf. § 34, 11) — as the 
feeling of harmonious unity in the manifold perceived by the senses. 
But just by reason of these presuppositions, the beautiful was for 
him valuable and perfect only when it was able to further the 
moral sense. Art, also, is thus drawn into the service of the morals 
of the Enlightenment, and the writer on aesthetics, who was so long 
celebrated in Germany, shows himself but a mechanical handicrafts- 
man of Philistine moralising in his conception of art and its task. 
How infinitely freer and richer in esprit are the " Observations " 
which Kant instituted " concerning the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
the Sublime," at the time when he, too, pursued, from the psycho- 
logical standpoint, and with admirable knowledge of the world, the 

1 For more detailed treatment, see the art. Home (Kames) by "W. Windel- 
band in Ersch unci Gruber's Enc, Vol. II. 32, 213 f. 

2 According to Home the beautiful is sublime if it is great. The antithesis 
between the qualitatively and the quantitatively pleasing seems to lie at the 
basis of his unclear and wavering characterisations. 

512 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

fine ramifications of the ethical and aesthetic life in individuals, 
tamilies, and peoples ! 

Finally these thoughts gave occasion in Germany to a change in 
psychological theory that was rich in results. Before this it had 
been the custom to divide the psychical activities according to the 
Aristotelian example into theoretical and practical. But now the 
feelings, which became thus recognised in their various significance, 
seemed incapable of being brought either into the group of knowing, 
or into that of willing, without disadvantage ; it seemed rather that 
the feelings, as a peculiar mode of expression, in part lay at the 
basis, and in part followed, both of the above functions of the soul. 
Here, too, the suggestion came from the Leibnizian Monadology. 
Sulzer, in his Berlin lectures,^ seems first to have pointed out that 
the obscure, primitive states of the monad should be separated from 
the developed forms of life seen in completely conscious knowing 
and willing, and he already found the distinguishing characteristic 
of these obscure states to be the conditions of pleasure and pain given 
with them. This was done also, in a similar way, from Leibnizian 
presuppositions by Jacob Friedrich Weiss.^ Mendelssohn (1755) 
first named these states Empfindungen^ [sensations], and later the 
same author designated the psychical power, which lies at their 
common basis, as th.Q faculty of approval {Billigungsvermögen) } But 
the decisive influence on terminology was exercised by Tetens and 
Kant. The former substituted for sensations {Empfindungen) the 
expression /ee^MZQ's {Fühlungen or Gefühle),^ and Kant used the latter 
almost exclusively. It was he, too, who later made the triple divis- 
ion of the psychical functions into ideation, feeling, and willing ( Vor- 
stellen, Fühlen, und Wollen) the systematic basis of his philosophy,^ 
and since then this has remained authoritative, especially for 

2: The counter-current, which proceeded from Hohhes and declared 
the profit or injury of the individual to be the sole possible content 
of the human will, maintained itself in the face of all these develop- 
ments. In this theory, the criterion of ethical action was sought in 
a purely psychological manner in the consequences of such action 

1 1751 f. Printed in tlie Vermischten Schriften (Berlin, 1773). 

2 J. F. Weiss, De Natura Animi et potissimum Cordis Humani (Stuttgart, 

3 In tliis Mendelssohn, with his Letters concerning the Sensations, refers 
directly to Shaftesbury. 

* Cf. Mendelssohn, 3Iorgenstimden, 1785, ch. 7 (W. I. 352). 

5 Cf. Tetens, Versuche, X. pp. 625 ff. 

6 In the article written between 1780 and 1790 desicjned at first as an intro- 
duction to the Critiqxie of Judgment which has passed over into his writings 
under the title TTp.hp_r Philosophie überhaupt. Cf. Ft. VI. ch. 1. 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Utilitarianism. 613 

for the advantage of our felloio-men. Morality exists only within 
the social body. The individual, if by himself and alone, knows 
only his own weal and woe ; but in society his actions are judged 
from the point of view of whether they profit or injure others, and 
this alone is regarded as the standpoint of ethical judgment. This 
conception of the ethical criterion corresponded not only to the 
common view, but also to the felt need of finding for ethics a basis 
that should be destitute of metaphysics, and rest purely on empiric 
cal psychology. Cumberland and Locke even acceded to it in the 
last resort, and not only the theological moralists like Butler and 
Paley, but also the associational psychologists like Priestley and 
Hartley, attached themselves to it. The classical formula of this 
tendency was gradually worked out. An action is ethically the 
more pleasing in proportion as it produces more happiness, and in 
proportion as the number of men who can share this happiness 
becomes greater : the ethical ideal is the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number. This became the watch-word of Utilitarianism. 

This formula, however, suggested the thought of determining 
quantitatively the ethical values for individual cases and relations. 
The thought of Hobbes and Locke, of grounding a knowledge of a 
strictly demonstrative ethics upon the utilitarian principle, seemed 
thereby to have found a definite form, welcome to the natural-science 
mode of thinking. This enticement was pursued by Bentham, and 
in this consists the peculiar element of utilitarian thought as carried 
out by him, — a work which he performed with a warm feeling for 
the public good, and which was later much referred to. The point 
is to find exact, definite points of view, according to which the value 
of every mode of action for the weal of the actor himself and of the 
community to which he belongs, can be determined, — partly in itself, 
partly in its relation to other modes of conduct; and Bentham in 
this table of values and their opposites, with an extensive consid- 
eration of both individual and social relations and needs, sketches a 
scheme of a pleasure and pain balance for reckoning the useful and 
injurious consequences of human activities and institutions. As 
with Hume (cf. below, No. 12), the reckoning of the ethically val- 
uable falls to the province of the measuring intellect ; but the factors 
with which it operates in this process are solely the feelings of 
pleasure and pain. 

10. The close connection in which this utilitarianism stood his- 
torically after Hobbes with the selfish system — that is, with the 
assumption of the essentially egoistic character of human nature 
— led necessarily to the separation of the question as to the criterion 
of morality and the kind of knowledge by which it is apprehended, 

514 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

from that as to the sanction of the moral commands and the motives 
for obeying them. For the metaphysical theories, the sanction of 
the ethical commands lay in the eternal truths of the law of Nature : 
and psychologically, also, there seemed to be no further and especial 
motive needed for the effort toward perfection, for the living out of 
the personality, for the following of innate ethical inclinations ; 
morality was self-explaining under such presuppositions. But he 
who thought more pessimistically of man, he who held him to be a 
being determined originally and in his own nature solely by regard 
to his own weal or woe, — he must ask with what right an altruistic 
way of acting is required of such a being, and by what means such 
a being can be determined to obedience to this requirement. If 
morality was not of itself inherent in man's nature, it must be 
declared how it comes into him from without. 

Here, now, the principle of authority, already adduced by Hobbes 
and Locke, performed its service. Its most palpable form was the 
theological; it was carried out with more finely wrought conceptions 
by Butler, and in a crude manner, intelligible to the common mind, 
by Paley. Utility is for both the criterion of ethical action, and the 
divine command is for both the ground of the ethical requirements. 
But while Butler still seeks the knowledge of this divine will in the 
natural conscience — his re-interpretation of Shaftesbury's emotions 
of reflection, for which he himself uses also the term " reflection " — 
for Paley, it is rather the positive revelation of the divine will that 
is authoritative ; and obedience to this command seems to him explic- 
able only because the authoritative power has connected its com- 
mandment with promises of reward and threatenings of punishment. 
This is the sharpest separation of ethical principles, and that perhaps 
which corresponds most to the " common sense " of the Christian 
world. The criterion of the moral is the weal of one's neighbour; 
the ground of our knowledge of the moral is the revealed will of 
God ; the real ground which supplies the sanction is the will of the 
Supreme Being ; and the ethical motive in man is the hope of the 
reward, and the fear of the punishment, which God has fixed for 
obedience and disobedience. 

11. Paley thus explained the fact of ethical action by the hypoth- 
esis that man, in himself egoistic, is brought at last by the agency 
of the equally egoistic motives of hope and fear, and by the round- 
about way of a theological motivation, to the altruistic mode of 
action commanded by God. The sensucdistic psychology substituted 
for the theological agency the authority of the state and the con- 
straining forces of social life. If the will of man is in the last 
resort always determinable only by his own weal and woe, his altru- 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Prineiples of Morals : Butler, Paley. 515 

istic action is comprehensible only on the supposition that he sees 
in it the surest, simplest, and most intelligent means under the 
given relations for bringing about his own happiness. While, there- 
fore, the theological utilitarians held that the natural egoism should 
be tamed by the rewards of heaven and punishments of hell, it 
seemed to the empiricists that the order of life arranged by the 
state and society was sufficient for this purpose. Man hnds himself 
in such relations that when he rightly reflects he sees that he will 
find his own advantage best by subordination to existing morals 
and laws. The sanction of ethical demands lies, accordingly, in the 
legislation of the state and of public morality which is dictated by 
the principle of utility, and the motive of obedience consists in 
the fact that each one thus finds his own advantage. Thus Man- 
deville, Lamettrie, and HelvMus developed the " selfish system " ; La- 
mettrie, especially, with tasteless cynicism that savoured of a 
desire tor admiration, seeking to exhibit " hunger and love " in 
their lowest sensuous meaning as the fundamental motives of all 
human life — a wretched, because artificial, imitation of ancient 

Morality, accordingly, appears to be only eudsemonistic shrewd- 
ness, the polished egoism of society, the refined cunning of the man 
who is familiar with life, and has seen that to be happy he can 
pursue no better path than to act morally, even if not to he moral. 
This view frequently finds expression in the Enlightenment philos- 
ophy as the governing principle of '' the world " of that day : 
whether it be as the naive, cynical confession of a writer's own dis- 
position, as in Lord Chesterfield'' s well-known letters to his son, — 
or in the form of moralising reflections, as in Labruy^re's " Charao 
t^res^' (1680), and in La Bochefoucauld' s ^^ Reflections'^ (1690), 
where the mask is unsparingly torn off from man's ethical behaviour, 
and naked egoism is disclosed as the sole impelling motor every- 
where, — or finally as bitter satire, as with Swift, where the true 
nature of the human beast is finally discovered by Gulliver among 
the Yahoos. 

Hand in hand with this gloomy conception of the natural mean- 
ness of man the view goes through the age of the Enlightenment 
that man's education to ethical action has to appeal to just this low 
system of impulses, working through power and authority, with the 
aid of fear and hope. This shows itself characteristically even with 
those who claim for the mature and fully developed man, a pure 
morality raised above all egoism. So, for example, Shaftesbury 
finds positive religion with its preaching of rewards and punish- 
ments quite good enough for the education of the great mass. So, 

516 The Enlightenment: Practical Questions. [Part V. 

too, Prussia's philosophical king Frederick the Great/ who for him- 
self had a consciousness of duty so strict and pure and free from all 
selfish considerations, and declared such to be the highest ethical 
good, yet thought that in the case of the education which the state 
gives to men it should start with their closest interests, however 
low these might be ; for he granted to the Encyclopaedists that man 
as a genus is never to be determined by anything else than by his 
own personal interests. In this respect the French Enlighteners, 
especially, sought to analyse the motives, by awakening which the 
state can win the citizens to care for the interests of the whole. 
Montesquieu showed with fine psychology how different the forms 
are which this relation takes under different forms of constitution. 
Lamettrie pointed, as Mandeville had already done, to the sense of 
honour or repute as the most powerful factor in the social sentiment 
among civilised peoples, and Helvetius carried out this thought 

But if the sensualistic psychology thus looked for man's ethical 
education from the state alone, the degree of success with which 
this was accomplished must serve as a standard for estimating the 
value of public institutions. This consequence was drawn by 
Holhach, and the most winning feature of this dry book is perhaps 
the honourableness and energy with which it tries to show how little 
the rotten conditions of the public life of that time were adapted to 
raise the citizen above the meanness of selfish endeavours. 

12. Hume's moral philosophy may be regarded as the most com- 
plete embodiment of this movement, and as the most refined consid- 
eration of the motives that contend within it. It, too, stands 
completely upon the basis of the psychological method : man's 
ethical life is to be understood by a genetic investigation of his 
passions, feelings, and volitions. The most significant element in 
Hume's teaching is the separation of utilitarianism from the selfish 
system. The criterion of ethical approval and disapproval is, for 
him, too, the effect which the quality or action to be judged is 
adapted to produce in the form of feelings of pleasure and pain, 
and, like the ancients and Shaftesbury, he interprets this in the 
widest sense, inasmuch as he regards as objects of ethical pleasure, 
not only the "social virtues," such as justice, benevolence, etc., but 
also the "natural abilities," ^ such as prudence or sagacity, fortitude, 
energy, etc. But we feel this approval, even when these qualities 

1 Cf. especially what is adduced by E. Zeller, F. d. G. als Philosoph, pp. 
67 ff., 105 ff., and also especially Frederick's '■'■ Antimacchiavelli.'''' 

2 Here, too, the old ambiguity of virtus (virtue) = moral virtue, and also 
ability or excellence, plays a part. 

Chap. 2, § 36.] Principles of Morals : Hume^ Smith. 517 

are completely indifferent to our own welfare, or indeed even inju- 
rious to the same ; and this cannot possibly be traced back to 
egoism through the medium of mere psychological association. On 
the other hand, the relation which these judgments sustain to the 
complicated relations of experience forbids the assumption of their 
innateness. They must rather be reduced to a simple, elementary 
form, and this is sympathy,^ i.e. primarily our capacity to feel 
with another his weal or woe as our own, at least in a weakened 
form. Such sympathetic feelings, however, are not only the 
impulsive grounds of moral judgments, but also the original motives 
of moral action, for the feelings are the causes of the decisions of 
the will. Still, these original impulses alone are not adequate to 
explain ethical judgment and action. For the more complicated 
relations of life, there is need of a clarification, ordering, and com- 
parative valuation of the factors of feeling, and this is the business 
of reason. From the reflection of reason arise, therefore, in addition 
to the natural and original values, derivative " artificial " virtues, as 
the type of which Hume treats justice and the whole system of 
standards of rights and law — in this, evidently, still dependent 
upon Hobbes. But in the last resort these principles, also, owe 
their ability to influence judgment and volition, not to rational 
reflection as such, but to the feelings of sympathy to which this 

Thus the crude conception of a "moral sense" is refined by 
Hume's investigation to a finely articulated system of moral psy- 
chology with its carefully differentiated conceptions, as the centre 
of which we find the principle of sympathy. A farther step in 
carrying out this same theory was taken in the ethical work of 
Adam Smith. As against the externality with which ordinary 
utilitarianism had placed the criterion of ethical judgment in the 
pleasurable or painful consequences of the act, Hume had energet- 
ically directed attention to the fact, that ethical approval or disap- 
proval concerns rather the disposition manifesting itself in the 
action, in so far as this aims at the consequences in question. 
Hence Smith found the essence of sympathy, not only in the 
capacity of feeling these consequences with the one who experiences 
them, but also in the ability to transfer one's self into the disposi- 
tion or sentiment of him who acts, and to feel his motives with him. 
And extending farther and farther the thought of transfer through 
sympathy, the judgment which the individual pronounces upon him- 
self in the conscience is then conceived as a reflex, mediated through 

1 Cf. Treatise, II. 1, 11, and II. 2, 5. 

518 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V 

feelings of sympathy, of the judgment which he receives from 
others and exercises upon others. 

All phenomena of the ethical life are thus rooted, according to 
Hume and Smith, in the social life, whose psychological basis is 
sympathy, and the founder of political economy, with his great 
philosophical friend, sees in the mechanism of sympathetic transfers 
of feeling an adjustment of individual interests similar to that which 
he believed himself to have discovered in the realm of the exchange 
of external goods, which is conducted with reference to the strait- 
ness of the conditions of life, in the mechanism of supply and 
demand in connection with the competition of labour.^ But with 
these insights into the thoroughgoing dependence of the individual 
upon a social body, which he does not create, but in which he finds 
himself actually placed, the philosophy of the Enlightenment is 
already pointing beyond itself. 

§ 37. The Problem of Civilisation. 

The fundamental thought, which the philosophy of the Enlight- 
enment would hold as to the great institutions of human society and 
its historical movement, was prescribed for it in advance, partly by 
its dependence upon natural-science metaphysics, and partly by its 
own psychological tendency. This was to see in these institutions 
the products of the activities of individuals ; and from this followed 
the tendency to single out those interests whose satisfaction the 
individual may expect from such general social connections when 
once these exist, and to treat them in a genetic mode of explanation 
as the motives and sufficient causes for the origin of the institutions 
in question, while at the same time regarding them from a critical 
point of view, as the standard for estimating the value of the same. 
Whatever was regarded as having been intentionally created by 
men should show also whether it was then really fulfilling their 

1. This conception was guided into the political and juristic track 
primarily by Hohhes. The state appeared as the work of individuals, 
constructed by them under the stress of need, when in a condition 
of war with each other and in fear for life and goods. With ics whole 
system of rights, it was regarded as resting upon the compact which 
the citizens entered into with each other from the above motives. 
The same Epicurean compact-theory, which had revived in the later 
Middle Ages, passed over with Nominalism into modern philosophy 

1 Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations fLond. 1776). 

Chap. 2, § 37.] Problem of Civilisation : Compact-Theory. 519 

and extended its influence over the whole eighteenth century. But 
the artificial construction of absolutism, which Hobbes had erected 
upon it, gave place more and more in consequence of political events 
to the doctrines of popular sovereignty. This lay at the basis of the 
English Constitution of 1688, as well as at that of the theoretical shap- 
ing which Locke gave the same in his doctrine of the separation and 
equilibrium of the three departments of the state, the legislative, 
executive, and federative. It controlled, also, as an ideal require- 
ment, the writings of Montesquieu, who, in considering the rotten 
administration of law at his time, would have complete independ- 
ence given to the judicial power, while he thought of the executive 
and federative departments (as administration within and without, 
respectively) as united in the one monarchical head. It was finally 
carried out to a complete system of democi-acy in Rousseau^ s Con- 
trat Social, in which the principle of transfer and representation 
was to be limited as much as possible, and the exercise of the sov- 
ereignty also to be assigned directly to the whole body of the peo- 
ple. In all these transformations of the doctrine of Hobbes, the 
influence of the realities of historical politics is obvious, but the 
antithesis between Hobbes and Kousseau has also its theoretical 
background. If man is regarded as by nature essentially egoistic, 
he must be compelled to keep the social compact by the strong arm 
of the state : if he is regarded as originally good and social in his 
feelings, as by Rousseau, it is to be expected of him that he will of 
himself always take part in carrying out, in the interest of the 
whole, the life prescribed by the compact. 

It is interesting now to see that the compact-theory in the 
eighteenth century communicated itself also to those theories of 
the philosophy of right which did not have a merely psychological 
basis. The " natural right " of this time proceeds also from the 
right of the individual, and seeks to derive from this the rights of 
individuals in their relation to each other. Yet in carrying out this 
principle two different tendencies show themselves in German phil- 
osophy, leading to results that were extremely characteristic in 
their differences. Leibniz had derived the conceptions of right (or 
law) from the most general principles of practical philosophy, fol- 
lowing the example of the ancients.^ Wolff followed him in this 
respect also, but made it on this account the end of the political 
compact to secure the mutual furtherance of individuals in behalf 
of their mutual perfecting, enlightening, and happiness ; according 

1 Cf. his introduction to tlie Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693), 
Works (Erd.), 118 ff. 

520 The Enlightenment : Tractical Questions. [Part V. 

to him, therefore, the state has to care, not merely for external 
safety, but also for the general welfare in the broadest extent 
The consequence of this is that Wolff assigns to the state the right 
and duty of a thorough tutelage of the great mass of unenlightened 
men who are controlled by error and passion, and of intermeddling 
even in their private relations in the way of education. Thus Wolff 
gave the theory for that " paternal " despotism of the benevolent 
police-state under which the Germans of his time lived with very 
mixed feelings. 

The exactly opposite result attached itself theoretically to the 
separation of the philosophy of right from morals, for which the 
way had already been prepared by Thomasius, with his sharp parting 
of the justum and the honestum. In this line the disciple of Tho- 
masius, Gundling (1671-1729), maintained that right or laiowas to he 
treated solely as the ordering of the external relatio7is of individuals, 
that it has for its end the preservation of peace without, and there- 
fore its decrees can be enforced only as to outward relations. This 
limitation of the state's activity to the external protection of law 
evidently corresponded most fully to the dualistic spirit of the 
Enlightenment. If the individual has conformed to the political 
compact only from need and want, he will evidently be inclined to 
make as few concessions to the state as possible, and will be willing 
to sacrifice to it of his original " rights " only so much as is uncondi- 
ditionally requisite for the end which it is to fulfil. This was not 
merely the thought of the Philistine citizen, who is indeed ready to 
call for the police at once when anything is the matter, but privately 
regards the order of the laws as an enemy that must be kept from 
his throat as much as possible ; it was also the feeling of the En- 
lightener of high intellectual development, who had for his rich 
inner life only the interest of being able to devote himself unmo- 
lested to the enjoyments of art and science. In fact, the petty 
spirit of the small German states, with its lack of ideals, must 
necessarily produce the indifference toward public life which thus 
found its theoretical expression. The lowest stage which the de- 
preciation of the state reached in this respect among the cultured 
classes is perhaps best characterised by William von ITitmboldfs 
" Ideas toward an Attempt to determine the Bounds of the Operation 
of the State." ^ Here every higher interest of man is carefully ex- 
cluded from the province of the state's authority, and the task of 
public government is restricted to the lower service of protecting 
the life and property of the citizen. 

1 Written 1792, published 1851 by E. Cauer. 

Chap. 2, § 37.] Problem of Civilisation : Voltaire. 521 

2. If in this respect German philosophy remained quite indif- 
ferent toward the actual political condition, on the other hand 
there appeared in it also the general tendency of the Enlightenment 
to order the life of society, as that of the individual, according to 
the principles of philosophy. If it is glory enough for this period 
to have successfully cleared away much historical lumber that had 
accumulated in the house-keeping of European peoples, Thomasius 
and Wolff, Mendelssohn and Nicolai, certainly deserve credit for 
their share in the work (cf. § 36, 5). But this side of the matter 
came forward in an incomparably more powerful and efficient 
degree with the French Enlighteners. It is enough here to recall 
Voltaire, who appeared as a literary power of the first rank, work- 
ing unweariedly and victoriously for reason and justice. But the 
contest which he carried on to a certain extent before the bar of 
public opinion of all Europe was taken up in detail by his fellow- 
countrymen, in a criticism of social institutions and by proposals 
for their improvement : in a broad and often passionate discussion 
philosophical reflection proceeds to the task of reforming the state. 
And here the weakness of the Enlightenment at once appears side 
by side with its strength. As always, it takes the standards of its 
criticism for existing institutions, and of its proposals for their 
change, from the universal, eternal nature of man or of things; 
thus it loses from sight the authorisation and vital force of histori- 
cal reality, and believes that it is only needed to make a tabula rasa 
of the existing conditions wherever they show themselves contrary 
to reason, in order to be able to build up society entire in accordance 
with the principles of philosophy. In this spirit the literature of 
the Enlightenment, especially in France, prepared for the actual 
break with history, — the Revolution. Typical in this was the pro- 
cedure of Deism which, because none of the positive religions with- 
stood its '^ rational" criticism, would abolish them all and put in 
their place the religion of Nature. 

So then the French Revolution, too, attempted to decree the 
abstract natural state of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," the 
realisation of "human rights" according to Eousseau's Social 
Contract. And numerous pens of very moderate quality hastened 
to justify and glorify the procedure.^ It is for the most part a 
superficial Epicureanism standing upon the basis of Condillac's 
positivism that acts as spokesman. Thus Volney seeks, with the 
Systeme de la Nature, the source of all the evils of society in the 

1 The preference for the catechism, a form designed for education in the 
Church, is characteristic of this literature. 

522 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

ignorance and covetousness of man, whose capacity for perfection 
has hitherto been restrained by religions. When all "illusions" 
shall be frightened away with these religions, then the newly 
organised society will have as its supreme rule of conduct, that 
"good" is only what furthers the interests of man, and the cate- 
chism for the citizen is comprehended in the rule " Conserve toi — 
instruis toi — modere toi — vis pour tes semblables, afin qu'ils vivent 
pour toi."^ Still more materialistic is the form in which the theory 
of the Revolution appears with St. Lambert, from whom the defini- 
tion that was much discussed in later literature comes : " L'homme 
est une masse organisee et sensible ; il regoit I'intelligence de ce qui 
I'environne et de ses besoins."^ With the most superficial con- 
sideration of history, he celebrates in the Eevolution the final 
victory of reason in history, and at the same time this Epicurean 
deduces that the democratic beginnings of this great event will be 
completed in Csesardom ! The extreme pitch of self-complacent 
boasting in this aspect of parliamentary dilettantism was reached 
by Garat and Lancelin.^ 

In contrast with these glittering generalities and declamations 
over the welfare of the people and the reign of reason, the earnest 
reality with which Bentham sought to make the utilitarian principle 
useful for legislation, appears in an extremely favourable light. 
This work he sought to accomplish by teaching the application of 
the quantitative determination of pleasure and pain values (cf. 
§ 36, 9) to the consideration of the ends of particular statutes, with 
a careful regard to the existing conditions in every case.* Just in 
this he showed his insight into the fact that in the political move- 
ment the question at issue is not merely that of political rights, but 
above all that of social interest, and along just this line an enthu- 
siastic and successful champion of the Revolution arose in Godwin,^ 
who was not uninfluenced by Bentham. But along other lines, too, 

1 Volney, at the close of the CatecM&me, CEuvr., I. 310. 

2 St. Lambert, Gatech. Introd., CEuvr., I. 53. For the characterisation of 
this literature it should not remain unmentioned that in St. Lambert's cate- 
chism the Analyse de Vhomme is followed in a second book by an Analyse de 
la — femme. 

3 The organ of this movement most worthy of esteem was the Decade Philo- 
sopMque, which saw and defended in the Eevolution the triumph of the philoso- 
phy of the eighteenth century. Cf. Picavet, Ideologues, 86 If. 

* It is the more to be lamented that Bentham later in his Deontology at- 
tempted to give a kind of popular catechism of the utilitarian morals, which, 
in radical one-sidedness, in rancour and lack of understanding for other moral 
systems, equals the worst products of the time of the Revolution. 

5 William Godwin (1756-1836) published his Inquiry concerning Political 
Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness in 1793. Cf. C. 
Kegan Paul, W. Godwin, his Fnends and Contemporaries, Lond. 1876, and L 
Stephen, English Thought, IL 264 ff 

Chap. 2, § 37.] Problem of Civilisation : France. 523 

the social storm is heard in the literature of the Revolution, as dull 
thunder still dying away in the distance. The investigations con- 
cerning the problems of political economy, which in France especially 
were chiefly promoted by the physiocratic school, became more and 
more comprehensive, and were grounded with increasing indepen- 
dence upon empirical principles. But while the theory of the 
state demanded, above all, security of possessions, there rose, from 
the depth of society, the question as to the right of personal property ; 
and while the philosophers considered with more and more dissen- 
sion the problem, how the interests of the community could be 
reconciled with those of the individual (cf. below), the thought 
forced its way to the surface that the ground of all evil with the 
human race lies in the striving after individual possessions, and 
that a social morality and a moral society will begin with the denun- 
ciation of this original sin, and not till then. Such communistic 
ideas were thrown to the world by Mahly and Morelly, and a Babeuf 
made the first abortive conspiracy to carry out these ideas, under 
the Directory. 

3. But the social question had already before this cast up its 
waves from its lowest depth. The contrast between the classes 
representing luxurious wealth and most wretched poverty, which 
had so great importance among the causes of the Revolution, might 
indeed at first be more palpable and effective; but it first acquired 
its full sharpness by virtue of the antithesis between culture and 
non-culture, which was linked with it by the whole development of 
European life, and this separating chasm was deepest and baldest 
in the age of the Enlightenment. The more the age plumed itself 
upon its "culture," the more evident it became that this was in the 
main a privilege of the property-owning class. In this point, too, 
English Deism had led the way with typical frankness. The 
religion of reason should be reserved for the cultivated man, just 
as the free, beautiful morality should be : for the ordinary man, on 
the other hand, Shaflesbury held, the promises and threatenings of 
positive religion must remain standing as a wheel and gallows. 
Toland, too, had presented his cosmopolitan natural worship as an 
"esoteric^' doctrine, and when the later Deists began to carry these 
ideas among the people in popular writings, Lord Bolingbroke, him- 
self a free-thinker of the most pronounced kind, declared them to 
be a pest of society against which the sharpest means were the best. 
Among the German Deists, also, men like Semler would have a very 
careful separation made between religion as a private matter and 
religion as a public order. 

The French Enlightenment, as the relation of Voltaire to Boling- 

524 The UnligTitenment : Practical Questions. [PartV. 

broke shows, was from the beginning decidedly more democratic. 
Indeed, it had the agitative tendency to play off the enlighten- 
ment of the masses against the exclusive self-seeking of the upper 
ten thousand. But with this was completed a revolution, by virtue 
of which the Enlightenment necessarily turned against itself. For 
if in those strata in which it first took hold " culture " or civilisa- 
tion had such consequences as appeared in the luxury of the "higher" 
classes, if it had been able to do s^ little in the way of yielding 
fruits that could be used for the needs of the masses also, its value 
must appear all the more doubtful the more philosophy regarded 
the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the proper 
standard for the estimation of things and actions. 

In this connection th.& problem of civilisation shaped itself out for 
modern philosophy : the question whether and how far civilisation, 
i.e. intellectual improvement (which is a historical fact), and the 
change in human impulses and in the relations of human life, which 
has been connected with it — whether and in how far this civilisa- 
tion has served to further the moral order and man's true happiness. 
The more proudly and self-complacently the average Enlightener 
praised the progress of the human mind, which had reached in him 
its summit of a clear and distinct rational life in theory and prac- 
tice, the more burning and — uncomfortable this question became. 

It is raised first, though not in a direct and square statement, by 
MandeviUe. In his psychology an extreme adherent of the selfish 
system, he sought to show, as against Shaftesbury, that the whole 
life and charm of the social system rests solely upon the struggle 
which self-seeking individuals carry on in their own interests — a 
principle which worked also upon Adam Smith in his doctrine of 
supply and demand.^ If we should think of man as stripped bare 
of all egoistic impulses (this is the meaning of the Fable of the Bees), 
and provided only with the "moral" qualities of altruism, the social 
mechanism would stand still from p^re absence of regard for self. 
The motive power in civilisation is solely egoism, and, therefore, 
we must not be surprised if civilisation displays its activity, not 
by heightening the moral qualities, but only by refining and dis- 
guising egoism. And the individual's happiness is as little enhanced 
by civilisation as his morality. If it were increased, the egoism, 
on which the progress of civilisation rests, would be thereby weak- 
ened. In truth, it appears, rather, that every improvement of the 
material condition, brought about by intellectual advance, ealls forth 
new and stronger wants in the individual, in consequence of which 

1 Cf. Lange, Gesch. d. Mater., I. 285 [Eng. tr. I. 295J. 

Chap. 2, § 37.] Prohlem of Civilisation : Mandeville, Rousseau. 525 

he becomes more and more discontented ; and so it turns out that 
the apparently so brilliant development of the whole is accomplished 
only at the cost of the morality and happiness of the individual. 

4. In Mandeville these thoughts appear in a mild suggestion, and 
at the same time, in the repelling form of a cynical commendation 
of the egoism, whose " private vices " are " public benefits." They 
attained an importance for world-literature through the brilliant 
turn given them by Rousseau. With him the question concerned 
nothing more and nothing less than the worth of all human 
history — its worth for the morality and happiness of individuals. 
And he cast into the face of the Enlightenment the reproach that 
all growth in knowledge, and all refinement of life, had but made 
man more and more untrue to his true vocation and his true nature. 
History with its artificial structure of civilised society has deterio- 
rated man : ^ he came forth from the hand of Nature good and pure, 
but his development has separated him from Nature step by step. 
The beginning of this " degeneration " Eousseau, in his second Dis- 
course, found in the creation of property, which had for its result the 
division of labour, and with this the separation of the classes and, ulti- 
mately, the awakening of all evil passions : this it was that enlisted 
the work of the intellect permanently in the service of self-seeking. 

In comparison with this unnatural condition of civilised barbarism 
the state of Nature appears at first as the lost paradise, and in this 
sense the sentimental yearning of a time intellectually and morally 
blas4 found its nourishment in Eousseau's writings, above all in the 
New Heloise. The ladies of the salon were carried away with enthu- 
siasm for the Gessnerian pastoral idyl; but on this account they 
mis-heard the admonition of the great Genevan. 

For he did not wish to lead back to that state of Nature which 
had no society. He was convinced that man is provided by his 
creator with a capacity for being perfected (perfectibiUti.) which 
makes the development of his natural endowment both a duty and 
a natural necessity. If this development has been guided into 
wrong paths by the historical process which has hitherto prevailed, 
and, therefore, has led to demoralisation and wretchedness, history 
must he begun anew; in order to find the right way toward his devel- 
opment man must return from the unnatural condition of intellectual 
pride to the simple natural state of feeling, from the narrowness 
and falsehood of relations of society to his pure unstunted self. 
For this end, according to Rousseau, humanity as a whole needs a 

1 The English Deists' conception of the history of religion (of. § 35, 8) is 
extended by Eousseau to all history. 

626 The Erüightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

political constitution, which affords the individual full freedom of 
personal activity in connection with the life of the whole body, and 
in accordance with the principle of equality of rights ; and as indi- 
viduals, humanity needs an education,^ which allows the natural 
endowments of the individual to unfold from his own vitality 
without constraint. The optimism, which Rousseau finds in the 
constitution of the natural God-descended nature of man, makes 
him hope that our condition will be better, the more freely and 
naturally we can develop. 

5. While we thus find Eousseau in lively opposition to the his- 
torical development, and in the zealous endeavour to put in its stead 
a new development "according to Nature," the last reconciling 
synthesis of the ideas of the Enlightenment is the endeavour to 
understand the previous course of human history itself as the 
natural development of human nature ; in this thought the phil- 
osophy of the eighteenth century strips off all its one-sided- 
ness and reaches its highest consummation. The first stirring of 
this is found in an isolated appearance of Italian literature, with 
Vico.^ Influenced by the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of the Eenais- 
sance, especially by Campanella, and educated by Bodin and Grotius, 
he had grasped the idea of a general natural law of the development 
of life, which manifests itself in the history of peoples as well as in 
that of individuals, and with great learning had sought to prove 
this principle of the identity of all natural development. But if in 
such a conception of the naturally necessary correspondences between 
the different historical systems and the fundamental biological 
scheme, the thought of a purposeful inter-relation of the destinies 
of nations had remained foreign to him, this had previously found 

1 In its details Rousseau's Emile frequently uses the "Thoughts," which 
Locke had advanced with a much more limited purpose for the education of a 
young man of higher station in society : there, too, the complete development 
of the individuality was the main thing, from which the turning away from 
learned one-sidedness, the direction of attention to the real and practical, the 
appeal to perception and the use of individual instead of general truths in 
instruction and education, followed as a matter of course. These principles, 
thought out for the Englishman of superior rank, Rousseau adopts as elements 
in an education which sought to develop in man, not the member of a definite 
class or of a future profession, but only "the man." In this spirit his peda- 
gogical doctrines passed over to the school of German pMlanthropii , which, under 
the lead of Basedow (172.3-1790), combined the principle of natural develop- 
ment with that of utility, and thought out the appropriate forms of an education 
for a community by which the individual should be trained to become by the 
natural way a useful member of human society. 

2 Giov. Battista Vico (1668-1744) became influential chiefly through his 
Principj cV una scienza nuova (V intorno alia commune natura delle nazioni 
(1725). Cf. K. "Werner, Giamhattista V. als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher 
(Vienna, 1879) ; R. Flmt, Vico (Edin. and Lond. 1884); and likewise for the 
following, Elint, The Philosophy of History in Europe, Vol I., new ed., 1893. 

Chap. 2, § 37.] Problem of Civilisation: Vico, Herder. 527 

all the more forcible support in BossueO The, French prelate con- 
tinues the patristic philosophy of history , which had pushed the 
Kedemption into the centre of the world's events. He would have 
the christianising of modern nations through the empire of Charles 
the Great, regarded as the concluding and decisive epoch of uni- 
versal history, the whole course of which is the work of divine 
providence, and the goal of which is the dominance of the one 
Catholic Church. Such a theological view of the world and of 
history had now, indeed, been energetically put aside by modem 
philosophy, but the meagreness of the results yielded for the con- 
sideration of history by the treatment of human society from the 
point of view of individual psychology is seen in the trivial lucu- 
brations of Iselin,^ in spite of his leaning upon Eousseau. 

It was in a mind of Herder's universal receptiveness and fineness 
of feeling that Rousseau's ideas first found in this respect, also, a 
fruitful soil. But his optimism, which had matured in the atmos- 
phere of Leibniz and Shaftesbury, did not allow him to believe in 
the possibility of that aberration which the Genevan would regard 
as the nature of previous history. He was rather convinced that the 
natural development of man is just that which has taken place in 
history. While Rousseau's conception of man's perfectibility was 
treated by the Genevan's French adherents, such as St. Lambert, 
and especially Condorcet, as the voucher for a better future, and as 
an infinite perspective toward the perfecting of the race, Herder 
used it — against Rousseau — as a principle of explanation for the 
past, also, of the human family. History is nothing but the unin- 
terrupted progress of natural development. 

This concerned, above all, the beginning of history. The begin- 
ning of the life of society is to be understood, not as an arbitrary 
act, whether of human reflection or of divine determination, but as a 
gradually formed result of the natural connection. It has neither 
been invented nor commanded, but has become. Characteristically 
enough, these opposing views as to the origin of history, asserted 
themselves earliest in theories of language. The individualism of 
associational psychology saw in language, as is manifest particularly 
in the case of Condillac,^ an invention of man, — supra-naturalism, 
defended in Germany by Siissmilch * saw a divine inspiration ; here 

1 Jacques Benigne Bossuet (1627-1704), the celebrated eloquent divine, wi-ote 
the Discours sur V Histoire Universelle (Paris, 1681) originally for the instruc- 
tion of the Dauphin. 

2 Isaak Iselin of Basle (1728-1782) published in 1764 his Philosophischen 
Muthmassungen ilher die Geschichte des Menschheit, 2 vols. 

^ Logique and Langue des Calculs. 

* Beweis, dass der Ursprung der menschlichen Sprache göttlich sei (Berlin, 

528 The Enlightenment : Practical Questions. [Part V. 

Rousseau had already spoken the word of solution when he saw in 
language a natural, involuntary unfolding of man's essential nature.^ 
Herdei not only made this conception his own (cf. above, § 33, 
11), but he extended it also consistently to all man's activities in 
civilisation. He proceeds, therefore, in his philosophy of history 
from the point of view of man's position in Nature, from that of 
the conditions of life which the planet affords him, and from that 
of his peculiar constitution, to understand from these sources the 
beginnings and the direction of his historical development : and in 
the progress of his exposition of universal history he makes, like- 
wise, the peculiar character of each people and of its historical sig- 
nificance proceed from its natural endowments and relations. But 
at the same time the developments of the various nations do not 
fall apart in his treatment, as was still the case with Vico : on the con- 
trary, they are all arranged organically as a great chain of ascend- 
ing perfection. And they all form in this connected whole the 
ever-maturer realisation of the general constitution of human nature. 
As man himself is the crown of creation, so his history is the 
unfolding of human nature. The Idea of Humanity explains the 
complicated movement of national destinies. 

In this consideration, the unhistorical mode of thinking which 
had characterised the Enlightenment was overcome : every form in 
this great course of development was valued as the natural product 
of its conditions, and the " voices of the peoples " united to form 
the harmony of the world's history, of which humanity is the theme. 
And out of this sprang also the task of the future, — to bring to 
ever richer and fuller development all the stirrings of human 
nature, and to realise in living unity the ripe fruits of the historical 
development. In the consciousness of this task of the " world- 
literature," far from all the pride of the meaner Enlightenment, 
full of the presage and anticipation of a new epoch, Schiller could 
call out, in valedictory to the "philosophical century," the joyful 
words : — 

"Wie schön, o Mensch, mit deinem Palmenzweige 

Stehst du an des Jalirhunderts Neige 

In edler, stolzer Männlichkeit ! " ^ 

1 With his arguments, though in part of another opinion, St. Martin the 
Mystic attacked the crude presentation of Condillac's doctrine by Garat ; cf. 
Seances des Jßcoles Normales, III. 61 ff. 

2 In rude paraphrase : 

How fair, man, with victory's palm, 
Thou standest at the century's wane 
In noble pride of manliness. 



To the literature cited on pp. 348 and 437, we add : — 

H. M. Chalybaeus, Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von 

Kant bis Regel. Dresden, 1837. [Tr. Edin. and Andover, 1854.] 
F. K. Biedermann, Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis auf unsere Tage. 

Leips. 1842 f. 
K. L. Michelet, Entwickelungsgeschichte der neuesten deutschen Philosophie. 

Berlin, 1843. 
C. Fortlage, Genetische Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant. Leips. 1852. 
O. Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen. Stuttgart, 1865. 
Pr, Harms, Die Philosophie seit Kant. Berlin, 1876. 
A. S. Willm, Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqiCa Hegel. 

Paris, 1846 ff. 
H. Lotze, Geschichte der uEsthetik in Deutschland. Munich, 1868. 
R. Plint, Philosophy of History in Europe, I. Edin. and Lond. 1874. 
R. Pester, Bousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie. Stuttgart, 1890. 
[J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Boston, 1892.] 

A fortunate union of various intellectual movements produced 
in Germany, during tlie close of the preceding and at the beginning 
of the present century, a bloom of philosophy, which in the history 
of European thought can be compared only with the great develop- 
ment of Greek philosophy from Socrates to Aristotle. In a devel- 
opment, powerful alike in its intensity and extent, the German 
mind during the short span of four decades (1780-1820) produced a 
wealth of systems of philosophical Weltanschauung, grandly pro- 
jected on all sides, such as has at no other time been compressed 
within so narrow a space ; and in all of these the thoughts of pre- 
ceding philosophy combine to form characteristic and impressive 
structures. They appear in their totality as the ripe fruit of a long 
growth, out of which germs of a new development, as yet scarcely 
recognisable, are to spring. 

This brilliant phenomenon had its general cause in the incompar- 
able vigour and spirit with which the German nation at that time 
took up again with new strength, and carried to its completion, the 
movement of civilisation which began in the Renaissance and had 


530 The German Philosophy. [Part VL 

been interrupted by external force. Germany attained the snmmit 
of its inner development at the same time that its outer history 
reached its lowest condition, — a process that has no equal in history. 
When it lay politically powerless, it created its world-conquering 
thinkers and poets. Its victorious power, however, lay just in the 
league hetiveen x>liüosopliy and poetry. The contemperaneousness of 
Kant and Goethe, and the combination of their ideas by Schiller, — 
these are the decisive characteristics of the time. 

The history of philosophy at this point is most intimately inter- 
woven with that of general literature, and the lines of mutual rela- 
tion and stimulus run continuously back and forth. This appears 
characteristically in the heightened and finally decisive significance 
which fell in this connection to the problem& and conceptions of 
cesthetics. Philosophy found thus opened before her a new world, 
into which she had hitherto had but occasional glimpses, and of 
which she now took possession as of the Promised Land. In their 
matter as well as their form, sesthetic principles gained the mastery, 
and the motives of scientific thought became interwoven with those 
of artistic vision to produce grand poetical creations in the sphere 
of abstract thought. 

The ensnaring magic which literature thus exercised upon philos- 
ophy rested mainly upon its historical xmiversality . With Herder 
and Goethe begins what we call, after them, world-literature ; the 
conscious working out of true culture from the appropriation 
of all the great thought-creations of all human history. The Ro- 
mantic School appears in Germany as the representative of this 
work. And, in analogy to this, philosophy also developed out of a 
wealth of historical suggestions ; it resorted with conscious deep- 
ening of thought to the ideas of antiquity and of the Renaissance, 
it plunged intelligently into what the Enlightenment had shown, 
and ended in Hegel by understanding itself as the systematically 
penetrating and formative comprehension of all that the human 
mind had hitherto thought. 

But for this mighty work it needed a new conceptional basis, 
without which all those suggestions from general literature would 
have remained without effect. This philosophical power to master 
the ideal material of history dwelt within the doctrine of Kant, and 
this is its incomparably high historical importance. Kant, by the 
newness and the greatness of his points of view, prescribed to the 
succeeding philosophy not only its problems, but also the means for 
their solution. His is the mind that determines and controls on all 
sides. The work of his immediate successors, in which his new 
principle unfolded itself in all directions and finished its life histor- 

The Grerman Philosophy. 531 

ically with an assimilation of earlier systems, is best comprehende(i 
in accordance with its most important characteristic, under the name 
of Idealism. 

Hence we treat the history of the German Philosophy in two 
chapters, of which the first embraces Kant, and the second the de- 
velopment of idealism. In the thought symphony of those forty 
years the Kantian doctrine forms the theme, and idealism its 



C. L. Reinhold, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie {Deutsch. Merkur, 

1786 f.). Leips. 1790 ff. 
V. Cousin, Lef^ons sur la Philosophie de Kant. Paris, 1842. 
M. Desdouits, La Philosophie de Kant, d'' apres les Trois Critiques. Paris, 1876. 
E. Caird, The Philosophy of Kant. Lond. 1876. 
[E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, Glasgow, Lond., and N.Y., 

2 vols., 1889.] 
C. Cantoni, Em. Kant (3 vols.). Milan, 1879-1884. 
W. Wallace, Kant. Oxford, Edin., and Lond. 1882. 
J. B. Meyer, KanVs Psychologie. Berlin, 1870. 

The pre-eminent position of the Königsberg philosopher rests 
upon the fact that he took up into himself the various motives of 
thought in the literature of the Enlightenment, and by their recipro- 
cal supplementation matured a completely new conception of the 
problem and procedure of philosophy. He passed through the 
school of the Wolffian metaphysics and through an acquaintance 
with the German popular philosophers ; he plunged into Hume's 
profound statement of problems, and was enthusiastic for Eousseau's 
gospel of Xature ; the mathematical rigour of the Newtonian natural 
philosophy, the fineness of the psychological analysis of the origin 
of human ideas and volitions found in English literature, Deism 
from Toland and Shaftesbury to Voltaire, the honourable spirit of 
freedom with which the French Enlightenment urged the improve- 
ment of political and social conditions, — all these had found in the 
young Kant a true co-worker, full of conviction, who with a rich 
knowledge of the world and admirable sagacity, and also, where it 
was in place, with taste and wit, though far from ail self-compla- 
cency and boasting, united typically within himself the best features 
of the Enlightenment. 

But it was in connection with the difficulties of the problem oj 
'knowledge, that he wrought out from all these foundation elements 
the work which gave him his peculiar significance. The more he 


Chap. 1.] The Critique of Reason. 533 

had originally prized metaphysics just because it claimed to give scien- 
tific certainty to moral and religious convictions, the more lasting 
was its working upon him when he was forced to become convinced 
by his own progressive criticism in his constant search for truth, 
how little the rationalistic school system satisfied that claim which 
it made. But the more, also, was his vision sharpened for the 
limitations of that philosophy which empiricism developed by the 
aid of psychological method. In studying David Hume this came 
to his consciousness in such a degree that he grasped eagerly for the 
aid which the Nouveaux Essais of Leibniz seemed to offer toward 
making a metaphysical science possible. But the epistemological 
system, which he erected upon the principle of virtual innateness 
extended to mathematics (cf. pp. 465 f. and 485 f.), very soon proved 
its untenability, and this led him to the tedious investigations 
which occupied him in the period from 1770 to 1780, and which 
found their conclusion in the Critique of Pure Reason. 

The essentially new and decisive in this was that Kant recog- 
nised the inadequacy of the psychological method for the solution of 
philosophical problems,^ and completely separated the questions 
which surround the origin and the actual development of man's 
rational activities, from those which relate to their value. He shared 
permanently with the Enlightenment the tendency to take the 
starting-point of his investigations, not in our apprehension of 
things, which is influenced by most various presuppositions, but 
in considering the reason itself; but he found in this latter 
point of view universal judgments which extend beyond all expe- 
rience, whose validity can neither be made dependent upon the 
exhibition of their actual formation in consciousness, nor grounded 
upon any form of innateness. It is his task to fix upon these judg- 
ments throughout the entire circuit of human rational activity, in 
order from their content itself and from their relations to the 
system of the rational life determined by them, to understand their 
authority or the limits of their claims. 

This task Kant designated as the Critique of Reason, and this 
method as the critical or transcendental method; the subject-matter 
to which this method was to be applied he considered to be the 
investigation as to the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori.^ 

1 Cf. the beginning of the transcendental deduction of the pure conceptions 
of the understanding in the Critique of Pure Beason, II. 118 ff. 

2 This expression took form gradually in connection with the origination of 
the Er. d. r. V. through the importance which the conception of synthesis 
acquired. Cf. § 38. Kant develops the above general formula in his introduc- 
tion to the Critique in the following way : judgments are analytical when the 
relation of the predicate to the subject, which is therein asserted, has its ground 

^34 The Q-erman Philosophy. [Part VI. 

This rests upon the fundamental insight that the validity of the 
principles of reason is entirely independent of how they rise in the 
empirical consciousness (whether of the individual or of the race). 
All philosophy is dogmatic, which seeks to prove or even merely to 
judge of this validity by showing the genesis of those principles 
out of elements of sensation, or by their innateness, whatever the 
metaphysical assumptions in the case may be. The critical method, 
or transcendental philosophy, examines the form in which these 
principles actually make their appearance, in connection with the 
capacity which they possess of being employed universally and 
necessarily in experience. 

From this there followed for Kant the task of a systematic inves- 
tigation of reason's functions in order to fix upon their principles, 
and to examine the validity of these ; for the critical method, which 
was first gained in epistemology, extended its significance of itself 
to the other spheres of the reason's activity. But here the newly 
acquired scheme of psychological division (cf. p. 512, note 6) proved 
authoritative for his analysis and treatment of philosophical problems. 
As thinking, feeling, and willing were distinguished as the funda- 
mental forms in which reason expresses itself, so the criticism of 
reason must keep to the division thus given ; it examined separately 
the princix)les of knowledge, of morality, and of the working of things 
upon the reason through the medium of feeling, —o. province inde- 
pendent of the other two. 

Kant's doctrine is accordingly divided into a theoretical, a practi- 
cal, and an msthetical part, and his main works are the three Critiqties, 
of the Pure Reason, of the Practical Reason, and of the Judgment. 

Immanuel Kant, born April 22, 1724, at Königsberg, Prussia, the son of 
a saddler, was educated at the Pietistic Collegium Fridericianum, and attended 
m 1740 the University of his native city to study theology: but subjects of 
natural science and philosophy gradually attracted him. After concluding his 
studies, he was a private teacher in various families in the vicinity of Könic^s- 
bergfrom 1746 to 1755, habilitated in the autumn of 1755 as Privatdocent^m 

m the concept itself which forms the subject ("explicative judgments")- 
synthetical, when this is not the case, so that the addition of the predicate to 
the subject must have its ground in something else which is logically different 
from both ("amphative judgments"). This ground is, in the case of syn- 
thetical judgments « pos^mon (''judgments of perception," cf. ProUgom^ 
ena, § i», in. 215 t.), the act of perception itself; in the case of synthetical 
judgments a priori, on the contrary, i.e. of the universal principles employed 
tor the interpretation of experience, it is something else ; what it is is just that 
which is to be sought. A priori is, with Kant, not a psychological, but a purely 
epistemological mark ; it means not a chronological priority to experience, but 
a U7iiversahty and necessitfi of validity in principles of reason which really tran- 
scends all experience, and is not capable of being proved by any experience [i.e. 
a logical, riot a chronological priority]. No one who does not make this clear 
to himself has any hope of understanding Kant. 

Chap. 1.] The Critique of Reason. 635 

the philosophical faculty of Königsberg University, and was made full Professor 
there in 1770. The cheerful, brilliant animation and versatility of his middle 
years gave place with time to an earnest, rigorous conception of life and to the 
control of a strict consciousness of duty, which manifested itself in his unremit- 
ting labour upon his great philosophical task, in his masterful fulfilment of the 
duties of his academic profession, and in the inflexible rectitude of his life, which 
was not without a shade of the pedantic. The uniform course of his solitary and 
modest scholar's life was not disturbed by the brilliancy of the fame that fcL upon 
his life's evening, and only transiently by the dark shadow, that the hatred of 
orthodoxy, which had obtained control under Frederick William II., threatened 
to cast upon his path by a prohibition upon his philosophy. He died from 
weakness of old age on the 12th of February, 1804. 

Kant's life and personality after his earlier works has been drawn most 
completely by Kuno Fischer {Gesch. d. neueren Philos., III. and IV., 4th ed. 
Heidelb. 1899) ; E. Arnoldt has treated of his youth and the first part of his 
activity as a teacher (Königsberg, 1882); [J. H. W. Stuckenberg, Life of Kant, 
Lond. 1882]. 

The change which was taking place in the philosopher toward the end of the 
seventh decade of the eighteenth century appears especially in his activity as 
a writer. His earlier " pre- critical " works (of which those most important 
philosophically have been already cited, p. 445) are distinguished by easy- 
flowing, graceful presentation, and present themselves as admirable occasional 
writings of a man of fine thought who is well versed in the world. His later 
works show the laboriousness of his thought and the pressure of the contending 
motifs, both in the form of the investigation with its circumstantial heaviness 
and artificial architectonic structure, and in the formation of his sentences, 
which are highly involved, and frequently interrupted by restriction. Minerva 
frightened away the graces ; but instead, the devout tone of a deep thought and 
an earnest conviction which here and there rises to powerful pathos and weighty 
expression hovers over his later writings. 

For Kant's theoretical development, the antithesis between the Leibnizo- 
Wolffian metaphysics and the Newtonian natural philosophy was at the begin- 
ning of decisive importance. The former had been brought to his attention at 
the University by Knutzen (cf . p. 444) , the latter by Teske, and in his growing 
alienation from the philosophical school-system, his interest for natural science, 
to which for the time he seemed to desire to devote himself entirely, co-operated 
strongly. His first treatise, 1747, was entitled Thoughts xipon the True Estima- 
tion of the Vis Viva, a controverted question between Cartesian and Leibnizian 
physicists ; his great work upon the General Natural History and Theory of 
the Heavens was a natural science production of the first rank, and besides 
small articles, his promotion treatise, De Igne (1755), which propounded a 
hypothesis as to imponderables, belongs here. His activity as a teacher also 
showed, even on into his later period, a preference for the subjects of natural 
sciences, especially for physical geography and anthropology. 

In theoretical philosophy Kant passed through many reversals {mancherlei 
Umkipjmngen) of his standpoint (cf. §§ 33 and 34). At the beginning (in the 
Physical Monadology) he had sought to adjust the opposition between Leibniz 
and Newton, in their doctrine of space, by the ordinary distinction of things-in- 
themselves (which are to be known metaphysically), and phenomena, or things 
as they appear (which are to be investigated physically) ; he then (in the writ- 
ings after 1760) attained to the insight that a metaphysics in the sense of 
rationalism is impossible, that philosophy and mathematics must have diametri- 
cally opposed methods, and that philosophy as the empirical knowledge of the 
given cannot step beyond the circle of experience. But while he allowed him- 
self to be comforted by Voltaire and Eousseau for this falling away of meta- 
physical insight, through the instrumentality of the "natural feeling" for the 
right and holy, he was still working with Lambert at an improvement of the 
method of metaphysics, and when he found this, as he hoped, by the aid of 
Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais, he constructed in bold lines the mystico-dogmatic 
system of his Liaugural Dissertation. 

The progress from there on to the System of Criticism is obscure and contro- 
verted. Cf . concerning this development, in which the time in which he was 
influenced by Hume and the direction which that influence took are especially 

536 Grerman Philosophy : KanVs Critique. [Pakt VL 

in question, the following : Fr. Michelis, Kant vor und nach 1 770 ^^3raunsbe^gi 
1871) ; Fr. Paulsen, Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der kantischen 
Erkenntnisstheorie (Leips. 1875) ; A. Eiehl, Geschichte und Methode des phi- 
losophischen Kriticismus (Leips. 1876) ; B. Erdmann, EanVs Kriticismiis 
(Leips. 1878) ; W. Windelband, Die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen 
Lehre vom Ding-an-sich {Vierteljahr sehr. f. wissensch. Philos., 1876). Cf. also 
the writings by K. Dieterich on Kant's relation to Newton and Rousseau under 
the title Die kantische Philosophie in ihrer inneren Entwicklungsgeschichte, 
Freiburg i. B. 1885. 

From the adjustment of the various tendencies of Kant's thought proceeded 
the "Doomsday-book" of German philosophy, the Critique of Pure Beason 
(Riga, 1781). It received a series of changes in the second edition (1787), and 
these became the object of very vigorous controversies after attention had been 
called to them by Sciielling (W., V. 196) and Jacobi ( W., II. 291). Cf. concern- 
ing this, the writings cited above. H. Vaihinger, Commentar zu K. K. d. r. V. 
(Vol. I., Stuttgart, 1887 [Vol. II., 1892]), has diligently collected the literature. 
Separate editions of the Kritik, by K. Kehrbach, upon the basis of the first edi- 
tion, and by B. Erdmann [and E. Adickes] upon the basis of the second 
edition. [Eng. tr. of the Critique (2d ed.), by Meiklejohn, in the Bohn Library, 
and by Max Müller (text of 1st ed. with supplements giving changes of 2d ed.), 
Lond. 1881 ; Paraphrase and Commentary by Mahaffy and Bernard, 2d ed., 
Lond. and N.Y. 1889 ; partial translations in J. H. Stirling's Text-book to Kant, 
and in Watson's Selections, Lond. and N.Y. 1888. This last contains also ex- 
tracts from the ethical writings and from the Critique of Judgment.'] 

The additional main writings of Kant in his critical period are : Prolegom,ena 
zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, 1783 ; Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten, 1785 ; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 1785 ; 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788 ; Kritik der TJrtheilskraft, 1790 ; Die 
Beligion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 ; Zum ewigen Frie- 
den, 1795 ; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Hechts- und Tugendlehre, 1797 ; 
Der Streit der Fakultäten, 1798 ; [Eng. tr. of the Prolegomena, by Mahaffy and 
Bernard, Lond. and N.Y. 1889 ; of the Prolegomena and Metaphysical Founda- 
tions of Natural Science, by Bax, Bohn Library ; of the ethical writings, includ- 
ing the first part of the Beligion within the Bounds of Pure Beason, by T. K. 
Abbott, 4th ed., Lond. 1889 ; of the Critique of Judgment, by J. H. Bernard, 
Lond. and N.Y. 1892 ; of the Philosophy of Law, by W. Hastie, Edin. 1887 ; 
Principles of Politics, including the essay on Perpetual Peace, by W. Hastie, 
Edin. 1891. The contents of KanVs Essays and Treatises, 2 vols., Lond. 1798, 
is given in Ueberweg, II. 138 (Eng. tr.)]. 

Complete editions of his works have been prepared by K. Rosenkranz and 
F. W. Schubert (12 vols., Leips. 1833 ff.), G. Hartenstein (10 vols., Leips, 
1838 f., and recently 8 vols., Leips. 1867 ff.), and J. v. Kirchmann (in the 
Philos. Biblioth.).'^ They contain, besides his smaller articles, etc., his lectures, 
upon logic, pedagogy, etc., and his letters. A survey of all that has been 
written by Kant (including also the manuscript of the Transition from Meta- 
physics to Physics, which is without value for the interpretation of his critical 
system) is found in Ueberweg-Heinze, III. § 24 ; there, too, the voluminous 
literature is cited with great completeness. Of this we can give here only a 
choice of the best and most instructive ; a survey of the more valuable literature, 
arranged according to its material, is offered by the article Kant, by W. Windel- 
band in Ersch rmd Gruber''s Enc. [The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
contains numerous articles upon Kant. We may mention also Adamson, The 
Philosophy of Kant, Edin. 1879 ; art. Kant, in Enc. Brit., by the same author; 
arts, in Mind, Vol. VI., by J. Watson, and in Philos. Beview, 1893, by J. G. 
Schurmann. — E. Adickes has begun an exhaustive bibliography of the German 
literature in the Philos. Review, 1893.] 

1 The citations refer to the older Hartenstein edition In the case of many 
works the convenient editions by K. Kehrbach {Beclam. Bib.) make easy the 
transfer of the citations to the other editions. 

Chap. 1, §38.] Object of Knowledge. 537 

§ 38. The Object of Knowledge. 

Erh. Schmid, Kritik der reinen Vernunft im Grundrisse. Jena, 1786. 

H. Cohen, Kanfs Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin, 1871. 

A. Holder, Darstellung der kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie. Tübingen, 1873. 

A. Stadler, Die Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnisstheorie in der kantischen 

Philosophie. Leips. 1876. 
Job. Volkelt, I. Kanfs Erkenntnisstheorie nach ihren Grundprincipien analysirt. 

Leips. 1879. 
E. Pfleiderer, Kantischer Kriticismus und englische Philosophie. Tübingen, 

J, Hutchinson Stirling, Text-Book to Kant. Edin. and Lond. 1881. 
Seb. Turbiglio, Analisi, Storia^ Critica della Bagione Pura. Rome, 1881. 
G. S. Morris, KanVs Critique of Pure Beason, Chicago, 1882. 
Er. Staudinger, Noumena. Darmstadt, 1884. 
[K. Eischer's Criticism of Kant, trans, by Hough. Lond. 1888.] 
[J. Watson, Kant and his English Critics. Lond. 1886.] 
[H. Vaihinger, Commentar zu KanVs Kritik d. r. Vernunft, IL (on the 

.Esthetic). Stuttgart, 1892.] 

Kant's theory of knowledge followed with tenacious consistency 
from the statement which modern Terminism had given to problems 
of knowledge (cf. pp. 466 and 482). The philosopher had grown up 
in the naive realism of the Wolffian school, which without close 
scrutiny regarded logical necessity and reality as identical ; and his 
liberation from the ban of this school consisted in his seeing the 
impossibility of determining out of " pure reason," i.e. through mere 
logical operations with conceptions, anything whatever as to the 
existence ^ or the causal relation ^ of real things. The metaphysi- 
cians are the architects of many a world of thought in the air ; ^ but 
their structures have no relation to reality. Kant now sought this 
relation first in the conceptions given through experience, since the 
genetic connection of these with the reality to be known by science 
seemed immediately evident, but he was shaken from this "dog- 
matic slumber" by Hume,* who demonstrated that precisely the 
constitutive Forms of the conceptional knowledge of reality, espec- 
ially the Form of causality, are not given in perception, but are 

1 Cf. Kant's Sole Possible Proof for the Existence of God. 

2 Cf . the Essay on Negative Magnitudes, especially the conclusion (W., I. 
59 ff.). 

8 Dreams of a Ghost Seer, I. 3 ; W., III. 75. 

* In connection with this frequently mentioned confession of Kant, it is for 
the most part disregarded that he characterised as ' ' dogTuatic ' ' not only 
rationalism, but also the empiricism of the earlier theory of knowledge, and 
that the classical passage at which he uses this expression (in the preface to 
the Prolegomena, W., III. 170 f.) does not contrast Hume with Wolff, but with 
Locke, Reid, and Beattie only. The dogmatism from which, therefore, 
Kant declared that he had been freed throueh Hume xcas that of empiricism. 

538 Grerman Philosoph^/ : Kant's Critique. [Part VI. 

products of the nieclianism of association without any demonstrable 
relation to the real. Reality was not to be known from the "given" 
conceptions, either. And then Kant, prompted by Leibniz, deliber- 
ated once more whether the purified conception of virtual innate- 
ness, with the aid of the " pre-established harmony " grounded in 
God between the monad which knows and the monad which is to be 
known, might not solve the mystery of the relation of thought and 
Being, and in his Inaugural Dissertation he had convinced himself 
that this was the solution of the problem. But cool reflection 
soon showed that this pre-established harmony was a metaphysical 
assumption, incapable of proof and unable to support a scientific 
system of philosophy. So it appeared that neither empiricism nor 
rationalism had solved the cardinal question, — the relation of knowl- 
edge to its object, in what does it consist and on what does it rest ? ^ 

1. Kant's own, long-weighed answer to this question is the Critique 
of Pure Reason. In its final systematic form, which found an ana- 
lytical explication in the Prolegomena, his criticism proceeds from 
the fact of the actual presence of synthetic judgments a priori in three 
theoretical sciences; viz. in mathematics, in pure natural science, and 
in metaphysics ; and the design is to examine their claims to universal 
and necessary validity. 

In this formulation of the problem the insight into the nature of 
reason's activity, which Kant had gained in the course of his critical 
development, came into play. This activity is synthesis, i.e. the 
uniting or unifying of a manifold.^ This conception of synthesis ^ is 
a new element which separates the Critique from the Inaugural Dis- 
sertation; in it Kant found the common element between the Forms 
of the sensibility and those of the understanding, which in his 
exposition of 1770 were regarded as entirely separate, in accordance 
with their characteristic attributes of receptivity and spontaneity 
respectively.* It now appeared that the synthesis of the theoretical 

1 Kant's letter to Marcus Herz, Feb. 21, 1772. 

" This frequently repeated definition makes the fundamental conception of 
of the critical doctrine of knowledge appear in closest proximity to the funda«- 
mental metaphysical conception of the Monadology. Cf. § 31, 11. 

3 Which is introduced in the Transcendental Analytic in connection with the 
doctrine of the categories. Sections 10 and 15 (of the first edition of the 

* Hence the conception of synthesis in the present form of the Critique of 
Pure Reason comes in collision with the psychological presuppositions which 
passed over to the Critique out of the German working-over of the Inaugural 
Dissertation, which forms the Transcendental Esthetic and the beginning of the 
Transcendental Logic (this was originally to have appeared immediately after 
1770 under the title Limits of the Sensibility and of the Understanding). In 
the Prolegomena these psychological presuppositions became obliterated. 
Earlier, sensibility and understanding were set over against each other as 
receptivity and SDontaneity ; but space and time, the pure Forms of the sensi- 

Chap. 1, § 38.] Object of Knowledge : Synthesis. 539 

reason completes itself in three stages : tlie combination of sensa- 
tions into perceptions takes place in the Forms of space and time ; 
the combination of the perceptions into experience of the natural 
world of reality takes place by means of concepts of the understand- 
ing; the combination of judgments of experience into metaphysical 
knowledge takes place by means of general principles, which Kant 
calls Ideas. These three stages of the knowing activity develop, 
therefore, as different Forms of synthesis, of which each higher 
stage has the lower for its content. The critique of reason has to 
investigate what the especial Forms of this synthesis are in each 
stage, and in what their universal and necessary validity consists. 

2. As regards mathematics, the conception of the Inaugural Dis- 
sertation fits aptly, in the main, into the critique of reason. Mathe- 
matical propositions are synthetic ; they rest in the last resort upon 
construction in pure perception, not upon the development of con- 
ceptions. Their necessity and universal validity, which cannot be 
established by any experience, is, therefore, to be explained only if 
an a priori principle of perception lies at their basis. Kant, there- 
fore, shows that the general ideas of space and time, to which all 
insights of geometry and arithmetic relate, are " pure Forms of per- 
ception" or "perceptions a priori." The ideas of the one infinite 
space and of the one infinite time do not rest upon the combination 
of empirical perceptions of finite spaces and times; but with the 
very attributes of limit in the " beside-of-one-another " and " after- 
one-another" (co-existence and succession), the whole of space and 
the whole of time respectively are already involved in the empirical 
perception of particular space and time magnitudes, which can accord- 
ingly be presented to the mind only as parts of space in general 
and of time in general. Space and time cannot be "concepts," 
since they relate to an object which is only a single, unique object, 
and which is not thought as complete, but is involved in an infinite 
synthesis ; and further, they are related to the ideas of finite magni- 
tudes, not as class-concepts are to their particular examples, but as 
the whole to the part. If they are, accordingly, pure perceptions 
{Anschauungen), i.e. perceptions not founded upon empirical percep- 
tions ( Wahrnehmungen), but lying at the basis of all empirical per- 
ceptions,^ then they are, as such, necessary ; for we can indeed think 

bility, were indeed the principles of the synthetical ordering of the sensations, 
and thus belonged under the general conception of synthesis, i.e. spontaneou? 
unity of the manifold. Thus the conception of synthesis burst the psychological 
schema of the Inaugural Dissertation. 

1 Here once more it must be recalled that it is but a perverted and completely 
erroneous conception of Kant to conceive of this "lying at the basis of" or 
"preceding," as referring to time. The nativism, which holds space and time 

540 Grerman Philosoph^/ : Kant's Critique. [Part VL 

everything away from them, but cannot think them away. They 
are the given Forms of pure perception from which we cannot escape, 
the laws of relations, in which alone we can mentally represent with 
synthetic unity the manifold of sensations. And further, space is 
the form of the outer sense, time that of the inner sense ; all objects 
of the particular senses are perceived as spatial, all objects of self- 
perception as in time. 

If, then, space and time are the " unchangeable Form of our sensu- 
ous receptivity," cognitions determined by these two kinds of per- 
ception without any regard to the particular empirical content, 
possess universal and necessary validity for the entire compass of 
all that we can perceive and experience. In the realm of the sensi- 
bility, — so the '' Transcendental ^Esthetic " teaches, — the only 
object of a priori knowledge is the Form of the synthesis of the man- 
ifold given through sensation, — the law of arrangement in space and 
time. But the universality and necessity of this knowledge is intel- 
ligible only if space and time are nothing hut the necessary Forms of 
man's sensuous perception. If they possessed a reality independent 
of the functions of perception, the a priori character of mathematical 
knowledge would be impossible. Were space and time themselves 
things or real properties and relations of things, then we could know 
of them only through experience, and, therefore, never in a univer- 
sal and necessary way. This last mode of knowledge is possible 
only if they are nothing but the Form under which all things in our 
perception must appear} According to this principle the a priori 
and the phenomenal become for Kant interchangeable conceptions. 
The only universal and necessary element in man's Tcnoioledge is the 
Form under which things appear in it. Rationalism limits itself to 
the Form, and holds good even for this only at the price of the 
" subjectivity " of the same. 

3. While Kant would thus have the spatial and chronological re- 
lations of objects of perception regarded as wholly a mode of mental 
representation, which does not coincide with the reality of things 
themselves, he distinguished this conception of their ideality very 
exactly from that "subjectivity of the qualities of sense " which was 
held by him, as by all philosophy after Descartes and Locke, to be 
self-evident.^ And the point at issue here again is solely the ground 
of the phenomenality. As regards colour, taste, etc., the phenome- 
nality had been based, since the time of Protagoras and Democritus, 

to be inborn ideas, is un-Kantian throughout, and stands in contradiction to 
express declarations of the philosopher (cf., e.g., above, p. 465 f.). 

1 This thought is developed with especial clearness in the Prolegomena., § 9. 
. 2 Cf. Critique, § 3, b. W., II. 68. 

Chap. 1, § 38.] Object of Knowledge: Space and Time. 541 

upon the difference and relativity of impressions ; for the Forms of 
space and time, Kant deduces their phenomenality precisely from 
their invariability. For him, therefore, the qualities of sense 
offered only an individual and contingent mode of representation ; 
while the Forms of space and time, on the other hand, present 
a universal and necessary mode in which things appear. All that 
perception contains, is, indeed, not the true essence of things, but 
an appearance or phenomenon ; but the contents of sensation are 
" phenomena " in quite another sense than that in which the Forms 
of space and time are such; the former have worth only as the 
states of the individual subject, the latter as "objective " Forms of 
perception for all. Even on this ground, therefore, Kant, too, sees 
the task of natural science to lie in the reduction of the qualitative 
to the quantitative, in which alone necessity and universal validity 
can be found upon a mathematical basis, agreeing in this with 
Democritus and Galileo ; but he differed from his predecessors in 
holding that, philosophically considered, even the mathematical mode 
of representing Nature can be regarded only as an appearance and 
phenomenon, though in the deeper sense of the word. Sensation 
gives an individual idea, mathematical theory gives a necessary, 
universally valid perception of the actual world; but both are 
merely different stages of the phenomenal appearance, behind which 
the true thing-in-itself remains unknown. Space and time hold 
without exception for all objects of perception, but for nothing 
beyond ; they have " empirical reality " and " transcendental ideality." 

4. The main advance of the Critique of Reason beyond the Inaiv- 
gural Dissertation consists in the fact that these same principles are 
extended in a completely parallel investigation to the question as 
to the epistemological value which belongs to the synthetic Forms 
of the activity of the understanding.^ 

Natural science needs besides its mathematical basis a number of 
general principles as to the connection of things. These principles, 
such as that every change must have its cause, are of a synthetic 
nature, but, at the same time, are not capable of being established 
by experience, though they come to consciousness through experi- 
ence, are applied to experience, and find there their confirmation. 
Of such principles a few have indeed been incidentally propounded 
and treated hitherto, and it remains for the Critique itself to dis- 
cover the "system of principles," but it is clear that without this 
basis the knowledge of Nature would be deprived of its necessary 

■ 1 This parallelism is seen most plainly by comparing §§ 9 and 14 of the 

642 Cferman Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Part "VX 

and universal validity. For " Nature " is not merely an aggregate 
of spatial and temporal Forms, of corporeal shapes and motions, 
but a connected system, which we perceive through our senses, but 
thinh at the same time through conceptions. Kant calls the faculty 
of thinking the manifold of perception in synthetic unity, the 
Understanding ; and the categories or j^ure conceptions of Understand- 
ing are the Forms of the synthesis of the Understanding, just as space 
and time are the Forms of the synthesis of perception. 

If now Nature, as object of our knowledge, were a real connected 
system of things, independent of the functions of our reason, we 
could know of it only through experience and never a priori; a uni- 
versal and necessary knowledge of Nature is possible only if our 
conceptional Forms of synthesis determine Nature itself. If Nature 
prescribed laws to our understanding, we should have only an 
empirical, inadequate knowledge ; an a priori knoioledge of Nature 
is tlierefore possible only if the case be reversed and our understanding 
prescribes laws to Nature. But our understa,nding cannot determine 
Nature in so far as it exists as a thing-in-itself, or as a system of 
things-in-themselves, but only in so far as it appears in our thought. 
A priori knowledge of Nature is therefore possible ojily if the con- 
nection which ive thinh between perceptions is also nothing but our mode 
of ideation; the conceptional relations also, in which Nature is an 
object of our knowledge, must be only "phenomenon." 

5. In order to attain this result, the Critique of Reason proceeds 
first to assure itself of these synthetic Forms of the understanding 
in systematic completeness. Here it is clear from the outset that 
we have not to do with those analytic relations which are treated in 
formal logic, and grounded upon the principle of contradiction. For 
these contain only the rules for establishing relations between con- 
ceptions according to the contents already given within them. Bui 
such modes of combination as are present when we affirm the rela 
tion of cause and effect, or of substance and accident, are not con- 
tained in those analytical Forms — just this had been shown by 
Hume. Kant discovers hert \ the completely new task of transcendental 
logic} Side by side with the (analytic) Forms of the understanding, 
in accordance with which the relations of conceptions which are 
given as to their contents are established, appear the synthetic Forms 
of understanding, through which perceptions are made objects of 
conceptional knowledge. Images of sensation, co-ordinate in space 
and changing in time, become " objective " only by being thought as 

6 Cf. M. Steckelmacher, Die formale Logik Kanfs in ihren Beziehungen zur 

transscendentalen (Breslau, 1878). 

Chap. 1, § 38.] Object of Knowledge : Categories. 643 

things with, abiding qualities and changing states ; but this relation 
expressed by means of the category inheres analytically neither in the 
perceptions nor in their perceptional relations as such. In the ana- 
lytic relations of formal logic thinking is dependent upon its objects, 
and appears ultimately with right as only a reckoning with given 
magnitudes. The synthetic Forms of transcendental logic, on the 
contrary, let us recognise the understanding in its creative function 
of producing out of perceptions the objects of thought itself. 

At this point, in the distinction between formal and transcen- 
dental logic, appears for the first time the fundamental antithesis 
between Kant and the conceptions of the Greek theory of knowl- 
edge which had prevailed up to his time. The Greek theory 
assmned "the objects" as "given" independently of thought, and 
regarded the intellectual processes as entirely dependent upon the 
objects ; at the most it was the mission of the intellectual processes 
to reproduce these objects by way of copy, or allow themselves to 
be guided by them. Kant discovered that the objects of thought 
are none other than the products of thought itself. This spontaneity 
of reason forms the deepest kernel of his transcendental idealism. 

But while he thus with completely clear consciousness set a new 
epistemological logic of synthesis by the side of the analytical logic 
of Aristotle, which had as its essential content the relations involved 
in subsuming ready-made conceptions under each other (cf. § 12), 
he yet held that both had a common element, viz: the science of 
judgment. In the judgment the relation thought between subject 
and predicate is asserted as holding objectively ; all objective think- 
ing is judging. Hence if the categories or radical conceptions of the 
understanding are to be regarded as the relating forms of the 
synthesis by which objects arise, there must be as many categories 
as there are kinds of judgments, and every category is the mode of 
connecting subject and predicate which is operative in its own kind 
of judgment. 

Kant accordingly thought that he could deduce the table of the 
categories from that of the judgments. He distinguished from the 
four points of view of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, 
three kinds of judgments for each: Universal, Particular, Singular, 
— Affirmative, Negative, Infinite, — Categorical, Hypothetical, Dis- 
"Sunctive, — Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic; and to these were 
to correspond the twelve categories : Unity, Plurality, Totality, — 
Eeality, Negation, Limitation, — Inherence and Subsistence, Caus- 
ality and Dependence, Community or Eeciprocity, — Possibility and 
Impossibility, Existence and Non-existence, Necessity and Con- 
tingency. The artificiality of this construction, the looseness of 

644 German Philosophy : Kant's Oritique. [Part VL 

the relations between Forms of judgment and categories, the un- 
equal value of the categories, — all this is evident, but Kant 
unfortunately had so much confidence in this system that he treated 
it as the architectonic frame for a great number of his later 

6. The most difficult part of the task, however, was to demon- 
strate in the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Conceptions 
of the Understanding" how the categories "make the objects of 
experience." The obscurity into which the profound investigation 
of the philosopher necessarily came here is best brightened up by 
a fortunate idea of the Prolegomena. Kant here distinguishes judg- 
ments of perception, i.e. those in which only the relation of sensations 
in space and time for the individual consciousness is expressed, and 
judgments of experience, i.e. those in which such a relation is 
asserted as objectively valid, as given in the object; and he finds 
the difference in epistemological value between them to be, that 
in the judgment of experience the spatial or temporal relation is 
regulated and grounded by a category, a conceptional connection, 
whereas in the mere judgment of perception this is lacking. Thus, 
for example, the succession of two sensations becomes objective and 
universally valid when it is thought as having its ground in the 
fact that one phenomenon is the cause of the other. All particular 
constructions of the spatial and temporal synthesis of sensations 
become objects only by being combined according to a rule of the 
understanding. In contrast with the individual mechanism of 
ideation, in which individual sensations may order themselves, 
separate and unite in any way whatever, stands objective think- 
ing, which is equally valid for all, and is bound to fixed, co- 
herent, ordered wholes, in which the connections are governed by 

This is especially true in the case of relations in time. For since 
phenomena of outer sense belong to the inner sense as "determina- 
tions of our mind," all phenomena without exception stand under 
the Form of the inner sense, i.e. of time. Kant, therefore, sought 
to show that between the categories and the particular Form of 
perception in time a " schematism " obtains, which first makes it 
possible at all to apply the Forms of the understanding to the 
images of perception, and which consists in the possession by every 
individual category of a schematic similarity with a particular form of 
the time relation. In empirical knowledge we use this schematism 
to interpret the empirically perceived time relation by the correspond- 
ing category [e.c/. to apprehend regular succession as causality] j 
transcendental philosophy, conversely, has to seek the justification 

Chap. 1, § 38.] Object of Knowledge : Experience. 545 

of this procedure in the fact that the category, as a rule of the 
UBderstanding, gives the corresponding time relations a rational 
basis as object of experience. 

In fact, the individual consciousness finds in itself the contrast 
between a movement of ideas (say of the fancy), for which it claims 
no validity beyond its own sphere, and, on the other hand, an activ- 
ity of experience, in the case of which it knows itself to be bound 
in a way that is likewise valid for all others. Only in this depend- 
ence consists the reference of thought to an object. But if it was 
now recognised that the ground of the objective validity of the 
time (and space) relation can rest only in its determination by a 
rule of the understanding, it is on the other hand a fact that 
the consciousness of the individual knows nothing of this co-opera- 
tion of the categories in experience, and that he rather accepts the 
result of this co-operation as the objective necessity of his appre- 
hension of the synthesis of sensations in space and time. 

The production of the object, therefore, does not go on in the 
individual consciousness, but lies already at the basis of this con- 
sciousness ; for this production, a higher common consciousness must 
therefore be assumed, which comes into the empirical consciousness 
of the individual, not with its functions, but only with their result. 
This Kant termed in the Prolegomena, consciousness in general; in 
the Critique, transcendental apperception, or the "J" [or ^^ self," 
or "eg'o"]. 

Experience is accordingly the system of phenomena in which the 
spatial and temporal synthesis of sensation is determined by the rules 
of the understanding. Thus " Nature as phenomenon " is the object 
of an a priori knowledge ; for the categories hold for all experience, 
because experience is grounded only through them. 

7. The universal and necessary force and validity of the cate- 
gories find expression in the Principles of the Pure Understanding, 
in which the conceptional Forms unfold themselves through the 
medium of the schematism. But here it is at once evident that the 
main weight of the Kantian doctrine of the categories falls upon 
the third group, and thus upon those problems in which he hoped 
"to solve Hume's doubt." From the categories of Quantity and 
Quality result only the "Axiom of Perception," that all phenomena 
are extensive magnitudes, and the "Anticipations of Empirical 
Perception " according to which the object of sensation is an inten- 
sive magnitude ; in the case of Modality there result only definitions 
of the possible, actual, and necessary, under the name of the " Postu- 
lates of Empirical Thought." On the other hand, the Analogies of 
Experience prove that in Nature substance is permanent, and that 

546 Crerman Philosophy : Kantus Critique. [Part VI 

its quantum can be neither increased nor diminished, that all 
changes take place according to the law of cause and effect, and that 
all substances are in thorough-going reciprocity or inter-action. 

These, therefore, are the universally and necessarily valid prin- 
ciples and highest premises of all natural science, which are uni- 
versally and necessarily valid without any empirical proof; they 
contain what Kant calls the metaphysics of Nature. In order that 
they may be employed, however, upon the Nature given through 
our senses, they must pass through a mathematical formulation, 
because Nature is the system of sensations perceived in the Forms 
of space and time and ordered according to the categories. This 
transition is effected through the empirical conception of motion, to 
which all occurrence and change in Nature is theoretically to be 
reduced. At least, science of Nature, in the proper sense, reaches 
only so far as we can employ mathematics : hence Kant excluded 
psychology and chemistry from natural science as being merely 
descriptive disciplines. The "Metaphysical Elements of Natural 
Science" contain, accordingly, all that can be inferred universally 
and necessarily concerning the laws of motion, on the ground of the 
categories and of mathematics. The most important point in Kant's 
philosophy of Nature, as thus built up, is his dynamic theory of mat- 
ter, in which he now deduces from the general principles of the 
Critique the doctrine already laid down in the " Natural History of 
the Heavens," that the substance of that which is movable in space 
is the product of two forces which maintain an equilibrium in a 
varying degree, — those of attraction and repulsion. 

8. But in accordance with Kant's presuppositions, the above 
metaphysics of Nature can be only a metaphysics of phenomena : 
and no other is possible, for the categories are Forms for relating, 
and as such are in themselves empty ; they can refer to an object 
only through the medium of perceptions, which present a manifold 
content to be combined. This perception, however, is, in the case 
of us men, only the sensuous perception in the forms of space and 
time, and as a content for their synthetic function we have only 
that given in sensations. Accordingly, the only object of human 
knowledge is experience, i.e. phenomenal appearance ; and the divis- 
ion of objects of knowledge into phenomena and noumena, which 
has been usual since Plato, has no sense. A knowledge of things-in- 
themselves through " sheer reason," and extending beyond experi- 
ence, is a nonentity, a chimera. 

But has, then, the conception of the thing-in-itself any rational 
meaning at all ? and is not, together with this, the designation of 
all objects of our knowledge as " phenomena," also without meaning ? 

Chap. 1, § 38.] Object of Knowledge : Tking-in-Itself. 647 

This question was the turning-point of Kent's reflections. Hitherto 
all that the naive conception of the world regards as " object " has 
been resolved partly into sensations, partly into synthetic Forms of 
perception and of the understanding ; nothing seems to remain 
besides the individual consciousness as truly existing, except the 
"consciousness in general,'' the transcendental apperception. But 
where, then, are the " things," of which Kant declared that it had 
never come into his mind to deny their reality ? 

The conception of the tldng-in-itself can, to be sure, no longer have 
a positive content in the Critique of Reason, as it had with Leibniz, 
or in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation; it can no longer be the object 
of purely rational knowledge, it can no longer be an " object" at all. 
But it is at least no contradiction, merely to think it. Primarily, 
purely hypothetically, and as something the reality of which is 
neither to be affirmed nor to be denied, — a mere " problem." 
Human knowledge is limited to objects of experience, because the 
perception required for the use of the categories is in our case only 
the receptive sensuous perception in space and time. If we suppose 
that there is another kind of perception, there would be for this 
other objects, likewise, with the help of the categories. Such objects 
of a non-human perception, however, remain still only phenomena, 
though this perception again might be assumed as one which 
arranges the given contents of sensation in any manner whatever. 
Nevertheless, if one should think of a perception of a non-receptive 
kind, a perception which synthetically produced not only its Forms, 
but also its contents, — a truly " productive imagination," — its 
objects would necessarily be no longer phenomena, but things-in- 
themselves. Such a faculty would deserve the name of an intellect- 
ual perception (or intuition), or intuitive intellect; it would be the 
unity of the two knowing faculties of sensibility and understand- 
ing, which in man appear separated, although by their constant 
reference to each other they indicate a hidden common root. The 
possibility of such a faculty is as little to be denied as its reality 
is to be affirmed ; yet Kant here indicates that we should have to 
think a supreme spiritual Being in this way. Noumena, or things- 
in-themselves, are therefore thinkable in the negative sense as objects of 
a non-sensuous perception, of which, to be sure, our knowledge can 
predicate absolutely nothing, — they are thinkable as limiting con- 
ceptions of experience. 

And ultimately they do not remain so completely problematical 
as would at first appear. For if we should deny the reality of 
things-in-themselves, "all would be immediately resolved into 
phenomena," and we should thus be venturing the assertion that 

548 G-erman PJiilosophy : Kant's Critique. ^/art VL 

nothing is real except wliat appears to man, or to other sensuously 
receptive beings. But this assertion would be a presumption com- 
pletely incapable of proof. Transcendental idealism must, therefore, 
not deny the reality of noumena; it must only remain conscious 
that they cannot in any wise become objects of human knowledge. 
Things-in-themselves must be thought, but are not knowable. In 
this way Kant won back the right to designate the objects of human 
knowledge as "only phenomena." 

9. With this the way was marked out for the third part of the 
critique of the reason, the Transcendental Dialectic} A metaphysics 
of that which cannot be experienced, or, as Kant prefers to say, of 
the supersensuous, is impossible. This must be shown by a criticism 
of the historical attempts which have been made with this in view, 
and Kant chose, as his actual example for this, the Leibnizo-Wolffian 
school-metaphysics, with its treatment of rational psychology, cos- 
mology, and theology. But at the same time, it must be shown that 
that which is incapable of being experienced, which cannot be 
known, must yet necessarily be thought ; and the transcendental 
illusion must be discovered, by which even the great thinkers have 
at all times been seduced into regarding this, which must necessarily 
be thought, as an object of possible knowledge. 

To attain this end Kant proceeds from the antithesis between the 
activity of the understanding and the sensuous perception by the 
aid of which alone the former produces objective knowledge. 
The thinking, which is determined by the categories, puts the data 
of the sensibility into relation with one another in siich a way, that 
every phenomenon is conditioned by other phenomena : but in this 
process the understanding, in order to think the individual phenom- 
enon completely, must needs grasp the totality of the conditions by 
which this particular phenomenon is determined in its connections 
with the whole experience. But, in view of the endlessness of the 
world of phenomena in its relation to space and time, this demand 
cannot be fulfilled. For the categories are principles of relation 
between phenomena ; they cognise the conditionality or conditional 
character of each phenomenon only by means of other phenomena, 
and demand for these again insight into their conditional nature as 
determined by others, and so on to infinity.^ Out of this relation 

_ 1 As regards the subject matter, the Transcendental iEsthetic, Analytic, and 
Dialetic, as the Introduction shows, form the three main co-ordinate parts of 
the Critique ; the formal schematism of the division which Kant imitated from 
the arrangement of logical text-books usual at that time, is, on the contrary, 
entirely irrelevant. The "Doctrine of Method" is in fact only a supplement 
extremely rich in fine observations. 

2 Cf. the similar thoughts in Nicolaus Cusanus and Spinoza, though there 
metaphysically applied ; above, pp. 347 and 419. 


Chap. 1, § 38.] Object of Knowledge : Ideas. 54& 

between understanding and sensibility result for human knowledge 
necessary and yet insoluble i)rohlems; these Kant calls Ideas, and 
the faculty rec^uisite for this highest synthesis of the cognitions 
of the understanding he designates as Jieason in the narrower 

If now the reason will represent to itseif as solved, a problem 
thus set, the sought totality of conditions must be thought as some 
thing unconditioned, which, indeed, contains in itself the conditions 
for the infinite series of phenomena, but which is itself no longer 
conditioned. This conclusion of an infinite series, which for the 
knowledge of the understanding is in itself a contradiction, must 
nevertheless be thought, if the task of the understanding, which 
aims at totality in connection with the infinite material of the data 
of the senses, is to be regarded as performed. The Ideas are hence 
ideas or mental representations of the unconditioned, which must 
necessarily be thought without ever becoming object of knowledge, 
and the transcendental illusion into which metaphysics falls con- 
sists in regarding them as given, whereas they are only imposed or 
set as a task {aufgegeben). In truth they are not constitutive prin- 
ciples through which, as through the categories, objects of knowl- 
edge are produced, but only regulative princi^ües, by which the 
understanding is constrained to seek for farther and farther con- 
necting links in the realm of the conditioned of experience. 

Of such Ideas Kant finds three ; the unconditioned for the totality 
of all phenomena of the inner sense, of all data of the outer sense, 
of all the conditioned in general, is thought respectively as the soul, 
the vmrld, and God. 

10. The criticism of rational psychology in the " Paralogisms of 
Pure Keason " takes the form of pointing out in the usual proofs 
for the substantiality of the soid, the quaternio terminorum of a 
confusion of the logical subject with the real substrate ; it shows 
that the scientific conception of substance is bound to our perception 
of that which persists in space, and that it is therefore applicable 
only in the field of the external sense, and maintains that the Idea 
of the soul as an unconditioned real unity of all phenomena of the 
inner sense, is indeed as little capable of proof as it is of refutation, 
but is at the same time the heuristic principle for investigating the 
inter-connections of the psychical life. 

In a similar way, the section on the " Ideal of the Reason " treats 
the Idea of God. Carrying out with greater precision his earlier 
treatise on the same subject, Kant destroys the cogency of the 
arguments brought forward for the existence of God. He combats 
the right of the ontological proof to infer existence from the concep- 

650 German Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Part YL 

tion alone ; lie shows that the cosmological proof involves a petitio 
principii when it seeks the "first cause" of all that is "contingent " 
in an " absolutely necessary" being; he proves that the teleological 
or physico-theological argument at the best — granted the beauty, 
harmony, and purposiveness or adaptation of the universe — leads 
to the ancient conception of a wise and good " Architect of the 
world." But he emphasises that the denial of God's existence is a 
claim which steps beyond the bounds of our experiential knowledge, 
and is as incapable of proof as the opposite, and that rather the 
belief in a living, Real unity of all reality constitutes the only 
powerful motive for empirical investigation of individual groups of 

Most characteristic by far, however, is Kant's treatment of the 
Idea of the world in the Antinomies of Pure Reason. These 
antinomies express the fundamental thought of the transcendental 
dialectic in the sharpest manner, by showing that when the universe 
is treated as the object of knowledge, propositions which are 
mutually contradictory can be maintained with equal right, in so 
far as we follow, on the one hand, the demand of the understanding 
for a completion of the series of phenomena, and on the other, the 
demand of the sensuous perception for an endless continuance of 
the same. Kant proves hence, in the "thesis," that the world must 
have a beginning and end in space and time, that as regards its 
substance it presents a limit to its divisibility, that events in it 
must have free, i.e. no longer causally conditioned, beginnings, and 
that to it must belong an absolutely necessary being, God ; and in 
the antithesis he proves the contradictory opposite for all four cases. 
At the same time the complication is increased by the fact that the 
proofs (with one exception) are indirect, so that the thesis is proved 
by a refutation of the antithesis, the antithesis by refutation of the 
thesis ; each assertion is therefore both proved and refuted. The 
solution of the antinomies in the case of the first two, the " mathe- 
matical," takes the form of showing that the principle of excluded 
third loses its validity where something is made the object of knowl- 
edge, which can never become such, as is the case with the universe. 
In the case of the third and fourth antinomies, the " dynamical," 
which concern freedom and God, Kant seeks to show (what, to be 
sure, is impossible in a purely theoretical way), that it is perhaps 
thinkable that the antitheses hold true for phenomena, and the 
theses, on the other hand, for the unknowable world of things-in- 
themselves. For this latter world, it is at least not a contradiction 
to think freedom and God, whereas neither is to be met with, it is 
certain, in our knowledge of phenomena. 

Chap. 1, § 39.] The Öategorical Imperative. 651 

§ 39. The Categorical Imperative. 

H. Cohen, Kanfs Begründung der Ethik. Berlin, 1877. 

E. Arnoldt, Kant's Idee vom höchsten Gut. Königsberg, 1874. 

B, Pünjer, Die Beligionsphilosophie Kaufs. Jena, 1874. 

[N. Porter, KanVs Ethics. Chicago, 1886.] 

[J. G. Schurmann, Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution. Lend. 1882.] 

The synthetic function in the theoretical reason is the combina- 
tion of mental presentations into perceptions, judgments, and Ideas. 
The practical synthesis is the relating of the will to a presented con- 
tent, by which this latter becomes an end. This relating Form Kant 
carefully excluded from the primary conceptions of the knowing 
understanding ; it is instead the fundamental category of the practical 
v^e of the reason. It gives no objects of knowledge, but instead, 
objects of will. 

1. For the critique of the reason there rises from this the prob- 
lem, whether there is a practical synthesis a priori, that is, whether 
there are necessary and universally valid objects of milling ; or whether 
anything is to be found which the reason makes its end or demands 
a priori, without any regard to empirical motives. This universal and 
accessary object of the practical reason we call the moral law. 

For it is clear for Kant from the outset, that the activity of pure 
reason in proposing ends to itself, if there is any such activity, must 
appear as a command, in the form of the imperative, as over against 
the empirical motives of will and action. The will directed toward 
the particular objects and relations of experience is determined by 
these and dependent upon them ; the pure rational will, on the con- 
trary, can be determined only through itself. It is hence necessarily 
directed toward something else than the natural impulses, and this 
something else, which the moral law requires as over against oui 
inclinations, is called duty. 

Hence the predicates of ethical judgment concern only this kind 
of determination of the will; they refer to the disposition, not to 
jhe act or to its external consequences. Nothing in the world, says 
Kant,^ can be called good without qualification except a Good Will ; 
and this remains good even though its execution is completely 
restrained by external causes. Morality as a quality of man is a 
disposition conformable to duty. 

2. But it becomes all the more necessary to investigate as to 

^ Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten^ I. (W., IV. 10 ff.) ; Abbott, p. 9. 

552 G-ermmi Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Pakt VI 

"whether there is such an a priori command of duty, and in what 
consists a law, to which obedience is required by the reason quite 
independently of all empirical ends. To answer this question Kant 
proceeds from the teleological connections of the actual volitional 
life. Experience of natural causal connections brings with it the 
consequence, that we are forced to will according to the syrithetic 
relation of end and means, one thing for the sake of another. From 
practical reflection on such relations arise (technical) rules of dex- 
terity and ("practical") counsels of prudence. They all assert, 
" If you will this or that, then you must proceed thus or so." They 
are on this account hypothetical imperatives. They presuppose a 
volition as actually present already, and demand on the ground of 
this the further act of will which is required to satisfy the first. 

But the moral law cannot be dependent upon any object of will 
already existing in experience, and moral action must not appear as 
means in service of other ends. The requirement of the moral 
command must be propounded and fulfilled solely for its own sake. 
It does not appeal to what the man already wishes on other grounds, 
but demands an act of will which has its worth in itself only, and 
the only truly moral action is one in which such a command is 
fulfilled without regard to any other consequences. The moral law 
is a command absolute, a categorical imperative. It holds uncondition- 
ally and absolutely, while the hypothetical imperatives are only 

If now it is asked, what is the content of the categorical impera- 
tive, it is clear that it can contain no empirical element : the demand 
of the moral law does not stand in relation to the " matter of the 
act of will." For this reason happiness is not adapted to be the 
principle of morals, for the striving after happiness is already ^ 
present empirically, it is not a demand of reason. Eudaemonistic \ 
morals leads, therefore, to merely hypothetical imperatives ; for it, 
the ethical laws are only " counsels of prudence or sagacity " advis- 
ing the best method of going to work to satisfy the natural will. 
But the demand of the moral law is just for a will other than the 
natural will ; the moral law exists for a higher purpose than to ' 
make us happy. If Nature had wished to place our destiny and 
vocation in happiness, it would have done better to equip us with 
infallible instincts than with the practical reason of conscience, 
which is continually in conflict with our impulses.^ The "happiness 
morals " is even, for Kant, the type of false morals, for in this the 
law always is that I should do something because I desire something 

1 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, IV. 12 f. ; Abbott, p. 11. 

Chap. 1, § 39.] Categorical Imperative : Autonomy. 553 

else. Every such system of morals is heteronomous ; it makes the 
practical reason dependent upon some thing given outside of itself, 
and this reproach applies to all attempts to seek the principle of 
morality in metaphysical conceptions, such as that of perfection. 
The theological morals is completely rejected by Kant with the 
greatest energy, for it combines all kinds of heteronomy when it 
sees the sanction in the divine will, the criterion in utility, and the 
motive in the expectation of reward and punishment. 

3. The categorical imperative must be the expression of the 
autonomy of the practical reason, i.e. of the pure self-determination 
of the rational will. It concerns, therefore, solely the Form of 
willing, and requires that this should be a universally valid law. 
The will is heteronomous if it follows an empirically given impulse ; 
it is autonomous only where it carries out a law given it by itself. 
The categorical imperative demands, therefore, that instead of act- 
ing according to impulses we should rather act according to maxims, 
and according to such as are adapted for a universal legislation for 
all beings who will rationally. " Act as if the maxim from which 
you act were to become through your will a universal law oj 

This purely formal principle of conformity to law gains a mate- 
rial import by reflection upon the various kinds of worths. In the 
kingdom of ends that which is serviceable for some end, and can 
therefore be replaced by something else, has a price, but that only 
has worth or dignity, which is absolutely valuable in itself, and is 
the condition for the sake of which other things may become valu- 
able. This worth belongs in the highest degree to the moral law 
itself, and, therefore, the motive which stimulates man to obey this 
law must be nothing but reverence for the law itself. It would be 
dishonoured if it were fulfilled for the sake of any external advan- 
tage. The worth or dignity of the moral law, moreover, passes over 
to the man who is determined by this alone in the whole extent of 
his experience, and is able to determine himself by the law itself, 
to be its agent, and to identify himself with it. Hence reverence for 
the worth of man is for Kant the material principle of moral science. 
Man should do his duty not for the sake of advantage, but out of 
reverence for himself, and in his intercourse with his fellow-man he 
should make it his supreme maxim, never to treat him as a mere 
means for the attainment of his own ends, but always to honour in 
him the wo7'th of personality. 

From this Kant deduces a proud and strict system of morals ^ in 

^ Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, "W., V. 221 fi. 

554 Grerman Philosophy : Kan€s Critique. [Part VI. 

■which, as set forth in his old age, we cannot fail to discern the 
features of rigourism and of a certain pedantic stiffness. But the 
fundamental characteristic of the contrast between duty and incUnOr 
tion lies deeply rooted in his system. The principle of autonomy 
recognises as moral, only acts of will done in conformity to duty, 
and wholly out of regard for maxims ; it sees in all motivation of 
moral action by natural impulses a falsification of pure morality. 
Only that which is done solely from duty is moral. The empirical 
impulses of human nature are, therefore, in themselves, ethically 
indifferent ; but they become bad as soon as they oppose the demand 
of the moral law, and the moral life of man consists in realising the 
command of duty in the warfare against his inclinations. 

4. The self-determination of the rational will is, therefore, the 
supreme requirement and condition of all morality. But it is impos- 
sible in the realm of the experience which is thought and known 
through the categories : for this experience knows only the deter- 
mination of each individual phenomenon by others ; self-determina- 
tion, as the power to begin a series of the conditioned, is impossible 
according to the principles of cognition. This power with reference 
to the will we call freedom, as being an action which is not conditioned 
by others according to the schema of causality, but which is deter- 
mined only through itself, and is on its part the cause of an endless 
series of natural processes. Hence if the theoretical reason, whose 
knowledge is limited to experience, had to decide as to the reality 
of freedom, it would necessarily deny it, but would thereby reject 
also the possibility of the moral life. But the Critique of Pure 
Reason has shown that the theoretical reason cannot assert any- 
thing whatever as to things-in-themselves, and that, accordingly, 
there is no contradiction in thinking the possibility of freedom for 
the supersensuous. But as it is evident that freedom must necessa- 
rily be real if morality is to be possible, the reality of things-in-them- 
selves and of the supersensuous, which for the theoretical reason must 
remain always merely problematical, is herewith guaranteed. 

This guarantee is, to be sure, not that of a proof, but that of a 
postulate. It rests upon the consciousness; tho^i canst, for thou 
oughtest. Just so truly as thou feelest the moral law within thee, 
so truly as thou believe st in the possibility of following it, so truly 
must thou also believe in the conditions for this, viz. autonomy and 
freedom. Freedom is not an object of knowledge, but an object of 
faith, — but of a faith which holds as universally and necessarily in 
the realm of the supersensuous, as the principles of the understand- 
ing hold in the realm of experience, — an a priori faith. 

Thus the practical reason becomes completely independent of the 

Chap. 1, § 39.] Oategorical Imperative : Freedom. 555 

theoretical. In previous philosophy " the primacy " of the theoreti- 
cal over the practical reason had prevailed ; knowledge had been 
assigned the work of determining whether and how there is freedom, 
and accordingly of deciding as to the reality of morality. Accord- 
ing to Kant, the reality of morality is the fact of the practical reason, 
and, therefore, we must believe in freedom as the condition of its 
possibility. From this relation results, for Kant, the primacy of the 
practical over the theoretical reason; for the former is not only capa- 
ble of guaranteeing that which the latter must decline to vouch for, 
but it appears also that the theoretical reason in those Ideas of the 
unconditioned in which it points beyond itself (§ 38, 9) is deter- 
mined by the needs of the practical reason. 

Thus there appears with Kant, in a new and completely original 
form, the Platonic doctrine of the two worlds of the sensuous and the 
supersensuous, of phenomena and things-in-themselves. Knowledge 
controls the former, faith the latter; the former is the realm of 
necessity, the latter the realm of freedom. The relation of antithesis 
and yet of mutual reference, which exists between these two worlds, 
shows itself best in the nature of man, who alone belongs in like 
measure to both. So far as man is a member of the order of Nature 
he appears as empirical character — i.e. in his abiding qualities as well 
as in his individual decisions — as a necessary product in the causal 
connection of phenomena; but as a member of the supersensuous 
world he is intelligihle character, i.e. a being whose nature is decided 
by free self-determination within itself. The empirical character is 
only the manifestation, which for the theoretical consciousness is 
bound to the rule of causality, of the intelligible character, whose 
freedom is the only explanation of the feeling of responsibility as it 
appears in the conscience. 

5. But freedom is not the only postulate of a jmori faith. The 
relations between the sensuous and the moral world demand yet 
a more general bond of connection, which Kant finds in the concep- 
tion of the highest good.^ The goal of the sensuous will is happiness; 
the goal of the ethical will is virtue ; these two cannot sustain to 
each other the relation of means to end. The striving after happi- 
ness does not make an act virtuous ; and virtue is neither permitted 
to aim at making man happy, nor does it actually do so. Between 
the two no causal relation exists empirically, and ethically no teleo- 
logical connection can be permitted to enter. But since man belongs 
as well to the sensuous as to the ethical world, the " highest good " 
must consist for him in the union of viHue and happiness. This 


Critique of Prac. Beason, Dialectic, W., IX. 225 ff.; [Abbott, 202 fi.]. 

656 G-erman Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Part VI 

last synthesis of practical conception, however, can be morally 
thought only in the form that virtue alone is worthy of happiness. 

The demand of the moral consciousness, here expressed, is never- 
theless not satisfied by the causal necessity of experience. Natural 
law is ethically indifferent, and affords no guarantee that virtue 
will necessarily lead to happiness ; on the contrary, experience 
teaches rather that virtue requires renunciation of empirical happi 
ness, and that want of virtue is capable of being united with tem- 
poral happiness. If, therefore, the ethical consciousness requires 
the reality of the highest good, faith must reach beyond the empirical 
life of man, and beyond the order of Nature, on into the super- 
sensuous. It postulates a reality of personality which extends 
beyond the temporal existence — the immortal life — and a moral 
order of the universe, which is grounded in a Supreme Beason — in 

Kant's moral proof for freedom, immortality, and God is, there- 
fore, not a proof of knowledge, but of faith. Its postulates are the 
conditions of the moral life, and their reality must be believed in 
as fully as the reality of the latter. But with all this they remain 
knowable theoretically, as little as before. 

6. The dualism of Nature and morality appears with Kant in its 
baldest form in his Philosophy of Religion, the principles of which, 
agreeably to his theory of knowledge, he could seek only in the 
practical reason ; universality and necessity in relation to the super- 
sensuous are afforded only by the ethical consciousness. Only that 
can be a priori in religion, which is based upon morals. Kant's 
religion of reason is, therefore, not a natural religion, but " moral 
theology." Eeligion rests upon conceiving moral laws as divine 

This religious form of morality Kant develops once more from 
the twofold nature of man. There are in him two systems of im- 
pulses, the sensuous and the moral ; on account of the unity of the 
willing personality neither can be without relation to the other. 
Their relation should be, according to the moral demand, that of 
the subordination of the sensuous impulses to the moral; but as 
a matter of fact, according to Kant, the reverse relation naturally 
obtains with man,^ and since the sensuous impulses are evil as soon 
as they even merely resist the moral, there is in man a natural bent 

1 The pessimistic conception of man's natural essence doubtless has with 
Kant its occasion in his religious education ; but he guards himself expressly 
against the identification of his doctrine of the radical evil with the theological 
conception of hereditary sin; cf. Rel. innerh. d. Grenze d. r. F., I. 4 j W., VL 
201 ff. ; [Abbott, p. 347]. 

Chap. 1, § 39.] Categorical Imperative : Religion^ haw. 557 

to evil. This " radical evil " is not necessary ; for otherwise there 
would be no responsibility for it. It is inexplicable, but it is a fact ; 
it is a deed of intelligible freedom. The task which follows from 
this for man is the reversal of the moving springs, which is to be 
brought about by the warfare between the good and evil principle 
within him. But in the above-described perverted condition, the 
brazen majesty of the moral law works upon man with a terror that 
dashes him down, and he needs, therefore, to support his moral 
motives, faith in a divine power, which imposes upon him the moral 
law as its command, but also grants him the help of redeeming love to 
enable him to obey it. 

From this standpoint Kant interprets the essential portions of 
Christian doctrine into a "pure moral religion," viz. the ideal of 
the moral perfection of man in the Logos, redemption through 
vicarious love, and the mystery of the new birth. He thus restores 
to their rightful place, from which they had been displaced by the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment, the truly religious motives which 
are rooted in the felt need of a redemption, — though he does this 
in a form which is free from the historical faith of orthodoxy. But 
the true Church, for him also, is only the invisible, the moral king- 
dom of God, the ethical community of the redeemed. The historical 
manifestations of the moral community of men are the Churches ; 
they need the means of revelation and of " statutory " faith. But 
they have the task of putting this means into the service of the 
moral life, and if instead of this they lay the main weight upon the 
statutory, they fall into service for a reward, and into hypocrisy. 

7. It is connected with his restriction of ethical judgment by 
making it apply only to the disposition, that in his Philosojjhy of 
Bight Kant pursued that direction which treats the same, so far 
as possible, independently of morals. Kant distinguished (even 
with regard to ethical valuation) between morality of disposition and 
legality of action, between voluntary obedience to the moral law 
and external conformity of action to what is demanded by posi- 
tive law. Actions are subject to compulsion, dispositions never. 
While morals speaks of the duties of the disposition, law or right 
is employed with the external duties of action which can be en- 
forced, and does not ask as to the disposition with which they are 
fulfilled or broken. 

And yet Kant makes freedom, which is the central conception of 
his whole practical philosophy, the basis also of his science of right. 
Tor right or law is also a demand of the practical reason, and has in 
this its a priori, valid principle : it cannot therefore be deduced as 
a product of empirical interest, but must be understood from the 

558 G-erman PMlosophy : Kaufs Critique. [Part VL 

general rational vocation or destiny of man. This latter is the 
vocation to freedom. The community of men consists of those 
beings that are destined for ethical freedom, but are yet in the 
natural state of caprice or arbitrary will, in which they mutually 
disturb and check each other in their spheres of activity. Law has 
for its task to establish the conditions under which the will of the 
one can be united with the will of another according to a universal 
law of freedom, and, by enforcing these conditions, to make sure 
the freedom of personality. 

From this principle follows analytically, according to Kant's 
deduction, all private law, public law, and international law. At 
the same time, it is interesting to observe how the principles of his 
theory of morals are everywhere authoritative in this construction. 
Thus, in private law it is a far-reaching principle — corresponding 
to the categorical imperative — that man must never be used as a 
thing. So, too, the penal law of the state is grounded not by the 
task of maintaining the state of right, but by the ethical necessity 
of retribution. 

Law in a state of nature is therefore valid only in a provisory 
way J it is completely, or, as Kant says, peremptorily, valid, only 
when it can be certainly enforced, that is, in the state. The supreme 
rule for justice in the state, Kant finds in this, that nothing should 
be decreed and carried out which might not have been resolved 
upon if the state had come into existence by a contract. The con- 
tract theory is here not an explanation of the empirical origin of 
the state, but a norm for its task. This norm can be fulfilled with 
any kind of constitution, provided only law really rules, and not 
arbitrary caprice. Its realisation is surest if the three public 
functions of legislation, administration and judicial procedure are 
independent of each other, and if the legislative power is organised 
in the " republican " form of the representative system, — a pro- 
vision which is not excluded by a monarchical executive. It is only 
by this means, Kant thinks, that the freedom of the individual wiU 
be secured, so far as this can exist without detriment to the freedom 
of others ; and not until all states have adopted this constitution can 
the state of Nature in which they now find themselves in their rela- 
tions to each other, give place to a state of law. Then, too, the law 
of nations, which is now only provisory, will become " peremptory." 

Upon foundations of philosophy of religion and philosophy of 
law is built up, finally, Kant's theory of history} This took form 

1 Cf. besides the treatises cited on pp. 417-422, the treatises, Idea of a Uni- 
versal History from a Cosmopolitical Point of View (1784) [tr. by Hastie in 

Chap. 1, § 40.] N'atural Purposiveness. 559 

in dependence upon the theories of Rousseau and Herder, a depend- 
ence which follows from the antithesis between those authors. 
Kant can see in history neither the aberration from an originally 
good condition of the human race, nor the necessary, self -intelligible 
development of man's original constitution. If there ever was a 
primitive paradisiacal state of humanity, it was the state of inno- 
cence in which man, living entirely according to his natural impulses, 
was as yet entirely unconscious of his ethical task. The beginning 
of the work of civilisation, however, was possible only through a break 
with the state of Nature, since it was in connection with its trans- 
gression that the moral law came to consciousness. This (theoret- 
ically incomprehensible) "Fall" was the beginning of history. 
Natural impulse, previously ethically indifferent, now became evil, 
and was to be opposed. 

Since then the progress of history has consisted not in a growth of 
human happiness, but in approximation to ethical perfection, and in 
the extension of the rule of ethical freedom. With deep earnestness 
Kant takes up the thought that the development of civilisation suc- 
ceeds only at the cost of individual happiness. He who takes this 
latter for his standard must speak only of a retrogression in history. 
The more complicated relations become, the more the vital energy 
of civilisation grows, by so much the more do individual wants 
increase, and the less is the prospect of satisfying them. But just 
this refutes the opinion of the Enlighteners, as if happiness were 
man's vocation. The ethical development of the whole, the control 
of practical reason, grows in an inverse ratio to the empirical satis- 
faction of the individual. And since history represents the outer 
social life of humanity, its goal is the completion of right and law, 
the establishing of the best political constitution among all peoples, 
perpetual peace — a goal whose attainment, as is the case with all 
ideals, lies at an infinite distance. 

§ 40. Natural Purposiveness. 

A. Stadler, Kaufs Teleologie. Berlin, 1874. 

H. Cohen, Kanfs Begründung der Ästhetik. Berlin, 1889. 

[J. H. Tufts, The Sources and Development ofKanfs Teleology. Chicago, 1892.] 

By his sharp formulation of the antithesis of Nature and Free- 
dom, of necessity and purposiveness (or adaptation to ends), thb 

Principles of Polities'] ; Becension von Herder's Ideen (1785); Muthmasslicher 
Anfang der Weltgeschichte (1786) ; Das Ende aller Dinge (1794). 

560 Grerman Philosophy : Kant's Critique. [Part VI. 

theoretical aud practical reason diverge so widely in Kant's system, 
that the unity of the reason seems endangered. The critical phil- 
osophy needs, therefore, in a manner that prefigures the methodical 
development of its system,^ a third principle that shall afford a defin- 
itive mediation, and in which the synthesis of the above opposites 
shall be effected. 

1. Psychologically, the sphere in which this problem is to be 
solved can, in accordance with the triple division adopted by Kant 
(cf. § 36, 8) , be only the faculty of feeling or " approval." This, in fact, 
takes an intermediate position between ideation and desire. Feeling 
or approval presupposes a complete idea of the object, — complete 
in the theoretical sense, — and sustains a synthetic relation to this ; 
and this syyithesis as a feeling of pleasure or pain, or as approval or 
disapproval, always expresses in some way that the object in ques- 
tion is felt by the subject to be either purposive, i.e. adapted to its 
end, or not to the purpose. 

The standard of this valuation may have existed beforehand as a 
conscious design, forming thus a case of intentional volition, and in 
such cases the objects are termed useful or injurious ; but there are 
also feelings which, without being referred to any conscious purposes 
whatever, characterise their objects immediately as agreeable or dis- 
agreeable, and in these also a determination with reference to an 
end must be somehow authoritative. 

The critique of the reason, accordingly, has to ask. Are there 
feelings a p)riori, or approvals that have universal and necessary valid- 
ity? and it is clear that the decision upon this case is dependent 
upon the natui-e of the ends which determine the feelings and 
approvals in question. With regard to the purposes of the will, this 
question has been already decided by the Critique of the Practiced 
Reason; the only end of the conscious will which has a priori 
validity is the fulfilling of the categorical imperative, and on this 
side, therefore, only the feelings of approval or disapproval in which 
we employ the ethical predicates " good " and " bad," can be regarded 
as necessary and universally valid. For this reason the new prob- 
lem restricts itself to the a priori character of those feelings in 
which no conscious purpose or design precedes. But these, as may 
be seen from the beginning, are the feelings of the Beautiful and the 

2. But the problem widens upon another side, when we take into 
consideration the logical functions which are concerned in all feel- 

1 Cf. note at the close of the Introduction of the Critique of Judgment., W., 
VII. 38 f. 

Chap. 1, § 40.] Natural Purposiveness : the Judgment. 561 

ings and approyals. The judgments in which these are expressed 
are evidently all synthetic. Predicates such as agreeable, useful, 
beautiful, and good, are not analytically contained in the subject, 
but express the worth of the object with reference to an end ; they 
are estimations of adaptation, and contain in all cases the subor- 
dination of the object to its end. Now in the psychological scheme 
which lies at the basis of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant desig- 
nates the faculty of subsuming the particular under the general by 
the name Judgment. And this, too, was regarded as playing among 
the theoretical functions, also, the mediating part between Keason 
and Understanding, in such a sort that the former gives principles, 
the latter objects, while the Judgment performs the task of applying 
the principles to the objects. 

But in its theoretical use the Judgment is analytical, since it 
determines its objects by general conceptions according to rules 
of formal logic ; the attainment of a correct conclusion depends only 
on finding the appropriate minor for a given major, or vice versa. 
In contrast with this determining Judgment, which thus needs no 
" Critique," Kant sets the reflecting Judgment, in the case of which 
the synthesis consists just in subordination to an end. And accord- 
ingly the problem of the Critique of the Judgment takes this formu- 
lation : Is it a priori possible to judge Nature to be adapted to an end f 
Evidently this is the highest synthesis of the critical philosophy ; 
the application of the category of the practical reason to the object of 
the theoretical. It is clear from the outset that this application itself 
can be neither theoretical nor practical, neither a knowing nor a 
willing : it is only a looking at Nature from the point of vieio of pur- 
posiveness or adaptation to ends. 

If the reflecting Judgment gives to this contemplation the direc- 
tion of judging Nature with regard to her adaptation to the contem- 
plating subject as such, it proceeds cesthetically, i.e. having regard to 
our mode of feeling or sensibility ; ^ if, on the contrary, it regards 
Nature as if she were purposive in herself, then it proceeds teleologi- 
cally in the narrower sense, and so the Critique of the Judgment is 
divided into the investigation of aesthetic and teleological prob- 

3. In the first part Kant is primarily concerned to separate the 
aesthetic judgment with exactness from the kinds of judgments of 
feeling or approval which border upon it on both sides, and to this 
end he proceeds from the point of view of the feeling of the beauti- 

1 Empfindung sweise ; thus Kant justifies his change in terminology, W., VIL 
28 ff. ; cf . II. 60 f. and above, p. 483 f. 

562 G-erman Philosophy : Kanfs Critique. [Part VL 

ful. The beautiful shares with the good the a priori character, but 
the good is that which agrees with the end presented as a norm in 
the moral law, while the beautiful, on the contrary, pleases zoithout 
a conception. For this reason, also, it is impossible to set up a 
universal criterion which shall contain a content according to which 
beauty shall be judged with logical clearness. An aesthetic doctrine 
is impossible ; there is only a " Critique of the Taste,'' that is, an 
investigation as to the possibility of the a priori validity of aesthetic 

On the other hand, the beautiful shares with the agreeable its 
conceptionless quality, the absence of a conscious standard of 
judgment, and, therefore, the immediacy of the impression. But 
the distinction here lies in the fact that the agreeable is something 
individually and contingently gratifying, whereas the beautiful 
forms the object of universal and necessary pleasure.'^ The princi- 
ple that there is no disputing over tastes, is true only in the sense 
that in matters of taste nothing is to be effected by proofs with con- 
ceptions, but this does not exclude the possibility of an appeal to 
universally valid feelings. 

Finally, the beautiful distinguishes itself from both the good and 
the agreeable, in that it is the object of a completely disinterested 
pleasure. This appears in the circumstance that the empirical reality 
of its object is a matter of complete indifference for the aesthetic 
judgment. The hedonic feelings all presuppose the material presence 
of the phenomena which excite them ; ethical approval or disapproval 
concerns just the realisation of the moral end in willing and acting ; 
the aesthetic feelings, on the contrary, require as their condition a 
pure delight in the mere represented image of the object, whether the 
same is objectively present for knowledge or not. The aesthetic life 
lacks the power of the feelings of personal weal and woe, just as it 
lacks the earnestness of a universally worthy work for ethical ends ; 
i.t is the mere 2jlay of ideas in the imagination. 

Such a delight which relates not to the object, but only to tht 
image of the object, cannot concern the objective material of the object, 
— for this always stands in relation to the interests of the subject, 
— but only the form in which the object is presented to the mind; 
and in this, therefore, if anywhere, is to be sought the ground of the 
a priori synthesis which belongs to the aesthetic judgments. The 
purposiveness of aesthetic objects cannot consist in their adaptation 
to some interest or other ; it can be only in their adaptation to the 

1 Cf. F. Blencke, KanVs Unterscheidung des Schönen vom Angenehmen 
(Strassburg, 1889), where the analogy to the judgments of perception and of 
experience is emphasised. 

Chap. 1, § 40.] Natural Furposiveness : Beauty. 563 

knowing Forms, by the aid of which they are imaged in the mind. 
But the faculties which are active in presenting every object are 
sensibility and understanding. The feeling of beauty arises, there- 
fore, in connection with those objects in the apprehension of which 
in the imagination sensibility and understanding co-operate in 
harmonious manner. Such objects are purposive with regard to 
their working upon our ideational activity, and to this relates the 
disinterested delight which manifests itself in the feeling of their 

But this relation to the formal principles of objective ideation 
has its ground, not in merely individual activities, but in the 
" consciousness in general," in the " supersensuous substrate of 
humanity." On this account the feeling of a fitness or purposive- 
ness of objects with reference to this consciousness in general is 
universally communicable, though not capable of proof by concep- 
tions, and from this is explained the a priori character of the 
aesthetic judgments. 

4. While the "undesigned fitness" or appropriateness of the 
beautiful is thus set in relation with the working of the object upon 
the cognitive functions, Kant conceives the nature of the sublime 
from the point of view of an adaptation of the working of the object 
to the relation between the sensuous and supersensuous parts of 
human nature. 

While the beautiful signifies a delightful rest in the play of the 
knowing faculties, the impression of the sublime is effected through 
the medium of a painful feeling of inadequacy. In the presence of 
the immeasurable greatness or overpowering might of objects, we 
feel the inability of our sensuous perception to master them, as an 
oppression and a casting down; but the supersensuous power of 
our reason raises itself above this our sensuous insufficiency. If 
here the imagination has to do only with extensive magnitudes, — 
the mathematically sublime, — then the firmly shaping activity of 
the theoretical reason gains the victory ; but if, on the contrary, it 
has to do with the relations of power, — the dynamically sublime, — 
then the superiority of our moral worth to all the power of Nature 
comes to consciousness. In both cases the discomfort over our sen- 
suous inferiority is richly outweighed and overcome by the triumph 
of our higher rational character. And since this is the appropriate 

1 [A fragment published by Eeicke in his Lose Blätter aus KanVs Nachlass 
(B. II. p. 112) shows that Kant at one time connected this adaptation with the 
psychological and physiological conception of a general furtherance of life, 
whether through the senses or through the play of intellectual faculties. Cf. 
J. H. Tufts, op. cit., p. 35 f.] 

664 Crerman Philosophy : Kantus Critique. [Part VI. 

relation of the two sides of our being, these objects have an exalting, 
"subliming" effect, and produce the feeling of a delight of the reason, 
and this feeling, again, because it is based only upon the relation of 
our ideational Forms, is universally communicable and of a priori 

5. Kant's aesthetic theory, accordingly, in spite of its "subjec- 
tive " point of departure, takes essentially the course of an explana- 
tion of the beautiful and the sublime in Nature ; and determines the 
same through the relation of the ideational Forms. Hence the 
philosopher finds pure beauty only where the aesthetic judgment 
relates solely to forms that have no meaning. "Where with the 
delight there is mingled a regard for the meaning of the forms for 
any norm whatever, however indefinite, there we have dependent 
beauty. This appears everywhere where the aesthetic judgment is 
directed toward objects in which our thought puts a reference to an 
end. Such norms of dependent beauty rise necessarily as soon as we 
contemplate in the individual phenomenon the relation to the class 
which it represents. There is no norm of beauty for landscapes, 
arabesques, or flowers, but there may be such perhaps for the higher 
types of the organic world. Such norms are aesthetic ideals, and the 
true ideal of the aesthetic judgment is man. 

The presentation of the ideal is art, the power of aesthetic produc- 
tion. But while this is a function of man which is performed with 
reference to an end, its product will make the impression of the beau- 
tiful only when it appears as undesigned, disinterested, and free 
from the attempt to represent a conception, as is the case with the 
beauty of Nature. Technical art produces structures corresponding 
to definite ends according to rules and designs, — structures which 
are adapted to satisfy definite interests. Fine art must work upon 
the feeling as does a purposeless product of Nature; it must "be 
able to be regarded as Nature." 

This, therefore, is the secret of artistic creation, and the character- 
istic element in it, viz. that the mind which builds with a purpose 
works, nevertheless, in the same way as Nature, which builds with- 
out designs and disinterestedly. The great artist does not create 
according to general rules ; he creates the rules themselves in his 
involuntary work ; he is original and prototypal. Genius is an in- 
telligence that worTcs like Nature. 

In the realm of man's rational activity the desired synthesis of 
freedom and nature, of purposiveness and necessity, of practical and 
theoretical function, is then represented by genius, which with 
undesigning purposiveness or appropriateness creates the work of 
fine art. 

Chap. 1, § 40.] Natural Purposiveness : Organisms. 565 

6. In the Critique of the Teleological Judgment the most promi- 
nent task is to establish the relations which, from the points of view 
of transcendental idealism, exist between the scientific explanation 
of Nature and the consideration of the adaptation that dwells within 
her. The theory of natural science can in all lines be only mechanical. 
" End " {Zweck) is not a category or a constitutive principle of 
objective knowledge : all explanation of Nature consists in pointing 
out the causal necessity with which one phenomenon produces 
another ; a phenomenon can never be made intelligible by emphasis- 
ing its adaptation or fitness. Such "lazy" teleology is the death of 
all philosophy of Nature. The apprehension of purposiveness can, 
therefore, never profess to be an act of knowledge. 

But, on the other hand, the standpoint of the mechanical explana- 
tion of Nature would give us the right to completely reject teleologi- 
cal consideration of Nature, only in case we were in a position to 
make intelligible with the aid of scientific conceptions the whole 
system of experience, even to the last remnant, in principle at least. 
But should points be found where scientific theory is inadequate for 
the explanation of the given material, not indeed on account of the 
limited nature of the material hitherto available in human experi- 
ence, but on account of the permanent form of the principle which 
determines this material, then in these points the possibility of 
supplementing our knowledge by a teleological consideration must 
be conceded, if, at the same time, it appears that that which is 
mechanically inexplicable makes upon us the inevitable impression 
of the purposive. Critical teleology can, therefore, concern only the 
limiting conceptions of the mechanical explanation of Nature. 

The first of these is Life. A mechanical explanation of the organ- 
ism has not only not yet succeeded, but it is, according to Kant, 
impossible in principle. All life can be explained only through 
other life. We are to understand the individual functions of organ- 
isms through the mechanical connection of their parts with each 
other and with the environment ; but we shall always be obliged to 
bring into our account the peculiar nature of organised matter and 
its capacity of reaction, as a factor incapable of further reduction. 
An archaeologist of Nature may trace back the genealogy of life, the 
origination of one species from another according to mechanical prin- 
ciples as far as possible ; ^ he will always be obliged to stop with an 
original organisation which he cannot explain through the mere 
mechanism of inorganic matter. 


^ The passages, in which Kant anticipated the latter theory of descent, are 
collected in Fr. Schultze, Kant und Darioin (Jena, 1874). 

566 G-erman Philosophy : Kants Critique. [Part Vt 

This explanation is impossible because the essential nature of an 
organism is, that the -whole is determined by the parts just as th? 
part is determined by the whole, — that every member is both cause 
and effect of the whole. This reciprocal causality is rucomprehen- 
sible mechanically: the organism is the miracle in the world of 
experience.^ It is just this inter-related play of forms and forces 
which in the organism makes the impression of the purposive, or of 
adaptation to an end. Therefore the teleological view of organisms 
is necessary and universally valid. But it must never profess to be 
anything else than a mode of consideration. Thought must never 
be satisfied with this in an individual case ; but the insight into this 
purposeful activity must rather serve as a heuristic principle for 
seeking out the mechanical connections by which this purposeful 
vitality realises itself in each particular case. 

7. A second limit of the knowledge of Nature Kant designates 
by the name of the Specification of Nature. From pure reason arise 
the general Forms of the uniformity of Nature [i.e. causality, etc.], 
but only these. The particular laws of Nature do indeed range 
themselves beneath those general laws, but do not follow from them. 
Their particular content is only empirical, i.e. from the standpoint 
of pure reason it is contingent, and has only the force and validity 
of an actual matter of fact,^ [not that of a priori necessity]. It is 
never to be understood why there is just this and not some other 
content. But at the same time, this particular aspect of Nature 
proves completely purposive; on the one hand, with reference to 
our knowledge, since the wealth of the matter of fact in our experi- 
ence shows itself to be adapted to be ordered under the a priori 
Forms of experience, — and on the other hand, as purposive in itself, 
also, inasmuch as the whole varied multiplicity of the given fits 
together to form a concrete world of reality, which is objectively 

In this lie the reasons a priori for regarding Nature as a whole 
from the point of view of purposiveness, and for seeing in the vast 
mechanism of her causal connections the realising of a supreme end 
of reason. But in accordance with the primacy of the practical 
reason, this end can be none other than the moral laio, and thus the 
teleological consideration issues in the moral faith in the divine 

Finally, if we consider Nature as purposive, in the sense that in 

1 Cf. above, p. 480. 

2 Here Kant joins on in an extremely interesting manner to the latest specu- 
lations of the Leibnizian Monadology ; cf. above, p. 425 [cf. further on this point 
Ueher eine Entdeckung, etc., and J. Dewey, Leibniz^ s New Essays, last chapter]. 

Chap. 1, § 40.] 

Natural Purposiveness. 


it the universal Forms and the particular contents completely har- 
monise with each other, then the divine mind, as the reason which 
creates the content at the same time with its Forms, appears as 
intellectual perception or intuitive understanding} In this conception 
the ideas of the three Critiques run together. 

1 Critique of Judg., § 77. 
(;Halle, 1876). 

Cf. G. Thiele, Kantus Intellectuelle Anschauung 



E. Haym, Die romantische Schule. Berlin, 1870. 
[A. Seth, From Kant to Hegel. Lond. 1882.] 

The development of the principles won by Kant, to the compre- 
hensive systems of German philosophy, took place under the co- 
operation of very different kinds of circumstances. Externally, it 
was of primary importance that the doctrine of criticism, after 
at first experiencing the fortune of being neglected and misunder- 
stood, was first raised as a standard by the leading spirits of the 
university of Jena, and made the centre of a brilliant teaching 
activity. But in this lay the incitement to build out a unified and 
impressive system of instruction, the foundations of which Kant had 
laid by a careful separation and fine arrangement of philosophical 
problems. The systematic impulse ruled philosophical thought at 
no period so energetically as at this, and this was due in good part 
to the desires of an audience in a state of high and many-sided 
excitement, which demanded from the teacher a complete scientific 

But in Jena philosophy found itself close by Weimar, the resi- 
dence of Goethe, and the main literary city of Germany. In constant 
personal contact, poetry and philosophy mutually stimulated each 
other, and after Schiller had joined the thoughts of the two, their 
interaction became constantly more intimate and deep with their 
rapid forward movement. 

A third factor was of a purely philosophical nature. A coinci- 
dence that was rich in results willed that just at the time when the 
Critique of Eeason of the "all-crushing" Königsberger began to 
break its path, the most firmly articulated and most influential of 
all metaphysical systems, the type of " dogmatism," became known 
in Germany — Spinozism. Through the strife between Jacobi and 
Mendelssohn, which related to Lessing's attitude to Spinoza, the 
latter's doctrine was brought into the most lively interest, and thus, 


Chap. 2.] The Development of Idealism. 669 

in spite of the deep opposition which prevails between the two, 
Kant and Spinoza became the two poles about which the thought 
of the following generation moved. 

The predominance of the Kantian influence may be chiefly recog- 
nised in that the common character of all these systems is idealism ; ^ 
they all develop out of the antagonistic thoughts which were inter- 
woven in Kant's treatment of the conception thing-in-itself. After 
a short time of critical hesitation, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel took 
the lead in the unresting effort to understand the world as a System 
of Reason. Over against the bold energy of metaphysical specula- 
tion of these thinkers, which was extended by numerous disciples 
to a many-coloured variety, there appears in men like Schleier macher 
and Herhart the Kantian reminder of the limits of human knowl- 
edge; while, on the other hand, the same motive unfolded in the 
construction of a Metaphysics of the Irrational in Schelling's later 
doctrine, and with Schopenhauer. 

Common to all these systems, however, is the all-sidedness of 
philosophical interest, the wealth of creative thoughts, the fineness 
of feeling for the needs of modern culture, and the victorious power 
of an elaboration from the point of view of a principle, of the his- 
torical material of ideas. 

The Critique of the Pure Beason found little regard at first, and then later 
violent opposition. The most important impetus to this was given by Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819, finally President of the Munich Academy). Hia 
main treatise bears the title, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus 
tmd Bealismus (1787) ; in addition to this the treatise Ueber das Unternehmen 
des Kriticismus die Vernunft zu Verstände zu bringen (1802). The treatise 
Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung (1811) was directed against 
Schelling. Cf. also his introduction to his philosophical writings in the second 
volume of the complete edition (6 vols., Leips. 1812-1825). His main disciple 
was Fr. Koppen (1775-1858 ; Darstellung des Wesens der Philosophie, Nurem- 
berg, 1810 ; cf. on him the art. K. by W. Windelband in Ersch u. Oruber''s Enc). 

As further opponents of Kant are to be named Gottlob Ernst Schulze 
(1761-1823), the author of the anonymous writing, ^nesidemus oder über die 
Fundamente der Elementarphilosophie (1792), and of a Kritik der theoretischen 
Philosophie (Hamburg, 1801) ; J. G. Hamann (cf. above, p. 510), whose 
"review" of the Critique was first printed in 1801 in Keinhold's Beiträgen., 

1 Let it be remarked here at the outset that not only the main series of the 
development from Reinhold to Fichte, Schelling, Krause, Schleiermacher, and 
Hegel is idealistic, but also the series which is usually opposed to this, Herbart 
and Schopenhauer, in so far, that is, as by "idealism" is understood the 
dissolution or resolution {Arifl'ösung) of the world of experience in the process 
of consciousness. Herbart and Schopenhauer are "idealists" in the same 
degree as Kant; they posit things-in-themselves, but the world of the senses 
is to them also a "phenomenon of consciousness." With Schopenhauer this 
is usually noted. With Herbart, on the contrary, the circumstance that he 
called the things-in-themselves "Reals" (Beaten), in connection with the fact 
that for entirely other reasons he opposed the Fichte-Hegel line of thought, 
has led to the completely distorted and misleading mode of expression which 
has run through all previous text-books of the histoiy of philosophy, of terming 
his doctrine "realism," and him in opposition to the " idealists " a "realist." 

570 (jferman Philosophy, [Part VL 

and G, Herder in his treatise, Verstand und Vernunft, eine Metakritik zur 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1799), also in the KalUgone, 1800. 

Jac. Sig. Beck (1761-1842 ; Einzig möglicher Standpunkt, axis welchem die 
kritische Philosophie beurtheilt werden muss, Riga, 179ö) worked more posi- 
tively in the development of the Kantian doctrine, as did also Salomon Maiznon 
(died 1800 ; Versuch einer Transscendentalphilosophie, 1790 ; Versuch einer 
neuen Logik, 1794 ; Die Kategorien des Aristoteles, 1794 ; cf. J. Witte, 8. M., 
Berlin, 1876). 

In Jena the Kantian philosophy vras introduced by Professor Erh. Schmid ; 
its main organ was the Allgemeine Litter aturzeitung, wliich appeared there after 
1785, edited by Schütz and Hufeland. The greatest success for extending the 
doctrine of Criticism was gained by K. L. Reiuhold's Briefe über die kantische 
Philosophie, which first appeared in Wieland's Deutscher Merkur (1786). 

The same author begins also the series of re-shapings and transformations 
of the doctrine. Karl Leonh. Reinhold (1758-1823 ; fled from the cloister of 
the Barnabites in Vienna ; 1788, Professor in Jena ; from 1794 Professor in 
Kiel) wrote Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermö- 
gens (Jena, 1789) and Das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1791). 
Later, after many changes in his standpoint, he fell into fantasticalness and was 
forgotten. His teaching presented in his Jena period gave in crude outlines 
a superficially systematic exposition, which soon became the school-system of 
the "Kantians." To tear from forgetfulness the names of these numerous 
men is not for this place. 

Much finer, richer, and more independent was the work which Fr. Schiller 
gave to Kant's ideas. Of his philosophical writings are here principally to be 
named On Grace and Dignity, 1793 ; On the Sublime, 1793 ; Letters upon the 
uEsthetical Education of Man, 1795 ; On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 1796 
[Eng. tr. Bohn Library] . In addition to these the philosophical poems such as 
Die Künstler, Ideal und Leben, and the correspondence with Körner, Goethe, 
and W. V. Humboldt. Cf. K. Tomaschek, Sch. in seinem Verhältniss zur 
Wisse?ischaft, Vienna, 1862 ; K. Twesten, Sch. in seinem Verhältriiss zur Wis- 
senschaft, Berlin, 1863 ; Kuno Fischer, Sch. als Philosoph, 2d ed., 1891 ; Fr. 
Ueberweg, Sch. als Historiker und Philosoph, pub. by Brasch, Leips. 1884. 

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, born 1762, at Rammenau in Lusatia, educated in 
the "Princes' School" at Pforta and at the University of Jena, after he had 
experienced many changes of fortune as a private teacher and had become 
famous by his Kritik aller Offenbarung, which appeared by chance anony- 
mously, and was universally ascribed to Kant (1792), was called in 1794, while 
living in Zurich, to become Reinhold's successor as Professor at Jena. After a 
brilliant activity there, he was dismissed in 1799, on account of the "atheism 
controversy" (ci.\\\& Ap)i:)ellation an das Publicum &ndt\xe. Gerichtliche Verant- 
wortung sschrift) , and went to Berlin, where he came into connection with the 
Romanticists. In 1805 he was for a time assigned to the University of Erlangen ; 
in 1806 he went to Königsberg, and then returned to Berlin, where in the winter 
of 1807 to 1808 he delivered the Reden an die deutsche Nation. At the newly 
founded Berlin University he acted as Professor and as the first Rector. He 
died, 1814, of hospital fever. His main writings are Grundlage der gesammten 
Wissenschaftslehre, 1794 ; Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschafts- 
lehre, 1795 [these two, together with other minor works, are translated by 
A. E. Kroeger, under the title The Science of Knowledge, Lond. 1889] ; Natur- 
recht, 1796 [tr. by A. E. Koeger, The Science of Bights, Lond. 1889] ; the 
two Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, 1797 ; System der Sittenlehre, 1798 ; 
Die Bestimmung des Älenschen, 1800 ; Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, 1801 ; 
lieber das Wesen des Gelehrten, 1805 ; Grundzüge des gegenioärtigen Zeitalters, 
1806 ; Anweisung zum seligen Leben, 1806 [of the last five all but the second 
are trans, by W. Smith, Fichte^s Popular Works, Lond. 1889. There are also 
translations and criticisms in Jour, of Spec. Phil.'\ ; Works, 8 vols., Berlin, 
1845 f. ; Post, works, 3 vols., Bonn, 1834 ; Life and Correspondence, Sulzbach, 
1830 ; Correspondence with Schelling, Leips. 1856 ; cf. J. H. Löwe, Die Philos. 
Fichte'' s, Stuttgart, 1862 ; R. Adamson, Fichte, Loud. 1881 ; [also art. in Enc. 
Brit. ; C. C. Everett, Eichte's Science of Knowledge, Chicago, 1883]. 

Chap. 2.] Development of Idealism. 571 

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, horn, 1775, at Leonherg in Würtem- 
berg, came to Leipsic in 1796 after his education in Tübingen, was made Pro- 
fessor in Jena in 1798, and in Würzburg in 1803. Called in 1806 to the Munich 
Academy, and for a time (1820-1826) active at the Erlangen University, he 
entered in 1827 the newly founded University of Munich. From here he ac- 
cepted, in 1840, a call to Berlin, where he soon gave up his activity as a teacher. 
He died in 1854 in Ragaz. Cf. Aus Sch.''s Lehen in Briefen, ed. by Plitt, Leips. 
1869 f. ; Caroline, Briefe, etc., ed. by G. Waitz, Leips. 1871. ScheUing's devel- 
opment as philosopher and author falls into five periods : (1) Philosophy of 
Nature, Ideen zu einer Philos. der Natur, 1797 ; Von der Weltseele, 1798 ; 
Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799; (2) Esthetic Ideal- 
ism, Der transcendentale Idealismus, 1800 ; Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Kunst ; (3) Absolute Idealism, Darstellimg meines Systems der Philosophie, 
1801 ; Bruno, oder über das natürliche und göttliche Princip der Dinge, 1802 ; 
Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Stxidiums, 1803 ; (4) his 
Doctrine of Freedom, Philosophie und Beligion, 1804 ; Untersuchungen über 
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, 1809 ; Denkmal der Schrift Jacobfs von 
den göttlichen Dingen, 1812 ; (5) Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, 
Lectures in Part IL of the writings; Collected works, 14 vols., Stuttg. and 
Augsb. 1856-1861 ; [J. Watson, Schelling'' s Transcendental Idealism, Chicago, 
Griggs series]. 

Among the thinkers who stood in close relation to Schelling may be noticed, 
of the Romantic School, Fr. Schlegel (1772-1829; Characteristics and Criti- 
cisms in the "Athenseum," 1799 f. ; Lucinde, 1799; Philosophical Lectures, in 
the years 1804-6, ed. by Windischmann, 1836 f. ; Complete writings, 15 vols., 
Vienna, 1846 [Eng. tr. of the Philosophy of History and of the Philosophy of 
Life and of Language in Bohn Library]) and Novalis (Fr. v. Hardenberg, 
1772-1801), also K. W. F. Solger (1780-1819; Erwin, 1815; Philosophische 
Gespräche, 1817 ; Vorlesungen über Ästhetik, ed. by Heyse, 1829) ; further, 
Lor. Oken (1779-1851 ; Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, Jena, 1809 ; cf. A. 
Ecker, L. 0., Stuttgart, 1880) ; H. Steffens (1773-1845; a Norwegian, Grund- 
züge der philosophischen Naturioissenschaft, 1806), G. H. Schubert (1780- 
1860; Ahndungen einer allg. Geschichte des Lebens, 1806 f.), Franz Baader 
(1765-1841 ; Fermenta Cognitionis, 1822 ff. ; Speculative Dogmatik, 1827 ff. 
Complete writings with a biography ed. by Fr. Hoffmann, Leips. 1851 fi.) ; 
and finally, K. Chr. Fr. Krause (1781-1832 ; Entwurf des Systems der Philoso- 
phie, 1804 ; Urbild der Menschheit, 1811 ; Abriss des Systems der Philosophie, 
1825 ; Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie, 1828. Some years since an 
inexhaustible body of material has appeared from his literary remains, ed. by 
P. Hohlfeld and A. Wünsche. Cf. R. Eucken, Zur Erinnerung an K., Leips. 

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ScheUing's older friend, was bom, 1770, 
in Stuttgart, studied in Tübingen, was a private teacher in Berne and Frank- 
fort, and began, in 1801, his activity as a teacher in Jena, where, in 1805, he 
became Professor Extraordinary. After 1806 he became editor of a review 
in Bamberg, and in 1808 Gymnasium Director in Nuremberg. In 1816 he went 
as Professor to Heidelberg; in 1818 from there to Berlin, where he worked 
until his death in 1831 as the head of a school which extended with greater and 
greater brilliancy. Besides the articles published in the Kritische Journal der 
Philosophie, which he edited in connection with Schelling, he published Phäno- 
menologie des Geistes (1807) [tr. of chs. 1, 2, and 3 in Jour. Spec. Phil., Vol. 
II. ; tr. in prep, by J. Royce, Holt & Co., N.Y.] ; Wissenschaft der Logik 
(1812 ff.) [tr. of Vol. IL by W. T. Harris, HegeVs Doctrine of Befleotion'] ; 
Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817) [of this the Logic is 
trans, with Pi-olegomena by W. Wallace, Clar. Press, 1874, 2d ed., in 2 vols., 
1892] ; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Bechfs (1821). After 1827 the Jahr- 
bücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik was the organ of his school. His works, 
including his lectures edited by his students, were published in 18 vols. (Berlin, 
1832 ff.) [trans, of the Philosophy of History, by J. Sibree, Bohn Library ; of the 
Introd. to Phil, of Art, by B. Bosanquet (Lend. 1886) ; of the Phil, of Art, abr. 
by W, Hastie (Edin.), and of the second part of the same in Jour. Spec. Phil., 
Vols. V.-XIII. ; of the History of Philosophy, by E. S. Haldane, in 3 vols., 

672 Crerman : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

Vol. I. (Lond. 1892) ; of the Phil, of Beligion and of the State, in part in Jour. 
Spec. Phil., Vols. XV.-XXI.]. From the very extensive literature we may- 
name C. Rosenkranz, IT.'s Leben (Berlin, 1844), and H. als deutscher National- 
Philosoph (Berlin, 1870) [part, trans. G. S. Hall, St. Louis, 1876] ; R. Haym, 
H. und seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857) ; K. Köstlin, H. (Tübingen, 1870) ; J. Klaiber, 
Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel in ihren schwäbischen Jugendjahren (Stuttgart, 
1877) \_The Secret of Hegel, by J. H. Stirling (Lond. 1865), 2 vols. ; Hegel, by 
E. Caird (Edin. and Loud. 1883) ; Hegelianism and Personalitij , by Seth (Edin. 
and Lond., 2d ed., 1893); Critical Expositions in Griggs series (Chicago); of 
the uEsthetics, by J. S. Kedney (1885) ; of the Philosophy of the State and of 
History, by G. S. Morris (1887) ; and of the Logic, by W. T. Harris (1890) ; 
numerous articles in the Jour. Spec. Phil, cited in last-named work]. 

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, born, 1768, in Breslau, educated at 
the Herrnhuter educational institutions in Niesky and Barby, and at the 
University of Halle, after private positions took a vicarship in Landsberg, and 
in 1796 began his duties as preacher at the Berlin Charite. In 1802 he went 
as court preacher to Stolpe ; in 1804 as Professor Extraordinary to Halle ; in 
1806 returned to Berlin, where in 1809 he became preacher at the Dreifaltigkeits- 
kirche ; and in 1810 Professor at the University. He acquitted himself weU 
in both oSices, occupying at the time a successful position in the ecclesiastical 
movement (Union) until his death in 1834. His philosophical writings form 
the third part of his works collected after his death (Berlin, 1835 ff.). They 
contain his lectures on Dialectic, Esthetic, etc. ; among his writings are to 
be mentioned : Beden über die Beligion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern 
(1799) ; Monologen (1800) ; Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre 
(1803). The most important work, the Ethik, is given in the coll. works, in 
the edition by Al. Schweizer ; it is also published in an edition by A. Twesten 
(Berlin, 1841). — Cf. Aiis Sch.^s Leben in Briefen, ed. by L. Jonas and W. Dil- 
they, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1858-1863) ; W. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermacher'' s. Vol. I. 
(Berlin, 1870) [art. S. in Enc. Brit., J. F. Smith]. 

Johann Friedrich Herbart, born, 1776, at Oldenburg, educated there and at 
the Jena University, for a time private teacher in Berne and acquainted with 
Pestalozzi, became in 1802 Privatdocent in Gröttingen, was from 1809 to 1833 
Professor in Königsberg, and then returned to Göttingen as Professor, where 
he died, 1841. His main writings are : Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik (1806) ; 
Allgemeine praktische Philosophie (1808) ; Einleitung in die Philosophie (1813) ; 
Lehrbuch zur Psychologie (1816) [Eng. tr. by M. K. Smith, N.Y. 1891] ; Psycho- 
logie als Wissenschaft (1824 f.). Complete edition by G. Hartenstein, 12 vols. 
(Leips. 1850 ff.) ; in process of appearance, ed. by K. Kehrbach, since 1882. The 
pedagogical writings have been edited by 0. Willmann in 2 vols. (Leips. 1873 
and 1875). Cf. G. Hartenstein, Die Probleme und Grundlehren der allgemeinen 
Metaphysik (Leips. 1836) ; J. Kaftan, Sollen und Sein (Leips. 1872) ; J. Cape* 
sius, Die Metaphysik HerbarVs (Leips. 1878) [Ward, art. Herbart, in Enc 

Arthur Schopenhauer, born 1788 in Danzic, passed over somewhat late to 
philosophical life, studied in Göttingen and Berlin, received his degree in 1813 
at Jena with his treatise on tlie Fourfold Boot <f the Principle of Sufficient 
Beason, lived for a time at Weimar and Dresden, habilitated as Privatdocent 
in Berlin in 1820, but withdrew after he had won no success in a work as 
teacher which was frequently interrupted by journeys, and spent the rest of his 
life in private, after 1831, in Frankfort on the Main, where he died in 1860. 
His main work is Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819 [ITie World as 
Will and as Idea, tr. by R. B. Haidane and J. Kemp, Lond. and Boston, 3 
vols., 1884-86]. To this were attached Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 1836 ; 
Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1841 ; finally, Parerga und Paralipomena, 
1851. Complete edition in 6 vols. (Leips. 1873 f.), and since then frequently 
edited. [Tr. of the Fourfold Boot and of On the Will in Nature, by K. Hille- 
brand, Bohn Library, 2d ed., 1891 ; of selected essays by Bax, Bohn Library, also 
by T. B. Saunders, 5 vols., Lond. and N.Y., 3d ed., 1892.] Cf. W. Gwinner, 
Sch.'s Leben, 2d ed. (Leips. 1878) ; J. Frauenstädt, Briefe über die Sch.'sche 

Chap. 2, § 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Jacohi. 673 

Philosophie (Loijis. 1854) ; R. Seydel, Sch.'s System (Leips. 1857) ; A. Ilaym, 
Ä. Sell. (Berlin, 1804) ; G. Jellinok, Die Weltanschaimuf/en Leibniz'' und 
Schopenhauer'' s (Loips. 1872) [II. Zinunern, Schopenhauer, llis Life and Phil., 
Lond. 1870 ; J. Sully, Pessimism, 2d ed., Lond. 1891 ; Adaiiisuii in Mind, 1876]. 
By the side of the main metaphysical development runs a psychological 
side-line, a series of schools which, in an eclectic way, fre(iuently approached 
the iloclrines of the p'cat systems by the path of the i)sycholopcal method. 
Such is the relation to Kant and Jacobi of J. Fr. Fries (177:3-1843 ; Beinhold, 
Fichte und tSchelliny, 18();3 ; Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, 1805 ; Neue Kritik 
der Vernunft, 18U7"; Psychische Anthropologie, 1820 f. Cf. Kuno Fischer, Die 
beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena, Acad. Address, Stuttg. 1802), — to Kant and 
Fichte of AVilh. Trauti;. Krug (1770-1842 ; Organon der Philosophie, 1801 ; 
Handw'örterJtuch der philns. Wissenschaften, 1827 ff.), — to Fichte and Schelling 
of Fried. Bouterwek (170(;-1828 ; Apodiktik, 1709; vEsthetik, 1800), — and 
finally, to lltrbavt of Fr. Beneke (1798-1854 ; Psychologische Skizzen, 1825 
and 1827 ; Lehrbuch der Psychologie, als Nattirioissenschaß, 1832 ; Metaphysik 
U7id Eeligionsphilosophie, 1840 ; Die neue Psychologie, 1845). 

§ 41, The Thing-in-Itself. 

The compelling power which Kant's philosophy gained over the 
minds and hearts of men was due chiefly to the earnestness and 
greatness of its ethical conception of the world ; ^ the progress of 
thought, however, attached itself primarily to the new form which 
had been given to the principles of the theory of knowledge in the 
Critique of the Pure Reason. Kant took the antithesis of phenom- 
ena and uoumena from earlier philosophy ; but by his transcen- 
dental analytic he widened the realm of phenomena to include the 
whole compass of human knowledge, and the thing-in-itself survived 
only as a problematical conception, like a rudimentary organ, which 
might be indeed characteristic for the historical genesis of this 
theory of knowledge, but which performed no living function in it. 

1. This was first seen by Jacobi, when he confessed that without 
the presupposition of realism one could not enter the Kantian 
system, and with the same could not remain in it ; - for the concep- 
tion of the sensibility introduced at the beginning involves the 
causal relation of being affected by things-in-themselves, — a rela- 
tion which, according to the doctrine of the analytic that categories 
must not be applied to things-in-themselves, it is forbidden to think. 
In this contradiction of professing to think things-in-themselves 
and yet of not being permitted to think them, the whole critique of 
the reason moves ; and at the same time this contradictory assump- 
tion does not at all help to guarantee to our knowledge of phe- 
nomena even the slightest relation to truth. For, according to 
Kant, the mind presents to itself in thought "neither itself nor 

1 This is especially to be recognised from Reinhold's Briefen über die 
kant. Ph. 

2 Jacobi, W., II. 304. 

574 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

other things, but solely and alone that which is neither what the 
mind is itself, nor what other things are." ^ The faculty of cogni- 
tion hovers between a problematical X of the subject and an equally 
problematical X of the object. The sensibility has nothing behind 
it, and the understanding nothing before it; "in a twofold en- 
chanter's smoke, called space and time, rise the ghostly forms of 
phenomena or appearances in which nothing appears." ^ If we 
assume things, Kant teaches that knowledge has not the least to do 
with them. The critical reason is a reason busy about pure noth- 
ing, i.e. only about itself. If, therefore, criticism will not fall into 
nihilism or absolute scepticism, the transcendental idealist must 
have the courage to assert the " strongest " idealism ; ^ he must 
declare that only phenomena are. 

In the claim that what Kant calls the object of knowledge is in 
truth " nothing," inheres as a presupposition the same naive realism, 
the destruction of which was the great service of the transcendental 
analytic ; and the same realism determines also the epistemology of 
Faith, which Jacobi opposes to "the transcendental uncertainty," 
not without being entirely dependent upon it- All truth is knowl- 
edge of the actual ; but the actual asserts itself in human con- 
sciousness not through thought, but through feeling; just Kant's 
experiment proves that thought alone moves in a circle out of which 
there is no access to actuality, in an endless series of the condi- 
tioned in which no unconditioned is to be found. The fundamental 
law of causality may indeed be formulated in exactly this manner, 
viz. there is nothing unconditioned. Knoivledge, therefore, or thought 
that can be demonstrated, is in its very nature, as Jacobi says, 
Spinozism, — a doctrine of the mechanical necessity of all that is 
finite : and it is the interest of science that there be no G-od, — 
indeed, a God who could be known would be no God.* Even he 
who is in his heart a Christian must be in his head a heathen ; he 
who will bring into his intellect the light which is in his heart 
quenches it.^ But this knowledge is only a mediate knowing ; the 
true, immediate Jcnowing is feeling; in this we are truly one with the 
object,^ and possess it as we possess ourselves in the certainty of 
a faith that has no proof.^ This feeling, however, as regards its 
objects, is of a twofold kind; the reality of the sensuous reveals 
itself to us in perception, that of the supersensuous in the " reason.'^ 

1 Allimll, XV. ; W., I. 121. 2 ^^_^ m. m f. 

8 W., II. 310. * W., III. .384. 

5 To Hamann, I. 367. e w., II. 175. 

■^ Hume's conception of belief and his distinction of impressions and ideas 
(here called Vorstellungen) experience in this a noteworthy transformation. 

Chap. 2, § 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Fries^ Meinhold. 575 

For this supra-natural sensualism, therefore, " reason " signifies the 
immediate feeling of the reality of the supersensuous, of God, free- 
dom, morality, and immortality. In this limitation Kant's dualism 
of theoretical and practical reason and of the primacy of the latter 
return in Jacobi,^ to be placed in the service of a mystical extrava- 
gance of feeling, which manifests itself also in the character of 
a style which is warm and full of spirit, but rhapsodical and more 
given to assertion than to proof. 

This same fundamental conception, brought somewhat nearer to 
Kant, appears with Fries. In demanding that the knowledge of the 
a priori forms to which the critical philosophy aspired must itself 
arise a posteriori, through inner experience, and therefore that Kant's 
results must be established or set right by an "■ anthropological " 
critique, he rested upon the conviction that the immediate, proper 
cognitions of the reason are given originally in an obscure form 
through the feeling,^ and transformed into intellectual knowledge 
only by means of reflection. This Leibnizian body ends, however, 
in the critical tail, since the perceptional and conceptional Forms of 
this reflection are regarded as only an expression of the phenomenal 
mode in which the above original truth [as experienced in feeling] 
appears ; on the other hand, the body received a Kant-Jacobi head, 
when the limitation of knowledge to these phenomenal Forms had 
set over against it the immediate relation of moral faith to things- 
in-themselves, while at the same time — with a decided attachment 
to the Critique of Judgment — the aesthetic and religious feelings 
had ascribed to them the significance of a presage {Ahndung) 
that the Being which lies at the basis of phenomena is just that to 
which the practical reason relates. 

2. The untenability of the Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself, 
so keenly recognised by Jacobi, became palpable to a certain extent 
when Reinliold in his Elementary Philosophy made the attempt to 
present the critical doctrine in a systematic unity. He admired 
Kant and adopted entirely his solutions of the individual problems, 
but missed in him the formulation of a simple, fundamental princi- 
ple from which all particular insights might be deduced. Through 
the fulfilment of this (Cartesian) demand,^ opposing private opinions 
would be at last replaced by the philosophy, — Philosophy without 
any surname. He himself believed that he had found this principle 
in the principle which he supposed to be quite free from presuppo- 
sitions, — that in consciousness every idea is distinguished by the 


1 W., III. 351 ff. 2 Fries, Neue Kritik, I. 206- 

3 Reinliold, Beiträge, I. 91 ff. 

676 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

consciousness of subject and object, and is related to both (Principle 
of Consciousness)} Hence there inheres in every idea something 
that belongs to the subject and something that belongs to the 
object. From the object comes the manifold of the material, from 
the subject the synthetic unity of the Form. Prom this it follows 
that neither the object in itself, nor the subject in itself, is know- 
able, but only the world of consciousness which hovers between the 
two ; from this results further the opposition of the (sensuous) 
material impulse and of the (ethical) Form impulse; in the former 
the heteronomy of the dependence of the will upon things may be 
recognised ; in the latter the autonomy of the will directed toward 
the formal conformity to law. 

In this crude form the Kayitian School propagated the doctrine of 
the master ; all the fineness and profound meaning of the analytic 
of the "object " had become lost, and the only substitute was Eein- 
hold's effort to find in the " ideational faculty " ( Vorstellungsver- 
mogen), or " consciousness," the deeper unity of all the different 
cognitive powers which Kant had separated from each other as 
Sensibility, Understanding, Judgment, and Eeason. In so far the 
" fundamental philosophy " opposed with a positive hypothesis the 
objections which the sharp seixtration of the sensibility and the under- 
standing in the Kantian doctrine encountered with many contempora- 
ries. This separation presented itself in the exposition determined 
by the after-working of the Inaugural Dissertation (cf. p. 538, note 
4), still more strongly than the spirit of the Critique of Reason 
required, and became at the same time still more palpable by the 
dualism of the practical philosophy. So the tendency was awak- 
ened to replace the sensibility again in its rights as against Kant, 
and the Leibnizian doctrine of the gradual transition from the func- 
tions of sense to those of reason proved the source of a powerful 
counter-current against Kant's " dissection " of the soul, — a dissec- 
tion more apparent than serious. Hamann in his review, and in 
conjunction with him, Herder in his Metakritik, urged this against 
the Critique of Pure Reason. Both lay chief emphasis upon lan- 
guage as the fundamental, unitary, sensuous-intellectual work of 
the reason, and seek to show how from the first " splitting apart " 
of sensibility and understanding all the other chasms and dualisms 
of the critical philosophy necessarily followed.^ 

1 Neue Theorie des Vorst., pp. 201 ff. 

2 Herder, Metakritik, 14, 111. AVorks in 40 vols., XXXVII. 333 ff. Moreover, 
this thought as Herder presented it in the Metakritik, a silly composition of 
personal irritation, was for a long time a positively impelling moment in the 
development. Cf. § 42. 

Chap. 2, §41.] Thing-i'nrltself : Schulze. 517 

3. The weak points in Eeinhold's system could not escape the 
sceptics, but their attacks applied at the same time to Kant himself. 
They were united most effectively in Schulze's ^nesidemus. He 
shows that the critical method ensnares itself by setting for itself 
a task, the solution of which is according to its own results im- 
possible. For if the Critique seeks the conditions which lie at the 
basis of experience, these conditions are yet not themselves objects 
of experience (a conception which certainly corresponded better 
with Kant's meaning than did Fries' attempt at a psychological 
discovery of the a priori) : the critical method demands, therefore, 
that philosophical knowledge, at all events a thinking in categories, 
shall go beyond experience ; and just this the Analytic declares 
impermissible. In fact, the "reason" and each of the knowing 
faculties, as sensibility, understanding, etc., is a thing-in-itself, an 
imperceptible ground of the empirical activities of the kind of 
cognition in question; and of all these things-in-themselves and 
their relations to each other and to experience, the critical philoso- 
phy — the metaphysics of knowledge — offers a very circumstantial 
body of information. To be sure, this information is, if closely 
examined, very slight ; for such a " faculty " is ultimately thought 
only as an unknown common cause of empirical functions, and is 
to be characterised only through these its workings. 

"iEnesidemus" develops this criticism in connection with Eein- 
hold's conception of the "ideational faculty";^ he shows that we 
explain nothing at all, when we postulate over again the content 
of that which is to be explained, provided with the problematical 
mark "power" or "faculty." Schulze thus turned against the 
"faculty theory," which was employed by the empirical psycholo- 
gists of the Enlightenment in rather a thoughtless manner. It is 
only descriptively that there is any sense in comprehending like 
phenomena of the psychical life under one generic conception ; but 
to hypostatise this conception to a metaphysical power — this is 
a mythological treatment of psychology. With this watch-word 
Herbart^ extended the criticism of Schulze to the whole earlier 
psychological theory, and Beneke also saw in the bringing into 
prominence of this conception the essential progress towards a 
natural science of the soul ; i.e. the associational psychology.^ 

For Schulze, this is only one of the elements in a proof that the 
critical philosophy, while aiming to prove the authority of the 
causal conception as against Hume, professes to limit the same 

1 JEnesid., p. 98. 

^ Herbart, Lehrb., s. Psych., § 3 ; W., V. 8 and elsewhere. 

3 Beneke, Xeue Psych. , pp. 34 ff . 

678 Crermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI. 

to experience, and yet everywhere makes the assumption of a 
causal relation between experience and that which "lies at its 
basis." Here, too, belongs of course the contradiction, already 
exhibited by Jacobi, in the conception of the thing-in-itself by 
which the "sensibility" is said to be affected. Every attempt of 
the Critique of Pare Reason to go beyond the circuit of experience, 
even merely problematically, is judged in advance by itself.^ 

4. The first attempt to transform the conception of the thing-in- 
itself, untenable in its Kantian shape, proceeded from Salomon 
Maimon. He saw that the assumption of a reality to be placed 
outside of consciousness involves a contradiction. What is thought 
is in consciousness ; to think of a something outside of consciousness 
is as imaginary as it would be mathematics to regard the require- 
ment V— ct as a real quantity. TJie thing-in-itself is an impossible 
conception. But what was the inducement to form it ? It lay in 
the need of explaining the given in consciousness.^ It meets us, that 
is to say, in our ideas of the antithesis between the Form which we 
ourselves create and are conscious of creating, and the matenal 
which we only find present in us, without knowing how we come 
by it. Of the Forms we have, therefore, a complete consciousness ; of 
the matter, on the contrary, only an incomplete consciousness ; it is 
something that is in consciousness, without being produced with con- 
sciousness. But since nothing outside of consciousness is thinkable, 
the given can be defined only by the lowest grade of the complete- 
ness of consciousness. Consciousness can be thought as diminishing 
through an infinite number of intermediate stages down to nothing, 
and the idea of the limit of this infinite series (comparable to the 
V2) is that of the merely-given, the thing-in-itself. Things-in-them- 
selves are, therefore, as Maimon says with direct reference to Leibniz 
— petites perceptions ; cf. p. 424 — differentials of consciousness.^ The 
thing-in-itself is the limiting conception for the infinite decreasing 
series from complete consciousness down — an irrational quantity. 
The consequence of this fundamental assumption with Maimon is, 
that of the given there can always be only an incomplete knowledge, 
as there is only an incomplete consciousness,* and that complete 

1 The author of the ^nesidemus repeated the thoughts of his polemic in 
raost concise and comprehensive manner in his Kritik der theoretischen Philoso- 
phie (II. 549 ff.), — a work, moreover, which contains not only an analysis of 
the Critique of Pure Beason (I. 172-582), which is one of the best even to the 
present day, but also a criticism of the same, supported by deep historical 
understanding (found II. 126-722). Cf. on the relation to Leihniz, II. 176 ff. 

2 Maimon, Transscendentalphilos., pp. 419 f. 

3 lb. 27 ff. 

* Cf. the contingency of the world with Leibniz and the specification of 
Nature with Kant, pp. 398 f., 566- 

Chap. 2, § 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Maimon, Fichte. 579 

knowledge is limited to the knowledge of the autonomous Forms of 
the theoretical consciousness, to mathematics and logic. In his 
esteem for these two demonstrative sciences Maimon's critical scep- 
ticism is in harmony with Hume ; with regard to their theories of 
the knowledge of that which is empirically given they diverge 

With this, however, it had become clear that the investigations of 
the Critique of Pure Eeason require a new conception of the relation 
of consciousness and Being. Being is to be thought only in conscious- 
ness, only as a kind of consciousness. Thus the prophecy of Jacobi 
begins to be fulfilled; Kant's doctrine urges toward the "strongest 

This is seen in a disciple who stood in the closest relations to 
Kant himself : Sigismund Beck. He found ^ the " Only Possible 
Standpo" it for Estimating the Critical Philosophy " in this, that 
the datura of the individual consciousness, given it as " object," is 
made the content of an " original" supra-individual ^ consciousness, 
which for this reason is authoritative for the truth of the empirical 
knowing process. In the place of the things-in-themselves he set 
Kant's " consciousness in general." But he explained to himself in 
this way the a priori character of the pure conceptions and catego- 
ries : the given in the sensuous manifold remained for him also the 
unsolved remnant of the Kantian problem. 

5. The full idealistic disintegration of the conception of the 
thing-in-itself was the work of Fichte. We may best understand 
the matter by following the course of thought in his introductions 
to his Science of Knowledge,^ which attaches itself directly, in a 
free reproduction, to the most difficult part of the Kantian doctrine, 
— the transcendental deduction, — and illumines with complete clear- 
ness the culmination of the movement of thought here considered. 

The fundamental problem of philosophy — or, as Fichte calls it, 
just on this account, of the Wissenschaftslehre [lit. "doctrine of 
science," where science has the twofold meaning of knowledge as 
a mental act, and knowledge as a body of truth = philosophy (cf. 
p. 94, note 2,) ] — is given in the fact, that in contrast with the ideas of 
individual consciousness, which may come and go in a voluntary 
and contingent manner, another set of our ideas maintain them- 
selves there, and these latter are characterised by a feeling of neces- 
sity that can be distinguished with entire certainty. To make this 
necessity intelligible is the chief task of philosophy or the Science 

1 3d vol. of his Erläuternder Auszug, from Kant's writing (Leips. 1796). 

2 lb. p. 120 ff. 3 Fichte' s W., I. 419 ff. 

580 G- er many : Development of Idealism. [PartVL 

of Knowledge. We call the system of those ideas which emerge 
with the feeling of necessity experience ; the problem runs, there- 
fore, ^' What is the ground of experience ? " To its solution there 
are only two paths. Experience is an activity of consciousness 
directed toward objects ; it can therefore be derived only from 
things or from the consciousness. In the one case the explanation 
is dogmatic, in the other idealistic. Dogmatism regards conscious- 
ness as a product of things ; it traces the activities of intelligence 
also back to mechanical necessity of the causal relations ; if con- 
sistently thought, therefore, it cannot end otherwise than fatalisti- 
cally and materialistically. Idealism, on the contrary, sees in 
things a product of consciousness, of a free function determined 
only by itself ; it is the system of freedom and of deed. These two 
modes of explanation, each of which is consistent in itself, are in 
such thorough-going contradiction to each other and so irreconcil- 
able that Fichte regards the attempt of syncretism, to explain expe- 
rience by dependence both upon things-in-themselves and upon the 
reason, as a failure from the outset. If one will not fall a victim to 
sceptical despair, he must choose between the two. 

This choice, since both present themselves logically as equally 
consistent systems, will primarily depend " on what sort of a man 
one is"^ {''teas für ein Mensch man ist")-, but while the ethical 
interest thus already speaks for idealism, there is still a theoretical 
consideration which comes to its aid. The fact of experience, in 
the constant reciprocal relation of " being " and " being conscious " 
{/Sein und Beivusstsein), consists in this, that the "real series" of 
objects is perceived in the "ideal" series of mental representations.^ 
This " doubleness " dogmatism cannot explain ; for the causality of 
things is only a simple series (of "mere being posited"). The 
repetition of Being in consciousness (or in the being conscious) is 
incomprehensible, if the being is to serve as a ground of explanation 
for being conscious. On the contrary, it belongs to the very nattire 
of intelligence "to see itself." Consciousness, in that it acts or func- 
tions, knows also that it acts and what it does ; in conjunction with 
the real (primary) series of its own functions it produces always at 
the same time the ideal (secondary) series of the knowledge of 
these functions. If, therefore, consciousness yields the sole ground 
of explanation for experience, it does this only in so far as it is the 

1 Fichte's W., I. 434. 

2 If the antithesis of dogmatism and idealism points back to the Kantian 
antithesis of Nature and Freedom, in which connection, moreover, the system 
of the necessity of things already appears with a strong Spinozistic character, 
the systematic influence of Spinoza's doctrine concerning the two attributes 
asserts itself for the first time in this relation of the two series. 

Chap. 2, § 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Fichte, Krug. 581 

actirity which perceives itself and is reflected back into itself, i.e. 
as self-consciousness. The science of knowledge has to show that all 
consciousness (of experience) which is directed toward something 
else — toward a Being, toward objects, toward things — has its root 
in the original relation of consciousness to itself. 

The principle of idealism is self-consciousness; in a subjective, 
methodical aspect, in so far as the science of knowledge aims to 
develop all of its insights from the intellectual perception alone, with 
which consciousness accompanies its own activities, from reflection 
upon that which consciousness knows of its own deed, — in objec- 
tive, systematic aspect, in so far as in this way those functions of 
intelligence are to be pointed out, by means of which that which 
in common life is called thing and object, and in the dogmatic 
philosophy thing-in-itself, is produced. This last conception, that 
of the thing-in-itself, which is through and through contradictory, 
is thus resolved to its last remnant ; all Being is comprehensible 
only as product of reason, and the subject-matter of philosophical 
knowledge is the system of the reason (cf. § 42). 

For Fichte and his successors, the conception of the thing-in- 
itself thus became indifEerent, and the old antithesis between Being 
and consciousness sank to the secondary significance of an immanent 
relation within the activities of the reason. An object exists only 
for a subject ; and the common ground of both is the reason, the / 
which perceives itself and its action.^ 

6. While the main development of German metaphysics followed 
this Fichtean tendency, the syncretism above mentioned did not re- 
main without supporters whom the Wissenschaftslehre had thrust from 
the threshold. Its metaphysical type had been stamped out by Eein- 
hold ; but it was likewise close at hand for all who took their point 
of departure from the individual consciousness with the psychological 
method, and believed that they found the individual consciousness 
equally dependent upon the Eeal and upon the universal essence of 
the intellect. The " transcendental synthetism," which Krug taught, 
may be conceived of as an example of this mode of view. For him, 
philosophy is an explanation of self by means of the reflection of 
the "I" upon the "facts of consciousness." But in this the primi- 
tive fact proves to be the transcendental synthesis, that real and 
ideal are posited in consciousness as equally original and in relation 
to each other.^ We know Being only in so far as it appears in con- 
sciousness, and consciousness only in so far as it refers to Being ; 

1 Cf. also Schelling's youthful opuscule, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie, 
W., I. 151 ff. 

2 Krug, Fundamentalphilosophie, pp. 106 ff. 

582 G-ermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

but both are objects of an immediate knowledge just as is the com- 
munity existing between them in our world of ideas. 

These thoughts found a finer turn given them in Schleiermacher' s 
dialectic. All knowledge has as its end to establish the identity of 
Being and thinking ; for the two emerge in human consciousness 
separate, as its real and ideal factors, perception and conception, 
organic and intellectual functions. Only their complete adjustment 
would give knowledge, but they remain always in a state of differ- 
ence. In consequence of this, science is divided with reference to 
its subject matter into physics and ethics, with reference to its 
methods into empirical and theoretical disciplines ; natural history 
and natural science, history of the world, and science of morals. In 
all these particular disciplines one or the other of the two factors 
has the predominance,^ materially or formally, although the oppo- 
sites strive toward each other — the empirical branches of knowledge 
toward rational articulation, the theoretical towards an understand- 
ing of the facts, physics towards the genesis of the organism and 
of consciousness out of the corporeal world, ethics towards the 
control and inter-penetration of the sensuous by the will, which acts 
according to ends. But the complete adjustment of the real and the 
ideal is nowhere attained in actual cognition ; it forms rather the 
absolute, unconditioned, infinitely removed goal of the thinking 
which desires to become knowledge, but will never completely suc- 
ceed.^ Hence philosophy is the science not of knowledge, but of 
knowledge in a perpetual state of becoming, — dialectic. 

But just for this reason it presupposes the reality of this goal 
which is never to be attained in human knowledge ; the identity of 
thought and Being. This Schleiermacher, with Spinoza (and Schell- 
ing), calls God. It cannot be an object of the theoretical reason, 
and just as little can it be such of the practical reason. We do not 
know God, and therefore we cannot order our ethical life with refer- 
ence to him. Religion is more than knowing and right-doing ; it is 
the community of life with the highest reality, in which Being and 
consciousness are identical. This communion, however, emerges 
only in the feeling, in the " pious " (frommen) feeling of an " abso- 
lute" dependence upon the infinite world-ground which cannot be 
exhausted by thought (cf. § 42, 6). Spinoza's God and Kant's 
thing-in-itself coincide in the infinite, but thus are raised above all 
human knowledge and will, and made the objects of a mystical feel- 
ing whose delicate vibrations harmonise in Schleiermacher (as in 

1 This relation in Schleiermacher's Dialectic appears copied after the meta- 
physical form of Schelling's System of Tdentity ; cf. § 42, 8. 

2 Dialektik, W., III. 4 b 68 f. 

CuAF. 2, § 41.] TMng-in-Itself : Schleiermacher. 583 

a somewhat different form in Fries, also) with the inwardness of 
the religious life among the Moravians. 

Thus the traditions of Mysticism pass through Pietism — in 
which the orthodox tendency toward a coarser view became more 
and more prominent after Spener and Francke, and so called forth 
the opposition of the Brothers of the Common Life — up to the 
summits of the idealistic development ; and indeed the doctrine of 
Eckhart and the transcendental philosophy are in close touch in the 
spirit which desires to transpose all the outer into the inner ; both 
have a genuinely Germanic savour, they seek the world in the 
" Gemüth" [the mind as the seat of the feeling and sentiments]. 

7. In putting aside the possibility of a scientific knowledge of 
the world-ground Schleiermacher remained nearer to Kant, but the 
intuition of religious feeling which he substituted was all the more 
dependent upon Spinoza and upon the influences which the latter 
had exercised upon the idealistic metaphysics after Fichte's Science 
of Knowledge. This monism of the reason (cf. the development in 
§ 42) Herhart combated by an entirely different re-shaping of the 
Kantian conception of the thing-in-itself. He desired to oppose 
the dissolution of this conception, and found himself forced thereby 
to the paradox of a metaphysics of things-in-themselves, which yet 
should hold fast to their unknowableness. The contradictions of 
the transcendental analytic appear here grotesquely magnified. 

This is the more noteworthy as the retrogressive tendency which 
has been ascribed to Herbart's doctrine, perhaps in contrast with 
the idealistic innovations, developed itself in his attack upon Kant's 
transcendental logic (cf. § 38, 5). Herbart saw in this with right 
the roots of idealism. It teaches, indeed, the Forms with which the 
"Understanding" produces the world of objects, and in Fichte's 
" I " we only have in a completely developed form that which in 
germ was in Kant's " consciousness in general " or " transcendental 
apperception." Herbart's inclination toward the earlier philosophy 
consists in this, that he denies the creative spontaneity of conscious- 
ness, and, like the associational psychologists, finds it determined 
and dependent in both Form and content from without. He opposes 
also the virtual innateness which had propagated itself from Leibniz 
on through the Inaugural Dissertation into the Critique of Pure 
Reason: the forms of relation expressed in the categories are for 
him, like space and time, products of the ideational mechanism. As 
regards the psycho-genetic questions, he stands entirely upon the 
platform of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. For this reason 
he knows no other logic than the formal logic whose principle is the 
principle of contradiction, i.e. the prohibition to commit a contra- 

584 G-ermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI. 

diction. The supreme principle of all thought is^ that which con- 
tradicts itself cannot be truly real or actual.-^ 

Now it is evident that the conceptions in which we think experi- 
ence are full of internal contradictions ; we assume things, which 
are to be identical with themselves and yet made equal to a variety 
of attributes ; we speak of alterations in which that which is equal 
to itself is successively different ; we trace all inner experience back 
to an ''/" or "self" which as that "which mentally represents 
itself " {sich selbst Vorstellende) involves an infinite series in the 
subject as well as in the object, — we trace all outer experience 
back to a matter, in the idea of which the attributes of the discrete 
and the continuous are at variance. This experience can be only 
phenomenon ; but this phenomenon must have at its basis something 
real which is free from contradictions, seeming things must have 
absolute "Heals" {Reale), seeming occurrence and change a real 
occurrence and change. Whatever seeming there is, there is just so 
much indication of Being. To discover this is the task of philoso- 
phy ; it is a ivorking over of the conceptions of experience which are 
given and which must be re-shaped according to the rules of formal 
logic, until we know the reality that has no internal contradictions. 

The general means to this end is the method of relation. The 
fundamental form of contradiction always is, that something simple 
is thought as having differences (the synthetic unity of the mani- 
fold in Kant) . This difficulty can be removed only by assuming a 
plurality of simple beings, through the relation of which to each 
other the ''illusion" of the manifold or changeable is produced in 
any individual object. Thus the conception of substance can be 
maintained only if we suppose that the various qualities and chang- 
ing states which substance is said to unite, concern not substance 
itself, but only the relation in which it successively stands to other 
substances. The things-in-themselves must be many ; from a single 
thing-in-itself the multiplicity of qualities and states could never be 
understood. But each of these metaphysical things must be thought 
as entirely simple and unchangeable; they are called by Herbart, 
"Meals" {Realen). All qualities which form the characteristics of 
things in experience are relative, and make these characteristics 

1 Cf. Einleitung in die Philos., W., I. 72-82. The historical stimulus to this 
sharp presentation of the principle of contradiction was no doubt the deprecia- 
tion which this principle found in the dialectic method (cf. § 42, 1) ; logically, 
however, Herbart' s doctrine (with the exception of his treatment of the "I" 
conception) is entirely independent of it. The Eleatic element in the Herbar- 
tian philosophy (cf. I. 225) is given with the postulate of Being void of contra- 
dictions, and to this circumstance the philosopher, who otherwise had little 
historical disposition, owed his fineness of feeling for the metaphysical motive 
in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. Cf. I. 237 ff. and XII. 61 ff. 

Chap. 2, § 41.] Thing-in-Itself : Herhart. 585 

appear only in relation to other things ; the absolute qualities of the 
Keals are, therefore, unknowable, 

8. But they must be thought as the ground which determines 
the qualities that appear ; and likewise we must assume as ground 
of the seeming changes which the mutation of qualities exhibits in 
the case of empirical things, an actual process or occurrence, a change 
of relations between the Reals. Here, however, this whole artificial 
construction of that which lies beyond experience began to waver. 
For the Eleatic rigidity of these Eeals in nowise permits us to form 
an idea of the kind of '' actual relations " which are held to obtain 
between them. First of all, these cannot be spatial;^ space and 
time are products of the series formed by ideas, products of the 
psychical mechanism, and hence phenomenal for Herbart in almost 
a higher degree than for Kant. Only in a transterred sense can the 
changing relations of substances be termed a " coming and going in 
the intelligible space " ; what they are themselves the Herbartian 
doctrine has no term to express. Only, in a negative direction it is 
obliged to make a questionable concession. Every Real has only 
simple and unchangeable determinations : the relation, therefore, 
which exists or arises between two Reals is not essential to either, 
and has not its basis in either. A tertium quid, however, which this 
relation would postulate, is not to be discovered in this metaphys- 
ics.^ Hence the relations which the Reals sustain to each other, 
and from which the appearance of things and their relations are 
said to follow, are called '' contingent views " (zufällige Ansichten) 
of the Reals ; and Herbart's meaning in several passages is scarcely 
to be understood otherwise than that consciousness is the intelligible 
space in which the above relations between the Reals obtain, that 
the real process or occurrence, also, is some thing which itself only 
"takes place for the spectator" as "objective seeming."^ If we 
add to this, that the " Being " of the Reals or absolute qualities is 

1 Not only in this point do Herbart's Keals distinguish themselves from the 
atoms of Democritus, with which they have the common basis of a pluralistic 
re-shaping of the Eleatic conception of Being^ but also by the difference in 
(unknowable) quality, in the place of which atomism allows only quantitive 
differences. Just as little are the Reals to be confused with Leibniz's monads, 
with which indeed they share their absence of windows, but not the attribute 
of being a unity of the manifold. With the Platonic Ideas, they have in com- 
mon the attributes of the Eleatic Being, but not the character of class-concepts. 

2 In this gap of his metaphysics Herhart inserted his j^hilosnpihy of religion ; 
for since there is no knowledge of the real ground of the relations between the 
Reals, from which the world of phenomena proceeds, the impression of pur- 
posiveness which the latter makes permits us to believe, in a manner which is 
theoretically unassailable, upon a supreme intelligence as the ground of these 
relations, — a very pale revival of the old physico-theological proof. 

3 Cf. W., IV. 98 ff., 127-132, 233, 240 f., 248 ff. ; see also E. Zeller, Gesch. d. 
deutsch. Philos., 844. 

586 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Pakt VI. 

defined by Herbart as " absolute position," i.e. as a " Setzung" ^ a pos- 
iting in which Being is at rest, and which is not taken back, we have 
opening before us the perspective into an " absolute " idealism. 

This was, indeed, carried out by Herbart still less than by Kant ; 
here, too, it would have led to absolute contradiction. For the 
theory of Keals aims to deduce consciousness also, as a consequence, 
emerging in the realm of phenomena, of the " co-existence of the 
Eeals." The Reals are held to reciprocally " disturb " each other, 
and to call forth in each other as reactions against these disturb- 
ances, inner states which have the signilicance of self-preservoj- 
tions."^ Such self-preservations are immediately known to us as 
those by the aid of which the unknown Eeal of our soul maintains 
itself against disturbance by other Reals; they are ideas (Vorstellun- 
gen). The soul as a simple substance is naturally unknowable; 
psychology is only the science of its self-preservations. These, the 
ideas, sustain within the soul, which simply furnishes the indiffer- 
ent stage for their co-existence, once more the relations of Reals ; 
they disturb and inhibit each other, and the whole course of the 
psychical life is to be explained from this reciprocal tension of ideas. 
By their tension the ideas lose in intensity ; and the consciousness 
depends upon the degree of intensity. The lowest degree of 
strength, which the ideas can have and still be regarded as actual, 
is the threshold of consciousness. If the ideas are pressed by others 
below this threshold, they change into impulse. Hence the essential 
nature of those psychical states which are called feeling and will is 
to be sought in the inhibitory relations of ideas. All these relations 
must be developed as a " statics and mechanics of ideas," ^ and since 
we have to do here essentially with the determining of differences of 
force, this metaphysical psychology must take on the form of a mathe- 
maticcd theory of the mechanism of ideas.* Herbart lays particular 

iCf. W., IV. 71 ff. 

2 The '■'■ suum esse co?iserw«?-e," with Hobbes and Spinoza the fundamental in- 
stinct of individuals, appears with Herbart as the metaphysical activity of the 
Eeals, by virtue of which they produce the world of seeming, i.e. experience. 

3 On this metapliysical basis Herbart erected the structure of an immanent 
associational psychology. The assumption of a mechanical necessity of the 
ideational process, and the view that the volitions follow from this as likewise 
necessary relations, proved a fortunate basis for a scientific theory of pedagog- 
ics, — a discipline which Herbart made also dependent upon ethics, since the 
latter teaches the goal of education (the formation of ethical character) , while 
psychology teaches the mechanism through which this is realised. In a similar 
way Beneke, who took the standpoint of associational psychology without Her- 
bart' s metaphysics, found the path to a systematic pedagogics. 

* In carrying out this thought Herbart assumed that ideas in their reciprocal 
inhibitions lose in intensity as much as the weakest of them possesses, and that 
this inhibition-sum is divided among the individual ideas in inverse ratio to 
their original strength, so that if in the simplest case, a> b, a is reduced by 

Chap. 2, § 41.] TUng-in-Itself : Eerhart. 587 

weight upon the investigation of the process by which newly entering 
ideas are "assimilated," ordered, formed, and in part altered, by the 
ideas already present ; he employs for this the expression appercep- 
tion (first coined by Leibniz ; cf. p. 463), and his theory of this takes 
the form of an explanation of the " I " or " self " by associational 
psychology. The " I " is thought as the moving point in which the 
apperceiving and apperceived ideas continually converge. 

While the self-preservation of the Real which constitutes the soul, 
against disturbance by other Reals thus produces the phenomena 
of the ideational life, the reciprocal self-preservation and " partial 
inter-penetration " of several Reals produce for the consciousness of 
the spectator the "objective seeming or illusion" of matter. The 
various physical and chemical phenomena are here tortured out of 
the metaphysical presuppositions with an unspeakably toilsome 
deduction,^ — an attempt forgotten to-day, which remained as desti- 
tute of results in natural science as in philosophy. 

9. Another Göttingen professor, BouterweJc, attacked the thing-in- 
itself with other weapons. He showed in his ApodiJctiJc, that if the 
doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason are to be taken in earnest, 
nothing remains for the "object to which the subject necessarily 
relates " except a completely inconceivable X. We cannot talk of a 
thing-in-itself or of things-in-themselves ; for in this are involved 
already the categories of Inherence, of Unity and Plurality,^ and of 
Reality, which hold good only for phenomena. The transcendental 
philosophy must become " negative Spinozism." ^ It can teach ordy 
that to the "consciousness in general" a "something in general" 
corresponds, concerning which nothing whatever is to be afi&rmed in 
absolute knowledge. (Cf . with regard to Spinoza, above, pp. 408 f.). 
On the other hand, this absolutely real asserts itself in all relative 
knowledge through the consciousness of willing.'^ For this shows 
everywhere the living force of individuality. We know of the subject 
because it wills something, and of the object because it furnishes 

the inhibition to ^ + ao — o ^ ^^^ ^ ^^ . " . Cf. on this arbitrarily axiomatic 

a+b a+b 

assumption and on the mistaken nature of the whole "psychological calculus," 
A. Lange, Die Grundlegung der mathematischen Psychologie, Duisburg, 1865. 

1 Allgem. Metaphysik, §§ 2-10 ff., 331 ff. ; W., IV. 147 ff., 327 ff. In Herbart's 
metaphysics the branching out of general ontology into the beginnings of psy- 
chology and natural philosophy is designated by the names Eidology and 

2 Cf. esp. Apodiktik, I. 261, 392 ff. 
8 lb. 385 ff. 

* Following the example of Kant and Fichte, Bouterwek ends his theoretical 
Apodiktik in scepticism or in completely abstract-formal, absolute knowledge ; 
it is the "practical" apodictic which first gains a relation of its content to 

588 Qermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI 

resistance to this will. The antithesis of force and resistance thus 
furnishes a common basis to the knowledge of the reality of our- 
selves, and to that of the reality of other things, — of the I and the 
Not-I.-^ This doctrine Bouterwek would have called absolute Virtu- 
alism. We know our own reality in that we will, and the reality of 
other things in that our will finds in them a resisting force. The 
feeling of resistance refutes pure subjectivism or solipsism, but this 
relative knowledge of the particular forces of the real is supple- 
mented by the consciousness of our own willing to form a merely 
empirical science.^ 

This thought of his Göttingen teacher was developed by Schopen- 
hauer, under the influence of Fichte, to a metaphysics. With a bold 
leap he swings himself up from the position of Virtualism to the 
knowledge of the essential nature of all things. We recognise the 
will within us as the true reality, and the resistance from which we 
know the reality of other things must, therefore, be likewise will. 
This is demanded by the " metaphysical need " of a unitary explana- 
tion for all experience. The world " as idea " can be only phenome- 
non ; an object is possible only in the subject and determined by 
the Forms of the subject. Hence the world in man's idea or mental 
representation (as " phenomenon of the brain," as Schopenhauer has 
often said with a dangerously contradictory laxity of expression) 
appears as a manifold ordered in space and time, a manifold whose 
connection can be thought only in accordance with the principle of 
causality, — the only one of the Kantian categories which Schopen- 
hauer can admit to an originality of the same rank as that which 
belongs to the pure perceptions. Bound to these Forms, conceptional 
knowledge can have for its object only the necessity which prevails 
between individual phenomena : for causality is a relation of phe- 
nomena to each other; science knows nothing absolute, nothing 
unconditioned; the guiding thread of causality, which leads from 
one condition to the other, never breaks of£ and must not be broken 
off arbitrarily.^ The conceptional work of science can, therefore, in 
nowise raise itself a,bove this infinite series of phenomena ; only an 
intuitive interpretation of the whole world of ideas, a look of genius 
over experience, an immediate apprehension, can penetrate to the 
true essence, which appears in our ideas as the world determined in 
space and time and by causality. This intuition, however, is that 
by which the knowing subject is given immediately through itself as 
will. This word solves, therefore, the mystery of the outer world 

1 Apodiktik II. 62 ff. 2 jb. n. 67 f . 

8 In this Schopenhauer is in complete agreement with Jacobi (cf. above^ 
p. 674). 

Chap. 2, § 41.] Thing-in-IUelf : Schopenhauer. 589 

also. For we must apprehend the significance of all that is given to 
us immediately in space and time as idea/ according to this analogy 
of the only thing which is immediately given. The thing-in-itself is 
the Will. 

The word "will" as here used must indeed be taken in an ex- 
tended sense. In men and in animals the will appears as motiva- 
tion determined through ideas, in the instinctive and vegetative life 
of the organism as susceptibility to stimulation, in the rest of the 
world of experience as mechanical processes. The meaning which 
is common to these different internal or external kinds of causality, 
should be designated a potiori as will, in accordance with that form 
in which alone it is immediately known to us. Accordingly the 
philosopher emphasises expressly the point, that the particular 
peculiarities with which the will is given in human self-perception, 
i.e. its motivation through ideas and conceptions, must be kept quite 
apart from our notion of the will as thing-in-itself, — a requirement 
which it was, indeed, hard enough for Schopenhauer himself to 

At the same time, however, the relation between thing-in-itself 
and phenomenon must not be thought according to the rule of the 
understanding, i.e. causally. The thing-in-itself is not the cause of 
phenomena. Even in the case of man the will is not the cause of 
his body or of the bodily activities ; but the same reality, which is 
given us mediately, through our ideas in space and time perception, 
as body, and which in cognition is conceived as something causally 
necessary and dependent upon other phenomena, — this is im- 
mediately given as will. Because the thing-in-itself is not subject 
to the principle of sufficient reason, we have the paradox, that man 
feels himself as will immediately free, and yet in idea knows him- 
self to be necessarily determined. So Schopenhauer adopts Kant's 
doctrine of intelligible and empirical character. In the same way, 
however, phenomenal Nature must everywhere be regarded as 
objectification ; that is, as the perceptional and conceptional mode of 
representation of the will or the immediately real, and must not 
be regarded as the product of the latter. The relation of essence 
to phenomenon is not that of cause and effect. 

Further, the will as thing-in-itself can be only the one, universal 
" world-ivill." All plurality and multiplicity belong to perception 
in space and time ; these latter are the principium individuationis. 
Hence things are different and separate from each other only as 
phenomena — in idea and cognition ; in their true essence they are 

1 Cf. World as Will, etc., II. §§ 18-23. 

590 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

all the same. The will is the eV koI ttSv. Here lies for Schopen- 
hauer the metaphysical root of morals. It is the deception of the 
phenomenal that makes the individual distinguish his own weal 
and woe from that of other individuals, and brings the two into 
opposition : in the fundamental moral feeling which feels another's 
sorrows as one's own — in sympathy, the transcendental unity of will 
of all reality comes to light. 

Finally, the will can have for its object no particular content that 
can be empirically presented in consciousness ; for every such 
content belongs already to its "objectivity." The world-will has 
only itself for its object ; it wills only to will. It wills only to be 
actual; for all that actually is, is itself only a willing. In this 
sense Schopenhauer calls it the loill to live. It is the thing-in-itself 
which ever gives birth to itself in timeless, eternal process, and as 
such it is represented in the restless mutation of phenomena. 

§ 42. The System of Beason. 

The direction which the main line of the idealistic development 
was to take was prescribed by the principle from which Fichte 
made bold to throw overboard the conception of the thing-in-itself. 
The relation of Being and consciousness can be explained only out 
of consciousness, and by the fact that consciousness "looks at its 
own action" and creates thereby at once the real and the ideal 
series of experience — objects and the knowledge of them. The 
problem of the Wissenschaftslehre is, therefore, to comprehend the 
world as a necessary connected whole of rational activities, and 
the solution can proceed only by reflection on the part of the philos- 
ophising reason upon its own action and upon that which is requi- 
site therefor. The necessity, therefore, which prevails in this 
system of reason is not causal, hut teleological. The dogmatic system 
understands the intelligence as a product of things, the idealistic 
develops intelligence as an inherently purposeful connection of acts, 
some of which serve to produce objects. The progress of philo- 
sophical thought should not take the form, that because something 
is, therefore something else is also, but should rather shape itself 
after the guiding principle that in order that something may take 
place, something else must take place also. Every act of reason has 
a task; to perform this it needs other acts and thus other tasks; 
the connected series of all activities for the fulfilment of all tasks, 
taken as a purposeful unity, is the system of the reason, the 
"history of consciousness." The ground or reason of all Being lies 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Dialectic. 591 

in the ought ; that is, in the activity of self-consciousness directed 
toward an end. 

The schema for carrying out this thought is the dialectical method. 
If the world is to be comprehended as reason, the system of reason 
must be developed from an original task; all particular acts of 
intelligence must be deduced as means to its performance. This 
act [lit. ''deed-act," Thathandlung'] is self -consciousness. A begin- 
ning without assumptions, such as philosophy needs, is not to be 
found by means of an assertion or proposition, but by means of a 
demand, which every one must be able to fulfil : " Think thyself! " 
And the whole business of philosophy consists in making clear 
what takes place in this act, and what is requisite for it. But this 
principle can lead on farther, only so long as it is shown that 
between that which should take place and that which does take 
place to this end, there is still a contradiction, out of which the new 
task results, and so on. The dialectical method is a system in 
which every problem or task creates a new one. There is in the 
reason itself a resistance to the result it seeks to achieve, and to 
overcome this resistance it unfolds a new function. These three 
momenta are designated as Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. 

If Kant had maintained the necessity of insoluble problems of 
reason for his explanation and criticism of metaphj» sics, the idealis- 
tic metaphysics now makes this thought a positive principle. By 
this means the reason's world becomes an infinity of self-production, 
and the contradiction between the task and the actual doing is 
declared to be the real nature of the reason itself. This contradic- 
tion is necessary and cannot be abolished. It belongs to the essen- 
tial nature of the reason ; and since only the reason is real, the con- 
tradiction is thus declared to be real. Thus the dialectical method, 
this metaphysical transformation of Kant's transcendental logic, 
came into stronger and stronger opposition to formal logic. The 
rules of the understanding, which have their general principle in 
the principle of contradiction, are adequate, perhaps, for the ordi- 
nary elaboration of perceptions into conceptions, judgments, and 
conclusions ; for the intellectual perception of the philosophising 
reason they do not suffice, before the problems of " speculative con- 
struction " they sink to a relative importance. 

This doctrine asserts itself already in the first exposition which 
Fichte gave to his Science of Knowledge ; ^ it was then spoken out 
more and more boldly by disciples and associates like Fr. Schlegel, 
and, ultimately, the speculative reason affected a superiority to the 

1 Grundlage der ges. W.-L., § 1 ; W., I. 92 fL [Kroeger's tr.. pp. 63 ff.]. 

592 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

"reflective philosopliy of the understanding" hemmed in within 
the principle of contradiction. Schelling ^ appealed to the coinci- 
dentia oppositorum of Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno, and 
Hegel ^ sees in the triumph of the "narrow understanding" over 
the reason the hereditary error of all earlier philosophy.^ Meta- 
physics, of which Kant has shown that it is not possible for the 
understanding, seeks an organ of its own in intellectual perception or 
intuition, and a form of its own in the dialectical method. The 
productive synthesis of the manifold must keep its unity above the 
antitheses into which it divides itself. It is the essential nature 
of mind or spirit to disunite itself, and from this state of being rent 
apart, to return back to its original unity. 

This triplicity rests entirely upon the above (Fichtean) funda- 
mental characterisation of the mind as that which beholds itself. 
The reason is not only "in-itself" as a simple ideal reality, but also 
" f or-itself " ; it appears to itself as "something other, alien"; it 
becomes for itself an object different from the subject, and this 
otherness is the principle of negation. The doing away with this 
difference, the negation of the negation, is the synthesis of the two 
moments above named. These are annulled or sublated {_^^ aufge- 
hoben," which has no exact English equivalent ; Bosanquet suggests 
"put by"] in the threefold aspect that their one-sided force is 
overcome, their relative meaning is preserved, and their original 
sense transmuted into a higher truth. Following this scheme of 
the "in-itself," "for-itself," and " in-and-f or-itself " (An-sich, Für- 
sich, An-und-für-sicK) . Hegel developed his dialectical method with 
great virtuosoship by making each conception " turn into its oppo- 
site," and from the contradiction of the two making the higher con- 
ception proceed, which then experienced the same fortune of finding 
an antithesis which required a still higher synthesis, and so on. The 
Master himself, in his employment of this method, particularly in 
the Phcßnomenology and in the Logic, worked in an astonishing 
wealth of knowledge, a quite unique fineness of feeling for concep- 
tional connections, and a victorious power of combining thought, 
while occasionally his profundity passed over into obscurity and 
schematic Avord-building, In the case of his disciples, a philosophical 
jargon grew out of this, which pressed all thought into the triple 
scheme, and by the thoughtless externality with which it was used, — 

1 Sixth Vorl. über Meth. d. nk. St., W., V. 267 ff. 

2 Cf. esp. his article on Glauben und Wissen, W., I. 21 ff. 

8 It is from tliis point of view tliat we best can understand Herbart's polemic 
against absolute idealism. He, too, finds contradictions in the fundamental 
conceptions of experience, but just on this account they ought to be worked 
over until the contradictionless reality is recognised j cf. above. S 41, '^. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Fichte. 593 

and used for a time in widely extended circles, — it was all too well 
adapted to discredit philosophy as an empty bombast.^ 

2. The system of reason with Fichte, in the first period of his 
philosophical activity (about 1800), is, in its content also, in full 
accord with the above method. The original " act " ( Thathandlung) 
of self-consciousness, which is determined by nothing except itself, 
is that the " /" or self can only be "posited" by being distinguished 
from a " I^ot-I" or "not-self," Since, however, the not-self is posited 
only in the self, — i.e. historically expressed, the object posited only 
in consciousness, — the self and the not-self (i.e. subject and object) 
must reciprocally determine each other within the " I " or self. From 
this results the theoretical or the practical series of self-conscious- 
ness, according as the Not-I or the " I " is the determining part. 

The functions of the theoretical reason are now developed by 
Fichte in the following manner : The particular stages result from 
the reflection of consciousness upon its own previously determined 
action. By virtue of its own activity, which is limited by nothing 
external, it presses beyond every bound which the " I " has set for 
itself in the Not-I as object. The pure perceptions, space and 
time, the categories as rules of the understanding, and the principles 
of the reason, are treated as the several forms of this self-determin- 
ing. In place of the antitheses which Kant had set up between 
these particular sti-ata, Fichte set the principle, that in each higher 
stage the reason apprehends in purer form what it has accomplished 
in the lower stage. Knowing is a process of self-knowledge on the 
part of the reason, beginning with sense perception and ascending 
to complete knowledge,^ But this whole series of the theoretical 
reason presupposes an original " self-limitation " of the I. If this 
is given, the entire series is comprehensible in accordance with the 
principle of self-perception ; for every activity has its object and 
its reason in the preceding. The first self-limitation has its ground 
in no preceding act, and therefore, theoretically, no ground what- 
ever. It is a groundless, /ree activity, but as such, the ground of all 
other activities. This groundless [undetermined] free act is sen- 
sation. It falls into consciousness, therefore, only in its content, 
which is to be taken up into perception ; as act it is, like all that has 

1 Cf. the humorous portrayal in G. Eümelin, Beden und A^ifsatze, pp. 47-50, 
Freiburg, 1888. 

2 Without any directly visible influence from Leibniz, his conception of the 
relation of the different knowing faculties asserts itself here in contrast with 
the Kantian separation. Only it is to be noted that this " history of the devel- 
opment of reason" is, with Leibniz, determined causally, with Fichte teleologi- 
cally. What Hamann and Herder (cf. above, p. 576) demanded as a requirement 
of the unity of intelligence in the Leibnizian sense, Fichte and Schelling had 
meanwhile performed in quite another sense. 

594 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [^art VI. 

no ground, unconscious} In this consists its " givenness," by virtue 
of which it appears as foreign and coming "from without." In 
place of the thing-in-itself comes, therefore, the unconscious self- 
limitation of the I. Fichte calls this activity the productive imagina- 
tion. It is the world- producing activity of the reason. 

For sensation there is then no ground which determines it; it 
is there with absolute freedom, and determines on its part all 
knowledge as regards content. Hence it can be comprehended only 
through its end — in the practical Wissenschaftslehre, which has 
to investigate to what end the self limits itself. This is only to 
be understood if we regard the I or self, not as resting Being, but 
as in its nature iyifinite activity or impulse. For since all action is 
directed toward an object in connection with which it develops, 
so the self, which finds its object not given to it, as is the case 
with the empirical will, must, in order to remain impulse and action, 
set objects for itself. This takes place in sensation : sensation has 
no ground, but only the end of creating for the impulse of the self 
a limit beyond which the self passes in order to become object for 
itself. The actual world of experience, with all its things, and with 
the " Eeality " which it has for the theoretical consciousness, is 
only the material for the activity of the practical reason. 

The inmost essence of the ego, therefore, is its action, directed 
only toward itself, determined only by itself, — the autonomy of the 
ethical reason. The system of reason culminates in the categorical 
imperative. The I is the ethical will, and the world is the material 
of duty put into sensuous form. It is there, to the end that we may 
be active in it. It is not that Being is the cause of doing, but 
Being is brought forth for the sake of the doing. All that is, is 
only to be understood or explained from the point of view of that 
which it ought to be (soil) . 

The demand of the Wissenschaftslehre, so paradoxical for the 
ordinary consciousness,^ amounts, accordingly, to robbing the category 

1 The paradox of the ' ' unconscious activities of consciousness ' ' lies in the 
expression, not in the thing. German philosophers have frequently been very- 
unfortunate in their terminology, most unfortunate precisely where they wished 
to give German words a new meaning. Fichte not only uses consciousness 
and self-consciousness promiscuously, but he understands by consciousness, 
on the one hand, the actual idea or mental presentation of the individual or the 
empirical ego (hence in this sense "unconscious," bewusstlos), and on the 
other hand, the functions of the "consciousness in general," of the transcen- 
dental apperception or the "universal ego or self" (in this sense he speaks of 
" history of consciousness "). In these verbal relations rests a good part of the 
difficulty of Fichte's exposition and of the misunderstanding which it has 
called forth. 

2 In this spirit Fr. H. Jacobi protested against this knitting, not indeed of the 
stocking, but of the knitting (W., III. 24 ff.). Cf., on the other hand, C. Fort- 
lage, Beiträge zur Psychologie (Leips. 1875), pp. 40 f. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Fichte. 595 

of substantiality of the fundamental significance whicli it has in the 
naive, sensuous view of the world. In this a something that " is," 
a "Being" ("Seiendes") is always thought as support and cause of 
activities ; in Fichte's thought the " doing " or action is conceived 
as the original, and Being is regarded as only the means posited for 
that end. This antithesis came sharply to light in the atheism 
controversy, which had so important consequences for Fichte per- 
sonally. The Wissenschaftslehre could not allow Ood to be regarded 
as " substance " ; in this case he would necessarily be something 
derived ; it could seek the metaphysical conception of God only in 
the "Universal Ego or Self" (allgemeinen Ich), in the absolutely 
free, world-creating action; and in clear contrast to the natura 
naturans of dogmatism it calls God the Moral World-order,^ the 
ordo ordinans. 

Accordingly, the chief philosophical discipline for Fichte is moral 
science. Projected before Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, Fichte's 
system takes from the same the categorical imperative in the 
formula " act according to thy conscience," for the starting-point of 
a strictly carried out science of duties, which develops the general 
and particular tasks of man from the opposition appearing in the 
empirical self between the natural impulse and the moral impulse. 
At the same time, the Kantian rigour is softened by the fact, that 
man's sensibility, also, is permitted to assert its rights as product 
of reason. The dualism still survives, but it is already on the way 
toward being overcome, and in the thought that the purposeful 
connected whole of the reason assigns each of its members a voca- 
tion prescribed by its natural manifestation, ethical theory is brought 
to an elaboration of the " material for the fulfilment of duty," which 
is much more penetrating and gives a deeper value to the data of 
experience. This shows itself in Fichte's exposition of professional 
duties, in his nobler conception of marriage and family life, in the 
finer penetration of his ethical investigations into the manifold 
relations of human life. 

The like is true, also, of Fichte's treatment of the problems of 
public life. A youthful energy masters the Kantian fundamental 
thoughts here, and gives them a much more impressive formulation 
than they could receive from Kant himself, who undertook the 
systematic carrying out of these thoughts, only in his old age. The 
reciprocal limitation of spheres of freedom in the outer social life of 
individuals is, for Fichte also, the principle of Natural Right. As 
"primitive rights" he regarded the claims of the individual to 

1 Fichte, W., V. 182 ff., 210 ff. 

596 Crermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

freedom of his body as the organ for performance of duty, of his 
property as being the external sphere of operation to this end, and 
finally of his self-preservation as personality. But these primitive 
rights become efficient as compulsory rights or laws only through 
the authority of (positive) laws in the state. The idea of the com- 
pact which is at the basis of the state, Fichte analyses into the 
citizen, the property, and the defence contract. It is interesting in 
this connection to see how these thoughts culminate in his politics 
in the principle, that the state has to make provision that every one 
may be able to live by his work, — the doctrine, named after him, of 
the so-called right to work} Work is the duty of the moral person- 
ality, the condition of existence of the physical ; it must uncondi- 
tionally be furnished by the state. Hence the regulation of the 
relations of labour must not be left to the natural working of supply 
and demand (as according to Adam Smith), and the profits of labour 
must not be left to the mechanism of society's war of interests, but 
the rational law of the state must enter here. From the point of 
view of this thought, with a careful consideration of the conditions 
given by experience,^ Fichte projected his ideal of the socialistic state 
as "the complete industrial state" {geschlossenen Handelsstaates), 
which itself takes in hand all production and manufacturing, and all 
trade with foreign countries, in order to assign to each citizen his 
work and also the full revenue for his work. The powerful idealism 
of the philosopher did not shrink from a deep system of compulsion, 
if he could hope to assure to every individual thereby a sphere for 
the free fulfilment of duty. 

3. The problem of conceiving the universe as a system of reason 
was solved in the main in the Science of Knowledge by the method 
of deducing the external world of the senses as a product, appearing 
in the empirical ego, of the " consciousness in general " ; in this 
sense Fichte's doctrine, like Kant's, was later characterised as'" sub- 
jective idealism." Fichte's meaning in this, however, was through- 
out that " Nature," which it was his intention to have posited as an 
organic whole,^ should possess the full significance of an objective 
product of reason, in contrast with the ideas of individuals ; to set 
this forth he lacked the penetrating knowledge of his subject which 
he possessed in the case of the relations of human life. Thus it was 
a supplementing of this work, that was welcome to Fichte also, 

1 JSfaturrecht, § 18 ; W., III. 210 ff. ; Geschl. HrnvMsst., I. 1 ; W., III. 400 ff. 

2 Cf. G. SchraoUer, Studie über J. G. Fichte in Hildebrand's Jah7'b. f. Nat. 
u. Stat., 1865 ; also W. Windelband, Fichte^s Idee des deutschen Staates (Frei- 
burg, 1890) . 

3 Fichte, W., IV. 115. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Schelling. 597 

when Schelling undertook to solve the other part of the problem and 
took up in earnest the thought of constructing or deducing Nature 
as the objective system of reason. According to the Science of 
Knowledge and Kant's Philosophy of Nature this was possible only 
if Nature could be successfully comprehended as a connected whole 
of forces, having their ultimate end in a service toward the realisa- 
tion of the reason's command. The starting-point for this construc- 
tion was necessarily Kant's dynamic theory, which derived the 
existence of matter from the relation of the forces of attraction and 
repulsion (cf. § 38, 7), and its goal was given by that manifestation 
of Nature in which alone the practical reason evinces itself — the 
human organism. Between the two the whole wealth of Nature's 
forms and functions must be spread out as a life in unity, whose 
rational meaning was to be sought in the organic growth of the final 
goal out of the material beginnings. Nature is the ego, or self, in 
process of becoming — this is the theme of Schelling's Philosophy 
of Natxire. This task, which had its basis in philosophical premises, 
seemed at the same time set by the condition of natural science, 
which had once again reached the point where scattered detail-work 
craved a living conception of Nature as a whole. And this craving 
asserted itself the more vigorously, as the progress of empirical 
science gave little satisfaction to the highly pitched expectations 
which had been set upon the principle of the mechanical explanation 
of Nature after the seventeenth century. The derivation of the 
organic from the inorganic remained, as Kant stated, problematical, to 
say the least ; a genetic development of organisms on this basis 
was a vexed question ; for the theory of medicine, Avhich was then 
passing through a great movement, no key had as yet been found by 
which it could be fitted into the mechanical conception of the world ; 
now came, also, the discoveries of electric and magnetic phenomena, 
for which at that time it could not be anticipated that it would be 
possible to subsume their peculiar mysterious qualities under the 
point of view of the Galilean mechanics. In contrast with this, 
Spinoza had made his powerful impression upon the minds of men 
just because he thought all Nature, man not excluded, as a con^ 
nected unity, in which the divine Being manifests itself in all 
its fulness, and for the development of German thought it became 
of decisive importance that Goethe made this conception his own. 
The poet, indeed, as we find it best expressed in his splendid apho- 
risms Die Natur, reinterpreted this view in his own way ; in the 
stead of the " mathematical consequence " and its mechanical neces- 
sity he set the concrete idea of a living unity of Nature, in which the 
Weltanschauung of the Renaissance was revived, though without a 

598 G-ermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI» 

formulation in abstract thought. ThiQ poetic Spinozism^ became an 
essential link in the development of the idealistic systems. 

All these motives come into play in Schelling's Philosophy of 
Nature : as a result its central conception is life, and it makes the 
attempt to consider Nature from the point of view of the organism, 
and to understand the connection of its forces from the ultimate 
end of the production of organic life. Nature is not to be described 
and measured, but the meaning and significance which belong to its 
particular phenomena in the purposeful system of the whole are to 
be understood. The " categories of Nature " are the forms or shapes 
in which the reason sets itself as objective to itself; they form a 
system of development in which every particular phenomenon finds 
its logically determined place. In carrying out this idea Schelling 
was of course dependent npon the condition of the natural science 
of his time. Of the connection of forces, of their transformation 
into each other, which was the principal point of interest for his 
purpose, ideas at that time were still very imperfect, and the 
philosopher did not hesitate to fill out the gaps of knowledge by 
hypotheses, which he took from the a priori construction of the 
teleological system. In many cases these theories proved valuable 
heuristic principles (cf. above, p. 566), in others they proved false 
paths by which investigation could attain no useful results. 

The element in the Philosophy of Nature, which is of historical 
significance, is its opposition to the dominance of the Democritic- 
Galilean principle of the purely mechanical explanation of Nature. 
Quantitative determination is here again regarded as only external 
form and appearance, and the cansal mechanical connection as only 
the mode of representation which conforms to the understanding. 
The meaning of the structures of Nature is the significance which 
they have in the system of the development of the whole. If, there- 
fore, Schelling turned his look toward the relationship of forms in 
the organic world, if he used the beginnings of comparative mor^ 
phology, in which Goethe played so important a role, in order to ex- 
hibit the unity of the jilan which Nature follows in the succession of 
animate beings, yet this connected system was not for him, or for 
his disciples such as Oken, properly a causal genesis in time, bnt the 
expression of a gradually succeeding fulfilment of the end. In the 
different orders of animate beings we see in separate forms, accord- 
ing to Oken, what Nature intends with the organism, and what she 
first reaches completely in man. This teleological interpretation 

1 It took Herder prisoner also, as is proved by Ids conversations on Spinoza's 
system under the title Gott (1787). 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : iSchelling^ Gfoethe. 599 

does not exclude a causal relation in time, but, with Schelling and 
Oken at least, it does not include it. It is not their point to ask 
whether one species has arisen from another; they only wish to 
show that one is the preliminary stage for that which the other 

From this we can understand why the mechanical explanation of 
Nature, which has again attained the victory in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, is wont to see in the period of the Philosophy of Nature, only 
a fit of teleological excess, now happily overcome, which checked 
the quiet work of investigation. But the chronicles of the contro- 
versy, which since the time of Democritus and Plato has filled the 
history of the mode of conceiving Nature, are not yet closed, even 
to-day. The reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative, which 
presses forward victoriously under the flag of mathematics, has 
repeatedly encountered the need which seeks behind motions in 
space a reality of rational meaning. This felt need of a living con- 
tent of Nature Schelling's theory aimed to meet, and for this reason 
the great poet, who endeavoured to demonstrate as the true reality 
in the charming play of colours not a vibration of atoms, but a some- 
thing that is originally qualitative, felt drawn toward it. This is 
the philosophical meaning of Goethe's " Theory of Colours." 

With Schelling the system of Nature is ruled by the thought that 
in it the objective reason struggles upward from its material modes 
of manifestation, through the multitude of forms and transforma- 
tions of forces, up to the organism in which it comes to conscious- 
ness? Sensitive beings form the termination of the life of Nature ; 
with sensation the system of the Science of Knowledge begins. 
The devious way which Nature pursues to this goal is frequently 
altered in details in the various remodellings which Schelling gave 
to his Philosophy of Nature, but in its main outlines it remained 
the same. In particular, it was the conception of duality, of the 
opposition of forces which negate each other in a higher unity, that 
formed the fundamental schema of his " construction of Nature," — 
a conception due to the Science of Knowledge, — and from this 
point of view the polarity in electric and magnetic phenomena which 

1 The " interpretation " of phenomena was, to be sure, a dangerous principle 
from a scientific point of view ; it opened the gates of the Philosophy of Nature 
to poetic fancy and brilliant flashes. These guests forced their way in even 
with Schelling, but still more with his disciples, such as Novalis, Steffens, and 
Schubert. In the case of Novalis especially we have a magical, dreamy sym- 
bolism of Nature in a play which is admirable in poetry but questionable in 

2 The poetry of this fundamental thought was expressed in most character- 
istic form by Schelling himself in the beautiful verses which are printed in 
Sch.''s Leben in Briefen. I. 282 ff. 

600 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI. 

busied Schelling's contemporaries as a newly found enigma was 
particularly significant for him. 

4. When Schelling wished to place beside his Philosophy of 
Nature an elaboration of his own of the Science of Knowledge, 
under the name of " Transcendental Idealism," an important change 
had taken place in the common thought of the Jena idealists, to 
which he now gave the first systematic expression. The impetus 
to this came from Schiller, and from the development which he had 
given to the thoughts of the Critique of Judgment. It had become 
plainer step by step that the system of reason must become perfected 
for idealism in the aesthetic function, and in place of the ethical 
idealism which the Science of Knowledge taught, and the physical 
idealism which the Philosophy of Nature presented, appeared now 
(esthetic idealism. 

The re-shaping, so rich in results, which Kant's thoughts experi- 
enced through Schiller, by no means concerned merely the aesthetic 
questions which lay nearest the poet, but likewise the ethical ques- 
tions and those pertaining to the history of philosophy, and there- 
with the whole system of reason. For Schiller's thoughts, even 
before his acquaintance with Kant, — as is shown among other 
things by his poem, Die Künstler, — had been turned to the prob- 
lem of the significance of art and the beautiful in the whole con- 
nected system of man's rational life and its historical development, 
and by solving this problem with Kantian conceptions he gave to 
the idealism of the Science of Knowledge a decisive turn. 

This began with the new Forms which Schiller found for Kant's 
conception of beauty. The synthesis of the theoretical and the 
practical in the aesthetic reason (cf. § 40, 2) could perhaps find no 
more fortunate expression than in Schiller's definition of beauty as 
freedom in phenomenal appearance.^ It asserts that aesthetic con- 
templation apprehends its object without subjecting it to the rules 
of the cognising understanding ; it is not subsumed under concep- 
tions, and we do not ask for the conditions which it has in other 
phenomena. It is perceived as if it were free. Schopenhauer after- 
wards expressed this in the form that the enjoyment of the beautiful 
is the contemplation of the object in independence of the principle 
of sufficient reason. Schiller later laid still more weight upon the 
point that the aesthetic process is as independent of the practical 
reason as of the theoretical. The beautiful (in distinction from the 
agreeable and the good) is as little an object of the sensuous as it 

^ Cf. chiefly the letters to Körner of February, 1793, also the sketch on 
"The Beautiful in Art," printed with the letter of the 20th of June of that 
same year, — all fragments of the dialogue Kallias which was not completed. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Schiller. 601 

is of the moral impulse ; it lacks that quality of want or need which 
belongs to the life of empirical impulse, just as it lacks the earnest- 
ness of the practical reason. In the aesthetic life the play impulse 
unfolds itself ; ^ every stirring of the will is silent in disinterested 
contemplation. In this, too, Schiller was followed by Schopenhauer, 
when the latter found the happiness of the aesthetic condition in the 
overcoming of the unhappy will to live, in the activity of the pure, 
willess subject of knowledge.^ 

From this Schiller concluded in the first place that wherever we 
have to do with educating man, subject to his sensuous nature, to a 
condition where he shall will morally, the aesthetic life offers the 
most effective means to this end. Kant had designated the " rever- 
sal of motives " as the ethical task of man (cf. above, § 39, 6) ; for 
the transition from the sensuous to the ethical determination of the 
will he offered man, as an aid, religion; Schiller offered art.^ Faith 
and taste cause man to act legally, at least, when he is not yet ripe 
for morality. In intercourse with the beautiful the feelings become 
refined, so that natural rudeness vanishes, and man awakes to his 
higher vocation. Art is the fostering soil for science and morality. 
Such was the teaching of Schiller in the Artists ; his Letters 
on the Esthetic Education of the Human Race go deeper. The 
aesthetic condition, or state (Staat), because it is the completely 
disinterested state, destroys the sensuous will, also, and thus makes 
room for the possibility of the moral will ; it is the necessary point 
of transition from the physical state, ruled by needs, into the moral 
state. In the physical state man endures the power of Nature ; in 
the aesthetic state he frees himself from it ; and in the moral state 
he controls it. 

But already in the Artists the beautiful had been assigned a 
second higher task of ultimately giving also the culmination and 
completion to moral and intellectual cultivation, and in building this 
thought into the critical system the poet passes over from supple- 
menting to transforming the Kantian doctrine. The two sides of 
human nature are not reconciled if the moral impulse is obliged to 
overcome the sensuous impulse. In the physical and in the "moral" 
state one side of human nature is always suppressed in favour of the 

1 The attempt which Schiller makes in his Letters concerning uEthestic 
Education (11 f.) to lay a basis for this in transcendental psychology remind 
US strongly of the Reinhold-Fichte time when "Jena whirred with the buzz 
of Form and Matter." 

2 World as Will, etc., I. §§ 36-38. In this connection Schopenhauer no 
doubt claims the same value for scientific knowledge. Cf. § 43, 4. 

3 Cf. the conclusion of the essay, Ueher den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer 

602 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

other. We have a complete manhood only where neither of the two 
impulses prevails over the other. Man is truly man, only where he 
plays, where the war within him is silent, where his sensuous nature 
is exalted to so noble a sentiment or sensibility that it is no longer 
needful for him to will loftily. The Kantian rigorism holds where- 
ever sensuous inclination stands over against duty : but there is the 
higher ideal of the " schöne Seele " — the beautiful soul — which does 
not know this internal conflict because its nature is so ennobled that 
it fulfils the moral law from its own inclination. And just this 
ennobling is gained by man, only through aesthetic education. 
Through it alone is the sensuous-supersensuous discord in human 
nature abolished ; in it alone does complete, full manhood come to 

5. In the ideal of the "schöne Seele" the " virtuosoship " of 
Shaftesbury overcomes the Kantian dualism. The completion of 
man is the sesthetic reconciliation of the two natures which dwell 
within him ; culture is to make the life of the individual a work of 
art, by ennobling what is given through the senses to full accord 
with the ethical vocation. In this direction Schiller gave expres- 
sion to the ideal view of life characteristic of his time in antithesis 
to the rigorism of Kant, and the aesthetic Humanism which he thus 
Wrested from abstract thought found besides his, a wealth of other 
characteristic manifestations. In them all, however, Goethe appeared 
as the mighty personality, who presented in living form this ide&,l 
height of humanity in the sesthetic perfection of his conduct of life, 
as well as in the great works of his poetic activity. 

In this conception of the genius Schiller was first joined by Wil- 
liam von Humboldt.^ He sought to understand the nature of great 
poems from this point of view ; he found the ideal of man's life in 
the harmony of the sensuous and the moral nature, and in his treatise 
which laid the foundations for the science of language ^ he applied 
this principle by teaching that the nature of language is to be under- 
stood from the organic interaction of the two elements. 

An attitude of sharper opposition to the Kantian rigorism had 
already been taken, in the Shaftesbury spirit, by Jacobi in his 
romance patterned after Goethe's personality, " AllwilVs Briefsamm- 
lung." The moral genius also is " exemplary " ; he does not subject 
himself to traditional rules and maxims, he lives himself out and 
thereby gives himself the laws of his morality. This "ethical 
Nature " is the highest that the circuit of humanity affords. 

iBorn 1767, died 1835. Works, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1841 ff.). Aside from 
the correspondence, especially that with Schiller, cf. principally the ästheti- 
schen Versuche (Brunswick, 1799). Also Rud. Haym, W. v. H. (Berlin, 1866). 

2 Ueher die Kawi-Sprache (Berlin, 1836^ 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Romanticists. 603 

Among the Romantic School this ethical "geniality" in theory 
and practice came to its full pride of luxuriant efflorescence. Here 
it developed as an aesthetic aristocracy of culture in opposition to the 
democratic utility of the Enlightenment morals. The familiar word 
of Schiller's as to the nobility in the moral world was interpreted 
to mean, that the Philistine, with his work ruled by general prin- 
ciples, has to perform his definite action determined by ends, while 
the man of genius, free from all external determination by purposes 
and rules, merely lives out his own important individuality as a 
something valuable in itself, — lives it out in the disinterested play 
of his stirring inner life, and in the forms shaped out by his own 
ever-plastic imagination. In his morals of genius, the sensibility 
{Sinnlichkeit) in the narrowest significance of the word is to come 
to its full, unstunted right, and by aesthetic enhancement is to become 
equal in rank to the finest stirrings of the inner nature, — a sublime 
thought, which did not prevent its carrying out in Schlegel's Lu- 
cinde from running out into sensual though polished vulgarity. 

Schleiermacher' s ethics brought back the Eomantic morals to the 
purity of Schiller's intention.^ It is the complete expression of the 
life-ideal of that great time. All ethical action seems to it to be 
directed toward the unity of K-eason and Nature. By this is deter- 
mined in general the moral law, which can be none other than the 
natural law of the reason's life ; by this is also determined in detail 
the task of every individual, who is to bring this unity to expression 
in a special way, proper only for him. In the systematic carrying- 
out of this thought, Schleiermacher distinguishes (according to the 
organic and the intellectual factors of intelligence, cf. § 41, 6) the 
organising and the symbolising activities, according as the unity 
of Nature and Eeason is procured by striving, or is presupposed, 
and thus result in all four fundamental ethical relations, to which 
correspond as goods, the state, society, the school, and the Church. 
From these the individual has to develop in self-activity to a 
harmonious life of his own. 

Finally, Herhart, also, reduced ethical theory to the aesthetic reason 
in a completely independent manner; for him, morals is a branch 
of general aesthetics. Besides the theoretical reason, which contains 
the principles for knowledge of Being, he recognises as original only 
the judging or estimation of the existent in accordance with cesthetic 
Ideas. This estimation has to do with the will and the needs of 
the empirical self as little as has the knowing activity; "Judgments 
of taste " hold necessarily and universally with direct self -evidence, 

1 Cf, also Schleiermaclier's Vertraute Briefe über die Lucinäe (1800). 

604 Crermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI 

and always refer to the relations in the existent: tliese have an 
original pleasure or displeasure inherent in them. The application 
of these principles to the narrower field of the aesthetic is only 
indicated by Herbart : ethics, on the contrary, is regarded by him 
as the science of the judgments of taste pronounced upon the rela- 
tions of human will. It has not to explain anything — that is the 
business of psychology ; it has only to settle the norms by which 
the judgment mentioned above is passed. As such norms, Herbart 
finds the five ethicalldeas, — Freedom, Affection, Benevolence, Right, 
and Equity, — and according to these he seeks to arrange the sys- 
tems of the moral life, while for his genetic investigation he always 
employs the principles of the associational psychology, and thus 
in the statics and mechanics of the state undertakes to set forth 
the mechanism of the movements of the will, by which the social 
life of man is maintained. 

6. From Schiller's aesthetic morals resulted, also, a philosophy of 
history, which made the points of view of Rousseau and Kant appear 
in a new combination. The poet unfolded this in an entirely char- 
acteristic manner in his essays on Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 
by gaining the fundamental aesthetic conceptions from bringing 
forward historical antitheses, and constructing a general plan of 
their movement. The different ages and the different kinds of poetry 
are characterised, in his view, by the different relations sustained 
by the spirit to the realm of Nature and the realm of Freedom. 
As the "Arcadian" state, we have that where man does what is in 
accordance with the moral order instinctively, without command- 
ment, because the antithesis of his two natures has not yet unfolded 
in consciousness : as the Elysian goal, we have that full consumma- 
tion in which his nature has become so ennobled that it has again 
taken up the moral law into its will. Between the two lies the 
struggle of the two natures, — the actual life of history. 

Poetry, however, whose proper task it is to portray man, is every- 
where determined by these fundamental relations. If it makes the 
sensuous, natural condition of man appear as still in harmonious 
unity with his spiritual nature, then it is native ; if, on the contrary, 
it sets forth the contradiction between the two, if in any way it 
makes the inconsistency between the reality and the ideal in man 
appear, then it is sentimental, and may be either satirical or elegiac 
or, also, in the form of the idyl. The poet who is himself Nature 
presents Nature naively; he who possesses her not has the senti- 
mental interest in her of calling back, as Idea in poetry, the Nature 
that has vanished from life. The harmony of Nature and Reason 
is given in the former, set as a task in the latter — there as reality, 

Chap. 2, § 42.J System of Reason : Schiller^ Schlegel. 605 

here as ideal. This distinction between the poetic modes of feeling 
is, according to Schiller, characteristic also for the contrast between 
the ancient and the modern. The Greek feels naturally, the modern 
man is sensible of Nature as a lost Paradise, as the sick man is 
sensible of convalescence. Hence the ancient and naive poet gives 
Nature as she is, without his own feelings ; the modern and senti- 
mental only in relation to his own reflection : the former vanishes 
behind his object, as the Creator behind his works ; the latter shows 
in the shaping of his material the power of his own personality 
striving toward the ideal. There realism is dominant ; here ideal- 
ism ; and the last summit of art would be the union in which the 
naive poet should set forth the sentimental material. So Schiller 
sketched the form of his great friend, the modern Greek. 

These principles were eagerly seized upon by the Romanticists. 
Virtuosos of the reviewer's art, such as were the Schlegels, rejoiced 
in this philosophical schema for criticism and characterisation, and 
introduced it into their comprehensive treatment of the history of 
literature. In this Frederick Schlegel gave Schiller's thoughts the 
specifically romantic flavour, for which he knew how to use Fichtean 
motifs with ready superficiality. While he designated the antithe- 
sis propounded by Schiller with the new names classic and romantic, 
he remodelled it materially, also, by his doctrine of irony. The 
classic poet loses himself in his material ; the romantic poet hovers 
as a sovereign personality above it ; he annuls matter by the form. 
In going with his free fancy beyond the material which he posits, 
he unfolds, in connection with it, merely the play of his genius, 
which he limits in none of its creation. Hence the romantic poet 
has a tendency to the infinite, toward the never complete : he him- 
self is always more than any of his objects, and just in this the 
irony evinces itself. For the infinite doing of the ethical will, of 
which Fichte taught, the Romanticist substitutes the endless play 
of the fancy, which creates without purpose, and again destroys. 

The elements in Schiller's doctrine that concern the philosophy 
of history found their full development in Fichte, from whom they 
borrowed much. As the result of their influence he allowed the 
antitheses of his Wissenschaftslehre to become reconciled in the 
aesthetic reason. Already in his Jena lectures on the Nature of 
the Scholar, and in the treatment which the professional duties 
of the teacher and the artist found in the "System of Ethics" we 
hear these motifs ; in his Erlangen lectures they have become the 
ruling theme. When he proceeded to draw the " Characteristics oj 
the Present Age," he did it in the pithy lines of a construction of 
universal history. As the first ("Arcadian") state of mankind 

606 Crermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

appears that of rational instinct or instinctive reason {^' VernunftiTi' 
stinct"), as tlie representatives of which a normal people is assumed. 
In this age the universal consciousness is dominant over and in 
individuals with immediate, uncontested certainty of natural neces- 
sity ; but it is the vocation of the free individual ego to tear himself 
loose from this government of custom and tradition, and follow 
his own impulse and judgment. With this, however, begins the 
age of sinfulness. This sinfulness becomes complete in the intel- 
lectual and moral crumbling of social life, in the anarchy of opin- 
ions, in the atomism of private interests. With clear strokes this 
" complete sinfulness " is characterised as the theory and practice of 
the Enlightenment. The community of mankind has here sunk to 
the "state based upon needs" {"JSfothstaat"), which is limited to 
making it externally possible for men to exist together, — and 
ought to be so limited, since it has nothing to do with any of man's 
higher interests, — morality, science, art, and religion, — and must 
leave them to the sphere of the individual's freedom. But for this 
reason the individual has no living interest in this "actual" state; 
his home is the world, and perhaps also at any moment the state 
which stands at the summit of civilisation.^ This civilisation, how- 
ever, consists in the subordination of individuals to the known law 
of reason. Out of the sinful, arbitrary free-will of individuals must 
rise the autonomy of the reason, the self-knowledge and self-legisla- 
tion of the universally valid, which is now consciously dominant in. 
the individual. With this the age of the rule of reason will begin, 
but it will not be complete until all the powers of the rationally 
matured individual are placed at the service of the whole in the 
"true state," and so the commandment of the common conscious- 
ness is again fulfilled without resistance. This ("Elysian") final 
state is that of rational art or artistic reason ("Vernuriftkunst"). 
It is the ideal of the " schöne /Seele " carried over to politics and 
history. To bring about this age, and in it to lead the community, 
the "kingdom," by reason, is the task of the "teacher," the scholar, 
and the artist.^ 

The " beginning of the rule of reason " Fichte's vigorous idealism 
saw just where sinfulness and need had risen to the highest point. 
In his "Addresses to the German Nation" he praised his people 

1 The classical passage for the cosmopolitanism of the culture of the eighteenth 
century is found in Ficlite, W., VII. 212. 

2 In the religious turn which Fichte's thought takes at the close, this picture 
of the ideal civilised state of the future takes on more and more theocratic 
features : the scholar and artist have now become the priest and seer- Cf. W., 
IV. 453 ff., and Nachgel. Werke, III. 417 ff. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason: Fichte^ ScJielling. 601 

as the only one that still preserves its originality and is destined 
to create the true civilised state. He cries to his people to bethink 
Itself of this its vocation, on which the fate of Europe is hanging, 
to raise itself from within by a completely new education to the 
kingdom of reason, and to give back freedom to the world. 

7. The point of view of the aesthetic reason attained full mastery 
in the whole system of the idealistic philosophy through Schelling. 
In his working out of the " Transcendental Idealism " he developed 
the Fichtean antithesis of the theoretical and practical Wissen- 
schaftslehre by the relation between the conscious and unconscious 
activity of the self (cf. above. No. 2). If the conscious is de- 
termined by the unconscious, the self is theoretical ; in the reverse 
case it is practical. But the theoretical self, which looks on at the 
productiveness of the unconscious reason, manifested in feeling, 
perceiving, and thinking, never comes to an end with this, and the 
practical self, also, which re-shapes and transforms the unconscious 
reality of the cosmos in the free work of individual morality, of 
political community, and of historical progress, has the goal of its 
activity in the infinite. In neither series does the whole essential 
nature of the reason ever come to its full realisation. This is 
possible only through the unconscious-conscious activity of the artistic 
genius, in which the above antitheses are abolished. In the un- 
designed appropriateness of the creative activity, whose product 
is freedom in phenomenal appearance, the highest synthesis of all 
activities of reason must be sought. Kant had defined genius as 
the intelligence that works like Nature; Schiller had characterised 
the aesthetic condition of play as the truly human; Schelling 
declared the aesthetic reason to be the capstone of the idealistic 
system. The work of art is that phenomenon in which the reason 
attains purest and fullest development ; art is the true organon of 
philosophy. It is in art that the '' spectator thought " has to learn 
what reason is. Science and philosophy are one-sided and never 
completed series of the development of the subjective reason ; only 
art is complete in all its works as entirely realised reason. 

After he had written the Transcendental Idealism Schelling 
delivered in Jena his lectures on the Philosophy of Art, which 
carried out this fundamental thought with an intelligent appreciar 
tion for artistic character and mode of production, that showed 
admirable fineness and acuteness especially in its treatment of 
poetry. These lectures, not printed at that time, determined the 
whole subsequent development of aesthetics by their influence upon 
the Jena circle. As published later they present that form which 
Schelling gave them some years after, when delivering them in 

608 G- er many : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

Würzburg. In this later form ^ the change in general point of view, 
to which the philosopher had meanwhile advanced, asserts itself 
still more. 

8. The aesthetic motif was active also, at least formally, in that 
a common systematic basis was sought for the Philosophy of iNature 
and the Transcendental Philosophy. The former treated the objec- 
tive, the latter the subjective reason; the two, however, must be 
indentical in their ultimate essence; whence this phase of idealism 
is called the System of Identity {Identität- sy stem) . According to 
this, a common principle is required for Kature and the self. In 
the treatise which Schelling entitled ''Exposition of my System 
of Philosophy," this common principle is called the '^Absolute 
Eeason" or the ^^Indifference of Nature and Spirit, of object and 
subject " ; for the highest principle can be determined neither as 
real nor as ideal; in it all antitheses must be obliterated. The 
" Absolute " is here as undetermined in its content,^ with Schelling, 
as in the old '' negative theology," or as in Spinoza's " substance." 
With the latter conception it has in common the property, that its 
phenomenal manifestation diverges into two series, the real and the 
ideal, Nature and Spirit or Mind. This kinship with Spinoza as 
regards his thought, Schelling strengthened by formal relationship, 
imitating in his Exposition the schematism of the Ethics. 
Nevertheless this idealistic Spinozism is different throughout from 
the original in its conception of the world. Both desire to set forth 
the eternal transmutation of the Absolute into the universe; but 
in this Spinoza regards the two attributes of materiality and con- 
sciousness as completely separate, and each finite phenomenon as 
belonging solely to one of the two spheres. Schelling, however, 
requires that "Reality" and "Ideality" must be contained in every 
phenomenon, and construes particular phenomena according to the 
degree in which the two elements are combined. The dialectical 
principle of absolute idealism is the quantitative difference between the 
real and the ideal factors ; the Absolute itself is just for this reason 
complete indifference.^ The real series is that in which the objective 
factor predominates ("überwiegt"); it leads from matter through 
light, electricity, and chemism to the organism — the relatively 
spiritual manifestation of Nature. In the ideal series the subjective 
factor predominates. In it the development proceeds from morality 

1 In the coll. works, V. 353 ff., first printed 1859. 

2 Schelling's disciple, Oken, expressed this very characteristically when he 
placed the Absolute, already called God by him, = ±0. 

2 Schelling illustrates this schematically by the example of the magnet, in 
the different parts of which north and south magnetism are present with vary- 
ing intensities. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Schelling. 609 

and science to the work of art, the relatively most natural appear- 
ance in the realm of Spirit. And the total manifestation of the 
Absolute, the universe, is, therefore, at once the most perfect orgam 
ism and the most perfect work of art.^ 

9. In this system Schelling would comprehend the entire issue of 
the investigations which had previously diverged in various direc- 
tions. The different stages of the self-differentiation of the Absolute 
he termed at first, " potencies," but soon introduced another name, 
and at the same time another conception of the matter. This was 
connected with the religious turn which the thinking of the Eoman- 
ticists took at about the close of the last and the beginning of the 
present century. The incitement to this came from Schleiermacher. 
He proved to the '• Cultured Despisers of Keligion," that the system 
of reason can become complete only in religion. In this, too, was a 
victory for the cesthetic reason. For what Schleiermacher then 
preached as religion (cf. § 41, 6) was not a theoretical or practical 
behaviour of man, but an aesthetic relation to the World-ground, the 
feeling of absolute dependence. Therefore, religion, too, was in his 
view limited to pious feeling, to the complete permeation of the 
individual by this inward relation to the universal, and put aside all 
theoretical form and practical organisation. For the same reason 
religion was held to be an individual matter, and positive religion 
was traced back to the " religious genius " of its founder. In view 
of this kinship we can understand the influence which Schleier- 
macher's " Beden " exercised upon Eomanticism : to this is due the 
inclination of the latter to expect from religion the unitary solution 
of all problems of mankind, to desire to bring in it the separated 
spheres of the activity of civilisation into inner and intimate union 
again, and, finally, to seek the eternal welfare of all in that rule of 
religion over all spheres of life, which obtained in the Middle 
Ages. As Schiller created an idealised Greece, so the later Roman- 
ticists created an idealised Middle Ages. 

Schelling followed this line of thought with great acuteness and 
fineness of feeling. Like Spinoza, he now named the Absolute " Ood " 
or the "Infinite," and likewise as Spinoza had inserted the attri- 
butes and the "infinite modes" (cf. p. 409 f.) between "substance " and 
the particular finite realities, so the " potencies " are now regarded as 
the eternal forms of the phenomenal manifestation of God, while 
the empirical particular phenomena are the finite copies of these. 
But when in this sense they were also termed by Schelling 
Ideas (in his Bruno and in his Method of Academical Study) 

1 W., I. 4, 42a 

610 Ciermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI. 

another influence still comes to light in this. Schleiermacher and 
Hegel, the latter of whom had exerted a personal influence upon 
Schelling since 1801, both pointed to Plato; but the philosophical 
knowledge of that time ^ still saw Plato's doctrine through the spec- 
tacles of Neo-Platonism, which conceived of the Ideas as God^s vision 
or intuition ofhimHelf (Selbstanschauung Gottes). And so Schelliug's 
doctrine turned back into a Neo-Flatonic Idealism, according to 
which the " Ideas " formed the intermediate link through which 
the Absolute became transformed into the world. 

This religious idealism of Schelling's doctrine of Ideas has a 
number of parallel and succeeding phenomena. The most interest- 
ing of these personally is Fichte's later doctrine, in which he paid to 
the victory of Spinozism the tribute of making the infinite impulse 
of the I proceed forth from an "absolute Being" (Sein) and be di- 
rected toward the same. For finite things, he held fast to his deduc- 
tion of them as products of consciousness ; but the infinite activity 
of this consciousness he now deduced from the end of " imitating " 
an absolute Being, the deity, and hence the vocation and destiny of 
man appeared to him no longer the restless activity of categorical 
imperative, but the " blessed life " of sinking into a contemplation 
of the divine original, — a mystical dying note of the mighty 
thinker's life, which makes the victory of the aesthetic reason 
appear in its full magnitude. 

The religious motif was followed still farther by Schelling's diS' 
ciple Krause. He wished to combine the pantheistic Weltanschauung 
of idealism, which Schelling even at that time still defended (in 
Spinozistic fashion), with the conception of divine personality. He, 
too, regards the world as the development of the divine " essence," 
which is distinctly stamped out in the Ideas ; but these ideas are 
the intuition which the supreme personality has of himself. Essence 
(Wesen) — this is Krause's term for God — is not indifferent Rea- 
son, but the personal, living ground of the world. In his farther 
carrying out of the system, which was characterised as "Panen- 
theism," Krause has scarcely any other origiuality than the very 
objectionable one of presenting the thoughts common to the whole 
idealistic development in an unintelligible terminology, which he 
himself invented, but declared to be pure German. He carries 
out, especially, his conception of the entire life of reason from the 
point of view of the " Gliedbaii" (in German, organism). He not 
only, like Schelling, regards the universe as a "Wesengliedbau" 

1 On Herbart's independent position, the importance of which becomes clear 
just in antithesis to that of Schelling and Hegel, see above, p. 584, note 1. 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Krause^ Hegel. 611 

(divine organism), but also regards the structures of society as 
continuations of the organic vital movement beyond the individual 
man ; every union {Bund) is such a " Gliedbau," and inserts itself 
again into a higher organism as a member (Glied), and the course 
of history is the process of the production of more and more perfect 
and comprehensive unions. 

For the Romantic cesthetics, finally, Schelling's new doctrine gave 
rise to the result that the Neo-Platonic conception of beauty, as 
phenomenal manifestation of the Idea in the sensuous, became again 
recognised as authoritative. The relation of inadequacy between 
the finite appearance and the infinite Idea agreed with Schlegel's 
principle of irony, and these thoughts Solger, especially, made the 
basis of his theory of art. 

10. The consummation of this whole rich and varied development 
is formed by HegeVs logical idealism. He signifies in the main 
a return from Schelling to Fichte, a giving up of the thoiight that 
the living wealth of the world can be derived or deduced from the 
"Nothing"^ of absolute indifference, and the attempt to raise this 
empty substance again to spirit,^ — to the self-determined subject. 
Such knowledge, however, cannot have the form of intuition or 
immediate perception (Anschauung), which Fichte and Schelling 
had claimed for the Ego or the Absolute, but only that of the coti- 
ception or notion (Begriff). If all that is real or actual is the mani- 
festation of spirit or mind, then metaphysics coincides with the 
logic* which has to develop the creative self-movement of spirit as 
a dialectical necessity. The conceptions into which mind or spirit 
takes apart and analyses its own content are the categories of reality, 
the forms of the cosmic life ; and the task of philosophy is not to 
describe this realm of forms as a given manifold, but to comprehend 
them as the moments of a single unitary development. The dialec- 
tical method, therefore, serves, with Hegel, to determine the 
essential nature of particular phenomena by the significance which 
they have as members or links in the self-unfolding of spirit. 
Instead of Spirit (Geist) Hegel also uses Idea or God. It is the 
highest task that has ever been set philosophy, to comprehend the 
world as a development of those principles or determinations which 
form the content of the divine mind. 

1 Hegel, Phänomen. Vorr., W., II. 14. 

2 [Geist, as in § 20, has the connotation of both "mind" and "spirit." 
The former seems more appropriate wliere logical relations are under considera- 
tion, though the latter is usually retained for the sake of uniformity.] 

3 This metaphysical logic is of course not formal logic, but in its determining 
principle is properly Kant's transcendental logic. The only difference is that 
the "phenomenon " is for Kant a human mode of representation, for Hegel an 
objoctivo externalising of the Absolute Spirit. 

612 G-ermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

In thiSj Hegel sustains not only to the German philosophy, but to 
the whole earlier intellectual movement, a relation similar to that 
of Proclus to Greek thought : ^ in the ''schema of trinities " of Posi- 
tion, Negation, and Sublation or Eeconciliation, all conceptions with 
which the human mind has ever thought reality or its particular 
groups, are woven together into a unified system. Each retains its 
assigned place, in which its necessity, its relative justification, is said 
to become manifest : but each proves by this same treatment to be 
only a moment or factor which receives its true value only when it 
has been put in connection with the rest and introduced into the 
whole. It is to be shown that the antitheses and contradictions of 
conceptions belong to the nature of mind itself, and thus also to the 
essential nature of the reality which unfolds from it, and that their 
truth consists just in the systematic connection in which the cate- 
gories follow from one another. "The phenomenon is the arising 
and passing away, which itself does not arise and pass away, but 
' is ' in-itself, and constitutes the reality and movement of the life 
of truth." 2 

Hegel's philosophy is, therefore, essentially historical, a systematic 
elaboration of the entire material of history. He possessed both the 
necessary erudition and also the combining power and fineness of 
feeling for the discovery of those logical relations which were of 
importance for him. The interest in his philosophy lies less in the 
individual conceptions, which he took from the intellectual labours of 
two thousand years, than in the systematic combination which he 
brought about between them : and just by this means he knew how 
to portray in masterly manner the meaning and significance of indi- 
vidual details, and to throw a surprising light upon long-standing 
structures of thought. He, indeed, displayed in connection with 
his data the arbitrariness (Willkür) of [a priori'] constructive thought, 
which presents the actual reality, not as it offers itself empirically, but 
as it ought to be in the dialectical movement, and this violation of the 
actual matter of fact might be objectionable where the attempt was 
made to bring empirical material into a philosophical system, as in 
the philosophy of Kature, the history of philosophy, and history in 
general. All the more brilliant did the power of the thinking sat- 
urated by the historical spirit prove in those fields where it is the 
express province of philosophical treatment, merely to reflect on 

1 Cf. above, § 20, 8. 

2 This Heracliteanisni, which was inherent already in Fichte's doctrine of 
action (cf. above, p. 594 f.), found its most vigorous opponent in Herbart's 
Eleaticism (cf. § 41, 7 f.). This old antithesis constitutes the essential element 
in the relation of the two branches of German idealism (^cf. above, p. 584, note). 

Chap. 2, § 42.] System of Reason : Hegel. 613 

undoubted data, but not to give any account of empirical reality. 
So Hegel gave as aesthetics a historical structure built up of the 
CBsthetic ideals of mankind. Following Schiller's method, and attach- 
ing himself also materially to Schiller's results, he displayed all the 
fundamental systematic conceptions of this science in the well- 
arranged series of the symbolic, the classic, and the romantic, and 
likewise divided the system of the arts into architecture, sculpture, 
painting, music, and poetry. So, too, from the fundamental concep- 
tion of religion as being the relation of the finite to the absolute 
Spirit in the form of imaginative representation (Voj'stellung) his 
philosophy of religion develops the stages of its positive realisation 
in the natural religion of magic, fire worship, and animal symbolism, 
in the religion of spiritual individuality of the sublime, the beautiful, 
and the intellectual, and finally in the absolute religion which repre- 
sents God as what he is, the triune Spirit. Here, with a deep-going 
knowledge of his material, Hegel has everywhere drawn the main 
lines in which the empirical treatment of these same subjects later 
moved, and set up the philosophical categories for the general con- 
sideration of historical facts as a whole. 

The same is true, also, of his treatment of universal history. 
Hegel understood by Objective Spirit the active and influential living 
body of individuals, which is not created by these, but rather forms 
the source from which they proceed as regards their spiritual life. 
The abstract form of this body is called Right ;^ it is the Objective 
Spirit "in itself." The subjection of the subjective disposition of 
the individual to the commands of the common consciousness the 
philosopher calls ''morality," whue he retains the name of "Sittlich- 
Tceit " [social morality or the moral order] for the realisation of the 
common consciousness in the State. In the immanent living activity 
of the human reason the state is the highest ; beyond this are only 
art, religion, and science, which press forward to the Absolute 
Spirit. The state is the realisation of the ethical Idea ; it is the 
spirit of the people become visible ; it is in its Idea the living work 
of art, in which the inwardness of the human reason comes forth 
into outer manifestation. But this Idea, from which the system of 
the forms and functions of political life derives, appears in the 
actual world only in the individual structures of the states which 
arise and pass away. Its only true and full realisation is universal 
history, in which the peoples enter successively, to live out their 
spirit in the work of state formation, and then retire from the stage, 

1 Hence Hegel treats the doctrine of Objective Spirit under the title Fhilosor 
phy of Bight (Bechtsphilosophie) . 

614 Q-ermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

So every epocli is characterised by the spiritual predominance of a 
definite people, which imprints the sign of its peculiar character 
upon all the activities of civilisation. And if it is the task of his- 
tory as a whole to understand this connected order, then politics, too, 
must not suppose that it can construct and decree a political life 
from abstract requirements; it must, rather, seek in the quiet 
development of the national spirit the motives of its political move- 
ment. So in Hegel, the "Philosopher of the Eestoration," the 
historical Weltanschauung turns against the revolutionary doctrinair- 
ism of the Enlightenment. 

Hegel is less successful in the treatment of questions of natural 
philosophy and psychology ; the energy of his thought lies in the 
domain of history. The external scheme of his system, as a whole, 
is in large the following: the Spirit in itself {Geist an sich), i.e. in 
its absolute content, is the realm of the categories ; this is treated 
by the Logic as the doctrine of Being, of Essence, and of Concep- 
tion or Notion. Spirit for itself (Geist für sich), i.e. in its otherness 
and self-estrangement or externalisation, is Nature, the forms of 
which are treated in Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. The third 
main part treats, as Philosophy of Spirit, the Spirit in and for itself 
{an und für sich), i.e. in its conscious life as returning to itself; 
here three stages are distinguished, viz. the Subjective (individual) 
Spirit ; the Objective Spirit as Eight, Morality, State, and History ; 
finally, the Absolute Spirit as pure perception {Anschauung) in 
Art, as imaginative representation {Vorstellung) in Eeligion, as 
conception {Begriff) in the History of Philosophy. 

He repeats, in all these parts of his philosophy, not only the 
formal dialectic of the construction of his conceptions, but also 
the material which constitutes the contents of the successive con- 
ceptions. So the Logic in its second and third parts develops 
already the fundamental categories of the Philosophy of Nature 
and of Spirit ; so the development of the aesthetic ideals constantly 
points toward that of the religious Vorstellungen ; and so the whole 
course of the Logic is parallel to his History of Philosophy. Just 
this relation belongs to the essential nature of the system of reason, 
which here embraces not only, as with Kant, the Eorms, but also 
the content, and aims to unfold before its view this content in the 
variety of the " forms of the actual world of reality," although this 
content is ultimately everywhere the same with itself. The course 
of development is always the same, viz. that the " Idea," by dif- 
ferentiating and becoming at variance with itself, "comes to itself." 
Hence the categories progress from the Being which has no content 
to the inner Essence, and from there to the Idea which understands 

Chap. 2, § 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational, 615 

itself ; hence the forms of the empirical world ascend from mattei 
to the imponderables, then to the organism, consciousness, self- 
consciousness, reason, right, morality, and the social morality of the 
state, successively, to apprehend the Absolute Spirit in art, religion, 
and science ; hence the history of philosophy begins with the cate- 
gories of material existence, and becomes complete after all its 
fortunes in the doctrine of the self -comprehending Idea ; hence, 
finally, the entrance into this " system of the reason," also, will best 
be found by making it clear to one's self how the human mind 
begins with the sensuous consciousness, and by the contradictions 
of this is driven to an ever higher and deeper apprehension of itself, 
until it finds its rest in philosophical knowledge, in the science of 
the conception. The inter-relation of all these developments Hegel 
has set forth with obscure language and many mysterious and 
thoughtful intimations, in his Phenomenology. 

In this system of reason every particular has its truth and reality 
only in its being a moment in the development of the whole. Only 
as such is it real in concreto, and only as such is it comprehended 
by philosophy. But if we take it abstractly, if we think it in its 
isolation, in which it exists not realiter, but only according to the 
subjective apprehension of the understanding, then it loses that 
connection with the whole, in which its truth and actual reality 
consists : then it appears as accidental and without reason. But 
as such, it exists only in the limited thinking of the individual 
subject. For philosophical knowledge, the principle holds, that 
•what is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable.^ The 
System of Eeason is the sole reality. 

§ 43. The Metaphysics of the Irrational. 

The " dialectic of history " willed it that the System of Eeason 
should also change into its opposite, and that the insight into the 
insurmountability of the barriers which the attempt to deduce all 
phenomena from one fundamental principle necessarily encounters, 
caused other theories to arise close beside the idealistic doctrines 
already treated ; and these other theories found themselves thereby 
forced to maintain the unreason of the World-ground. The first to 
pass through this process was the many-sided agent of the main 
development, the Proteus of idealism, Schelling. The new in this 
movement is not the knowledge that the rational consciousness 
always has ultimately something for its content, which it simply 

1 Vorrede, zur Bechtsphilos., W., VIII. 17. 

616 Grermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI 

finds present within itself, without being able to give any account 
of it : such limiting conceptions were the transcendental X as thing- 
in-itself, with Kant ; as differential of consciousness, with Maimon,- 
as a free act without rational ground, in Fichte. The new was, 
that this which could not be comprehended by the reason, and 
which resisted its work, was now also to be thought as something 

1. Schelling was forced upon the path of irrationalism, remarka- 
bly enough, by taking up the religious motif into his absolute ideal- 
ism (§ 42, 9). If "the Absolute" was thought no longer merely 
in Spinozistic fashion, as the universal, indifferent essence of all 
phenomena, if the divine and the natural principle of things were 
distinguished, so that the eternal Ideas as the Forms of the divine 
self-perception were assigned a separate existence beside finite things, 
then the transmutation of God into the world must again become a 
problem. This was really Hegel's problem also, and the latter was 
right when he taught later that, in his view, philosophy has the same 
task as theology. He aided himself with the dialectical method 
which aimed to show in the form of a higher logic, how the Idea 
agreeably to its own conceptional essence releases itself to "other- 
ness" {Anderssein) , i.e. to Nature, to finite phenomenal appearance. 

Schelling sought to solve the same problem by the method of 
theosophy, i.e. by a mystico-speculative doctrine, which transposed 
philosophical conceptions into religious intuitions. His happening 
upon this method was due to the fact that the problem met him in 
the form of an attempt to limit philosophy by religion. He obligated 
himself, in a vigorous reaction against this in the name of philoso- 
phy, to solve the religious problem also. This, indeed, could only 
be done if philosophy passed over into theosophical speculations. 

A disciple of the System of Identity, Eschenmayer,^ showed that 
philosophical knowledge can indeed point out the reasonableness of 
the world, and its agreement with the divine reason, but cannot show 
how this world attains the self-subsistent existence with reference 
to the deity, which it has in finite things. Here philosophy ceases 
and religion begins. In order to vindicate this domain also for 
philosophy, and restore the old unity between philosophy and relig- 
ion, Schelling lays claim to specifically religious intuitions as philo- 
sophical conceptions, and so re-shapes them in accordance with this 
claim that they appear usable for both disciplines : in doing which 
he makes a copious use of Kant's philosophy of religion. 

^ Eschenmayer (1770-1852), Die Philosophie in ihrem Uehergange zur Nicht" 

philosdphie (1803). 

Chap. 2, § 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schelling. 617 

In fact/ there is no continuous transition from the Absolute to 
the concrete reality; the origin of the world of sense from God is 
thinkable only by a leap {Sprung) , a breaking off from the condition 
of absoluteness. A ground for this — Schelling still teaches here — 
is to be found neither in the Absolute nor in the Ideas : but in the 
nature of the latter the possibility at least is given. For to the 
Ideas as the " antitype " or counterpart of the Absolute, in which it 
beholds itself, the self-subsistence of the archetype communicates 
itself, — th.Q freedom of that which is in itself {" In-sich-selbst-seins^') . 
In this lies the possibility of the falling away of the Ideas from God, 
of their assuming metaphysical independence, by which they become 
actual and empirical, i.e. finite. But this falling away is not neces- 
sary and not comprehensible: it is a fact without rational ground; 
not, however, a single event, but as timeless and eternal as the Abso- 
lute and the Ideas. We see that the religious colouring of this doc- 
trine comes from Kant's theory of the radical evil as a deed of the 
intelligible character, while the philosophical, on the contrary, comes 
from Fichte's conception of the free acts of the ego, which have no 
rationale. On this apostasy, therefore, rests the actualisation of the 
Ideas in the world. Hence the content of the actual reality is rational 
and divine ; for it is God's Ideas that are actual in it : their being 
actual, however, is apostasy, sin, and unreason. This reality of the 
Ideas external to God is Nature. But its divine essence strives back 
to the original ground and archetype, and this return of things into 
God is history, the epic composed in the mind of God, whose Iliad 
is the farther and farther departure of man from God, and whose 
Odyssey is his return to God. Its final purpose is the reconciliation 
of the apostasy, the reuniting of the Ideas with God, the cessation of 
their self-subsistence. Individuality also experiences this change 
of fortunes : its selfness {Ichheit) is intelligible freedom, self-deter- 
mination — breaking loose from the Absolute ; its deliverance is a 
submergence in the Absolute. 

In similar manner Frederick SchlegeP mside the "triplicity" of 
the infinite, the finite, and the return of the finite to the infinite, 
the principle of his later theory, which professed to maintain the 
contradictions of the actual as a fact, to explain them from the 
fall, and to reconcile them through subjection to divine revelation; 
but merely concealed, with great pains, the philosophical impotence 
of its author under the exposition employed. 

1 Schelling, Beligion und Philosophie, W., I. 6, pp. 38 ff. 

2 In the Philosophische Vorlesungen, edited by Windischmann (1804-1806), 
and likewise later in the Philosophie des Lebens and the Philosophie der 
Geschichte (1828-1829). 

618 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VI. 

2. The subtlety of SchelUng, on the contrary, could not free itself 
from the once-discovered problem. The monism, which had always 
controlled his thought, forced him to the question, whether the 
ground of the falling away was not ultimately to be found in the 
Absolute itself: and this could be afS.rmed only if the irrational 
was transferred to the essence of the Absolute itself From the point 
of view of this thought, Schelling became friendly to the mysticism 
of Jacob Boelime (cf. p. 374 f.). This was brought near to him by 
his intercourse with Franz von Baader. The latter himself had 
received his stimulus both from Boehme and from Boehme's French 
prophet St. Martin,^ and, holding fast to the Catholic faith, had 
elaborated his mysticism with obscure fantastic genius and un- 
methodical appropriation of Kantian and Fichtean thoughts. The 
original idea that stirred within him was, that the course of the 
life of man, who is the image of God, and who can know of himself 
only so much as God knows of him, must be parallel to the self- 
development of God. Since, now, man's life is determined by the 
fall as its beginning and redemption as its goal, the eternal self- 
generation of God must consist in God's unfolding himself out of 
his dark, irrational, primitive essence, through self-revelation and 
self-knowledge, to absolute reason. 

Under such influences Schelling also began in his treatise ^ on 
freedom (1809) to speak of an Urgrund, Ungrund, or Abgrund [pri- 
mordial ground, unreason, or abyss] in the divine nature, which is 
depicted as mere Being, and absolute primordial accident (" Urzu^ 
fall"), as a dark striving, an infinite impulse. It is the uncon- 
scious will, and all actual reality is in the last instance will. This 
will, directed only toward itself, creates as its self-revelation the 
Ideas, the image in which the will beholds itself — the reason. 
Out of the interaction of the ever dark and blind urgency and its 
ideal self-beholding proceeds the world, which as Nature permits 
us to recognise the conflict between purposive formation and irra- 
tional impulse, and as historical process has for its content the 
victory of the universal will revealed in reason, over the natural 

1 St. Martin (1743-1803), " Le philosophe inconnu," the stern opponent of 
the Enhghtenment and of the Eevolution, was seized through and through by 
Boehme's teachings, and translated his Aurora. Of his writings, the most 
important are U Homme de Desir (1790), Le Nouvel Homme (1796), and De 
VSsprit des Chases (1801) ; tlie most interesting perhaps is the strange work, 
Le Crocodile, ou guerre du Men et du mal arrivee sous la regne de Louis XF., 
poeme epicomagique (1799). Cf. A. Franck, La Philosophie Mystique en France 

(Paris, 1866) ; also v. Osten-Sacken, Fr. Baader und St. Martin (Leips. 1860). 

2 This later doctrine of Schelling's is accordingly usually called the Doctrine 
of Freedom, as the earlier is called the System of Identity. Schelling, Unters, 
über die Freiheit, W.. I. 7, 376 

Chap. 2, § 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schelling. 619 

unreason of the particular will. In this way the development oi 
the actual leads from the unreason of the primordial will {deus 
implicitus) to the self-knowledge and self-determination of reason 
(deus explicitus) } 

3. Thus at last religion became for Schelling the "organon of phil- 
osophy," as art had been earlier. Since the process of God's self- 
development goes on in the revelations, with which in the human 
mind he beholds himself, all momenta of the divine nature must 
appear in the succession of ideas which man in his historical 
development has had of God. Hence in the Philosophy of Mythol- 
ogy and Bevelation, the work of Schelling's old age, the knowledge 
of God is gained from the history of all religions : in the progress 
from the natural religions up to Christianity and its different forms 
the self-revelation of God makes its way from dark primordial will 
to the spirit of reason and of love. God develops or evolves in 
and by revealing himself to men.^ 

In its methodical form this principle reminds us strongly of 
Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, in which "the Idea 
comes to itself," and the happy combination and fineness of feeling 
with which Schelling has grouped and mastered the bulky material 
of the history of religions in these lectures shows itself throughout 
akin and equal in rank to the Hegelian treatment. But the funda- 
mental philosophical conception is yet entirely different. Schelling 
terms the standpoint of this his latest teaching, metaphysical em- 
piricism. His own earlier system and that of Hegel he now calls 
negative philosophy : this philosophy may indeed show that if God 
once reveals himself, he does it in the forms of natural and historical 
reality which are capable of dialectical a priori construction. But 
that he reveals himself and thus transmutes himself into the world, 
dialectic is not able to deduce. This cannot be deduced at all ; it is 
only to be experienced, and experienced from the way in ivhich God 
reveals himself in the religious life of mankind. To understand from 
this process God and his self-evolution into the world is the task of 
'positive philosophy. 

Those who both immediately and later derided Schelling's Phil- 
osophy of Mythology and Revelation as " Gnosticism " scarcely 
knew, perhaps, how well founded the comparison was. They had 
in mind only the fantastic amalgamation of mythical ideas with 
philosophical conceptions, and the arbitrariness of cosmogonic and 
theogonic constructions. The true resemblance, however, consists 

1 Cf. above, p. 290 f . 

ä Cf . Constautin Frantz, Schelling^s Positive Philosophie (Cöthen, 1879 f.). 

620 Crermany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL 

in this, that as the Gnostics gave to the warfare of religions, in the 
midst of which they were standing, the significance of a history of 
the universe and the divine powers ruling in it, so now Schelling 
set forth the development of human ideas of God as the develop- 
ment of God himself. 

4. Irrationalism came to its full development in Schopenhauer by 
the removal of the religious element. The dark urgency or instinct 
directed only toward itself appears with him under the name of 
the will to live, as the essence of all things, as the thing-iu-itself 
(cf. § 41, 9). In its conception, this will, directed only towards 
itself, has a formal resemblance to Fichte's " infinite doing," just as 
was the case with Schlegel's irony (cf. § 42, 5) : but in both cases 
the real difference is all the greater. The activity directed solely 
toward itself is with Fichte the autonomy of ethical self-determina- 
tion, with Schlegel the arbitrary play of fancy, with Schopenhauer 
the absolute unreason of an objectless will. Since this will only 
creates itself perpetually, it is the never satisfied, the unhappy will : 
and since the world is nothing but the self-knowledge (self-revelation 
— objectification) of this will, it must be a world of misery and 

Pessimism^ thus grounded metaphysically, is now strengthened 
by Schopenhauer ^ by means of the hedonistic estimate of life itself. 
All human life flows on continually between willing and attaining. 
But to will is pain, is the ache of the "not-yet-satisfied." Hence 
pain is the positive feeling, and pleasure consists only in the removal 
of a pain. Hence pain must preponderate in the life of will under 
all circumstances, and actual life confirms this conclusion. Compare 
the pleasure of the beast that devours with the torture of the one 
that is being devoured — and you will be able to estimate with 
approximate correctness the proportion of pleasure and pain in the 
world in general. Hence man's life always ends in the complaint, 
that the best lot is never to be born at all. 

If life is suffering, then only sympathy can be the fundamental 
ethical feeling (cf. § 41, 9). The individual will is immoral if it 
increases the hurt of another, or also if it is merely indifferent 
toward it ; it is moral if it feels another's hurt as its own and seeks 
to alleviate it. From the standpoint of sympathy Schopenhauer 
gave his psychological explanation of the ethical life. But this 
alleviation of the hurt is only a palliative ; it does not abolish the 
will, and with the will its unhappiness persists. " The sun burns 
perpetual noon." The misery of life remains always the same; 

1 World as Will and Idea, I. §§ 56 ff. ; II. ch. 46 ; Parerga, II. ch. 11 f. 

Chap. 2, § 43.] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schopenhauer. 621 

only the form in whicli it is represented in idea alters. The special 
shapes change, but the content is always the same. Hence there 
can be no mention of a progress in history ; intellectual perfecting 
alters nothing in the will which constitutes the essential nature of 
man. History shows only the endless sorrow of the will to live, 
which with an ever-new cast of characters constantly presents the 
same tragi-comedy before itself.^ On this ground the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer has no interest in history ; history teaches only indi- 
vidual facts ; there is no rational science of it. 

A deliverance from the wretchedness of the will would be possible 
only through the negation or denial of the will itself. But this is 
a mystery. For the will, the Iv koX ttSv — the one and all — the only 
Eeal, is indeed in its very nature self-aflSrmation ; how shall it deny 
itself ? But the Idea of this deliverance is present in the mystical 
asceticism, in the mortification of self, in the contempt of life and 
all its goods, and in the peace of soul that belongs to an absence 
of wishes. This, Schopenhauer held, is the import of the Indian 
religion and philosophy, which began to be known in Europe about 
his time. He greeted this identity of his teaching with the oldest 
wisdom of the human race as a welcome confirmation, and now 
called the world of idea the veil of Maia, and the negation of the 
will to live the entrance into Nirvana, But the unreasonable will 
to live would not let the philosopher go. At the close of his work 
he intimates that what would remain after the annihilation of the 
WÜ1, and with that, of the world also, would be for all those who 
are still full of will, certainly nothing ; but consideration of the life 
of the saints teaches, that while the world with all its suns and 
milky ways is nothing to them, they have attained blessedness and 
peace. " In thy nothing I hope to find the all." 

If an absolute deliverance is accordingly impossible, — were it 
ever possible, then in view of the ideality of time there could be no 
world whatever of the affirmation of the will, — there is yet a rela- 
tive deliverance from sorrow in those intellectual states in which 
the pure willess subject of knowing is active, viz. in disinterested 
contemplation and disinterested thought. The object for both of 
these states he finds not in particular phenomena, but in the eternal 

1 Hence the thought of grafting the optimism of the Hegelian development 
system on this will-irrationalism of Schopenhauer's after the pattern of Schel- 
ling's Doctrine of Freedom was as mistaken as the hope of reaching speculative 
results by the method of inductive natural science. And with the organic 
combination of the two impossibilities, even a thinker so intelligent and so deep 
and many-sided in his subtle investigations as Echvard von Hartmann, could 
have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period {Die PhilosO' 
phie des Unbewussten, Berlin, 1869) [Eng. tr. The Philosophy of the Unconscious, 
by E. C. Coupland, Lend. 1884]. 

622 G-ermany : Development of Tdealism. [Part VI. 

Forms of the objectification of the will — the Ideas. This Platonic 
(and Schellingian) element, however (as is the case also with the 
assumption of the intelligible character), fits with extreme difiiculty 
into Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, according to which all 
particularising of the will is thought as only an idea in space and 
time ; but it gives the philosopher opportunity to employ Schiller's 
principle of disinterested contemplation in the happiest manner to 
complete his theory of life. The will becomes free from itself 
when it is able to represent to itself in thought its objectification 
without any ulterior purpose. The misery of the irrational World- 
will is mitigated by morality ; in art and science it is overcome. 



M. J. Monrad, Denkrichtungen der neueren Zeit. Bonn, 1879. 
A. Franck, Philosophes Modernes, Strangers et Fran<^ais. Paris, 1873. 
R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart. Leips. 
1878. 2d ed. 1892. 

E. V. Hartmann, Kritische Wanderung durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart. 
Leips. 1890. 

W. Diltliey, Archiv ßlr Geschichte der Philosophie. Vol. XI. pp. 551 ff. 

H. Siebert, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Philosophie seit Hegel. Göt- 
tingen, 1898. 

Ph. Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en France au 19' Siede. 
Paris, 1834, 

H. Talne, Les Philosophes Classiques Fran(^ais au 19' Siede. Paris, 1857. 

F. Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au 19' Siede. Paris, 1868. 

L. Ferraz, Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19^ Siede, 3 vola. Paris, 

P. Janet, Les Maitres de la Pensee Moderne. Paris, 1883. 
E. De Roberty, La Philosophie du Siede. Paris, 1891. 
Ch. Adam, La Philosophie en France, pr. Moitie du 19' Siede. Paris, 1894. 
L. Liard, Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains. Paris, 1878. 
Th. Ribot, La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine. Paris, 1870. 
D. Massen, Recent English Philosophy, 3d ed. Lond. 1877. 
Har. Höffding, Einleitung in die englische Philosophie der Gegenwart. Leips. 

L, Ferri, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en Italie au 19' Siede. Paris, 

K. Werner, Die italienische Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts. Vienna, 1884 ff. 
fO. Pfleiderer, The Development of Bational Theology since Kant. Lond. and 

N.Y. 1891.] 
[L. Stephen, The English Utilitarians, 3 vols. Lond. and N.Y. 1900.] 
[J. T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Vol. I. 


The history of philosophical principles is closed with tlie develop- 
ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth 
and the nineteenth centuries. A survey of the succeeding development 
in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his- 
torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen- 
tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century 
is far from being a philosophical one ; it is, in this respect perhaps, 


624 Philosophy of tTie Nineteenth Century. [Part Vn. 

to be compared with the third and second centuries b.c. or the four- 
teenth and fifteenth a.d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might 
say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reality 
and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to 
itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home.^ The 
philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten- 
sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of 
Ideas, which has been wafted over to us from the days of the flower of 
the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science 
and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history 
have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing 
combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, 
but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, 
have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and 
fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con- 
ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and 
vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the 
problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our 
century,^ moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans- 
mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new 
form in their empirical expression. 

For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the 
nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of 
importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may 
claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence 
which this special science had gained over philosophy and the 
intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin- 
ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all 
the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there- 
fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main 
under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con- 
ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the 
actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of 
occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable 
necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined 
theoretical investigation. The "natural" was thus made a general 
standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe- 

1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W., VI., XXXV. 

2 To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master 
on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many 
years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as 
special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his Geschichte der neueren 
Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and 
proved what here can only be briefly sketched. 

PMlosopJiy of the Nineteenth Century. 626 

rience, Tlie spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world 
was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, 
that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and 
vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true 
comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance 
that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The 
historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought 
which the System of Reason desired to trace out. 

These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life 
of our century. And in the warfare between them all arguments 
from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre- 
sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any 
new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to 
incline toward the side of the principles of Democritus, there are 
two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of 
essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative 
in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the 
simplicity and clearness to perception or imagination {anschauliche 
Einfachheit^, the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science 
knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable 
in experience, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and 
all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our 
day is the evident utility of natural science. The mighty trans- 
formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place 
with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the 
average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to 
which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under 
the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f.). 

On the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept 
alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social 
and historical life has for the individual. The more the political 
and social development of European humanity has entered upon the 
epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an 
increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which 
the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even 
in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make 
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds 
expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con- 
test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec- 
tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most 
violently at the point where the question will ultimately be decided, 
in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living 
to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the 


626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century . [Part VII. 

environing wliole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tiine 
of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition. 

If we are to briag out from the philosophical literature of this 
century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac- 
teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we 
have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical 
life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; 
for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be 
decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov- 
ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, 
the method, and the systematic significance of psychology has never 
been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and 
the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has 
appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus 
psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com- 
pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda- 
mental principles of its problem and method. 

This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction 
against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a 
broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine- 
teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not 
indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more 
passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in 
its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb 
of sceptical and positivist caution. 

To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought 
belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the 
historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist- 
ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the 
unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop 
a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend 
upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested 
toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37). 

But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not 
failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The 
idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the 
philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly 
impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical 
principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as 
if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the 
historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate 
as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall 
reshape and reconstruct. 

Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627 

From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which 
were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by 
the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the 
worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic 
temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the 
deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in 
general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And 
so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was 
enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which 
are universally valid. 

From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following 
main points may be emphasized : — 

In France Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho- 
logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, 
such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1826; Nosographie Fhilosophique, 1798), F. J. V, 
Broussais (1772-1838 ; Tratte de Physiologie, 1822 f. ; Traite de V Irritation 
et de la Folie, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Gall (1758-1828 ; 
Becherches sur le Systeme Nerveux en general et sur cehii du Cerveau enparti- 
cidier, 1809, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzheim). — The an- 
titjiesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : 
Barthez (17oi-i80ö ; Nouveaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed., 
1808). Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; 
Becherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort, 1800), Bertrand (1796-1831 ; 
Traite du Somnambulisme, 1823), and Buisson (1766-1805; De la Division 
la plus Naturelle des Phenomenes Physiologiques, 1802). Corresponding to 
this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Essai dUdeologie, 1803), 
and especially with Pierre Laronügui^re (1756-1837 ; Legons de Philosophie, 
1815-1818) and his disciples, Fr. Thurot (1768-1832; De VEntendement et de 
la Baison, 1830) and J. J. Cardaillac (1766-1845 ; Etudes Elementaires de 
Philosophie, 1830). — Cf. Picavet, Les Ideologues (Paris, 1891). 

A line of extensive historical study and of deeper psychology begins with 
M. J. Degerando (1772-1842 ; De la Generation des Connaissances Humaines, 
Berlin, 1802 ; Hlstoire ComparÄe des System,es de Philosophie, 1804) and has 
its head in Fr. P. Gonthier Maine de Biran (1766-1824 ; De la Decomposition 
de la Pensee, 18 jj ; Les Bapports du Physique et du Moral de VEomme, printed 
1834; Essaisur les Fondements de la Psychologie, 1812 ; (Euvres Philosophiques, 
edited bv V. Cousin, 1841 ; (Euvres Inedites, edited by E. Naville, 1859; Nou- 
velles (Euvres Inedites, edited by A. Bertrand, 1887). The influences of the 
Scottish and German philosophy discharge into this line (represented also by 
A. M. Ampfere) through P. Pr^^x-ost (1751-1839), Ancillon (1766-1837), 
Hoyer-Collard (1763-1845), Jouffroy (1796-1842), and above all, Victor 
Cousin (1792-1867 ; Introduction ä VHistoire Generale de la Philosophie, 7th 
ed., 1872 ; Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1845 ; complete works, Paris, 1846 ff. ; 
et E. Fuchs, Die Philos. V. G.'s, Berlin, 1847 ; J. Elaux, La Philosophie de M. 
Cousin, Paris, 1864). The numerous school, founded by Cousin, which was 
especially noted through its historical labours, is called the Spiritualistic or 
Eclectic School. It was the official philosophy after the July Revolution, and is 
in part still such. To its adherents who have been active in the historical field, 
where their work has been characterised by thoroughness and Uterary taste, 
belong Ph. Damiron, Jul. Simon, E. Vacherot, H. Martin, A. Chaignet, Ad. 
Franck, B. Haureau, Ch. Bartholmess, E. Saisset, P. Janet, E. Caro, etc. F. 
Ravaisson has risen from the school to a theoretical standpoint which is in a 
certain sense his own. (Morale et metaphysique, in the Bev^ie de Met. et de Mor. 

Its principal opponents were the philosophers of the Church party, whose 
theory is known as Traditionalism. Together with Chateaubriand (Le Genie 
is Christianisme, 1802), Jos. de Maistre (1753-1821 ; Essai sur le Principe 

628 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII. 

Generateur des Constitutions Politiques, 1810 ; Soirees de St. Petersbourg, 1821 ; 
Du Pape, 1829 ; cf . on him Fr. faulhan, Paris, 1893) and J. Frayssinons 
(1765-1841; Defense du Christianisme, 1823), V. G. A. de Bonald (1753-1841; 
Theorie du Pouvoir Politique et Beligieux, 1796 ; Essai Analytique sur les Lois 
Naturelles de Vordre Social, 1800; Du Divorce, 1801; De la Philosophie 
Morale et Politique du 18^ siede; complete works, 15 vols., Paris, 1816 ff.) 
stands here in the foreground. The traditionalism of P. S. Ballanche is 
presented in a strangely fantastic fashion (1776-1847 ; Essai sur les Institutions 
Sociales, 1817 ; La Palingenesie Sociale; complete works, 5 vols., Paris, 1883). 
In the beginning H. F. R. de Lamennais (1782-1854) also supported this line in 
his Essai sur VLidifference en Matiere de Religion (1817) ; later, having fallen 
out with the Church {Parole d'un Croyant, 1834), he presented in the Esquisse 
d'une Philosophie (4 vols., 1841-1846) a comprehensive system of philosophy, 
which had for its prototype partly the Schellingian System of Identity and 
partly the Italian Ontologism. 

Among the philosoplucal supporters of Socialism (cf. L. Stein, Geschichte 
der socialen Bewegung in Frankreich, Leips. 1849 ff.) the most important is 
CI. H. de St. Simon (1760-1825; Litroduction aux Travaux Scientißqties du 
19^ siede, 18U7 ; Beorganisation de la Societe Europeenne, 1814 ; Systeme In- 
dustriel, 1821 f. ; Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 ; CEuvres choisies, 3 vols., 1859). 
Of his successors may be mentioned, Bazard (Doctrine de St. Simon, 1829), 
B. Enfantin (1796-1864; La Religion St. Simonienne, 1831), Pierre Leroux 
(1798-1871 ; Refutatimi de I'Eclecticisme, 1839 ; De V Humanite, 1840), and Ph. 
Buchez (1796-1866; Essai dhin Praite Complet de Philosophie au Point de 
Vue du Catholicisme et du Progres, 1840). 

Aug. Comte occupies a most interesting position apart. He was born in 
Montpellier in 1798 and died alone in Paris in 1857 : Cotirs du Philosophie 
Positive (6 vols., Paris, 1840-1842) [Eng. tr., or rather a condensation and repro- 
duction by H. Martineau, The Positive Philosoi^hy of A. Comte, 2 vols., Lond. 
1853] ; Systeme de Politique Positive (Paris, 1851-1854) ; The Positive Polity 
and certain earlier works, trans, by various authors, 4 vols., Lond. 1876-1878; 
Catechisme Positiviste (1853) ; cf. Littr6, C. et la Philosophie Positive, Paris, 
1868 ; J. S. Mill, C. and Positivism, Lond. 1865 ; J. Rig, A. C. La Philosophie 
Positive Resümee, Paris, 1881 ; E. Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion 
of C, Glasgow, 1885. 

In the following period Comte's position became more infiuential and in part 
controlling. E. Littrö (1801-1881 ; La Science au Point de Vue Philosophique, 
Paris, 1873) defended his positivism in systematic form. A freer adaptation of 
positivism was made by such writers as H. Taine (1828-1893 ; Philosophie de 
VArt, 1865 ; De V LiteUigence, 1870 ; cf. on him G. Barzellotti, Rome, 1895) 
and Ernest Renan (1823-1892; Questions Contemporaines, 1868; U Avenir 
de la Science, 1890). Under Comte's influence, likewise, has been the develop- 
ment of empirical psychology. Th. Eibot, editor of the Revue Philoso2Jhique, 
is to be regarded as the leader in this field. In addition to his historical works 
on English and German psychology, his investigations with regard to heredity 
and abnormal conditions of memory, will, personality, etc., may be noted. 

In part also Sociology stands under Comte's influence, as R. Worms, G. 
Tarde, E. Durkheim, and others have striven to work it out (cf. Annee Sociolo- 
gique, pub. since 1894). Finally, evolutionary theories belong in this connection, 
which have been especially carried out by J. M. Guyau (1854-1888 ; Esquisse 
d''une Morale, 1885; U irreligion de Vavenir, 1887; Vart^au point de vue 
sociologique, 1889) [^Problemes de V Esthetique Contemporaine, 1897]. 

By far the most important among the present representatives of philosophy in 
France is Ch. Renouvier (born 1818 ; Essais de Critique Generale, 2d ed., 
1875-96; Esquisse dhine Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philoso- 
phiques, 1885 ; La Philosophie Analytique de I'Histoire, 1896 ; La Nouvelle 
Monadologie, 1899). The synthesis of Kant and Comte which he has sought to 
effect has its literary organ in the Annee Philosophique (published since 1889). 

In England the Associational Psychology continues through Thomas 
Brown to men like Thomas Belsham (1750-1829 ; Elements of the Philosophy 
of the. Human Mind, 1801), John Feam (First Lines of the Human Mind, 

Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 629 

1820), and many others; finds support here also in physiological and phreno- 
logical theories as with G. Combe {A System of Phrenology, Edin. 1825), Sam. 
Bailey (Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, 1829 ; The Theory of Reasoning, 
1851 ; Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1855) and Harriet Mar- 
tineau {Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, 1851), and 
reaches its full development through James Mill {Analysis of the Phemnnena 
of the Human Mind, 1829), and his son, J. Stuart Mill (1806-1873 : System 
of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, 1843; Principles of Political Economy, 
1848 ; On Liberty, 1859 ; Utilitarianism, 1863 ; Examination of ,Sir W. 
Hamilton's Philosophy, 1865 ; Autobiography, 1873; Posthumously, Essays on 
Religion, 1874 ; Collected Dissertations and Discussions, N. Y., 1882 ; Useful 
ed. of Ethical "Writings by Douglas, Edin. 1897. Cf. H. Taine, Le Positivisme 
Anglais, Paris, 1864 [Eng. tr. by Haye ; Courtney, Life of 31., and 3feta- 
physics of J. S. M. ; Bain, J. 8. M. 1882], Douglas, J. S. M., A Study of his 
Philos., Edin. 1895). Closely connected with this line of thought stands Alex. 
Bain {The Senses and the Intellect, 1856, 3d ed. 1868; Mental and Mural 
Science, 1868, 3d ed. 1872, Pt. II, 1872 ; The Emotions and the Will, 1859, 3d 
ed. 1875 ; Mind and Body, 3d ed. 1874. 

The related Utilitarianism is represented by T. Cogan ( Philosophical Treatise 
on the Passions, 1802; Ethical Questions, 1817), John Austin (179Ü-1859; 
The Philosophy of Positive Law, 1832), G. Cornwall Lewis {A Treatise on the 
Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics, 1852). [As representatives 
of Utilitarianism, in addition to Mill, and Bain, op. cit. above, H. Sidg-wick, 
Methods of Ethics, Lond. 1874, 6th ed. 1901, and T. Fowler, Principles of 
Morals, Lond. 1886 f., should also be mentioned. 

Scottish Philosophy, after Dugald Stewart and James Mackintosh (1764- 
1832 ; Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, 1830), had at first 
unimportant supporters like Abercrombie (1781-1846 ; Inquiry concerning the 
Intellectual Powers, 1830; Philosophy of the Moral Feelings, 1833) and 
Chalmers (1780-1847), and was especially as academical instruction brought 
into affiliation with the eclecticism of Cousin by Henry Calderwood {Philoso- 
phy of the Infinite, 1854), S. Morell {A71 Historical and Critical Vieio of the 
Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 19th Century, 1846), also H. Wedg- 
wood {On the Development of the Understanding, 1848). 

The horizons of English thought were widened by acquaintance with the 
German literature, to which Sam. Tayl. Coleridge (1772-1834), W. Words- 
worth (1770-1850), and especially Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881 ; Past and 
Present, 1843 [the articles on various German thinkers and the Sartor Resartus 
belong here also]) contributed. In philosophy this influence made itself felt 
primarily through Kant, whose theory of cognition influenced J. Herschel ( On 
the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1831), and especially W. Whewell {Phi-^ 
losophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1840). 

In intelligent reaction against this influence, Scottish philosophy experienced 
a valuable re-shaping at the hands of Sir William Hamilton (1788-185H ; Dis- 
cussions on Philosophy and Literature, 1852 ; On Truth and Error, 1856 ; Lec- 
tures on Metaphysics and Logic, 1859 ; Editions of Reid's and Stewards Works ; 
cf. J. Veitch, S. W. H., The Man and his Philosophy, Edin. and Lond. 1883 
[Memoir in 2 vols., 1869, by same author]). In his school Agnosticism proper, 
supported principally by H. L. Mansel (1820-1871 ; 3Ietaphysics or the Phi- 
losophy of Consciousness, 1860), is separated from a tendency inclining toward 
eclectic metaphysics : J. Veitch, R. Lowndes {Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Primary Beliefs, 1865), Leechman, McCosh, and others. 

Following a suggestion from one aspect of Hamilton's thought, a movement 
arose which sought to develop formal logic as a calculus of symbols. To this 
movement belong G. Boole {The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, 1847 ; An 
Analysis of the Laws of Thought, 1854) ; De Morgan {Formal Logic, 1847) ; 
Th. Spencer Baynes {An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms, 1850) ; 
W. Stanley Jevons {Pure Logic, 1864 ; Principles of Science, 1874) ; J. Venn 
{Symbolic Logic, 1881 ; Logic of Chance, 1876 ; Principles of Logic, 1889) 
[C. S. Peirce, Algebra of Logic, 1867 ; Ladd and Mitchell, in Studies in Logic, 
ed. by Peirce, Boston, 1883]. Compare on this A. Riehl { Vierteljahr sschr. f. 
wiss. Philos. 1877) and L. Liard {Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains, 1878). 

The combined influence of Kant and the later German theism impressed the 

630 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL 

philosopher of religion, James Martineau (who is also the most prominent 
recent representative of intuitionist ethics [Types of Ethical Theory, 1885; A 
Study nf Religion, 1888 ; Seat of Authority in Bel., 1890]; cf. A. W. Jackson, 
J. M., Boston, 1900), and likewise F. W. Newman (The Soul, etc., 1849; 7%e- 
ism, 18-38), A. C. Fräser and othei-s. Since Hutchinson Stirling (The Secret 
of Hegel, 1865 ; What is Thought f 1900) German idealism in its whole develop- 
ment and in its metaphysical aspect, particularly in the Hegelian form, has called 
forth a vigoi'ous idealistic movement, of which the leading representative was 
the late Ihouias Hill Green (183(3-1882), Professor at Oxford. [His Introd. 
to Hume was followed by criticisms on Lewes and Spencer and (posthumously) 
by the Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883, and complete works (except the Proleg.), 
3 vols., Lond. and N. Y. 1885, 1886, 1888; cf. W. H. Fairbrother, The Phi- 
losophy of T. H. G., Lond. 1896.] In sympathy with this idealistic and more 
or less Hegelian interpretation of Kantian principles are F. H. Bradley (Logic, 
Lond. 1883 ; Ethical Stiidies, 1876; Appearance and Reality, 1893), B. Bosan- 
quet (Logic, 2 vols., 1888 ; Hist, of ^Esthetics, 1892 ; Philos. of the State, 1899, 
etc.) ; J. Caird (Introduction to the Philosophy of Beligion, 1880) ; E. Caird 
( Critical Phil, of Kant, 2 vols., 1889 ; Essays, 2 vols., 1892 ; Evolution of Beligion, 
1893); Seth and Haldaue (Essays in Phil. Criticism, 1883) ; J. Mackenzie 
(Social Philosophy, 1890). Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, 1887, 
and the review of this in Mind, by D. G. Ritchie. 

These movements above noted stand under the principle of Evolution; the 
same principle became authoritative for the investigation of organic nature 
through Charles Darwin (Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, 
1859; Descent of Man, 1871; The Expression of the Emotions, 1872). The 
same principle wa,s formulated in more general terms and made the basis of a 
comprehensive System of Synthetic Philosophy by Herbert Spencer (born 
1820), First Principles, 1862, 6th ed. 1901; Principles of Psychology, 1855, 5th ed. 
1890 ; Principles of Biology, 1864-1867, 4th ed. 1888 ; Principles of Sociology, 
1876-1896 ; Principles of ^Ethics, 1879-1893. Cf. on him O. Gaupp, Stuttgart, 
1897 [T. H. Green, in Works ; F. H. Collins, Ejntome of the Synthetic Philoso- 
phy, 1889.] Huxley, Wallace, Tyndall, G. H. Lewes (Problems of Life and 
Mind, 3d ed. 1874), belong in the main to this tendency. 

[Other works in evolutionary ethics are, L. Stephen, The Science of Ethics, 
Loud. 1882 ; S. Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, Lond. 1889 ; C. M. 
Williams, The Ethics of Evolution, Lond. and N.Y. 1893. This last contains 
useiul summaries of the chief works.] 

[In America idealistic lines of thought were introduced (in opposition to the 
prevalent Scottish philosophy) through the medium of Coleridge's interpretation 
of Kant, by James Marsh (1829) and Henry's trans, of V. Cousin's Lectures on 
Locke (1834), more directly from Germany by L, P. Hickok (Bational Psy- 
chology, 184S ; Emp. Psych., 1854 (rev. ed. by J. H. Seelye, 1882) ; Moral 
Science, 1853 (rev. ed. by J. H. Seelye), etc.). W. T. Harris, in the Jour. 
Spec. Philosophy, and elsewhere, has done an important work in the same line. 
Of more recent writers, J. Royce (The Beligious Aspect of Philosophy, 1885; 
Spirit of Modern Philos., Vö'.}'2 ; The World and the Individual, 1900), J. 
Dewey (Psychology, 1886 ; Outlines of Ethics, 1891), are closer to the school 
of Green, while gI^ T. Ladd (Phys. Psychology, 1887 ; Introd. to Phil, 1891; 
Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894 ; Philos. of Mind, 1895 ; Philos. 
of Knowledge, 1897 ; A Theory of Beality, 1899) and B. P. Bowne (Meta- 
physics, Psychological Theoi^y, Ethical Theory, etc.) stand nearer to Lotze. 
Oriuoad (The Foundations of Knowledge, 1900) combines idealistic motives 
with those of Scottish thought. The extremely suggestive work of W. James 
(Psychology, 2 vols., 1890) should also be mentioned, and as representatives 
of the modern treatment of this science, in addition to the works of Ladd and 
Dewey cited above, J. M. Baldwin (Psychology, 2 vols., 1890 f. ; Mental Devel- 
opment. 1895-1897) and G. S. Hall (in Am. Jour. Psychology) may be named 
as American writers, and Jas. Ward (art. Psychology in Enc. Brit.), S. H^ 
Hodgson ( Time and Space, 1865 ; The Philosophy of Beflection, 1878 ; Meta- 
physics of Experience, 1898), James Sully (TTie Human Mind, 2 vols., 1892), 
and G. F. Stout (Analytic Psychology, 1896) as Englishmen. Darwin, 
Romanes, and Lloyd Morgan have treated comparative psychology. The 
Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy, ed. by J. M. Baldwin with coöpera- 

Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 631 

tion of Britisli and American writers, will give historical material as well as 
definitions (in press).] 

The Italian philosophy of the nineteenth century has been determined still 
more than the French by political motives, and in the content of the thoughts 
that have been worked over for these ends, it has been dependent partly upon 
French, partly upon German, philosophy. At the beginning the EncyclopEe- 
dists' view of the world, both in its practical and its theoretical aspects, was 
dominant in men like Gioja (1766-1829) or his friend, Romagnosi (1761- 
1835), while as early as Pasquale Galuppi (1771-1846 ; Saggio Filosofico sulla 
Critica delle Conoscenze Umane, 1320 ff. ; Filosofia delta Volonta, 1832 ff.) 
Kantian influences assert themselves, — to be sure, under the psychologistic 
form of the Leibnizian virtual innateness. 

At a later period philosophy, which was mainly developed by the clergy, was 
influenced essentially by the political alliance of the Papacy with democratic 
Liberalism, inasmuch as Rationalism wished to unite itself with revealed faith. 
The most characteristic representative of this tendency and the most attractive 
personally was Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855; Nuovo Saggio snlV Ori- 
gine delle Idee, 1830 ; Principii della Scienza Morale, 1831 ; Poslhum, Teosoßa, 
1859 ff. ; Saggio Storico-Cntico sulle Categorie e la Dialettica, 1884) [Eng. tr. 
of the first. Origin of Ideas, 3 vols., Lond. 1883 f. ; also B.''s Philos. System, by 
T. Davidson, with int. bibliog., etc., Lond. 1882 ; Psychology, 3 vols., Lond. and 
Boston, 1884-1889]. Cf. on him P. X. Kraus {Deutsche Bundschau, 1890). The 
combination of Platonic, Cartesian, and Schellingian ideas proceeds in still 
more pronounced lines to an Ontologism, i.e. an a priori science of Being, 
in Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852 ; Degli Errori Filosofico di Bosmini, 1842 ; 
Introduzione alia Filosofia, 1840 ; Protologia, 1857. Cf. B. Spaventa, La Filo- 
sofia di G., 1863). Terenzo Mamiani passed through this entire development 
(1800-1885; Gonfessioni di un Metafisico, 1865); Luigi Perri (1826-1895), 
Labanca, Bonatelli, and others followed it, though infiuenced also by German 
and French views. 

As opponents this tendency found, on the one hand, the rigid Orthodoxism 
of Ventura (1792-1861), Tapparelli and Liberatore {Delia Conoscenza Intel- 
letuale, 1865), and, on the other hand, politically radical Scepticism, as repre- 
sented by Guiseppe Ferrari (1811-1866 ; La Filosofia delle Bevoluzioni, 1851) 
and Antonio Francki {La Beligione del 19. Secolo, 1853). The Kantian 
philosophy was introduced by Alf. Testa (1784-1860 ; Della Critica della 
Ragione Pura, 1849 ff.), and more successfully by C. Cantoni (born 1840 ; cf. 
above, p. 532), F. Tocco, S. Turbiglio, and others. Hegel's doctrine was intro- 
duced by A. Vera (1813-1885), B. Spaventa (1817-1883), and Pr. Pioreiitino, 
and Comte's positivism by Cataneo, Ardigo, and Labriola. [Cf. for this Italian 
thought the App. in Ueberweg's Hist. Phil., Eng. tr., Vol. II. 461 ff.] 

In Germany (cf. J. E. Erdmann, History of Phil. [Eng. tr. Vol. III.] 
§ 331 ff.) the first development was that of the great philosophic schools in the 
third and fourth decades of the century. Herbart's following proved the most 
complete in itself and firmest in its adherence. In it were prominent : M. 
Drobisch {Beligionsphilosophie, 1840 ; Psychologie, 1842 ; Die moralische 
Statistik und die menschliche Willensfreiheit, 1867), R. Zimmermann {Äs- 
thetik, Vienna, 1865), L. Strümpell {Hauptprinkte der Iletaphysik, 1840; 
Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1886), T. Ziller {Einleitung in die Allgemeine 
Pädagogik, 1856). A special divarication of the school is formed by the 
so-called Völkerpsychologie [Comparative or Polk-Psychologj^], as opened by 
M. Lazarus {Lehen der Seele, 1856 f.) and H. Steinthal {Ahriss der Sprach- 
wissenschaft, I. ; Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, 1871) ; 
cL their common programme in Vol. I. of the Zeitschrift für V ölkerpsychulogie 
und Sprachwissenschaft. 

The Hegelian School had rich experience in its own life of the blessing of 
dialectic ; it split even in the Thirties upon religious antitheses. The important 
historians of philoöophy. Zeller and Prantl, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer, 
went their way, not confused by this. Between the two parties, with a consid- 
erable degree of independent thinking, stand K. Rozenkranz (1805-1879; 
Wissenschaft der logischen Idee, 1858 f.) and Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807- 
1887; Ästhetik, 1846-1858; Auch Einer, 1879). 

G32 Philosophy of ihe Nineteenth Century. [Part vn 

The "right wing" of the Hegelian school, which resisted a pantheistic inter 
pretation of the master, and emphasised the metaphysical importance of per- 
sonality, attracted those thinkers who stood in a freer relation to Hegel, and 
maintained Fichtean and Leibnizian motifs. Such were I. H. Fichte (son of 
the creator of the Wissefischaftslehre, 1797-1879 ; Beiträge zur Characteristik 
der neueren Philosophie, 1829 ; Ethik, 1850 ff. ; Anthropologie, 1856), C. Fort- 
lage (1806-1881; System der Psychologie, 1855), Christ. Weisse (1801-1866; 
System der ^Esthetik, 1830 and 1871 ; Grundzüge der Metaphysik, 1835 ; Das 
philosophische Problem der Gegenwart, 1842 ; Philosophie des Christenthums, 
1855 ff.), H. Uirici (1806-1884; Bas Grundprincip der Philosophie, 1845 f.; 
Gott und die Natur, 1861; Gott und der Mensch, 1866); further, E. Trahn- 
dorf (1782-1863; Ästhetik, 1827), Mor. Carriere (1817-1895; Ästhetik, 1859, 
3d ed. 1885 ; Die Kunst im Ztcsammenhang der Kultur entivickelung, 5 vols.). 
Related to these was, on the one side, R. Rothe (1797-1867 ; Theologische 
Ethik, 2d ed. 1867-1871 ; cf. on his speculative system, H. Holtzmann, 1899), 
who interwove many suggestions from the idealistic development into an origi- 
nal mysticism, and on the other side A. Trendelenburg, who set the concep- 
tion of " Motion" in the place of Hegel's dialectical principle, and thought 
thereby to combat Hegel's philosophy. His merit, however, lies in the stimulus 
which he gave to Aristotelian studies (1802-1872 ; Logische Untersuchungen, 
1840; Naturrecht, 1860). 

To the " Left" among the Hegelians belong Arnold Huge (1802-1880 ; joint 
editor v^^ith Echtermeyer of the HalWsche Jahrbücher, 1838-1840, and of the 
Deutsche Jahrbücher, 1841 f.; coll. writings in 10 vols., Mannheim, 1846 ff.), 
Ludwig Peuerbach (1804-1872 ; Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit, 1830; 
Philosophie und Ghristenthum, 1839 ; Wesen des Christenthums, 1841 ; Wesen 
der Religion, 1845 ; Theogonie, 1857 ; Works, 10 vols., Leips. 1846 ff.). Cf. K. 
Grün (L. F., Leips. 1874), David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874 ; Das Leben 
Jesu, 1835; Christliche Glaubenslehre, 1840 f.; Der Alte und der neue Glaube, 
1872 ; Works, 12 vols., Berlin, 1876 ff.). Cf. A. Hausrath, D. F. Str. und die 
Theologie seiner Zeit (Heidelberg, 1876 and 1878). 

From the Materialism controversy are to be mentioned : K. Moleschott 
{Kreislauf des Lebens, 1852), Rudolph Wagner {Ueber Wisse^i und Glauben, 
1851 ; Der Kampf um die Seele, 1857), C. Vogt {Köhlerglaube und Wissen- 
schaft. 1854 ; Vorlesungen über den Menschen, 1863), L. Büchner {Kraft und 
Stoff, 1855) [Force and Matter, Lond.]. 

Related to this materialism was the development of the extreme Sensualism 
in the form in which it was presented by H. Czolbe (1819-1873 ; Neue Dar- 
stellung des Sensualismus, 1855 ; Grundzüge der extensionalen Erkenntniss- 
theorie, 1875), and by F. Ueberweg (1826-1871), who was originally more 
closely related to Beneke (cf. A. Lange, History of Materialism, IL). In a 
similar relation stood the so-called Monism which E. Haeckel (born 1834; 
Natüi-liche Scli'dpfungsgeschichte, 1868 ; Welträthsel, 5th ed. 1900 : cf. Loofs, 
Anti-Baeckel, 1900, and Fr. Paulsen, E.' H. als Philosoi^h. Preuss. Jahrb. 
1900) has attempted to develop, and finally the socialistic Philosophy of His- 
tory, whose founders are Fr. Engels {Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der 
klass'-^chen deutschen Philosophie, 1888; Der Ursprung der Familie, des Pri- 
vateigenthums und des Staates, 1884) and Karl Marx {Das Kapital, 1867 ff., 
Capital, 1891); cf. on Engels and Marx, R. Stammler, Wirthschaft und Becht, 
1893 ; L. Wolfmann, Der historische Materialismus, 1900. 

By i'ar the most important among the epigones of the German Philosophy 
was Rudolph Herm. Lotze (1817-1881 ; Metaphysik, 1841; Logik, 1842; Medi- 
cinische Psychologie, 1842 ; Mikrokosmus, 1856 ff. ; System der Philosophie, I. 
Logik, 1874 ; IL Metaphysik, 1879) [3Iicrocosmus, tr. by Hamilton and Jones, 
Edin. aud N. Y. 1885 ; Logic and Metaphysics, 2 vols, each, tr. ed. by B. Bosan- 
quet, Oxford. 1884, also 1888 ; Outlines, ed. by G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1885 ff.]. 
Cf. O. Caspari, H. L. in seiner Stellung zur deutschen Philosophie (1883); 
E. V. Hartmann, Z.'s Philosophie (Berlin, 1888); H. Jones, Philos. of L., 1895. 

Interesting side phenomena are : G. T. Fechner (1801-1887 ; Nanna, 1848; 
Physical, und philos. Atomenlehre, 1855; Elemente der Psychophysik. 1860; 
Drei Motive des Glaubens, 1863 ; Vorschule der JSsthetik, 1876 ; Die Tagesan- 
sicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht, 1879) and Eug. Dühring (born 1833 ; Natur* 
liehe Diali'ktik, 1865 ; Werth des Lebens, 1865 ; Logik und Wissenschaüstheorie. 

Philosophy of the J^ineteenth Centuri'. 633 

1878). — The following from the Catholic side have taken part in the develop- 
ment of philosophy : Fr. Hermes (1775-1831 ; Einleitung in die christkathO' 
lische Theologie, 1819), Beruh. Bolzano (1781-1848 ; Wissenschaftslehre, 
1837), Anton Günther (1785-1863; Ges. Schriften, Vienna, 1881), and Wil- 
helm Roaenkrantz (1824^1874 ; Wissenschaft des Wissens, 1866). 

Philosophie interest in Germany, which was much crippled about the middle 
of the century, has strongly revived, owing to the union of the study of Kant with 
the demands of natural science. The former, called forth by Kuno Fischer's 
work (1860), evoked a movement which has been characterized in various aspects 
as Neo-Kantianism. To it belong, as principal members, A. Lange (1828- 
1875 ; History of Materialism, 1866) and O. Liebmanu (bom 1840 ; Analysis 
der Wirklichkeit, 3 Aufl., 1900). In theology it was represented by Alb. 
mtBchl (Theologie und Metaphysik, 1881). [A. T. Swing, l^heol. of A. S. 1901.] 

Theoretical Physics became significant for philosophy through the work prin- 
cipally of Rob. Mayer {Bemerkungen über die Kräfte der unbelebten Natur, 
1845 ; lieber das mechanische äquivalent der Wärme, 1850 ; cf. on him A. 
Riehl in the Sigwart-Abhandlungen, 1900) and H. Helmholtz {Physiologische 
Optik, 1886; Sensations of Tone, 1875; Thatsachen der Wahrnehmung, 1879). 

Beginning with physiology, Willhelm Wundt (born 1837) has developed a 
comprehensive system of philosophy. From his numerous writings may be men- 
tioned Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, 1873 f., 4th ed. 1893 [Outlines 
of Physiological Psychology, Eng. tr. in prep. by E. Titchenor] ; Logik, 1880 f. ; 
Ethik, 1886 [Eng. tr. by Titchenor, Washburn, and Gulliver] ; The Facts of 
the Moral Life, Ethical Systems, 1897 ; Principles of Morality, 1901 ; System 
der Philosophie, 1889; Grundriss der Psychologie, 1897 [Eng. tr. by Judd, Out- 
lines of Psychology, 1897] ; Völkerpsychologie, 1900. 

The Kantian theory of knowledge was met by Realism in J. v. Kirchmanu 
(Philosophie des Wissens, 1804), and by Positivism in C. Goring (System der 
kritischen Philosophie, 18741), E. Laas (Idealismus und Positivismtis, 1879 ff.), 
and in part too in A. Riehl (Der philosophische Kriticismus, 1876 ff. [Eng. 
tr. of Part III. by A. Fairbanks, 1894, Science and Metaphysics^). A similar 
tendency was followed by R. Avenarius (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1888- 
1890; Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 1891). 

As in the first-named authors the concepts of natural science were especially 
authoritative, so on the other hand the interests of the historical view of the 
world have normative value for investigators such as Rudolf Eucken (Die Ein- 
heit des Geisteslebens, 1888 ; Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, 1896), 
H. Glogau (Abriss der philosophischen Gr^indwissenschaften, 1880), and W. 
Dilthey (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883). 

A mediating standpoint is taken by Christian Sigwart (Logik, 2d ed. 1893 ; 
[Eng. tr. by Helen Dendy, 1895]). 

Two authors who occupy a position in closer relation to general literature 
are: — 

E. V. Hartmann (bom 1842), who excited general attention by his Philosophy 
of the unconscious, 1869 [Eng. tr. by Coupland, 1884]. This was followed 
by a long series of writings, of which the most important are Das Unbewusste 
vom Standpunkt der Descendenztheorie, 1872 ; Phänomenologie des sittlichen 
Bewusstseins, 1879; Die Eeligion des Geistes, 1882 ; Ästhetik, 1886 f. ; Katego- 
rienlehre, 1897 ; Geschichte der Metaphysik, 1900. These works represent a 
more and more completely scientific standpoint. As representing a popular 
philosophy, in part pessimistic, in part mystical, may be named as typical, 
Mainländer (Philosophie der Erlösung, 1874 f.) on the one hand, and on the 
other, Duprel (Philosophie der Mystik, 1884 f.). 

Fr. Wilh. Nietzsche (1844-1900), whose development in its changing stages 
is characterised by the following selection from his numerous writings, of which 
the complete edition is published in Leipsic, 1895 ff. : Die Geburt der Tragödie 
aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872 ; Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, 1873-1876 ; 
Menschliches — Allzumenschliches, 1876-1880 ; Also sprach Zarathustra, 1883 f.; 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 1886 ; Zzir Genealogie der Moral, 1887 ; Götzendäm- 
merung, 1889. [Eng. tr. by A. Tille, 1896 ff.. Thus spake Zarathustra ; Beyond 
Good and Bad ; Genealogy of MoralsJ] Cf. Al. Riehl, Nietzsche, Stuttgart, 
2d ed. 1897. [P. Carus in The Monist, IX. 572 ff.; G. N. Dolson in Cornell 
Cant, to Phil, III.] 

634 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century [Part VII 

§ 44. The Controversy over the Soul. 

A characteristic change in the general scientific relations during 
the nineteenth century has been the constantly progressing loosening 
and separation of psychology from philosophy^ which may now be 
regarded as in principle complete. This followed from the rapid 
decline of metaphysical interest and metaphysical production, which 
appeared in Germany, especially, as a natural reaction from the high 
tension of speculative thought. Robbed thus of a more general base 
of support, in its effort to give itself a firm footing as purely empir- 
ical science, psychology had at first but little power of resistance 
against the inroad of the method of natural science, according to 
which it should be treated as a special province of physiology or 
general biology. About this question a number of vigorous move- 
ments grouped themselves. 

1. At the beginning of the century a brisk interchange of thought 
obtained between the French Ideology and the later developments 
of the English Enlightenment philosophy which had split into asso- 
ciational psychology and the common sense doctrine : in this inter- 
change, however, France bore now the leading part. Here the 
antithesis which had existed in the French sensualism from the be- 
ginning between Condillac and Bonnet (cf. p. 458), came out more 
sharply. With Destutt de Tracy, and even as yet with Laromiguiere, 
it does not come to a sharp decision. On the other hand, Cabanis is the 
leader of the materialistic line : his investigation as to the interconnec- 
tion of the physical and the psychical (moral) nature of man, after con- 
sidering the various influences of age, sex, temperament, climate, etc., 
comes to the result that the psychical life is everywhere determined by 
the body and its physical relations. With the organic functions thus 
reduced solely to mechanical and chemical processes, at least in prin- 
ciple, it seemed that the soul, now superfluous as vital force, had also 
outlived its usefulness as the agent and supporter of consciousness. 

In carrying out these thoughts other physicians, for example 
Broussais, gave to materialism a still sharper expression : the intel- 
lectual activity is "one of the results" of the brain functions. 
Hence men eagerly seized upon the strange hypothesis of phre- 
nology, with which Gall professed to localise at definite places in 
the brain all the particular " faculties," which empirical psychology 
had provided up to that time. It was not merely an interesting 
diversion to hear in public that a more or less vigorous development 
of special psychical powers could be recognised in the skull; the 

1 Cf. W. Windelband, Ueber den gegenwärtigen Stand der psychologischem 
Forschung (Leips. 1876). 

$44.] Controversy over the Soul: Ideology. 635 

thought was connected with this, especially among physicians, that 
now the materiality of the so-called soul-life was discovered, with- 
out doubt. In England especially, as is shown by the success of 
Combe's writings, the phrenological superstition called out very- 
great interest and promoted a purely physiological psychology, in 
the line of that of Hartley. It was John Stuart Mill who first 
brought his countrymen back to Hume's conception of associational 
psychology. Without asking what matter and mind are in them- 
selves, the student should proceed from the fact that the corporeal 
and mental states form two domains of experience, completely incar 
pable of comparison, and that psychology as the science of the laws of 
mental life must study the facts of the latter in themselves, and may 
not reduce them to the laws of another sphere of existence. Alex- 
ander Bain, attaching himself to Mill's standpoint, developed the 
associational psychology farther. His especial contribution was to 
point out the significance of the muscular sensations, in which the 
fundamental facts of the mental life which correspond to spontane- 
ous bodily motion are to be found. This associational psychology 
has thus nothing in common with a materialistic view of the soul ; 
nevertheless the mechanism of ideas and impulses is the only prin- 
ciple recognised for the purpose of explaining the mental processes. 
2. The opposition to the materialistic psychology comes much 
more sharply to the fore in those lines of thought which emphasise 
the activity of consciousness as a unity. Following de Tracy's 
example Laromiguih'e' s Ideology distinguished carefully between 
the " modifications," which are the mere consequence of bodily exci- 
tations, and the " actions " of the soul, in which the soul proves its 
independent existence, even in perception. In the school of Mont- 
pellier they still believed in the "vital force." Barthez regarded 
this as separate from body and soul, as a something completely 
unknown: Bichat distinguished the "animal" from the "organic" 
life by the characteristic of spontaneous " reaction." This element 
in psychology came to full development through Maine de Biran. 
The acute, subtle mind of this philosopher received many suggestions 
from English and German philosophy ; with reference to the latter 
his acquaintance with Kant's and Fichte's doctrines — though only 
a superficial one — and with the virtualism of Bouterwek, who was 
named with remarkable frequency in Paris, is to be emphasised.-' 

1 The lines of communication were here not merely literary (Villers, 
Deg^rando, etc.), hut in a strone; degree personal. Of great importance among 
other things was the presence of the Schlegels in Paris, especially the leeturef 
of Frederick Schlegel. In Paris itself the society of Auteuil, to which also the 
Swiss embassador Stapfer, a prominent medium of influence, belonged, was oS 

636 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL 

The fundamental fact on which Maine de Biran bases his theory, 
later called spiritualism, is that in the will we immediately experi- 
ence at once our own activity and the resistance of the " Non-Mai " 
(primarily our own body). The reflection of personality upon this 
its own activity forms the starting-point of all philosophy: inner 
experience furnishes the form, experience of that which resists fur- 
nishes the matter. From this fundamental fact the conceptions 
force, substance, cause, unity, identity, freedom, and necessity are 
developed. Thus Maine de Biran builds upon psychology a meta- 
physical system, which frequently reminds of Descartes and Male- 
branche, but replaces the cogito ergo sum, by a volo ergo sum; just 
for this reason he exerts himself especially to fix securely the 
boundary lines between psychology and physiology, and particularly 
to exhibit the conception of iriner experience (sens intime) as the 
clear and self-evident basis of all mental science, of which the self- 
consciousness of the willing and choosing personality appeared to 
him to be the fundamental principle. These significant thoughts, 
directed against the naturalistic one-sidedness of the eighteenth 
century, were supplemented by Maine de Biran for his own faith 
by a mystical turn, which finds the highest form of life in the 
giving up and losing of personality in the love of God. This sup- 
plementation was made especially toward the close of his life. His 
scientific doctrine, on the contrary, found further points of contact, 
in part with the Scottish, and in part with the German philosophy, 
through his friends, such as Ampere, Jouffroy, and Cousin. In this 
process, much of the original character was lost in consequence of 
the eclectic appropriation of material. This was shown externally 
in the fact that his theory, as thus modified, especially in the in- 
structional form which it received through Cousin, was freely called 
Spiritualism. In fact, the original character of the theory, which 
might better have been called Voluntarism, was changed by the 
intellectualistic additions which Cousin especially brought to it 
from the German philosophy of identity. At a later time, Ravais- 
Bon, and in a still more independent fashion, closely related to the 
Kantian criticism, Renouvier, sought to hark back from eclecticism 
to Maine de Biran.^ 

3. Voluntarism has been on the whole, perhaps, the most strongly 
marked tendency of the psychology of the nineteenth century. It is 
the form in which empirical science has appropriated Kant's and 

lA similar position is occupied in Italy by Gallupi. Among the "facts of 
consciousness" which he makes the basis of philosophy, he regards the au- 
tonomy of the ethical will as the determining factor, while Rosmini has retained 
the older intellectualism. 

§ 44.] Controversy over the Soul : Voluntarism. 637 

Fichte's transfer of the standpoint of philosophy from the theoretical 
over to the practical reason. In Germany the principal influences on 
this side have been Fichte's and Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Both 
these authors make the essential nature of man to consist in the will, 
and the colouring which such a point of view gives to the whole the- 
ory of the world could only be strengthened by the course of German 
history in our century, and by the transformation in the popular 
mind which has accompanied it. The importance of the practical, 
which has been enhanced to the highest degree, and the repression 
of the theoretical, which is not without its dangers, have appeared 
more and more as the characteristic features of the age. 

This tendency made its appearance in a scientific form with 
Beneke, who in spite of his dependence in part upon English philos- 
ophy and in part upon Herbart, gave a peculiar turn to his exposi- 
tion of the associational psychology (cf. above, p. 586) by conceiving 
the elements of the mental life as active processes or impulses 
{Triebe). He called them "elementary faculties" {Urverraögen), 
and maintained that these, originally set into activity by stimuli, 
bring about the apparently substantial unity of the psychical nature 
by their persistence as traces {Spuren), and by their reciprocal adjust- 
ment in connection with the continual production of new forces. The 
soul is accordingly a bundle — not of ideas, as with Hume, but — 
of impulses, forces, and "faculties." On the other hand, all real 
significance is denied to the faculties in the older sense of classifica- 
tions of the mental activities (cf. above, p. 577). To establish this 
doctrine inductively by a methodical elaboration of the facts of inner 
perception is regarded by Beneke as the only possible presupposition 
for the philosophical disciplines, such as logic, ethics, metaphysics, 
and the philosophy of religion. In this procedure he passes on to a 
theory of the values which belong to stimuli (the so-called "things"), 
on account of the increase or diminution of the impulses. 

Fortlage gave metaphysical form to the psychological method and 
theory of Beneke, by incorporating it into Fichte's Science of Know- 
ledge. He, too, conceives of the soul and all things in their relations 
as a system of impulses or forces, and perhaps no one has carried 
through so sharply as he the conception that the source of substantial 
existence is the activity of the will, — an activity which is devoid of 
any substrate.^ He regarded the essential nature of the psychical pro- 
cesses as follows : From original functions arise contents which grow 
into synthetic union, remain, become established, and thus produce 
the forms of psychical reality. He thus pointed out once more the way 

^ Cf. C. Fortlage, Beiträge zur Psychologie (Leips. 1875), p. 40. 

638 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII 

by which alone metaphysics can be freed from the schema of material 
processes which are conceived as movements of unchangeable sub- 
stances, such as atoms. But, at the same time, there were in these 
theories suggestions for the thought that the processes of ideation, 
of attention, and of evaluation in judgments, must be regarded as 
functions of the "impulse" which issues in question and assent or re- 
jection. In the later development, indeed, the psychological analysis 
of the thinking process has penetrated even to the realm of logic, 
and here has often averted attention from the proper problems of 
that science. In the last decades especially, psychology as method 
and theory has had a luxurious development similar to that in the 
eighteenth century, and in its degenerate forms it has led to the 
same manifestations of the most superficial popular philosophy. 

4. In England, also, the traditional psychological method and 
standpoint remain in control ; nor was this dominance essentially 
affected by the transformation which Hamilton gave to the Scottish 
tradition under the influence of German philosophy and particularly 
of Kant. He, too, defends the standpoint of inner experience and 
regards it as affording the standard for all philosophical disciplines. 
Necessity and universality are to be found only in the simple, imme- 
diately intelligible facts of consciousness which are present in every 
one. But in these facts — and to these belong also all individual 
perceptions of the presence of an external thing — it is only the 
finite, in finite relations and conditions, which comes to our knowl- 
edge. It is in this sense, and without reference to the Kantian con- 
ception of the phenomenal, that human knowledge is regarded by 
Hamilton as limited to experience of the finite. Of the Infinite and 
Absolute, i.e., of God, man has only a moral certainty of faith. Sci- 
ence, on the contrary, has no knowledge of this " Unconditioned," 
because it can think only what it first distinguishes from another in 
order then to relate it to another (cf. Kant's conception of synthesis). 
Mansel brought this " Agnosticism " into the service of revealed 
theology, making a still stronger and more sceptical employment of 
the Kantian theory of knowledge. He shows that religious dogmas 
are absolutely incomprehensible for human reason, and maintains 
that just on this account they are also incapable of attack. The 
unknowableness of the '' Absolute " or the " Infinite," as Hamilton 
had ta.ught it, still plays an important role in other philosophical 
tendencies in England ; e.g. in Herbert Spencer's system (cf. below, 

As set over against psychology, which has to do only with the 
facts of consciousness, Hamilton treats logic, aesthetics, and ethics, 
which correspond to the three classes of psychical phenomena, as the 

§44.] ControverBy over the Soul : Ramilton. 639 

theory of the laws under which facts stand ; yet he does not attain 
complete clearness as to the normative character of this legislation, 
and so the philosophical disciplines also remain entangled in the 
method of psychology. In working out his system, Hamilton's 
logical theory became one of the most clearly defined produc- 
tions of formal logic. The problem of logic for him is to set forth 
systematically the relations which exist between concepts, and he 
limits the whole investigation to relations of quantity, going quite 
beyond the principle of the Aristotelian analysis (cf . above, pp. 135 f.). 
Every judgment is to be regarded as an equation, which declares 
what the relation is between what is comprised in the one concept, 
and what is comprised in the other. For example, a judgment of 
subo);'dination, " the rose is a flower," must take the form : " All S 
= some P," " all roses = some flowers." The peculiarity of this is 
that the predicate is " quantified," whereas previous logical theory 
has quantified the subject only. When all judgments were thus 
reduced to the form of equations, obtaining between the contents of 
two concepts, inferences and conclusions appeared to be operations 
of reckoning, performed with given magnitudes. This seemed to 
be the complete carrying through of the principle of the terminis- 
tic logic, as it was formulated by Occam (cf. above, p. 342), Hobbes 
(p. 404), and Condillac (p. 478). The new analysis or logical cal- 
culus has spread since the time of Hamilton, and become a broad 
field for the intellectual gymnastics of fruitless subtlety and ingenu- 
ity. For it is evident that such a logic proceeds from only a single 
one among the numerous relations which are possible between con- 
cepts and form the object of judgments. Moreover, the relation in 
question is one of the least important; the most valuable relations 
of logical thought are precisely those which fall outside this kind of 
analysis. But the mathematical exactness with which this logic has 
seemed to develop its code of rules has enlisted in its behalf a series 
of vigorous investigators, and that not merely in England. They 
have, however, overlooked the fact that the living, actual thought 
of man knows nothing of this whole formal apparatus, so neatly 

5. In the debates over these questions in France and England the 
religious or theological interest in the conception of the substance of 
the soul is naturally always a factor : the same interest stood in the 
foreground in the very violent controversies which led in Germany 
to the dissolution of the Hegelian school. They turned essentially 
about the personality of God and the immortality of the soul. Hegel- 
ianism could not continue as " Prussian state-philosophy " unless ij? 
maintained the " identity of philosophy with religion." The am« 

640 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part YH 

biguous mode of expression of the master, who had no direct interest 
in these questions, enveloped as it was in the dialectical formalism, 
favoured this contest as to the orthodoxy of his teaching. In fact, 
the so-called " right wing " of the school, to which prominent 
theologians like Gabler, Göschel, and Hinrichs belonged, tried to 
keep this orthodoxy : but while it perhaps might remain doubtful 
how far the " coming-to-itself of the Idea " was to be interpreted as 
the personality of God, it became clear, on the other side, that in the 
system of perpetual Becoming and of the dialectical passing over 
of all forms into one another, the finite personality could scarcely 
raise a plausible claim to the character of a " substance " and to 
immortality in the religious sense. 

This motive forced some philosophers out of the Hegelian school 
to a " theistic " view of the world, which, like that of Maine de Biran, 
had for its centre the conception of personality, and with regard to 
finite personalities inclined to the Leibuizian Monadology. The 
younger Fichte termed these mental or spiritual realities Urpositionen 
[prime-positions]. The most important carrying-out of the thought 
of this group was the philosophical system of Chr. Weisse, in which 
the conception of the possible is placed ontologically above that of 
Being, to the end of deriving all Being from freedom, as the self- 
production of personality (Fichte). 

In the relation between the possible and the actual, we have here 
repeated the antithesis set up by Leibniz, between the verites eter- 
nelles, and the veritis de fait, and likewise the problems which Kant 
brought together in the conception of the " specification of Nature " 
(cf. above, p. 566). Within the " possibilities " which cannot be 
thought away, the actual is always ultimately such that it might be 
conceivably otherwise; i.e. it is not to be deduced, it must be re- 
garded as given through freedom. Law and fact cannot be reduced 
to each other. 

Carrying out this view in a more psychological manner, Ulrici 
regarded the self as the presupposition for the distinguishing activ- 
ity, with which he identified all consciousness, and out of which he 
developed his logical, as well as his psychological, theory. 

6. The orthodoxy, which at the time of the Restoration was grow- 
ing in power and pretension, was attacked by the counter-party with 
the weapons of Hegelianism, and in this contest Euge served as 
leader in public support of both religious and political liberalism. 
How pantheistically and Spinozistically the idealistic system was 
apprehended by this wing is best seen from Feuerbach's Thoughts on 
Death and Immortality, where the divine infinitude is praised as the 
ultimate ground of man's life, and man's disappearance in the same 

§ 44.] Controversy over the Soul : Materialism. 641 

as the true immortality and blessedness. From this ideal pantheism 
Feuerbach then rapidly advanced to the most radical changes of his 
doctrine. He felt that the panlogistic system could not explain 
the individual things of Nature : though Hegel had called Nature 
the realm of the accidental or contingent, which is incapable of 
keeping the conception pure. This inability, thought Feuerbach, 
inheres rather in the conception which man makes to himself of 
things : the general conceptions in which philosophy thinks are no 
doubt incapable of understanding the real nature of the individual 
thing. Therefore Feuerbach now inverts the Hegelian system, and 
the result is a nominalistic materialism. The actual reality is the 
individual known to the senses ; everything universal, everything 
mental or spiritual, is but an illusion of the individual. Mind or 
spirit is " Nature in its otherness." In this way Feuerbach gives 
his purely anthropological explanation of religion. Man regards his 
own generic nature — what he wishes to be himself — as God. 

This " theory of the wish," is to free humanity from all supersti- 
tion and its evil consequences, after the same fashion as the theory 
of Epicurus (cf. above, p. 188). The epistemology of this " philoso- 
phy of the future " can be only sensualism ; its ethics only eudse- 
monism: the impulse to happiness is the principle of morals, and 
the sympathetic participation in the happiness of another is the 
fundamental ethical feeling. 

After materialism had shown so illustrious a metaphysical pedi- 
gree, others employed for its advantage the anthropological mode o£ 
argument which had been in use in French literature since Lamettrie, 
and which seemed to become still stronger through the progress of 
physiology. Feuerbach had taught : man is what he eats {ist was er 
isst) ! And so once more the dependence of the mind upon the body 
was interpreted as a materialising of the psychical activity ; thinking 
and willing were to be regarded as secretions of the brain, similar to 
the secretions of other organs. A companion for this theory appeared 
in the guise of a purely sensualistic theory of knowledge, as it was 
developed by Czolbe independently of metaphysical assumptions; 
although at a later time Czolbe himself reached a view of the world 
which bordered closely upon materialism. For, since he regarded 
knowledge as a copy of the actual, he came ultimately to ascribe to 
ideas themselves spatial extension, and, in general, to regard space 
as the supporter of all attributes, giving it the place of Spinoza's 

So the materialistic mode of thought began to spread in Germany 
also, among physicians and natural scientists, and this condition of 
affairs came to light at the convention of natural scientists at Got- 

642 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VH. 

tmgen in 1854. The contradiction between the inferences of natural 
science and the " needs of the heart " {GemütJi) became the theme of 
a controversy which was continued in writing also, in which Carl 
Vogt championed the absolute sovereignty of the mechanical view of 
the world, while Rudolph Wagner, on the contrary, professed to gaia 
at the bounds of human knowledge the possibility for a faith that 
rescued the soul and its immortality. This effort,^ which with 
extreme unaptness was termed " book-keeping by double entry," had 
subsequently its chief effect in creating among natural scientists who 
saw through the one-sidedness of materialism, but could not befriend 
the teleology of idealism, a growing inclination toward Kant, into 
whose thing-in-itself they thought the needs of the heart and soul 
might be permitted to make their escape. When, then, in 1860, 
Kuno Fischer's brilliant exposition of the critical philosophy ap- 
peared, then began the "return to Kant" which was afterwards 
destined to degenerate into literary-historical micrology. To the 
natural-science temper, out of which it arose, Albert Lange's History 
of Materialism gave expression. 

Many misunderstandings, to be sure, accompanied this move- 
ment when even great natural scientists like Helmholtz ^ confused 
transcendental idealism with Locke's theory of signs and doctrine 
of primary and secondary qualities. Another misunderstanding 
appeared somewhat later, when a conspicuous school of theology, 
under the leadership of Ritschl, adopted the doctrine of the " thing- 
in-itself," in a form analogous to the position of English agnosticism. 

The philosophical revival of Kantianism, which has permeated 
the second half of the century, especially since Otto Liebmann's 
impressive book, Kant and the Epigones (1865), presents a great 
variety of views, in which we find repeated all shades of the oppos- 
ing interpretations which Kant's theory met at its first appearance. 
The empirical and the rationalistic conceptions of knowledge and 
experience have come again into conflict, and their historical, as well 
as their systematic, adjustment has been the ultimate ground of the 
pragmatic necessity which has brought about gradually a return to 
Fichte. To-day there is once more an idealistic metaphysics in 
process of formation, as the chief representative of which we may 
regard Rudolf Eucken. 

1 It is not without interest to note the fact that this motif was not far removed 
from the French materialists. Of Cabanis and of Broussais we have expressions, 
made at the close of their life, which are in this spirit, and even of a mystical 

2 Cf. H. Helmholtz, Physiologische Optik, 25, and, especially. The Facts of 
PiTzepticn (Berlin, 1879^. 

§44.] Controversy over the Soul : Lotze. 643 

But in all these forms, this Neo-Kantian movement, with its 
earnest work upon the problem of knowledge, has had the result of 
rendering the superficial metaphysics of materialism evidently inad- 
equate and impossible, and hence has led to its rejection. Even 
where Kant's doctrine was given an entirely empirical, and indeed 
positivistic turn, or even in the fantastic reasonings of so-called 
" solipsism," the thought of regarding consciousness as an accessory 
function of matter was rejected as an absurdity. Kather we find 
the opposite one-sided view that primary reality is to be ascribed 
only to inner perception, in contrast with outer perception. 

Materialism was thus overcome in science ; it lives in popular expo- 
sitions, such as Büchner's " Force and Matter " {Kraft und Stoff), or 
in the more refined form of Strauss's " Old and New Faith " ^ {Alter 
und neuer Glaube) ; it lives on also as theory of life in just those 
circles which love to enjoy the "results of science" from the most 
agreeable hand. For this superficial culture, materialism has found 
its characteristic exposition in Haeckel's works and his so-called 
" monism." 

For psychology as science, however, it became necessary to re- 
nounce the conception of a soul-substance for the basis as well as 
for the goal of its investigation, and as a science of the laws of the 
psychical life to build only upon inner or outer experience. So we 
came by our " psychology without a soul," which is free from all 
metaphysical assumptions — or means to be. 

7. A deeper reconciliation of the above antitheses was given by 
Lotze from the fundamental thoughts of German idealism. The 
vital and formative activity which constitutes the spiritual essence 
of all this real world has as its end, the good. The mechanism 
of nature is the regular form in which this activity works in the 
realisation of its end. Natural science has doubtless no other prin- 
ciple than that of the mechanical, causal connection, and this principle 
is held to apply to organisms also ; but the beginnings of metaphysics, 
like those of logic, lie only in ethics. In carrying out this teleological 
idealism, motifs from all the great systems of German philosophy 
accord to a new, harmonious work; every individual real entity has 
its essential nature only in the living relations in which it stands to 
other real entities ; and these relations which constitute the con- 
nected whole of the universe are possible only if all that is, is 
grounded as a partial reality in a substantial unity, and if thus all 

1 The evidence of descent from the Hegelian dialectic is seen also in this, the 
most ingenious form which materialism can find, — L. Knapp's Bechtsphilo So- 
phie (1857) might perhaps be classed with it, — for all higher forms of mental 
life are treated as the striving of nature to go beyond herself. 

644 Philosoph]/ of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL 

that takes place between individuals is to be apprehended as pur- 
poseful realisation of a common life goal. By the powerful uni- 
versality with which he mastered the material of facts and the forms 
of scientific elaboration in all the special disciplines Lotze was 
specially fitted to carry out fully this fundamental metaphysical 
thought, and in this respect, also, his personality as well as what he 
taught, joins worthily on to the preceding epoch. His own attitude 
is best characterised by its conception of knowledge as a vital and 
purposive interaction between the soul and the other " substances." 
The " reaction " of the soul is combined with the excitation which 
proceeds from " things." On the one side, the soul develops its own 
nature in the forms of perception, and in the general truths which 
come to consciousness with immediate clearness and evidence on the 
occasion of the stimulus from things ; on the other hand, the partici- 
pation of the subject makes the world of ideas a phenomenal appear- 
ance. But this appearance or phenomenal manifestation, as the 
purposive inner life, is by no means mere illusion. It is rather a 
realm of worths or values, in which the good is realising itself. The 
coming to actual reality of this world of consciousness is the most 
important result of the interaction of substances. It is the ulti- 
mate and truest meaning of the world-process. From these funda- 
mental thoughts, Lotze, in his Logic, has conceived the series of 
forms of thought as a systematic whole, which develops out of the 
problems or tasks of thinking. In his Metaphysics, he has developed 
and defined his view of the world with fineness and acuteness in his 
treatment of conceptions, and with most careful consideration in all 
directions. The view is that of teleological idealism. The third 
part of the system, the ethics, has unfortunately not been completed 
in this more rigorous form. As a substitute, we have the convic- 
tions of the philosopher and his mature comprehension of life and 
history presented in the fine and thoughtful expositions of the 

8. Another way of escape from the difficulties of the natural- 
science treatment of the psychical life was chosen by Fechner. He 
would look upon body and soul as the modes of phenomenal mani- 
festation — completely separated and different in kind, but in constant 
correspondence with each other — of one and the same unknown 
reality ; and follows out this thought in the direction, that every 
physical connection has a mental series or system of connections 
corresponding to it, although the latter are known through percep- 
tion only in the case of our own selves. As the sensations which 
correspond to the excitation of particular parts of the nervous sys- 
tem, present themselves as surface waves in the total wave of oui 

§ 44.] Controversy over the Soul : Fechner. 645 

individual consciousness, so we may conceive that the consciousness 
of a single person is in turn but the surface wave of a more general 
consciousness, — say that of the planetary mind : and if we continue 
this line, we come ultimately to the assumption of a universal total- 
consciousness in God, to which the universal causal connection of the 
atoms corresponds. Moreover, according to Fechner, the connection 
of inner and outer experience in our consciousness makes it possible 
to investigate the laws of this correspondence. The science of this 
is psycho-physics. It is the first problem of this science to find out 
methods for measuring psychical quantities, in order to obtain laws 
that may be formulated mathematically. Fechner brings forward 
principally the method of just perceptible differences, which defines 
as the unit of mass the smallest difference that is still perceptible 
between intensities of sensation, and assumes this to be equal 
everywhere and in all cases. 

On the basis of this assumption, which to be sure is quite arbi- 
trary, it seemed possible to give a mathematical formulation to the 
so-called " Weber-Fechner law." This was stated as follows : The 
intensities of different sensations are to each other as the logarithms 
of the intensities of their stimuli. The hope was thus awakened 
by Fechner that through the indirect measurement of psychical 
magnitudes a mathematical statement could be given by scientific 
methods for the psycho-physical, perhaps even for the psychological 
laws, and in spite of the numerous and serious objections which it 
encountered, this hope has had great success in promoting experi- 
mental study during the past decades in many laboratories estab- 
lished for this purpose. Yet it cannot be said that the outcome for 
a new and deeper comprehension of the mental life has kept pace 
with the activity of experimentation.^ 

The revival of the Spinozistic parallelism has likewise met greater 
and greater difficulties. With Fechner it was dogmatically intended 
since he claimed complete metaphysical reality for the contents of 
sense-perception. He called this view the "day view," and set it 
over against the " night view " of the phenomenalism which is found 
in natural science and philosophy. Others, on the contrary, con- 
ceived the parallelism in a more critical fashion, assuming that 
mind and body, with all their states and activities, are only the 
different manifestations of one and the same real unity. But as 
a result of the vigorous discussions which this question has awak- 

1 With reference to controversies upon these points, it is simplest to refer to 
Fechner himself, Bevision der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik (Leips. 1882). 
In addition we may refer especially to H. Münsterberg, Ueber Aufgaben und 
Methoden der Psychologie (Leips. 1891) IPsychologie, 1900]. 

646 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII, 

ened,^ it has become increasingly evident that such a parallelism is 
untenable in any form. 

This is seen in the case of the investigator who has been most 
active in the extension of psycho-physical study, Wilhelm Wundt. 
He has gone on in the development of his thought from a " Physio- 
logical Psychology " to a " System of Philosophy." This latter 
work regards the world as an interconnected whole of active indi- 
vidualities which are to be conceived in terms of will. Wundt employs 
in his metaphysics the conception of activity without a substrate, 
which we have met in Fichte and Fortlage, and limits the applica- 
tion of the conception of substance to the theories of natural science. 
The interaction between the activities of these wills produces in 
organic beings higher unities of will, and at the same time, various 
stages of central consciousness ; but the idea of an absolute world- 
will and world-consciousness, which arises from these premises in 
accordance with a regulative principle of our thought, lies beyond 
the bounds of the capacity of human knowledge. 

9. Voluntarism has thus grown stronger and stronger, especially 
in its more general interpretation, and has combated the intel- 
lectualism which was regarded as a typical feature in the most 
brilliant period of German neo-humanism. As a result of this con- 
flict we find emerging the same problem as to the relative primacy 
of the will or the intellect which occupied so vigorously the dia- 
lectical acuteness of the scholastics (cf. above, § 26). That this 
problem actually arose from the antagonistic development within 
the system of idealism was seen most clearly by Eduard von Hart- 
mann. His "Philosophy of the Unconscious" proceeds from a 
synthesis of Hegel, on the one hand, with Schopenhauer and the 
later thought of Schelling, on the other. Its purpose was to bring 
together once more the rational and irrational lines of idealism. 
Hartmann attempts by this means to ascribe to the one World-Spirit 
hoth tmll and idea (the logical element), as coordinated and inter- 
related attributes. In calling the absolute spirit the "Unconscious," 
Hartmann attributes to the concept of consciousness an ambiguity 
like that which Schopenhauer ascribed to the will ; for the activities 
of the " Unconscious " are functions of will and ideation which are 
indeed not given in any empirical consciousness, but yet presuppose 
some other consciousness if we are to think of them at all. This 

1 A critical survey of the literature on the question is given by E. Busse in 
the Philos. Abhandlungen zur Sigwart's 70. Geburtstag (Tübingen, 1900). Cf. 
also especially the investigation by H. Rickert in the same volume. [Cf. also the 
arts, by Erhardt, Busse, Paulsen, König, and Wentscher, in Zeitschr. f. Philos., 
Vols. 1 14-117, and A. K. Rogers, in Univ. of Chicago Cont. to Phil, 1899."! 

§ 44.] Controversy over the Soul : Hartmann. 647 

higlier consciousness, which is called Unconscious, and is to form the 
common ground of life in all conscious individuals, Hartmann seeks 
to exhibit as the active essence in all processes of the natural and 
psychical life ; it takes the place of Schopenhauer's and Schelling's 
Will in Nature, and likewise of the vital force of former physi- 
ology and the " Entelechies " of the System of Development. The 
Unconscious unfolds itself above all in the teleological inter-rela- 
tions of organic life. In this respect Hartmann has controverted 
materialism very efficiently, since his theory everywhere points to 
the unitary mental or spiritual ground of things. To this end he 
employed a wealth of knowledge in the fields of natural science, 
and that too in the most fortunate manner, although it was an illu- 
sion to suppose that he was winning his " speculative results by the 
inductive methods of natural science." At all events, the interest 
which he borrowed from the natural sciences in combination with 
an attractive and sometimes brilliant exposition, contributed much 
to the extraordinary, though transient, success of the " Philosophy 
of the Unconscious " ; its greatest attractiveness lay in the treatment 
of pessimism (cf. below, § 46), and along this line it was followed 
by a train of popular philosophical literature which was for the 
most part of very inferior quality. 

Hartmann himself made extensive historical studies, and with 
their aid extended his fundamental metaphysical thoughts to the 
fields of ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion ; then he pro- 
ceeded to work out a rigorous dialectic system in his Theory of the 
Categories. This is the most systematic work of a constructive char- 
acter in the field of abstract concepts which has appeared during 
the last decades in Germany, — a work which has been supplemented 
by a historical and critical basis in his History of Metaphysics} 

The Tlieory of the Categories, which is no doubt Hartmann's main 
work from a scientific standpoint, seeks to gain a common formal 
basis for the disciplines of philosophy by tracing all the relating 
principles employed by the intellect, whether in perception or in 
reflection, through the subjective ideal field of the theory of knowl- 
edge, the objective real field of the philosophy of nature, and the 
metaphysical realm. In the fineness of its dialectical references, 
and in the wealth of interesting outlooks upon the fields of reality, 
it presents a unique counterpart to Hegel's Logic. As Hegel devel- 
oped dialectically the whole process in which the Idea changes over 
into Nature, in which the concept leaves itself and becomes " other," 
so Hartmann shows, in the case of every category, the transforma- 

1 Geschichte der Metaphysik (2 parts, Leips. 1899-1900). 

648 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Bart VII. 

tion which the " logical " experiences by its relation to the " non- 
logical " element of reality, which arises from the Will. Here, too, 
the world appears as divided within itself, as the conflict of Eeason 
against will. 

§ 45. Nature and History. 

The dualism of the Kantian Weltanschauung is reflected in the 
science of the nineteenth century by the peculiar tension in the rela- 
tion between science of Nature and science of iidnd. At no earlier 
time has this antithesis been so current as respects both material 
and methods, as in ours; and from this circumstance a number of 
promising new shif tings have arisen. If from the domain of mental 
science we take, as has been shown, the contested province of psychol- 
ogy, we then have remaining over against " Nature," what corre- 
sponds still more to Kantian thought — the social life and its historical 
development in its full extent in all directions. The thinking of 
natural science, pressing forward in its vigorous career of annex- 
ation, from the nature of the case easily found points in the social 
phenomena as it had previously found in the psychological, where it 
might set the levers of its mode of consideration, so that a struggle 
became necessary upon this field, similar to that which had taken 
place on account of the soul ; and thus the earlier antithesis culmi- 
nated in that between natural science and historical science. 

1. The first form in which the struggle between the natural science 
and the historical Weltanschauung was fought out, was the successful 
opposing of the E-evolution Philosophy by the French Traditionalism. 
After St. Martin and de Maistre had set forth the Eevolution as the 
judgment of God upon unbelieving mankind, de Bonald proceeded to 
oppose to the social theories of the eighteenth century, which he too 
held responsible for the horrors of the Reign of Terror, the theory of 
the clerical-legitimist Kestoration. Unschooled in abstract thought, 
a dilettante, especially in his predilection for etymology, he was in- 
fluential by the warmth of his presentation and by the weight of the 
principle which he defended. It was the mistake of the Enlighten- 
ment, he taught, to suppose that the reason could from its own re- 
sources find out truth and organise society, and to leave to the liking 
of individuals the shaping of their social life. But in truth all intellec- 
tual and spiritual life of man is a product of historical tradition. For 
it is rooted in language. Language, however (and just here Condil- 
lacism is most vigorously opposed), was given man by God as the first 
revelation ; the divine " Word " is the source of all truth. Human 
knowledge is always only a participating in this truth ; it grows out 
of nnnscience, in which we make that which holds universall}^, oui 

§ 45.] Nature and History : Traditionalism. 649 

own. But the bearer of the tradition of the divine word is the 
Church : her teaching is the God-given, universal reason, propagated 
on through the centuries as the great tree on which all the genuine 
fruits of human knowledge ripen. And therefore this revelation is 
the only possible foundation of society. The arrogance of the indi- 
viduals who have rebelled against this has found its expiation in the 
dissolution of society, and it is now in point to build society once 
more upon the eternal basis : this was also the thought which held 
loosely together the obscure and strange fancies of Ballanche. 

2. The philosophical factor in this church-political theory was, 
that the generic reason realising itself in the historical development 
of society was recognised as the ground of the intellectual and spir- 
itual life of individuals: if the theological views were distracted 
from this Traditionalism, the reader found himself hard by Hegel's 
conception of the Objective Spirit. Hence it was extremely humor- 
ous when Victor Cousin, while adopting German philosophy on just 
this side, to a certain extent took from the Ultra-montanes the cream 
of their milk. Eclecticism also taught a universal reason, and was 
not disinclined to see in it something similar to the Scottish '' com- 
mon sense," to which, however, it still did not deny a metaphysical 
basis, fashioned according to Schelling and Hegel. When, there- 
fore, Lamennais, who at the beginning had been a traditionalist and 
had then passed through the school of the German philosophy, treated 
the doctrine of Ideas in his Esquisse d'une Philosophie, he could fully 
retain the above theory of the conscience, so far as its real content 
was concerned. 

Quite another form was assumed by the doctrine of Objective 
Spirit, where it was apprehended purely psychologically and empiri- 
cally. In the mental life of the individual, numerous processes go 
on, which rest solely upon the fact that the individual never exists 
at all except as member of a psychical interconnected whole. This 
interacting and overreaching life, into which each one grows, and 
by virtue of which he is Avhat he is, evinces itself not by conformity 
to natural laws, as do the general forms of the psychical processes : 
it is rather of a historical character, and the general mind which lies 
at the basis of individual life expresses itself objectively in language, 
in customs and morals, and in public institutions. Individual psy- 
chology must be broadened to a social psychology by a study of these. 
This principle has been propounded by Lazarus and Steinthal, and 
the eminently historical character which this must have when car^ 
ried out they have indicated by the otherwise less fortunate name 
of Völkerpsychologie [Folk or Comparative Psychology]. 

3. One must take into account the fundamental social thought of 

650 Philosophy of the JVtnefeenth Century. [Part VIL 

Traditionalism to understand the religious colouring whicli is char« 
acteristic of French socialism since St. Simon, in contrast with, the 
social-political theories of the last century. St. Simon's theory, 
however, stands not only under the pressure of the religious zeal 
which was growing to become a new social and political power, but 
also in lively relations to German philosophy, and indeed to its 
dialectic. All this passed over to his disciple, Auguste Comte, 
whose thought passed through an extremely peculiar course of 

He aims at nothing more or less than a complete reform of human 
society. He, too, regards it as an evident conclusion that with the 
Revolution, the Enlightenment, which was its cause, has become 
bankrupt. Like the Traditionalists, he fixes the responsibility for 
this upon the independence of individuals, upon free investigation 
and autonomy in the conduct of life. From these follow anarchy 
of opinions and anarchy of public life. The salvation of society is 
to be sought only in the dominance of scientific knowledge. We 
must find once more, and along securer lines, that subordination of 
all the activities of life beneath a universally valid principle which 
was approximately attained in the grand but premature catholic sys- 
tem of the Middle Ages. In place of theology we must set positive 
science, which tolerates freedom of faith as little as theology toler- 
ated it in the Middle Ages. This Romantic element determined 
Comte's theory throughout. It is shown not only in his philosophy 
of history by his enthusiastic portrayal of the mediaeval system of 
society, not only in his projected "Religion of Humanity" and its 
cultus, but above all in his demand for a concurrent spiritual and 
secular authority for the new social order. The new form of the 
social order was to proceed from the creative activity of the pouvoir 
spirituel, and Comte made fantastic attempts toward this by estab- 
lishing his " Western Committee." As he thought of himself as the 
chairman of this committee, so he trusted to himself the establish- 
ment of the new teaching. But the positive philosophy on which 
the new social order was to arise was nothing other than the ordered 
system of the positive sciences. 

Comte's projected positive system of the sciences first of all pushes 
Hume's and Condillac's conception to the farthest point. Not only 
is human knowledge assigned for its province to the reciprocal rela- 
tions of phenomena, but there is nothing absolute whatever, that 
might lie unknown, as it were, at the basis of phenomena. The only 
absolute principle is, that all is relative. To talk of first causes or 
ultimate ends of things has no rational sense. But this relativism 
(or, as it has later been termed. " correlativism ") is forfeited at once 

§ 45.] Nature and History : Comte. 651 

to the universalistic claim of the thinking of mathematical natural 
science, when science is assigned the task of explaining all these 
relations from the point of view that in addition to individual facts 
we must discover and establish also the order of these facts as they 
repeat themselves in time and space. This order we may call " gen- 
eral fact," but nothing more. Thus positivism seeks by " laws " — 
this is Comte's usual name for general facts — not to explain the 
particular facts, but only to establish their recurrence. From this 
is supposed to come foresight for the future, as the practical outcome 
of science, — savoir pour prevoir, — although such foresight is quite 
unintelligible and unjustifiable under his presuppositions. This con- 
ception of Comte's has found assent not only with philosophers like 
C Goring, who appropriated it especially for his theory of causality, 
but also to some degree among natural scientists, particularly with 
the representatives of mechanics, such as Kirchhoff and Mach. Their 
tendency is to exclude the conception of efficient agency from the 
scientific theory of nature, and to reach the elimination of " force " 
on the basis of a mere " description " or discovery of the most ade- 
quate " image." This has been attempted by H. Hertz in his Prin- 
ciples of Mechanics. Similar thoughts have been spun out into the 
unspeakably tedious terminologies of his " Empirio-Criticism," by 
Richard Avenarius, who has employed the generalisations of an ab- 
stract dialectic, and seeks to demonstrate all philosophical conceptions 
of the world to be needless variations of one original world-concep- 
tion of pure experience, which is to be once more restored. 

4. Phenomena, according to Comte, both individual and general, 
are in part simple, in part more or less complicated. Knowledge of 
the simpler must precede that of the more complex. For this reason 
he arranges the sciences in a hierarchy which proceeds step by step 
from the simple to the complex. Mathematics is followed by 
astronomy, then by physics, chemistry, biology which includes 
psychology, and finally by " sociology." This relation, nevertheless, 
is not to be conceived as if every following discipline was supposed 
to be deduced from the preceding discipline or disciplines ; it 
merely presupposes these in the sense that their more complicated 
facts include within themselves the more elementary facts ; the 
completely new facts add their own peculiar combination and nature 
to those more elementary facts. So, for example, biology presupposes 
physical and chemical processes, but the fact of life is something 
completely new, and incapable of deduction from these processes; 
it is a fact which must be verified by biological observation. Such, 
too, is the relation of sociology to the five preceding disciplines. 
Following this principle Comte's social statics declines with charac- 

652 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII 

teristic emphasis to derive sociality from the individual, as was done 
in the Enlightenment philosophy. The social nature is an original 
fact, and the first social phenomenon is the family. Still more inde- 
pendent is his social dynamics, which without psychological explana- 
tion sets itself the task of discovering the natural law of the history 
of society. Comte finds this in the principle of the three stages, which 
society necessarily passes through (an apergu, which had been antici- 
pated by d'Alembert and Turgot as well as by Hegel and Cousin). 
Intellectually, man passes out of the theological phase, through the 
metaphysical, over into the positive. In the first he explains phe- 
nomena by supernatural powers and beings thought in anthropo- 
morphic guise, in the second by general concepts [^e.g. force, etc.] 
which he constructs as the essence working behind phenomena ; in 
the positive stage he comprehends the particular only by the actually 
demonstrable conditions, from which it follows according to a law 
verifiable experimentally. To this universal law of the mental life 
are subject all special processes into which the same divides, and 
likewise the movement of human history as a whole. Moreover, the 
intellectual process is accompanied by a corresponding course of 
development in the external organisation of society, which passes 
out of the priestly, warlike condition, through the rule of the jurists 
(Ugistes), to the " industrial " stage. 

The very circumstantial philosophy of history which Comte here 
carries out, interesting in particular points, but on the whole com- 
pletely arbitrary and often distorted by ignorance and prejudice, is 
to be estimated solely as a construction undertaken for his reforma- 
tory purpose. The victory of the positive view of the world, and at 
the same time of the industrial order of life, is the goal of the his- 
torical development of European peoples. At this goal "the great 
Thought, viz. : positive philosophy, will be wedded with the great 
Power, the proletariate." ^ 

But as if the law of the circuit of the three phases was to be first 
verified in the case of its author, Comte in the last ("subjective") 
period of his thinking fell back into the theological stage, making 
mankind as Grand-^tre the object of a religious veneration or wor- 
ship, as whose high priest he imitated the whole apparatus of worship 
of the saints, with a positivist remodelling. Among these phantastic 
products of the imagination the history of philosophy can at most 
consider only the motive which guided Comte in his later course. 
He best set this forth in the General View of Positivism, which is 

1 Cf. on Comte, among recent works, Tschitscherin, Philosophische Fon 
schu7igen, tr. from the Russian (Heidelberg, 1899). 

§ 45.] Nature and History : Comte. 653 

reprinted in the first volume of the Positive Polity. This shows him 
turning aside from the outspoken individualism which had shown 
itself in his earlier conviction that positive science as such would be 
sufficient to bring about the reform of society. He has now seen 
that the positive philosophy may indeed teach how the new order of 
things is to appear, but that the work of bringing about this new 
order can be achieved only by the "affective principle" — the feeling. 
Whereas he had formerly taught that the specifically human, as 
it develops in history, is to be sought in the predominance of the in- 
telligence over the feelings, it is from the predominance of the 
heart over the intellect that he now expects the fulfilment of his 
hopes which he formulates as V amour pour principe, Vordre pour base, 
le progr^s pour hut.^ And since Gall has shown that the preeminence 
of heart over intellect is a fundamental characteristic of the brain of 
woman, Comte bases on this his worship of woman, which he would 
make an essential constituent in the religion of humanity. He who 
had begun with the proud announcement of a positivist papacy ended 
with an appeal to the proletariate and the emancipation of woman. 

5. It is in accord with the practical, i.e. political, ends which 
Comte followed, that in history also general facts or laws appeared 
to him more important than particular facts. He believed that in 
the realm of history a foresight (privoyance) should guide and 
direct action. But apart from this theory and in spite of the one- 
sidedness of his education along the lines of mathematics and natu- 
ral science, Comte was yet sufficiently broad-minded to understand 
and to preserve the distinctive character of the different disciplineSj 
and as he had already attempted to secure for biology its own dis' 
tinctive methods, he expressly claimed for his sociology the "his- 
torical method." In the biological field the series of successive 
phenomena in a race of animals is only an external evolution which 
does not alter or concern the permanent character of the race (hence, 
Comte was throughout an opponent of Lamarck's theory). In 
sociology we have to do with an actual transformation of the human 
race. This has been brought about through the changing vicissi- 
tudes of generations and the persisting cumulation of definite life 
processes which has been made possible thereby. The historical 
method is to return to general facts, and thus observation is to be 
guided by theory, so that historical investigation will yield only a 
construction based upon a philosophy of history. It was thus per- 
haps not quite in Comte's meaning, but nevertheless it was a con 
sequence of his teaching, when the effort was made here and thei» 

1 "Love for the principle, order for the basis, progress for the end." 

654 Philosophy of the Nineteenth öentury, [Part VIIo 

to raise history to the plane of a natural science. John Stuart Mill 
called attention to this in his methodology. Schopenhauer had 
denied to history the character of a science on the ground that it 
teaches only the particular and nothing of the universal. This 
defect seemed now to be remedied in that the effort was made to 
press forward beyond the description of particular events to the 
general facts. The most impressive attempt of this sort was made 
by Comte's English disciple, Thomas Buckle. In his History of 
Civilisation in England (1857), Buckle defined the task of historical 
science as that of seeking the natural laws of the life of a people. 
For this purpose Buckle found in those slow changes of the social 
conditions which are recorded in the statistical tables, much more 
usable and exact material than in the recital of particular events to 
which the old chronicle forms of historical writing had been limited. 

Here the proper sense of the antithesis is disclosed : on the one 
hand the life of the masses with the changes taking place conform- 
ably to general law — on the other hand the independent value of 
that which presents itself but once, and is determined within itself. 
In this respect the essence of the historical view of the world has 
been by no one so deeply apprehended, and so forcibly and warmly 
presented, as by Carlyle, who worked himself free from the phi- 
losophy of enlightenment by the assistance of the German idealism, 
and laboured unweariedly for the recognition of the archetypal and 
creative personalities of history, — for the comprehension and ven- 
eration of " heroes." 

In these two extremes are seen anew the great antitheses in the 
conception of the world which were already prevalent in the Renais- 
sance, but which had not at that time attained so clear and methodi- 
cal an expression. We distinguished in that period a historical 
century, and a century of natural science, in the sense that the new 
investigation of nature emerged from the conflict of traditions as 
the most valuable outcome (cf. Part IV.). From the victory of the 
methods and conceptions of natural science resulted the great meta- 
physical systems, and as their sequence the unhistorical mode of 
thought characteristic of the Enlightenment. In opposition to this 
the German philosophy set its historical view of the world. It is to 
be noted that the almost complete counterpart of this antithesis is 
found in the psychological realm in the antithesis between Intellec- 
tualism and Voluntarism. On this account the attempt which has 
been made during the last decade to introduce the so-called scien- 
tific ^ method into history, is not in accord with the development of 

1 [Naturwissenschaftliche. In English the term "science" is so commonly- 
used as the equivalent of "natural science" that the confusion objected to in 

§ 45.] Nature and History : Oarlyle^ Marx. 655 

psychology during our century. It is indeed not the great histo- 
rians who have fallen victims to this mistake, but here and there 
some who have either been too weak to stand against the watch- 
words of the day, or have made use of them for popular effect. In 
this so-called scientific^ treatment of historical structures or pro- 
cesses the misuse of comparisons and analogies is especially unde- 
sirable — as if it were a genuine insight to call society an organism ; ^ 
or as if the effect of one people upon another could be designated as 
endosmose and exosmose ! 

The introduction of natural-science modes of thought into history 
has not been limited to this postulate of method which seeks to as- 
certain the laws of the historical process ; it has also had an influ- 
ence upon the contents. At the time when Feuerbach's Materialism, 
which was a degenerate product of the Hegelian dialectic (cf. above, 
§ 44, 6), was yet in its vigour, Marx and Engels created socialism's 
materialistic philosophy of history, in which motives from Hegel and 
from Comte cross in peculiar manner. The meaning of history they 
too find in the " processes of social life." This collective life, how- 
ever, is essentially of an economic nature. The determining forces 
in all social conditions are the economic relations ; they form the 
ultimate motives for all activities. Their change and their develop- 
ment are the only conditioning forces for public life and politics, and 
likewise for science and religion. All the different activities of 
civilisation are thus only offshoots of the economic life, and all 
history should be economic history. 

6. If history has had to defend its autonomy against the destruction 
of the boundary lines which delimit it from the sciences, the natural 
science of the nineteenth century has conversely contained an emi- 
nently historical factor which has attained a commanding influence, viz. 
che evolutionary motive. In fact we find the natural science of to-day 
in its general theories, as well as in its particular investigations, de- 
termined by two great principles which apparently stand in opposition 
to each other, but which in truth reciprocally supplement each other, 
viz. the principle of the conservation of energy and that of evolution. 

The former has been found by Robert Mayer, Joule, and Helm- 
holtz to be the only form in which the axiom of causality can be used 
by the physical theory of to-day. The epistemological postidate that 
there is nothing new in nature, but that every following phenomenon 

the text is all the more likely to occur. Of course the author is objecting not to 
scientific methods, but to the assumption that the scientific method for natural 
science is the proper scientific method for history. ] 

2 [But cf. on this, Kant, Critique of Judgment, § ß5. Cf, also Lapie in Rev 
de Met. et de la Morale. May. 3 895.7 

656 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VEu 

is only a transformation of that wMch precedes, was formulated by 
Descartes as the law of the Conservation of Motion (cf. above, p. 411), 
by Leibniz as the law of Conservation of Force (p. 421), by Kant as 
that of the Conservation of Substance (pp. 545 f.). The discovery of 
the mechanical equivalent of heat, and the distinction between the 
concepts of kinetic and potential energy, made possible the formula- 
tion that the sum of energy in nature is quantitatively unchangeable, 
and only qualitatively changeable, and that in every material system 
which is regarded as complete or closed within itself, the spatial 
distribution and direction of the kinetic and potential energy at any 
time is absolutely determined by the law just stated. It is not to be 
overlooked that in this statement the exclusion of other than mate- 
rial forces from the explanation of nature is made still more sharply 
than with Descartes ; on the other hand, however, signs are already 
multiplying that a return to the dynamic conception of matter has 
been thereby introduced, such a conception as was demanded by 
Leibniz, Kant, and Schelling (cf. above, § 38, 7). 

7. The principle of evolution had many lines of preparation in 
modern thought. In philosophic form it had been projected by 
Leibniz and Schelling, although as a relation between concepts, and 
not as a process taking place in time (so with Aristotle ; cf . § 13) ; 
and among Schelling' s disciples it was Oken who began to regard the 
ascending of classes and species in the realm of organic life as a pro- 
cess in time. With the aid of comparative morphology, to which 
also Goethe's studies had contributed, Oken dared that " adventure " 
in the "archaeology of nature" of which Kant had spoken (p. 565). 
All organisms are regarded as variously formed "protoplasm" {Ur- 
schleim), and the higher have proceeded from the lower by an 
increasing multiplication of protoplasmic vesicles. At the same time 
(1809), in his Philosophie Zoölogique, Lamarck gave the first system- 
atic exposition of the theory of descent. He explained the relation- 
ship of organisms by descent from a common original form, and their 
differences, in part by the direct effect of environment, and in part 
by the indirect effect of environment which operates by calling for 
a greater use of some organs and a less use of others. This use 
modifies structures, and the modifications in structure are inherited. 
The variations in species which become stable were thus explained 
by the alternating influences of heredity and adaptation. To these 
factors of explanation Charles Darwin added the decisive factor of 
natural selection. Organisms tend to increase at a far higher rate 
than the available means of nutrition. Hence the struggle for exist- 
ence. Those plants or animals which vary in a direction that favours 
them in this struggle will survive. 

§ 45.] Nature and History : Darwin. 657 

The presuppositions of tlie theory, therefore, are the two princi- 
ples of heredity and variability; an additional element was the 
assumption of great periods of time for the accumulation of indefi- 
nitely small deviations, an assumption which was made possible by 
contemporaneous geological investigations. 

This biological hypothesis at once gained more general signifi- 
cance in that it promised a purely mechanical explanation of the 
adaptations or purposive elements which constitute the problems of 
organic life, and it was believed that thereby the necessity of the 
progress of nature to higher and higher forms had been understood. 
The " purposive " had been mechanically explained in the sense of 
that which is capable of survival — that is, of that which can main- 
tain and propagate itself — and it was supposed that the same 
explanation could be applied to everything else which appears pur- 
posive in other relations, especially to that which is purposive in a 
normative respect. So the theory of selection following Darwin's 
own suggestions was very soon applied on many sides to psychology, 
sociology, ethics, and history, and was pressed by zealous adherents 
as the only scientific method. Few were clear on the point that 
nature was thereby placed under a category of history, and that this 
category had experienced an essential change for such an applica- 
tion. For the evolutionary theory of natural science, including the 
theory of natural selection, can indeed explain alteration but not 
progress; it cannot give the rational ground for regarding the result 
of the development as a " higher," that is, a more valuable form, 

8. In its most universal extent the principle of evolution had 
already been proclaimed before Darwin by his countryman Herbert 
Spencer, and had been made the fundamental conception of the lat- 
ter's System of Synthetic Philosophy, in which many threads of 
English philosophy are brought together. He proceeds from agnos- 
ticism in so far as he declares the Absolute, the unconditioned, the 
Unitary Being, which he is also fain to call Force, to be unknowable. 
Eeligion and philosophy have laboured in vain to conceive this in 
definite ideas ; for us it is by the very nature of the case incapable 
of determination. Human knowledge is limited to an interpretation 
of phenomena, that is, to the manifestations of the Unknowable. 
Philosophy has only the task of generalising the results of the 
particular sciences, and putting these generalised results together 
into the simplest and most complete totality possible. 

The fundamental distinction in phenomena Spencer designates as 
that of the "vivid" and the "faint" manifestations of the Un- 
knowable, i.e. of impressions and ideas. This indicates an attach-, 
ment to Hume which is not fortunate (of. above, p. 453). From this 

658 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Pakt VIL 

starting-point, althougli Spencer rightly rejects the reproach of 
materialism, he yet introduces a turn in his view of the world which 
directs preeminent interest to the character of physical phenomena. 
For an examination of all the particular sciences is supposed to 
yield the result that the fundamental form in which the Absolute 
manifests itself is evolution. And by evolution Spencer under- 
stands — following a suggestion of the scientist, von Baer — the 
tendency of all natural structures to pass over from the homoge- 
neous to the heterogeneous. This active variation in which the 
ever-active force manifests itself consists in two processes, which in 
cooperation with each other constitute evolution, and which Spencer 
designates as differentiation and integration. On the one hand, by 
virtue of the plurality of effects which belong to every cause, the 
simple passes into a manifold; it differentiates and individualises 
itself; it divides and determines itself by virtue of the fulness of 
relations into which it enters. On the other hand, the thus sepa- 
rated individual phenomena come together again to form firm com- 
pounds and functional systems, and through these integrations new 
unities arise which are higher, richer, and more finely articulated 
than the original. So the animal organism is a higher imity than 
the cell ; society is a higher " individual " than a single man. 

This schema is now applied by Spencer to all material and spir- 
itual processes, and with tireless labour he has sought to enforce it 
in the case of the facts of all the particular sciences. Physics and 
chemistry are refractory; they stand under the law of the conser- 
vation of energy. But astrophysical theory shows the differentia- 
tion of the original gas into the suns and the peripheral structures 
of the planets with their satellites, and likewise the corresponding 
integration in the articulated and ordered system of motion which 
all these bodies maintain. It is, however, in biology and sociology 
that the system attains full unfolding. Life is regarded by Spencer 
as a progressive adaptation of inner to outer relations. From this 
the individualising growth of a single organism is explained, and 
from the necessary variations of the latter according to the method 
of the theory of selection is explained the alteration of species. 

Social life also in its whole historical course is nothing other than 
the progressive adaptation of man to his natural and plastic environ- 
ment. The perfecting which the race wins thereby rests upon the 
dying out of the unfit and upon the survival of the fit functions. 
From the standpoint of this doctrine Spencer seeks also to decide 
the old strife between rationalism and empiricism upon both the 
logical and ethical fields. As against the associational psychology 
lie admits that there are for the individual immediately evident 

§ 45.] Nature and Sidory : Spencer. 659 

principles, and truths which are innate in the sense that they cannot 
be explained by the experience of the individual. But the strength 
with which these judgments assert themselves so that consciousness 
finds it impossible to deny them, rests upon the fact that they are 
the intellectual and emotional habits acquired by the race, which 
have proved themselves to be adapted to further the race, and have 
maintained themselves on this ground. The a priori is everywhere 
an evolutionary product of heredity. So in particular for morals, 
everything in the form of intelligent feeling and modes of will sur- 
vives which is adapted to further the self-preservation and develop- 
ment of the individual, of society, and of the race. 

Finally every particular development reaches its natural end when 
a condition of equilibrium has been gained in which the inner rela- 
tions are everywhere completely adapted to the outer, so that the 
capacity for further articulation and variation has been exhausted. 
It is, therefore, only by external influence that such a system can be 
destroyed and disturbed, so that its individual parts may enter into 
new processes of eyolution. On the contrary Spencer strives against 
the assumption of the possibility that the whole universe, with all 
the particular systems which it contains, can ever come to a perfect 
and therefore permanent condition of equilibrium. He thus con- 
tradicts those investigators who have regarded as theoretically possi- 
ble such a distribution of energies as to exclude all alterations ; this 
is due ultimately to the fact that Spencer regards the Unknowable 
as the ever self-manifesting force, and regards evolution itself as 
the most universal law of the manifestation of the Unknowable. 

9. Taken all in all Spencer's development of the principle of 
evolution is throughout of a cosmological character, and in this is 
shown just the alteration in this controlling principle which is due 
to the prevalence of natural science in our century. This is seen 
most clearly by comparing Hegel and Spencer. With the former, 
evolution is the nature of the self -revealing spirit ; with the latter, 
it is the law of the successive manifestations of an unknowable 
force. To speak in Hegel's language (cf. p. 611), the subject has 
again become substance. In fact the Unknowable of Spencer 
resembles most that "indifference of real and ideal" which Schel- 
ling designated as the Absolute. This analogy would lead us to 
expect that the cosmological form of the principle of evolution will 
not be the final one, and that the historical standpoint and method, 
as the appropriate home of this principle, will give the permanent 
form which it will take in philosophy. In England itself, and still 
more in America, a decided turn toward Hegel is to be noticed since 
the impressive book of Hutchinson Stirling and Wallace's excellent 

660 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL 

introduction of Hegel's logic. In Germany, Kuno Fischer's exposi- 
tion of Hegel's doctrine, which is now just reaching completion, will 
dissipate prejudices which have hitherto stood in the way of its just 
valuation, and by stripping off the terminology which has become 
foreign to us, will cause this great system of evolution to appear in 
full clearness. 

The same tendency to win back the historical form for the thought 
of evolution is found in the logical and epistemological efforts which 
have as their goal what Dilthey has denoted with a fortunate expres- 
sion, a " critique of the historical reason." The aim is to break 
through that one-sidedness which has attached to logic since its 
Greek origins, and which prescribes as the goal and norm of logical 
laws in their formal aspect the relation of the universal to the par- 
ticular (cf. § 12), and for the content and material of those laws the 
knowledge of nature. Under these presuppositions stand not only 
the extreme of mathematical logic (cf. § 44, 4), but also the impor- 
tant works of John Stuart Mill and Stanley Jevons, which are to 
be characterised essentially as the logical theory of natural science. 
Over against this, the elaborations of logical science by Lotze and 
Sigwart, especially in the latter's second edition, show a much more 
universal stamp, and in connection with the movement of historical 
idealism which has its attachments to the Fichtean view of the world 
(cf. § 44, 6), a deeper comprehension of the logical forms of histori- 
cal science is on the way ; such, for example, as we find in Rickert's 
investigations regarding the limitations of the concepts of natural 

§ 46. The Problem of Values. 

While the end of the century finds us in the yet unadjusted strife 
between the historical and the natural-science standards, we see just 
in this continuation of an inherited antithesis how little the philoso- 
phy of this period has been able to win a real progress in its princi- 
ples. Its great and varied industry has been rather at the periphery, 
and in the work of adjusting relations with the special sciences, 
while the central development falls prey to a certain stagnation 
which must be simply put up with as a fact easily comprehensible 
historically. The exhaustion of metaphysical energy and the high 
tide of empirical interests give a completely satisfactory explana- 
tion. For this reason we can readily understand that the philoso- 
phy of the nineteenth century shows a rich development along the 
bounding provinces in which it comes in contact with the empirical 
disciplines, as in psychology, philosophy of nature, anthropology, 

1 H. Rickert, Grenzen del naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 1896. 

§ 46.] Problem of Values : Utilitarianism. 661 

philosophy of history, philosophy of law and philosophy of reli- 
gion, -while on the contrary it makes the impression of an eclectic 
and dependent attitude in the fundamental disciplines. Surely this 
is the inevitable consequence of the fact that it suffers from the 
repressive wealth of traditions which have attained complete histori- 
cal consciousness. It is in accord with this that no earlier time has 
seen such a luxuriant and fruitful growth in the study of the history 
of philosophy. But there is need of a new central reconstruction if 
philosophy is to meet in satisfactory manner the wants which in 
recent time come once more for satisfaction from the general con- 
sciousness and from the special sciences.^ 

The direction in which the solution of this problem is to be sought 
is determined on the one hand by the predominance of that volun- 
tarism which extends from psychology into general metaphysical 
theories (§ 44), and on the other by the circumstance that the two 
forms of the principle of evolution (§ 45), viz. the historical and 
that of natural science, are distinguished from each other by their 
different attitudes toward the determinations of value. In addition 
the mighty upward sweep in the conditions of life which Europeans 
have experienced in this century has worked at once destructively 
and constructively upon general convictions. Civilisation, caught in 
this movement of rapid enhancement and extension, is urged on by 
a deeper demand for comprehension of itself, and from the problem 
of civilisation which made its appearance in the Enlightenment (cf. 
§ 37) a movement has developed for which the " transformation and 
re-valuation of all values" (Umwertung aller Werthe) has become the 

1. The characteristic trait in this is that in the foreground of all 
ethical considerations the relation of the individual to society stands 

1 That the Catholic Church has sought to solve this problem by a revival oi 
Thomism is well known, and does not need to be further set forth here. Nor on 
this account do we need to cite the numerous Thomists (mostly Jesuits) in Italy, 
France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland. In theory they represent no new 
principles, but at most seek to build out the old doctrine in details so that it may 
appear in some manner adapted to modern knowledge, in particular to moder» 
science of nature. But the freer tendencies of Catholic philosophy, which are 
usually called Ontologism, have created nothing new and fruitful. They attach 
themselves for the most part to the Flatonism of Malebranche, and point back to 
Augustine, so that the antagonism which we noted in the Middle Ages and in the 
Renaissance is repeated again (cf. pp. 364, 416.) The finest presentation of 
Ontologism was found in the Italians, Rosmini and Gioberti ; the former gave 
it a sort of psychological basis; the latter a purely metaphysical form {Uente 
crea resistente). In Germany Günther introduced into it certain elements of 
the idealistic speculations, especially of Fichte's doctrine ; in France, Gratry 
from this standpoint combats especially the eclecticism of Cousin, and in this 
eclecticism he combats Hegelianism and the "pantheism" which he finds in 
both (cf. ^tude sur la Sophistique Contemporaine, lettre ä M. Vacherot, 
?aris, 1861). 

662 Phüoiophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII 

forth in much more conscious and explicit form than ever before, — 
whether in the positive form that the subordination of the individual 
to society is presented and grounded in some manner as the norm of 
all valuation, or whether it be in the negative form that the resist- 
ance of the individual to the oppressing weight of the species is 
praised and justified. 

The first form is that which has been transmitted from the phi- 
losophy of the Revolution and from Utilitarianism, especially in the 
stamp given to it by Bentham (cf. p. 522). This Utilitarianism goes 
through the popular literature of the century as a broad stream in 
which the standard of the public good is taken as a matter of course 
without deep analysis of its meaning. It is characterised for the 
most part by limiting its care '^ for the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number " to man's earthly welfare ^ the mental and spiritual 
goods are not indeed denied, but the measure of all valuation is 
found in the degree of pleasure or pain which a circumstance,, a 
relation, an act, or a disposition may call forth. Theoretically, this 
doctrine rests on the unfortunate inference of the associational psy- 
chology, that because every satisfied desire is accompanied with 
pleasni'e the expectation of the pleasure is, therefore, the ultimate 
motive of all willing, and every particular object is willed and valued 
only as means for gaining this pleasure. This formal eudsemonism 
was earlier forced either to regard the altruistic impulses as equally 
original with the egoistic, or to make them proceed from the egoistic 
through the experiences which the individual undergoes in social life. 
In contrast with this the noteworthy transformation which Utili- 
tarianism has experienced in recent time consists in its combination 
with the principle of evolution, as has already been mentioned in the 
case of Spencer's doctrine (cf. § 45, 8). The valuation of altruism 
from the standpoint of social ethics appears according ta this new 
point of view to be the result of the process of evolution, inasmuch as 
only those social groups have maintained themselves iu the struggle 
for existence whose individual members have achieved altruistic 
thought and action in a relatively high degree.^ The history of 
luorals is a struggle of values or "ideals," from which we may in 
part explain the relativity of historical systems of morals, and in 
part their converging development to a universal human ethics. 
These fundamental thoughts of evolutionary ethics have been car- 
ried out in many detailed expositions ; among their representatives 

^ Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution^ London, 1895, has attempted to determine 
the nature of religion sociologically by considering the part which ideas of the 
supernatural have played in this evolutionary process — a genuinely English 

§46.] Problem of Values : Bentham. 663 

may be mentioned, in Prance, Fonillee, in Germany, Paul Eee, whose 
evolutionary theory of conscience excited attention for a time, and 
G. H. Schneider, 

[Before passing to the continental representatives of Utilitarian- 
ism it will be instructive to consider more fully the changes which 
have been effected in British theories both within and without the 
so-called Utilitarian school.^ These changes affect the standard of 
value, the motives to which ethical appeal is made, and the relation 
which the individual is conceived to sustain to the social body ; their 
nature shows the influence of the close relation which ethical theory 
in England has always sustained to social and political conditions. 
During the century England has seen an almost continuous effort 
toward social and political reform. This movement has aimed at 
an extension of political privilege, and at making possible a higher 
standard of living for the less fortunate members of society. It has 
thus been democratic in so far as it has insisted upon the widest par- 
ticipation in the goods of civilisation ; but by emphasising not merely 
material comforts, but also political rights, social justice, and educa- 
tional opportunities, it has tended to measure human welfare, not so 
much in terms of feeling as in terms of " dignity " and fulness of 
life or "self-realisation." The movement along these two direc- 
fdons has been due in part to the influence of German idealism as 
transmitted through Coleridge, Carlyle, and later through Green and 
others, but the immanent forces of social progress have had a deci- 
sive influence in the same direction. 

As has been pointed out (pp. 513 f.), a general tendency of British 
theory has been to unite a social standard or criterion of moral value 
with an individualistic, and even egoistic theory of motives. This 
seemed the more possible to Bentham, because in the individualistic 
language of his day the community was defined as a " fictitious body 
composed of individual persons who are considered as constituting, 
as it were, its members." The interest of the community, then, " is 
the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." 
Hence it might seem that one way to promote the interest of the 
community would be for every man to seek his own interest. If, 
however, it should be necessary to bring pressure to bear upon the 
individual in order to keep him from interfering with the interests 
of others, Bentham conceived that the principal reliance should be 
placed upon what he called the four sanctions, which he specified 
as the physical, political, moral, and religious, meaning by these the 

1 The material from this point to the paragraph numbered " 2 " on p, 670 has 
been added by the translator. 

664 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII 

pleasures and pains derived from physical sources, from the penal- 
ties of law, from public opinion, or from belief in divine rewards and 
punishments. It is for pain and pleasure alone " to point out what 
we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do," and the 
ambiguity in the terms " pain " and " pleasure," according to which 
they mean in the one case pleasure or pain of the community, and in 
the other case pleasure or pain of the agent, permits Bentham to 
suppose that he is maintaining a consistent hedonistic theory. But 
there were two other important qualifications in this hedonistic and 
individualistic theory. In the first place he intimates that the indi- 
vidual may seek public pleasure as well as private,^ thus giving the 
theoretical statement of the principle which governed his own life, 
directed as it was toward the public interest. In the next place, the 
maxim which Bentham used to interpret the phrase, " greatest good 
of the greatest number," was, " everybody to count for one, nobody 
for more than one." This, while apparently a principle of extreme 
individualism, was really a recognition of individual rights, and was 
based upon fairness rather than upon a purely hedonistic standpoint. 
It is thus essentially a social principle, and a demand that the 
pleasure which " determines what we should do " shall be not merely 
a maximum, but a particular kind of pleasure, regulated not by con- 
siderations of quantity, but by principles of fairness and justice. A 
further inadequacy of Bentham's theory to account for Bentham's 
practice appears in his famous definition that in estimating pleasures 
and pains we must consider quantity only, — " push-pin is as good 
as poetry." But Bentham's own activity, if not primarily directed 
toward poetry, was at least as little directed toward push-pin for 
himself or for others. His whole life-work was given toward pro- 
moting legislative and social reform, toward securing rights and 
justice; and although he had little appreciation of certain of the 
finer values of art and culture, he was at least as little as his suc- 
cessor, Mill, to be explained by the hedonistic formula. 

The theoretical individualism of the hedonistic standard for meas- 
uring the values of human life and the motives for moral action 
found vigorous and successful opposition in the work of Coleridge 
and Carlyle. The former exerted his influence primarily in the 
religious field, and in special opposition to the theories of motive 
and obligation propounded by Paley (p. 514, above), which had wide 
currency in educational and religious circles. According to Paley, 
the only difference between prudence and duty is that in the one we 

- " pleasures seek, if private be thy end. If it be public," etc Ct 
J. Dewey, Study of Ethics. 

§46.] Problem of Values : Coleridge, Carlyle. 665 

consider the gain or loss in the present world ; in the other, we con-i 
sider also gain or loss in the world to come. Obligation, according td 
Paley, means to be urged by a violent motive, resulting from the 
command of another. Against these positions Coleridge urged that 
while man as a mere animal, or as a being endowed merely with 
" understanding," may know only motives which spring from the 
calculations of pleasures and pains, man as rational may hear another 
voice and respond to higher appeals. It is, in fact, in just this 
distinction that we find the difference between prudence and true 
morality. The written works of Coleridge were few and fragmen- 
tary, but his personal influence upon the literary, religious, and 
philosophical thought of his own and the succeeding period, in both 
Britain and America, has been powerful and far-reaching. 
• The criticism of Carlyle was directed against " Benthamism." Its 
individualism of motive seemed to Carlyle adapted to aggravate 
rather than to heal the disease of the age. The economic develop- 
ment had been steadily in the direction of greater individualism. It 
had substituted the wage-system for the older personal relation. 
What Carlyle felt to be needed was the deeper sense of social unity, 
a stronger feeling of responsibility. Now the pursuit of happiness 
-s essentially an individualising force, — "the man who goes about 
pothering and uproaring for his happiness, he is not the man that 
will help us to get our knaves and dastards arrested ; no, he is rather 
on the way to increase the number — by at least one unit." A true 
social organisation can be secured only if the individualistic and 
commercial theory of interests is abandoned. This leads at once to 
the other point of Carlyle's attack, — measurement of value in terms 
of pleasure and happiness. Instead of a " greatest happiness prin- 
ciple," a " greatest nobleness principle " must be substituted. Man 
cannot be satisfied with the results of attempts to give him pleasure 
if these aim simply at pleasure. " Man's unhappiness comes of his 
greatness ; it is because there is an infinite in him which he cannot 
quite bury under the finite. The shoe-black also has a soul quite 
other than his stomach, and would require for his permanent satis- 
faction and saturation Ood^s Infinite Universe." It is to the heroes 
that we must look for our ideals of human life. It is in work rather 
than in pleasure that the end of human life is to be achieved. 

It was in the thought of John Stuart Mill that the fusion of utili- 
tarian and idealistic principles found its most instructive illustration. 
The social philosophy of Comte and a personal character actuated by 
high ideals of duty and ardent for the promotion of public welfare 
conspired with the influences already named to secure this result. 
Educated by his father, James Mill, in the principles of associational 

666 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century [Part VH 

psychology, associated with Ricardo, the representative of an indi- 
vidualistic economic theory, and with Bentham, he inherited thus a 
theory of human nature and a method of analysis from which he 
never completely freed himself ; but on the other hand he introduced 
into the scheme a new content which led him to transcend the hedo- 
nistic position.^ First as regards the dbjed, of desire. It had been the 
position of the associationalists that the individual desires originally 
pleasure, and pleasure only. This is the only intrinsic good. It was 
held that other objects, however, might become associated with the 
individual's happiness, and thus become independent objects of 
desire. In this theory it would be the purpose of moral training so 
to associate the public good with the private good of the individual 
that he woiild come to desire the public welfare. Taught by his own 
experience that such external associations had no permanent motive 
power, Mill was led to reject this theory, and to state the hedonistic 
paradox that to find pleasm-e one must not consciously seek it. Of 
greater significance for our present purpose is Mill's theory of the 
motives to moral action. On the one hand he retains so much of 
the eighteenth century atomistic view of conduct as to affirm that " the 
motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though 
much with the morality of the agent." He still retains the doctrine 
of the external sanctions without stating explicitly that however 
useful these may be to control the non-moral or immoral, until other 
motives get a foothold, they are not moral motives. But on the 
other hand he lays far greater stress upon the " internal " sanctions 
of duty. This feeling of duty, in turn, though strengthened by edu- 
cation and association, has as its ultimate foundation the " social 
feelings of mankind." It is because man naturally " never conceives 
himself otherwise than as a member of a body '^ that the interest of 
the community is the interest of the individual. The principle of 
sympathy which had served alternately as a means of psychological 
analysis and as a term for the broader social impulse, was given its 
most important place as that on which rests " the possibility of any 
cultivation of goodness and nobleness and the hope of their ultimate 
entire ascendency." 

Finally, Mill transcends the hedonistic criterion of value. While 
maintaining that the mental pleasures are superior to the bodily 
pleasures on purely quantitative grounds, he asserts that, quite 
apart from questions of quantity, some kinds of pleasure are 
more desirable and valuable than others. The test for pleasure, 

1 In addition to the Utilitarianism, the Autobiography, the essay ^i Bentham 
and Coleridge and On Liberty are of special interest. 

§ 46.] Problem of Values : Milly Spencer. 667 

wketlier we seek to measure its iatensity or its quality, must in any 
case be subjective ; and the question as to which of two pleasures 
is the better must be decided by those who have had experience of 
both. Instead, therefore, of using pleasure as the standard for 
value, Mill, like Plato, would appeal to "experience and wisdom 
and reason" as judges. Instead of pleasure as standard, we have 
rather a standard for pleasure. If, then, we ask what these " com- 
petent judges " will assign as the highest values, we may find differ^ 
ent names, such as love of liberty and love of power, etc., but the 
most "appropriate appellation is the sense of dignity." "It is 
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better 
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." And in the fur, 
ther development of this principle of valuation Mill even goes 
beyond Carlyle's position by declaring that to do without happiness 
is now done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, and 
often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, who in 
sacrificing his own happiness for that of others displays the " high- 
est virtue which can be found in man." 

A similar conflict between hedonistic and other standards of value 
is evident in the ethical system of Herbert Spencer. On the one 
hand, following the tradition of a hedonistic psychology, Spencer 
maintains that life is good or bad according as it does or does not 
bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. The only alternative to this 
test is to reverse the hypothesis and suppose that pain is good and 
pleasure is bad. No other standard of value can be admitted. 
This position is fortified by the biological law that if creatures 
should find pleasure in what is hurtful, and pain in what is advan- 
tageous, they would soon cease to exist. On the other hand, Spen- 
cer propounds also a standard of value which does not easily 
conform to the test of pleasure and pain. According to this 
standard the highest conduct is that which conduces to " the great- 
est breadth, length, and completeness of life " ; the highest stage in 
evolution is that reached when "conduct simultaneously achieves 
the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men." 
The subjective standard of pleasurable feeling and the objective 
standard of fulness of life are thus set over against each other. The 
attempt is made to bring them together by showing that the bio- 
logical development has necessarily brought about a harmony 
between pleasure and progress, but on the other hand it is admitted 
that a condition of progress involves a lack of adaptation between 
the individual and the environment. It would therefore seem that, 
however well-suited pleasure might be as a test for the static indi- 
vidual, it cannot be regarded as a test of value for the guidance ol 

668 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VH 

a progressive being. Hence Spencer maintains that the perfect 
application of his test supposes an ideal humanity. A consistent 
hedonism would require that the test of such an ideal humanity 
be solely the continuity and intensity of pleasurable feeling 
attained, but the numerous recognitions of more objective fac- 
tors make it improbable that Spencer would regard merely sen- 
tient beings deprived of all active faculties as the highest type of 

The employment by Spencer of the principles of evolution as 
affording a moral standard leads to an interesting complication of 
the problems considered under § 45 with the problem of the indi^ 
vidual in relation to society. On the one hand, as already noted 
(p. 662), the social sentiments and related moral principles are 
regarded by Spencer as finding their basis in the evolutionary pro- 
cess. These social qualities subserve the welfare of the family or 
species, and aid it in the struggle for existence. On the other hand, 
it is maintained that the fundamental law of progress is that " each 
individual shall take the consequences of his own nature and 
actions : survival of the fittest being the result." Among gregarious 
creatures the freedom of each to act has to be restricted by the pro- 
vision that it shall not interfere with similar freedom on the part 
of others. Progress is therefore dependent upon giving the greatest 
possible scope to individual freedom. With Bentham and Mill the 
maxim ** everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one" 
had represented a socialising of the criterion and ideal. In Spen- 
cer's opinion this represents an undue emphasis upon equality; 
from this to communism the step is only one from theory to prac- 
tice. " Inequality is the primordial idea suggested " by evolution ; 
equality, as suggested in the need of restriction, is secondary. 
From this individualistic interpretation of evolution Spencer opposes 
not only communism in property, but the assumption by the State 
of any functions beyond that of securing " justice " to the indi- 
vidual. The State should keep the individual from interfering 
with the freedom of other individuals. The State is thus essentially 
negative in its significance. Man in his corporate capacity may not 
realise a positive moral value in the pursuit of common good. But 
while agreeing thus with the views of Gundling and von Humboldt 
(cf. p. 520), Spencer insists that, in denying the possibility of reach- 
ing positive values through the State, he aims to secure these values 
more efficiently by voluntary and private action. " Beneficence " 
belongs to the family virtues ; " justice " to the State.^ 

1 Cf. Ethics, Vol. II., The Man vs. the State, and Essays, Vol. III. 

§460 Prodlem of Values: Huxley^ Crreen. 669 

The relation of evolutionary processes to the problem of moral 
values has been most sharply formulated by Huxley.^ In opposi- 
tion to certain philosophical writers who find in the evolutionary 
process a moral standard, Huxley points out with great vigour and 
incisiveness the distinction between the " cosmic process " and 
the " ethical process." The attempt to find in the " cosmic pro- 
cess" an ethical standard is based upon the ambiguity in the 
phrase " survival of the fittest." Fittest, it is scarcely necessary to 
say, is not synonymous with ethically best. If the temperature 
of the earth should be reduced, the survival of the fittest would 
mean a return to lichens and diatoms. 

The ethical process must find its standard not in the cosmic pro- 
cess, but in the moral ideals of man. Its principle is not that of 
the survival of the fittest, but that of fitting as many as possible 
to survive. The duty of man is not to conform to the cosmic pro- 
cess, but to combat it. In a sense it may be admitted that the moral 
process is a part of the cosmic process, but the important point is 
that the moral process cannot take its standards from the non-moral 
parts of the cosmic process, and the theory of government which 
Spencer would derive from this is characterised by Huxley as 
"administrative nihilism." * 

The opposition to an ethical theory based upon the conceptions of 
natural science, has received its most thorough-going expression in 
the work of T. H. Green. Previous English sympathisers with 
German idealism had for the most part appropriated results 
without attempting for themselves the " labour of the notion." 
Believing that current theories of evolution and ethics were 
repeating the fallacies of Hume in another form, Green set himself 
the task of criticising those fallacies and of re-stating the conditions 
under which any experience, and especially any moral experience, 
is possible. The central, fundamental, and determining conception 
is found in self-consciousness. Questions as to freedom, desire, and 
ideals must be stated in terms of self-consciousness, and not in 
physical concepts, if they are to be intelligible. Nor can self- 
consciousness be explained in terms of the unconscious, or as 
developing from the unconscious. It seems rather to be compre- 
hensible only as the reproduction in man of an eternal conscious- 
ness. This has an important bearing on the determination of the 
moral ideal. In the first place it requires that the end or ideal 
shall always be some desirable state of self. In this it seems to 

1 In his Romanes lecture, 1803. Reprinted as Evolution and Ethics, 1894. 
Cf. J. Dewey, Evolution and Ethics, Monist, VUI. 321 ff. 

2 Critiques and Addresses. 

Stt l" h/ihsophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII 

approach hedonism, but whereas hedonism holds that pleasure makes 
a state or an object desirable, Green insists that the pleasure follows 
the attainment of desire, and that what a being desires is determined 
by the nature of the being. Man desires the full realisation of him- 
self, and " in it alone he can satisfy himself." The good is therefore 
a personal good. It is also a common or social good. " Without 
society, no persons." While therefore it may not be possible to 
state definitely the specific characteristics of the " best state of 
Tnan," history shows that man has bettered himself through insti- 
tutions and habits which make the welfare of all the welfare of 
each, and through the arts which make nature the friend of man." 
It is in political society that self-consciousness finds fullest develop- 
ment. The institutions of " civil life give reality to the capacities 
of will and reason and enable them to be really exercised." ^ 

The ultimate justification of all rights is that they serve a moral 
end in the sense that the powers secured in them are essential to the 
fulfilment of man's vocation as a moral being, i.e. as a being who in 
living for himself lives for other selves. With Green's definition 
may be compared Spencer's formulation of the ideal as " complete- 
ness of life." It is a striking illustration of the strong relation 
which British ethical theory has always maintained to British life, 
that two thinkers from such opposite standpoints should approach 
so near in actual statement. 

2. Turning now to continental theories, we note that] the con- 
ception of life which corresponds to this utilitarian social ethics is 
throughout an optimistic affirmation of the world. Life as an 
evolutionary process is the sum total of all goods, and the progress 
to the more perfect is the natural necessity of the actual world ; the 
strengthening and broadening of life is as well the moral law as the 
law of nature. This consequence has been carried out with the most 
refinement and warmth, and not without a religious turn by Guyau. 
He finds the highest meaning and enjoyment of individual existence 
in the conscious unity of life with society, and beyond this with the 

But even without the evolutionary supplement, naturalism and 
materialism had asserted their joyous optimism and directed it 
against eveiy kind of morals which avoids or renounces the world, 
especially against the religious forms of such ethical theories. This 
was shown already in the case of Feiierbach, who set for his philo- 
sophical activity the task of making man a " free, self-conscious 

1 These principles are further developed by B. Bosanquet, T%e Philosophical 
Theory of the State, 1899. 

1 46.] Problem of Values : Dühring. &I\ 

oitizen of the earth." * The -will is for him identical with the 
impulse to happiness, and happiness is nothing else than " life, 
normal, sound, without defect." Hence the impulse to happiness is 
the foundation of morals ; the goal, however, consists in the vital 
and active combination of the striving toward one's own happiness 
■with that toward the happiness of others. In this positive action of 
willing the welfare of others lies the root of sympathy also. Virtue 
stands in contradiction with only that form of happiness which seeks 
to be happy at the expense of others. On the other hand, virtue has 
a certain degree of happiness as its indispensable presupposition, for 
the pressure of want forces the impulse to happiness irresistibly 
and one-sidedly toward the egoistic side. Just on this account 
human morality can be furthered only by the improvement of man- 
kind's external situation — a thought from which Feuerbach proceeds 
to very far-reaching demands. His moral sensualism is supported 
by the firm conviction that historical development lies along the 
line of his postulates, and with all his pessimistic and often bitter 
estimate of the present he combines a strongly hopeful optimism for 
the future. Man, as a bodily personality, with his sensuous feeling 
and willing, is for him the sole truth ; when set over against this 
truth all philosophic theories, echoes as they are of theological 
theories, collapse into nothing. 

Another optimistic materialist is Eugen Diihring, who has made 
a peculiar " philosophy of reality " the basis of his estimation 
of the " worth of life." The anti-religious character of this kind of 
world-affirmation appears here much more clearly than in the case of 
Feuerbach. Diihring sees in the pessimism of the 60's and 70's, which 
he has opposed with bitter relentlessness, the romantic continuation 
of the attitudes of Christianity and Buddhism, which are hostile 
to the world. He regarded the " superstitious " ideas of the " other 
world," or the " beyond," as the real ground of the lack of apprecia- 
tion for the actual world of reality ; only when all superstitious 
belief in supernatural beings has been banished will the true and 
immanent worth of life be completely enjoyed, in his opinion. True 
knowledge apprehends reality exactly as it is, just as it lies imme- 
diately before human experience ; it is delusion to seek still another 
behind it. And even as -with knowledge, so also with values, they 
must be found in what is given ; the only rational is reality itself. 
Already in the conceptions of infinity Diihring detects — not so 
incorrectly — a going beyond what is given ; for him, therefore, the 

1 Cf. particularly the fragment published by K. Grün, L. Feuerbach in 
Seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass., 11. 253 ff., üa which Feuerbach declares hia 
position as against Schopenhauer. 

672 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VH 

actual world is limited in magnitude and number. But it bears 
within itself all the conditions of self-satisfying happiness. Even 
the view that there is a lack of sufficient means of life, on which 
Darwin grounded his doctrine of the struggle for existence and his 
theory of selection, is controverted by Dtlhring in a most vigorous 
fashion, although he is not hostile to the theory of descent and the 
principle of evolution. On the basis of these conceptions Dtlhring 
seeks to refute pessimism by demonstrating that man's enjoyment 
of life is spoiled only by the bad arrangements and customs which 
owe their origin to ideas of the supernatural. It is the mission of 
the philosophy of reality alone to produce healthy life from healthy 
thought, and to create the satisfaction of a disposition based on a 
noble humanity, capacities for which have been given by nature 
herself in the sympathetic affections. Although Dtlhring has de- 
claimed thus sharply and with irritation against the present social 
system, he has enlisted himself energetically in defence of the 
reasonableness of the actual world as a whole. As he has theoreti- 
cally maintained the identity of the forms of human perception and 
thought with the laws of reality, so he has also convinced himself 
that this same reality contains all the conditions for ultimately 
realising the values presented in the rational consciousness. For 
this rational consciousness of ours is in the last analysis nothing 
more than the highest form of the life of nature. 

3. All these kinds of positivistic optimism make the most instruc- 
tive variations in the Hegelian principle of the identity of the real 
and the rational (p. 615); all of them show besides a trace of that 
faith in the goodness of nature which was characteristic of Rousseau, 
and in their hope for a better future of the human race they incline 
to give an evolutionary stamp to the thought of man's unlimited 
capacity for perfection, which the philosophy of the French Revolu- 
tion had produced (cf. p. 525). All the more characteristic is it 
that the last factor has given an essentially altered form to the 
opposite conception, viz. pessimism. 

In themselves optimism and pessimism, as answers to the hedonic 
question, whether the world contains more pleasure or pain, are 
equally pathological phenomena. This is true especially in the form 
in which these enter as factors into general literature. For science 
this question is as unnecessary as it is incapable of answer. The 
controversy gains philosophic significance only because it is brought 
into connection with the question as to the rationality or irrationality 
of the world-ground, as it had already been brought by Leibniz along 
one line and by Schopenhauer along another. But in both cases it 
was completely impossible to make the hedonistic origin of the 

i 46.] Problem of Values : Hartmann. 67h 

problem disappear by the metaphysical transformation which was 
given to it. 

The pessimistic temper which prevailed in Germany in the first 
decade of the second half of our century had its easily recognisable 
grounds in political and social relations, and the eager reception and 
welcome of Schopenhauer's doctrines, supported by the brilliant 
qualities of the writer, are usually regarded as easily intelligible for 
that reason. It is more remarkable and serious that this temper has 
outlasted the year 1870, and indeed that precisely in the following 
decade it unburdened itself in an unlimited flood of tirades of a 
popular philosophical sort, and for a time has completely controlled 
general literature. Considered from the standpoint of the history of 
civilisation, this fact will be regarded as a manifestation of relaxation 
and surfeit ; the part which the history of philosophy has in the 
movement is connected with the brilliant and misleading "Philos- 
ophy of the unconscious." Eduard von Hartmann found a witty 
synthesis between Leibniz and Schopenhauer on the basis of his 
metaphysics, which regarded the world-ground as a complex resultant 
of the irrational will and of the " logical element" (cf. § 44, 9). This 
synthesis was that this world is indeed the best of all possible 
worlds, but nevertheless that it is still so bad that it would have 
been better if there had been none at all. The mixture of teleologi- 
cal and dysteleological views of nature which had passed by inheri- 
tance from Schelling to Schopenhauer (pp. 618 ff.) appears here with 
Hartmann in grotesque and fanciful development; and the contra- 
diction is to be solved by the theory that after the irrational will 
has once taken its false step of manifesting itself as life and actual 
existence, this life-process goes on in a progressive development 
whose ripest meaning is the insight into the unreason of the " will to 
live." The rational element in this life-process will then consist in 
denying that unreason, in retracing the act of world-origination, and 
in redeeming the will from its own unhappy realisation. 

On this account Hartmann found the essential nature of the 
*' rational " consciousness to lie in seeing through the " illusions " 
with which the irrational pressure of the will produces just what 
must make it unhappy, and out of this relation he developed the 
ethical task that each one should co-operate to save the world-will 
by the denial of illusions. He developed also the thought of funda- 
mental importance for the philosophy of history that all work of 
civilisation should be directed toward this goal of salvation. The 
development of the irrational will ought to have the annihilation of 
this will as its rational goal ; hence Hartmann approves all work of 
civilisation because its ultimate end is the annihilation of life and 

674 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part Vli 

the redemption of the will from the unhappiness of existence. In 
this respect he comes into contact with Mainländer, who with him 
and after him worked out Schopenhauer's theory to an ascetic " Phi- 
losophy of Salvation " ; but with Hartmann these thoughts take on 
the colouring of an evolutionary optimism which shows a much 
deeper intelligence for the earnestness and wealth of historic 
development than we find with Schopenhauer. And as von Hart- 
mann has anonymously given the best criticism of his '■' Philosophy 
of the Unconscious," from the standpoint of the theory of descent, 
so in his own development the shell of pessimism has been gradually 
stripped off and the positive principle of evolution has emerged as 
the essential thing. In him, too, Hegel has triumphed over Schopen- 

4. All these theories of life, whose typical extremes were here set 
over against each other, vary indeed with regard to their recognition 
and gradation of individual values and goals, but they coincide in 
recognising on the whole the prevailing moral code, and in particular 
the altruism which is its chief constituent. Their differences con- 
cern rather the general formulation, or the sanction, or the motive 
of morality, than morality itself. Even the more radical tendencies 
seek only to free human ethics from the perversions which it is said 
to have experienced in certain historical systems, or in their sur- 
vivals and their after effects ; and through all the doctrines already 
mentioned goes a strongly democratic tendency which sets the weal 
of the whole above everything else, and estimates the worth of the 
individual much lower than was the case in the great period of Ger- 
man philosophy. A tendency to hero-worship, like that of Carlyle 
(cf. p. 654), is quite isolated in our century; far more prevalent is 
the theory of the milieu or environment which Taine brought into 
circulation for the history of the mind, and which is inclined to 
minimise the part which the individual bears in the historical move- 
ment as contrasted with the influence of masses. 

We cannot fail to recognise that such theories correspond com- 
pletely to certain political, social, literary, and artistic conditions 
and obvious manifestations of modern life; hence it is easier to 
understand why, here and there, the reaction of individualism in 
an especially passionate form has made its appearance. We must 
insist, in the first place, that over against that type of assiduous 
striving which permits itself to be driven by every tide of influence, 
the individualistic idea of culture which belongs to that great period, 
now somewhat depreciatingly denoted Romanticism, has in no wise 
so completely died out as is supposed. It lives on in many highly 
developed personalities who do not find it necessary to make a dis» 

§ 46.] Problem of Values : Stirjier^ Bahnsen. 675 

play with it in literature; for the theory of this ideal has been 
expressed by Fichte, Schiller, and Schleiennacher. And just for 
this reason it does not make common cause with the artificial para- 
doxes which radical individualism loves to present on occasion. 

The most robust example of such paradoxes came from the He- 
gelian " left," in the fantastic book of M. Stirner (Kaspar Schmidt, 
1806-185(5), The Individual cuid his Property''- (1S4:4). Stirner is re- 
lated to Feuerbach as Feuerbach is to Hegel : he draws the conclu- 
sion which Avould completely invert the premises. Feuerbach had 
looked upon " spirit " or the " idea " as the " other-being of Na- 
ture,'* and as abstract and unreal as the theological ghost. He had 
declared the only reality to be man, living man of flesh and blood ; 
but his ethics aimed toward humanity, active love to humanity. 
What is mankind? asks Stirner. A general idea, an abstraction — 
a last shadow of the old ghost which is still walking, even in Feuer- 
bach's system. The true concrete reality is the individual — the 
autocratic personality. Such a personality makes its world both in 
its acts of ideation and in its acts of will ; therefore its ownership 
extends as far as its will extends. It recognises nothing above 
itself ; it knows no other weal than its own, and serves no alien law 
or alien will. For in truth there is nothing for it except itself. 
Thus by reversing Flehte's doctrine of the " universal ego," Stirner 
attains to " egoism " in both the theoretical and the practical sense 
of the word. He plays the " solipsist " ^ and preaches unscrupulous 
self-seeking, — Ich hab^ mein' Sach' auf nichts gestellt.^ All this 
sounded like an artificial cynicism, and it was a matter of doubt 
whether the book was intended to be taken seriously. At all events 
it soon lost the interest which it momentarily excited, and fell 
into an oblivion from which it has only recently been rescued. But 
when, as now, there is a disposition to see in it a first cry of distress 
from the individual repressed by the mass, it ought not to be ignored 
that the "individual" who was here seeking to emancipate himself 
from the community did not give any indication of a peculiar value 
which would have justified him in any such emancipation. His sole 
originality consisted in the courage of paradox. 

5. Another bizarre form of individualism was developed from 
Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, by Julius Bahnsen. Here 
the "unreason" of the will is taken with complete seriousness, but 
the pantheistic aspect of the " one only will " is stripped away. 

1 Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum. 

2 Cf. above, p. 471. ^ I care for nothing. 

* Beiträqe zur Charakterologie (1867); Der Widerspruch im Wissen und 
Wesen der Welt (1«81-1882). 

676 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII. 

We know only individuals who will, and Bahnsen sees in them the 
independent elementary potencies of reality, beyond which no higher 
principle is to be assumed. The separate and self-sufficient exist- 
ence of finite personalities, which Bahnsen also calls " Henads," has 
never been so sharply formulated as in this atheistic atomism of the 
will. Each of these '' wills " is, moreover, divided within itself into 
two, and in this consists its unreason and its unhappiness. This 
contradiction belongs to the essence of the will ; the will is the " as- 
serted contradiction,'' and this is the true dialectic, " the real dialec- 
tic." This contradiction, however, cannot be grasped by logical 
thinking; hence all the effort which the will makes to know the 
world is in vain. Logical thinking which excludes contradiction is 
incapable of understanding a world which consists of intrinsically 
contradictory wills. The contradiction between the world and the 
intellect makes impossible even the partial salvation which Schopen- 
hauer admitted,^ and the indestructible individual will must there- 
fore endure forever the suffering of self-laceration in ever new 
existences. At so high a price is the metaphysical dignity pur- 
chased, which personality here receives as its "intelligible charac- 
ter." The living out of this "intelligible character," purposeless 
and futile as it really is, forms the principle of all values. 

Since the theory of knowledge involved in this "real dialectic" 
maintains that logical thinking and reality with its contradictions 
have no common measure, the fantasies of this " miserableism " make 
no claim to scientific validity ; they are only the expression of the 
gloomy mood of the individual who is caught in the conflict of his 
own will. They form the melancholy counterpart to the pert frivol- 
ity of Stirner's individual. Both show what result may be expected 
if " philosophy " takes moods which constitute the peculiar nature 
of pessimism and optimism as a basis for serious conclusions. 

This is still more recognisable in the case of the great influence 
which has been exercised in the last decade upon the view of life 
and its literary expression by the poet, Friedrich Nietzsche. Many 
factors combine to form this influence : the fascinating beauty of 
language which ensnares and intoxicates even where the content 
passes over into enigmatic suggestions; a mysterious symbolism 
which, in " Thus spake Zarathustra," permits the author to revel in 
obscurity and indefiniteness ; the aphoristic form of expression 
which never requires the reader to think coherently in scientific 
terms, but rather leaves him to determine for himself how much 
stimulus and suggestion he will utilise, and thus decide the degree 

1 C£. p. 621. 

§ 46.] Problem of Values : Nietzsche. 677 

in which he will expect himself to enjoy the surprising hits, the brill- 
iant formulations, the happy comparisons, and paradoxical combi- 
nations. But all these elements are unimportant in comparison with 
the immediate impression of the personality of the writer. We meet 
an individual of the highest culture, and of a thoroughly original 
stamp, who experiences all the tendencies of the time, and suffers 
from the same unsolved contradictions by which the time itself is 
out of joint. Hence the echo which his language has found; 
hence the danger of his influence, which does not heal the sickness 
of his age, but increases it. 

The two factors of the inner antagonism of his own nature 
Nietzsche himself has called the "Dionysus" and the "Apollo." 
It is the antithesis between voluntarism and intellectualism, be- 
tween Schopenhauer's will and Hegel's idea. It appears here in 
an individual of the highest intellectual culture and aesthetic pro- 
ductiveness, who is able to apprehend history and life with the 
greatest delicacy and to reproduce them poetically with equal fine- 
ness of feeling. But science and art have not saved this individual 
from the dark " will to live " ; deep within stirs a passionate, com- 
pelling impulse toward wild deeds, toward the achieving and unfold- 
ing of power. His is the case of a nervous professor who would 
fain be a wild tyrant, and who is tossed back and forth between the 
quiet enjoyment of the goods of the highest culture on the one hand, 
and that mysterious, burning demand for a life of passion on the 
other. Now he luxuriates in serene blessedness of aesthetic contem- 
plation and artistic production; now he casts all this aside and 
asserts his impulses, his instincts, his passions. Sensual enjoyment, 
as such, has never been a value for him — this is shown in the 
height and purity of his nature. The enjoyment which he seeks is 
either that of knowing or that of power. In the struggle between 
the two he has been crushed — the victim of an age which is satisfied 
no longer by the impersonal and superpersonal values of intellec- 
tual, aesthetic, and moral culture, but thirsts again for the bound- 
less unfolding of the individual in a life of deeds. Caught in the 
struggle between its reason inherited from the past and its passion 
thirsting for the future, it and all of value that it possesses are torn 
and ground. The artistic expression of a nature thus rent and torn 
is the charm of Nietzsche's writings. 

In his first period, which contains the following in germ, the 
conflict between the two motive forces has not yet come to opea 
outbreak ; rather we find him applying Schopenhauer's fundamental 
thoughts to the origin of Greek tragedy and to Eichard Wagner's 
musical drama, and thus presenting art as the source of salva- 

6T8 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL 

tion from the torture of the will. But even at that time it was his 
thought that out of this tragic temper a new, a higher culture 
should be brought forth ; a prouder race should emerge, of bold and 
splendidly audacious will which would victoriously burst the bonds 
of the present intellectual and spiritual life, and even at that period 
this bent toward originality and independence threw overboard the 
ballast of the historic period. No condition and no authority is to 
repress this artistic civilisation ; aesthetic freedom is to be cramped 
neither by knowledge nor by life. 

It is not difficult to understand that when these thoughts began to 
clarify themselves the philosophic poet followed for a time along 
the path of intellectualism. Science is the free spirit which casts 
off all fetters and recognises nothing above itself; but she is such 
only when she makes the " real " man free, placing him on his own 
feet, independent of everything that is above the senses or apart 
from the senses. This science which Nietzsche would now make 
the bearer of the essence of culture is positive science, — no meta- 
physics, not even the metaphysics of the will ; hence he dedicates 
his book " for free spirits " to the memory of Voltaire, and while 
he had earlier turned Wagner from Feuerbach to Schopenhauer, 
now he himself goes the reverse way. He comes into agreement 
with the utilitarian ethics of Paul R^e; he believes in the possi- 
bility of the purely scientific culture. He even goes so far as to 
see in knowledge the highest and best aim of life. Knowledge is 
for him the true joy, and the whole freshness of delight in the joys 
of the world and of life which is found in Oewpta (contemplation) — 
an enjoyment of the present actual world which is at once sesthetic 
and theoretical — is the fundamental note of this period, the most 
fortunate period which was granted to him. 

Then the Dionysus element of passion came to expression as an 
Uncontrollable longing for strong, masterful, unsympathetic living 
out of personality, which throws down all that would stand in its 
path. The strongest impulse of man is the mZZ/o?-poioer. It is for 
him to assert this. But this unconditional assertion bursts the 
system of values in which our civilisation, up to this time, has 
enmeshed itself ; the new ideal is in this sense " beyond good and 
bad." ^ The will for power knows no bonds which prescribe what is 
"permitted"; for it, everything is good which springs from power 
and increases power ; everything is bad which springs from weak- 
ness and weakens power. So also in our judgments, in knowledge 

1 Jenseits von Gut und Böse, the title of one of Nietzsche's books, translated 
by A. Tille. 

§ 46.] Problem of Values : Mttzsche. 679 

and in conviction, the important thing is not whether they are 
" true," but whether they help us, whether they further our life and 
strengthen our mind. They have worth only if they make us strong. 
Hence, conviction also may and must change as life unfolds its 
changes (as was the case in part with Nietzsche himself). Man 
chooses what he needs ; the value of knowing also lies beyond true 
and false. Here begins, therefore, the overturning and re-valuation 
of all values {Umwerthung aller Werthe). Here the philosopher be- 
comes a reformer of morals, the legislator the creator of a new civili- 
sation. In the third period of his development Nietzsche was full 
of the consciousness of this task. 

From this standpoint he sets up the ideal of the over-man (Ueber- 
mensch) in contrast with the ordinary, everyday man of the com- 
mon herd. Will for power is will for mastery, and the most 
important mastery is that of man over man. Hegel once said that 
of all great things which the world's history shows, the greatest is 
the mastery of one free will over others. It recalls this saying 
when Nietzsche develops his new idea of civilisation from the 
antithesis between the " morals of masters " and " morals of slaves." 
All the brutality of trampling down those who may be in the way, 
all the unfettering of the primitive beast in human nature, appear 
here as the right and duty of the strong. The strong man unfolds 
and defends the energy of living as against the scantiness and 
meagreness of renunciation and humility. The morality of slaves, 
therefore, coincides essentially with the ascetic nature of the super- 
naturalism which Nietzsche had formerly combated, and the positive 
connection of the transition period with his third period consists in 
the " joyous " assertion of a world-conquering thirst for living. 

Nevertheless the ideal for the "over-man" remains veiled in 
poetic dimness and indefiniteness. According to the original ten- 
dency, the over-man is the great individuality which asserts its 
primitive rights over against the mass. The common herd of the 
" far too many " ( Viel-zu-Viele) exists only to the end that out of it as 
rare instances of fortune may rise the over-men. These, from century 
to century, recognize each other as bearers of all the meaning and 
worth that is to be found in all this confused driving of disordered 
forces. The genius is the end and aim of history, and it is in this 
that his right of mastery as over against the Philistine has its root. 
But according to another tendency the over-man appears as a higher 
type of the human race, who is to be bred and trained — as the 
strong race which enjoys its strength of mastery in the powerful 
unfolding of life, free from the restraints and self-disturbing ten- 
dencies of the slavish morality. In both cases Nietzsche's ideal of 

680 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Pakt VII 

the over-man is alike aristocratic and exclusive, and it is a sharp 
penalty for the poetic indefiniteness and symbolic ambiguity of his 
aphorisms that his combating of " slavish morality " and of its 
supernatural foundations has made him popular with just the very 
ones who would be the first to strike from the over-man the head by 
which he towers above the common herd of the " too many." 

Between the two lines along which the ideal of the over-man 
develops, the author has not come to a clear decision. Zarathustra 
mingles them together, with wavering lines of transition. It is clear 
that the one form is an echo of the romantic ideal of the genius as 
the other borrows from sociological evolution. But the thought 
of an elevation of the human type through the agency of philosophy 
reminds us of the postulates of German idealism. 

The remark is quite just that from this conception of the doctrine 
of the over-man the step to Fichte would not have been a long one. 
That Nietzsche could not take it was due to the fact that he had in 
his nature too much of Schlegel' s " genius," which treats all expe- 
riences from the standpoint of irony (p. 605). This made him unable 
to find his way back from the individual mind to the " universal 
ego " — to the conception of values which assert their validity over 

7. The revolt of boundless individualism culminates in the claim 
that all values are relative. Only the powerful will of the over-man 
persists as the absolute value, and sanctions every means which it 
brings into service. For the " higher " man there is no longer any 
form or standard, either logical or ethical. The arbitrary will of the 
over-man has superseded the "autonomy of reason" — this is the 
course from Kant to Nietzsche which the nineteenth century has 

Just this determines the problem of the future. Eelativism is 
the dismissal and death of philosophy. Philosophy can live only as 
the science of values which are universally valid. It will no longer 
force its way into the work of the particular sciences, where 
psychology also now belongs. Philosophy has neither the craving 
to know over again from her standpoint what the special sciences 
have already known from theirs, nor the desire to compile and 
patch together generalisations from the "more general results" 
of the separate disciplines. Philosophy has its own field and 
its own problem in those values of universal validity which are 
the organising principle for all the functions of culture and civili- 
sation and for all the particular values of life. But it will de- 
scribe and explain these values only that it may give an account 
of their validity ; it treats them not as facts but as norms. Hence 

§46.] The Problem of Values. 681 

it will have to develop its task as a " giving of laws " — not laws of 
arbitrary caprice which it dictates, but rather laws of the reason, 
which it discovers and comprehends. By following the path toward 
this goal it seems to be the aim of the present movement, divided 
within itself as it often is, to win back the important conquests of 
the great period of German philosophy. Since Lotze raised the con- 
ception of value to a place of prominence, and set it at the summit of 
logic and metaphysics as well as of ethics, many suggestions toward 
a "theory of values," as a new foundation science in philosophy, have 
arisen. It can do no harm if these move in part in the psychologi- 
cal and sociological realm, provided it is not forgotten that in estab- 
lishing facts and making genetic explanations we have only gained 
the material upon which philosophy itself must perform its task of 

But a no less valuable foundation for this central work is formed 
by the history of philosophy, which, as Hegel first recognised, must 
be regarded in this sense as an integrant part of philosophy itself. 
For it presents the process in which European humanity has 
embodied in scientific conceptions its view of the world and judg- 
ment of human life. 

In this process particular experiences have furnished the occasions, 
and special problems of knowledge have been the instrumentalities, 
through which step by step reflection has advanced to greater clear- 
ness and certainty respecting the ultimate values of culture and 
civilisation. In setting forth this process, therefore, the history of 
philosophy presents to our view the gradual attainment of clearness 
and certainty respecting those values whose universal validity forms 
the problem and field of philosophy itself. 


P. 348. To the lit., add : — 

W. Windelband, Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie, 2d ed. Vols. I. IL 1899 ,• 
H. Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy (Eng. tr. by B. Meyer, Lond. and 
N.y. 1900) ; K. Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton. 
2 vols., Hamburg, 1889-1890 [W. Graham, English Political Philosophy from 
Hobbes to Maine, Lond. and N.Y. 1900J. 

P. 352. To the lit., add : — 

"W. Dilthey, Aufassang und Analyse des Menschen in 15 and 16 Jahr. 
{Arch. /. Gesch. d. 'Philos., IV., V.). 

P. 356. Line 5, add : — 

H. Maier, M. als Philosoph (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., X., XL). 

P. 356. Line 22, from foot, insert : — 

The unsettled character of his life was in part due to his own character. He 
combined a proud flight of imaginative thought and an enthusiastic devotion to 
the new truth — especially to the Copernican system — for which he had to 
suffe'*, with unbridled passionateness, ambitious boastfulness and keen pleasure 
in agitation. On his Italian and Latin writings, cf. recently, F. Tocco (Florence, 
1889, and Naples, 1891) ; cf. also Dom Berti, G. B., sua Vita e sua Dottrine 
(Rome, 1889). 

P. 357. Line 3. To the notice of Campanella, add : — 

In him, too, we find learning, boldness of thought, and desire of innovation 
mingled with pedantry, fancifulness, superstition, and limitation. Cf. Chr. 
Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, I. (Freib. 1889). 

P. 362. Line 1. After « also," insert : — 

Popular Stoicism had a considerable number of adherents among 
the Renaissance writers on account of its mora) and religious doc- 
trines, which were independent of positive religion. 

P 367. Note 1. Add : — 

Indeed, the humanistic reaction favoured Stoicism directly as against the more 
medigeval Neo-Platonism. 

P. 378. To the lit., add : — 

W. Dilthey, Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften in 17 Jahrh. 
(Arch.f Gesch. d. Philos., V., VL, VII.). 

P. 379. Last line. To the notice of Galileo, add : — 

His quiet, unimpassioned advocacy of the investigation of nature, which had 
been newly achieved and given its conceptional formulation by hiuiseit', could 
not shield him from the attacks of the Inquisition. He purchased peace and the 
right to further investigation, which was all that he cared for, by extreme sub- 
jection. Cf. C. Prantl, Galileo und Kepler als Logiker (Munich, 1875). 

P. 380. Line 9. To lit. on L Newton, add : — 
F ß. Kosenberger, J N. und seine physikalischen Primnpien (Leips. 1895). 


684 A'p'pendix. 

P. 380. Line 18. To the lit. add : — 

E. Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung (Leips. 1883). H. Hertz, Die 
Frincipien der Mechanik, Introd., pp. 1-47 (Leips. 1894). 

P. 380. To the notice of Bacon, add : — 

The unfavourable aspects of his personal character, which had their origin in 
political rivalry, fall into the background in comparison with the insight which 
filled his life, that man's power, and especially his power over nature, lies only 
in scientific knowledge. In a grandiloquent fashion, which was in conformity 
with the custom of his time, he proclaimed it as the task of science to place 
nature with all her forces at the service of man and of the best development of 
social life. 

P. 380. To the notice of Descartes, add : — 

A complete edition of his works is appearing under the auspices of the Paris 
Academy. The main characteristics of his nature are found in the passion for 
knowledge, which turns aside from all outer goods of life, in his zeal for self- 
instruction, in his struggle against self-delusion, in his abhorrence of all public 
appearance and of the conflicts connected therewith, in the calm pre-eminence 
of the purely intellectual life, and in the complete earnestness which springs 
from sincerity. 

P. 381. To the notice of Spinoza, add : — 

In proud indepe